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ABSTRACT 
 
Robert Putnam’s 2007 empirical study, E Pluribus Unum, has 
become the seminal study in a growing body of work which uses 
statistical methods to measure the effects of ethnic diversity on social 
capital, or other measures of social quality. Putnam’s study found 
that ethnic diversity negatively affects social capital in the United 
States, leading people to withdraw from social contact and ‘hunker 
down’ at home, alone, miserably watching TV. This study revisits 
Putnam’s findings and seeks to plug two major gaps across this field: 
firstly, the absence of any frame of reference for social capital or 
other measures of social quality, which has led to both a narrowing of 
the commonly used indicators of social quality and a possible over-
stating of the relative importance to overall social quality of those 
indicators which are employed; and, secondly, the lack of any 
investigation into how relationships between ethnic diversity and 
social quality change over time.  
 
This study addresses two research questions: Do ethnic diversity and 
immigration have any effects on a range of indicators of social quality 
in local areas of England? Do any effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration on social quality change over time? The study analyses 
data from the Citizenship Survey and other sources to investigate 
whether the rapid increase and spread of ethnic diversity throughout 
England in the twenty year period from 1991 to 2011 had any 
measurable effects on indicators of social quality in local authority 
areas over the period 2001 to 2011.  
 
The study finds that ethnic diversity and immigration do have the 
negative effect on local trust identified by Putnam but that they also 
have positive effects on some social quality measures, and no effects 
on others. Broadly, these effects become more positive over time for 
measures of social cohesion and more negative for measures of 
social capital. The study demonstrates that the negative, positive and 
null effects of ethnic diversity are linked to differences in the measure 
of social quality; when individual-level, attitudinal, proximate 
measures of social quality are used, like local trust, negative findings 
are far more likely. The study concludes that ethnic diversity and 
immigration are not useful explanations for variance in social quality; 
levels of deprivation and higher-education more strongly account for 
this. It would be worthwhile to further develop a robust framework for 
quantitative studies of social quality and to improve methodologies 
for measuring social quality relationships over time. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis revisits Robert Putnam’s seminal paper, E Pluribus Unum 
(2007) to test his finding that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on 
social capital. This thesis presents an original, empirical study which 
uses secondary analysis of quantitative data to compare any effects 
of ethnic diversity on the social quality of local areas in England over 
a ten-year period, from 2001 to 2011. The study addresses the 
question explored by Putnam and others by asking whether 
increasing ethnic diversity in local areas is affecting the social quality 
within those areas, and breaks new ground by further considering 
how any such effects change over time.   
 
1.1 Originality in this thesis  
 
This thesis makes an original contribution to the field of study which 
uses quantitative methods to investigate the effects of ethnic diversity 
and immigration on social capital, social cohesion, social trust or 
other aspects of the social quality of life in modern, Western 
societies. The best known work in this field is Robert Putnam’s study 
of the relationship between ethnic diversity and social capital in the 
United States (US). Putnam found that neighbourhoods with greater 
ethnic diversity have lower levels of social capital and concluded that 
living in areas of increased ethnic diversity causes people to ‘hunker 
down…like turtles’, avoiding contact with their neighbours and 
retreating from associational life (Putnam, 2007, p149). In response 
to Putnam’s study, a growing body of research has tested whether 
these findings hold true in the US (for example, Stolle et al, 2008; 
Uslaner, 2011), in the UK  (in works by, for example, Twigg et al, 
2010; Sturgis at al, 2010; Laurence, 2011; Schmid et al, 2014), and 
elsewhere in the world (including studies in Australia by Wickes et al, 
2001, in the Netherlands by Gijsberts et al, 2011; and in Canada by 
Pendakur and Mata, 2012). In similar vein, this study takes Putnam’s 
findings as the starting point and seeks to contribute new material to 
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this area of investigation. Specifically, this study addresses two areas 
not yet examined by research in this field. 
 
Firstly, this study examines the possible effects from ethnic diversity 
and immigration on a broad range of social quality indicators. As I will 
discuss in detail in Chapter Four, it is my contention that studies in 
this field tend to focus on one or two aspects of social quality; social 
capital, social cohesion and social trust are the most common but 
others include national identity, civic engagement, life satisfaction, 
integration and inter-racial attitudes. None of these studies attempt to 
locate these aspects of social quality within a wider framework of 
what constitutes social quality in modern, Western societies. The 
studies proffer social capital (or some other aspect of social quality) 
as a measure of social ‘well off-ness’ which is untethered to any 
theoretical or conceptual explanation of where these measures fit 
with other elements of social well-being. Each study offers a slice of 
social quality (many offer the same slice) but do not give any sense 
of how big or important that slice is within the overall social quality 
cake. If ethnic diversity has a negative effect on social capital, for 
example, should we think of social capital as being a large or small 
part of the bigger social quality whole? Surely we need to know this 
to work out how much the negative effect matters in the overall 
scheme of things. In the absence of any wider social quality 
framework, Putnam’s study, and others in this field, can be read, and 
have been interpreted, as studies of wider social well off-ness. This 
study seeks to lodge the exploration of ethnic diversity effects within 
a theoretical framework of social quality. In so doing, the study is 
able to examine the effects of ethnic diversity on a broader range of 
social quality outcomes than is common in this field.  
 
Secondly, this study looks at whether any effects of ethnic diversity 
and immigration on social quality indicators change over time. This 
element of the research is entirely original; none of the published 
work in this field has looked at whether the effects of ethnic diversity 
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and immigration are fixed or whether, as seems more likely, they are 
dynamic and changing. Again, Chapter Four will present a detailed 
examination of this issue. The conclusions of Putnam’s and other 
studies in this field are based on analysis of cross-sectional data 
which represents only one point in time. But social factors and the 
relationships between them change over time and some factors, like 
immigration and ethnic diversity, have changed particularly rapidly in 
recent times. Indeed, it is the increase in ethnic diversity which 
motivates these studies. Without factoring a temporal element into 
the analysis, the research is unable to address questions about 
where these relationships are heading. If Putnam’s thesis is correct 
and ethnic diversity and immigration have damaging effects on social 
quality, do these effects worsen or dissipate over time as ethnic 
diversity and immigration increase? This study examines whether the 
growth and diffusion of ethnic diversity and immigration across 
England in the late 20th and early 21st century had any effects, or had 
any changing effects on indicators of social quality. 
 
This thesis might also be considered original in its synthesis of 
epistemological approaches which conventionally underpin separate, 
or even divergent research strategies. This thesis presents a 
quantitative study which uses the deductive logic, methods and 
reporting conventions of positivist empirical enquiry. But this is 
framed by discussion of the meanings of critical concepts used within 
the research, drawing on an interpretivist perspective to consider 
how these concepts are constructed and how the study itself is made 
possible through the social processes that give rise to these shared 
meanings.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The areas of originality described above are framed in the research 
questions which guide the empirical study presented in Part Two of 
this thesis. This thesis addresses two primary research questions: 
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1. Do ethnic diversity and immigration have any effects on a range 
of indicators of social quality in local areas of England? 
 
2. Do any effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality change over time? 
 
1.3 Terminology   
 
It seems helpful to explain at the outset some key points about the 
terminology employed in this thesis. These concepts and their 
contexts are more fully explored in later chapters. But for now, a 
quick explanation of ‘social quality’ and my use of ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’ will clarify their usage, at least until the fuller explanations 
are arrived at. 
 
Social quality 
 
The term ‘social quality’ is not commonly used in the literature on this 
subject and so needs defining from the outset. The concept of ‘social 
quality’ was introduced in the late 1990s to debates about the 
European Union (EU) by people concerned that the European project 
had become focused on the pursuit of economic growth to the 
exclusion and possibly at the expense of sufficient regard for social 
issues.  As developed in this context of incorporating a stronger 
social dimension within the European policy agenda, ‘social quality’ is 
defined as ‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the 
social and economic life of their communities under conditions which 
enhance their well-being and individual potential’ (Beck et al, 1997, 
p3).  
 
For this study, the value of the term ‘social quality’ is that it 
encompasses multiple dimensions of social life, offering a broader 
framework for social relations than either ‘social cohesion’ or ‘social 
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capital’, the terms which are widely used in the literature in this field. 
Moreover, social quality helps avoid the problems thrown up by the 
inconsistent use and contested meanings of social cohesion and 
social capital. Throughout this thesis, ‘social quality’ is used to cover 
the multiple dimensions of social life, or social relations, or social 
outcomes that research in this field seeks to measure in relation to 
ethnic diversity and immigration, including social cohesion, social 
capital, community cohesion, and social trust.  
 
Race and ethnicity 
 
The terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are variously defined and widely 
contested. The terms are not used inter-changeably in this thesis, but 
the difference between them is in their historic usage rather than in 
the meanings they convey. The term ‘race’ is used when discussing 
the theoretical and research work which took place at a time when 
‘race’ was the conventional term. ‘Ethnicity’ has largely replaced 
‘race’ in both social research and everyday life and my study follows 
suit. The precise meanings of associated terminology, including 
ethnic diversity, ethnic minority and visible ethnic minority, are given 
in the methods section in Chapter Five. 
 
1.4 The Putnam studies 
 
Robert Putnam’s 2007 paper, E Pluribus Unum, sits at the heart of a 
growing body of work which uses quantitative methods to investigate 
the effects of ethnic diversity on aspects of social quality in 
contemporary Western societies. This thesis responds to the group 
of published studies which share Putnam’s research question and 
methodological approach. Throughout this thesis I call these ‘the 
Putnam studies’. The Putnam studies are presented and discussed 
in detail in Chapter Four. But it is helpful to know before then which 
works I am labelling as ‘Putnam studies’ and on what basis I have 
grouped these together.   
16 
 
 
The Putnam studies referenced in this thesis comprise 30 published 
papers, summarised in Table i. These studies share the following 
characteristics: 
 A focus on the effects of a minority population defined by race, 
ethnicity or immigrant-status; 
 A focus on a social quality outcome, or a set of social quality 
outcomes, on which the effects of the minority population are 
measured; 
 A focus on Western societies, predominantly the US and the UK, 
but studies have also been carried out in Canada, Australia and 
other parts of western Europe; 
 The use of large scale national surveys and national censuses as 
the primary data sources; 
 The use of regression analysis as the main analytic method, 
where the minority population is represented by an independent 
variable and a social quality outcome is the dependent variable; 
 A comparison of the effects of the minority population within a 
boundaried geographic area, most commonly at the lowest 
measurable spatial level, such as ‘neighbourhood’, although 
some studies compare effects between countries;  
 Almost always, a multi-level modelling approach to distinguish 
between the area-level effects of the minority population and any 
effects on the social quality outcome from individual variables 
such as age, education and ethnicity.  
 
The list in Table i is neither definitive nor exhaustive. Post-Putnam 
studies are regularly being published and there are many more pre-
Putnam studies (Putnam says there are ‘hundreds’ (2007, p144)) 
which I have not unearthed. The aim here is not to provide a 
comprehensive guide to the work in this field, but to demonstrate 
what is included within the immediate context for my own research, 
as presented in Part One of this thesis. 
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Table i: The Putnam studies: summary 
 
Author Year of 
pub 
Country  Author Year of 
pub 
Country 
Taylor 1998 US Letki 2008 UK   
Alesina and 
Ferrara 
2000 US Stolle et al 2008 US and 
Canada 
Glaeser et al 2000 US Andrews 2009 UK   
Oliver and 
Wong 
2003 US 
 
Twigg et al 2010 UK   
Costa and Kahn 2003 US Fieldhouse and 
Cutts  
2010 UK & US 
Duffy 2004 UK Sturgis et al 2010 UK   
Pennant 2005 UK   Wickes et al 2011 Australia  
Flore 2005 UK Laurence 2011 UK 
Coffe and Geys 2006 Belgium  Gijsberts et al 2011 Netherlands 
Dixon 2006 US Uslaner 2011 UK and US 
Leigh 2006 Australia Pendakur and 
Mata 
2012 Canada 
Anderson and 
Paskeviciute 
2006 Worldwide Saggar et al 2012 UK 
Putnam 2007 US   Laurence 2014 UK 
Gesthuizen et al 2008 Europe Sturgis et al 2014 UK 
Laurence and 
Heath 
2008 UK    Schmid et al 2014 UK 
 
 
1.5 Why should Putnam be revisited? 
 
The starting point for this study is my disquiet about Putnam’s 
findings and their citation as evidence in support of anti-diversity and 
anti-immigration agendas. I find it difficult to accept that Putnam is 
correct. It makes no sense to me that increasing immigration and 
ethnic diversity can be a cause of declining social quality in Western 
societies.  
 
I grew up in a small town in central England which was then almost 
entirely ethnically homogeneous.  Ethnic minorities were a rarity. 
More than 30 years on, I can remember the names of every ethnic 
minority child in my secondary school; there were only three. In 
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contrast, I have spent my adult life living and working in some of 
London’s most ethnically diverse districts, including Hackney, 
Brixton, Peckham, Tower Hamlets, Southall and Tooting.  My own 
children have grown up amidst this ethnic diversity, attending multi-
ethnic schools and colleges.  Through my personal experience of 
living in a multi-ethnic family and my professional experience of 
working in ethnically diverse communities I have only ever seen the 
positive contributions that immigrants and ethnic diversity make to 
British society, not least of which is London’s reputation as one of the 
most dynamic, creative and cosmopolitan cities in the world. I have 
seen ethnic homogeneity and ethnic heterogeneity close up, and I 
simply do not recognise Putnam’s contention that people in ethnically 
diverse areas ‘hunker down’ and avoid associating with each other.  
 
To reconsider what Putnam found and the conclusions he drew from 
this, I developed a study based on the approach used by Putnam, 
and others, to look at whether there is a measurable relationship 
between ethnic diversity and various aspects of social quality. When I 
began this research, in early 2010, my reasons for revisiting 
Putnam’s study were strong ones: there had been relatively few 
studies which tested Putnam’s findings for the UK; the body of work 
in this field, from both the US and the UK, was inconclusive as to 
whether ethnic diversity and immigration have damaging effects on 
social quality; there were some clear gaps in the research designs 
which a study like mine could plug. Since then, a proliferation of new 
studies in this field, including many from the UK, have revisited, 
updated and moved on from Putnam’s work. With every new 
publication it has been tempting to adopt the methodologies or 
measures of more recent studies in order to stay ahead, or even just 
abreast of, the rapid developments in this field.  
 
However, six years on, the reasons for going back to Putnam’s study 
as the starting point for this work are perhaps even more compelling 
than they were in 2010. Putnam’s study was by no means the first to 
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test the effects of diversity on measures of social quality and many 
more have done this since. Yet it is Putnam’s study which is best 
known and most frequently cited. As I will show in Chapter Four, 
some studies, including in the UK, have now found that ethnic 
diversity does not damage social quality. But Putnam’s negative 
finding prevails. His study provides the empirical basis for evidence 
that ethnic diversity or immigration are having damaging effects on 
UK society, as used, for example, by Goodhart (2013), Collier (2013) 
and West (2013). Unless a strong consensus to the contrary can be 
established, it seems likely that Putnam’s findings and conclusions 
will continue to inform polemic and, more worryingly, policy. It 
remains important to revisit Putnam on this basis. 
 
Equally compellingly for this study, the post-Putnam work has tended 
to focus on just one of his findings; the negative effect of ethnic 
diversity on social trust. Putnam gives greater focus to this finding 
than to others in his paper because, he explains, ‘the most 
impressive and substantial patterns we have so far discovered 
involve trust of various sorts’ (2007, p149). In responses to Putnam’s 
findings the trend is towards a similar focus on trust (for example, 
Twigg et al, 2010; Laurence, 2011; Uslaner, 2011; Pendakur and 
Mata, 2012; Sturgis et al, 2014). As a consequence, while studies in 
this field have moved on from Putnam in the methods used to 
measure the effects of ethnic diversity on social trust, most of 
Putnam’s other indicators of social quality have been left behind. 
Putnam measured ‘social capital’ through a rather loose set of 
indicators including confidence in local government and local leaders, 
voter registration, feeling able to influence one’s local area, interest 
and knowledge of politics, working together on community projects, 
giving to charity, feeling happy and watching television. Few of these 
indicators have been included in the post-Putnam studies and the 
scope of the social quality outcomes has become increasingly 
narrow. This study seeks to move away from this focus on trust as 
the measure of social well-being by enlarging the conceptualisation 
20 
 
of social quality. This enlargement enables both a wider range of 
social quality indicators than has become usual in this field, and 
provides a frame of reference for understanding the relative value of 
each indicator within the overall world of social quality.  
 
Finally, in terms of reasons to revisit Putnam, the growing body of 
work in this field has not yet addressed, far less closed the yawning 
gap in understanding how any relationship between ethnic diversity 
and social quality changes over time. Despite presenting his own 
conclusions as challenges for the future of modern societies, 
Putnam’s findings about the negative effects of ethnic diversity tell us 
nothing about what the future of those effects will be. Do these 
negative effects increase or decrease over time? We just don’t know.  
 
1.6 Immigration or ethnic diversity 
 
Putnam’s study examines the effects of both ethnic diversity and 
immigration on social capital. But far more studies look only at ethnic 
diversity. Only one of the UK studies listed in Table i examines the 
effects of immigration (Saggar et al, 2012) and no UK study looks at 
both ethnic diversity and immigration effects. The relative lack of 
empirical investigation of immigration effects on social quality in the 
UK has been noted by Demivera (2015). 
 
This study investigates the effects of both ethnic diversity and 
immigration. But the conceptual and theoretical frameworks which 
underpin the study are rooted in ethnicity as distinct from, and rather 
than, immigration. I want to briefly explain the reasons why. 
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration are interwoven. Questions of who 
belongs have been fundamental to the creation of modern nations, 
and ethnic or racial identities have been a core part of this process. 
Arguably, nation states can be divided between those based on 
shared ethnicity, the ties of blood and ancestry, and those which are, 
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rather, bound together by common rights and commitments (Geertz, 
1994; Smith, 1991). Immigration has been integral to nation building; 
the US is commonly characterised as a ‘nation of immigrants’. 
Immigration is also integral to the determination of citizenship, 
borders and entry; the processes of deciding who can enter the 
nation and how long they may stay (Castles et al, 2014).  
 
For Britain, and other Western states, immigration is bound up with 
notions of racial or ethnic difference. Immigration produces ‘ethnic 
minorities’, but only for immigrant groups that are perceived as 
ethnically ‘other’ than the national majority; not all immigrants 
become minorities (Castles and Davidson, 2000).  Ethnicity is an 
underlying principle in defining who can be part of, and who should 
be kept out of, the nation state. This ‘inclusion/exclusion dialectic’ is 
seen by many as an inherent feature of the modern nation state 
where one of the main targets of exclusion is the ‘ethnic other’ or 
‘ethnic minorities’, who have arrived through migration (Giddens 
1994; Castles 2000; Bauman 2004). Ethnicity is always central to 
issues of migration.   
 
Across the Putnam studies there is greater focus on the social effects 
of ethnic diversity than of immigration, particularly in the UK studies. 
The UK studies in particular tend not to distinguish between what 
may be the differing effects of ethnic difference and new arrivals. The 
distinction is more usual elsewhere, with studies looking at differing 
effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social quality in the US 
(Costa & Kahn, 2003) and Australia (Leigh, 2006). Putnam’s study 
tests the effects of both ethnic diversity and immigration but his 
reporting is focused on the ethnic diversity findings and little attention 
is paid to how these effects differ from those of immigration.  
 
This focus on ethnic diversity over immigration may well be a 
consequence of measuring the pattern of relations at fixed points in 
time, rather than as a process which takes place over time. When 
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considered temporally, there is greater imperative to factor in 
immigration, as this is the process which creates ethnic diversity. 
This study introduces immigration into the analysis in this context; as 
one element in the process of change over time. The possibility of 
separate, or different effects from ethnic diversity and immigration is 
an interesting avenue, and one which is explored, but which does not 
constitute one of the primary research questions of this study. The 
focus here is on post-settlement effects rather than migratory 
processes. For this reason, although the inter-twining relationship 
between ethnic diversity and immigration is a constant theme, the 
contextual basis for this research study lies in the concepts and 
theories of ethnicity rather than of migration.  
 
1.7 The social effects of ethnic diversity and immigration 
 
Few subjects excite as much political, policy and academic attention 
as the effects of immigration and ethnic diversity on Western 
societies. The reasons for this have deep and complex historical 
roots. Chapter Three will examine how the social effects of ethnic 
diversity and immigration have been studied through history, and 
how evidence of these has been used in policy and public debates. 
The main themes of these debates are touched on here.       
 
In Britain, as with other nations that characterise themselves as net 
receivers of people from other parts of the world, immigration is 
never far from the top of the political agenda and is almost always 
presented in negative terms. There is not enough room for more 
immigrants; we cannot afford to house/educate/provide health 
services for immigrants; immigrants don’t share our 
language/culture/values. These familiar themes in the British 
discourse on immigration have appeared for centuries; for as long as 
immigrants have been arriving in Britain (Winder, 2004). While there 
is continuity in these themes, the language of the debate is ever 
changing. The words ‘foreigners’ and ‘coloureds’, very familiar to me 
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in the 1970s, are no longer widely used. The current lexicon includes 
migrants, new arrivals, refugees, asylum seekers, displaced people, 
as well as trafficked, unaccompanied and undocumented migrants. 
After some years in retreat, the term ‘immigrant’ has reappeared in 
mainstream discussion where, as in the 1970s, it tends to denote 
something or somebody problematic. 
 
From the late 1940s, even as Britain was seeking to meet labour 
shortages by encouraging immigration from the colonies, the 
legislative direction has largely been towards restricting immigration 
(Goulbourne, 1998). In more or less overt ways, immigration 
restrictions have been tied to concerns about ethnicity and the need 
to limit entry to Britain from people who are ethnically ‘different’ from 
the majority, white British population (Mason, 2000). This has 
become more complex in recent years, with enlargement of the EU to 
include eastern European member states. It is now argued that the 
Labour government’s downfall in 2010 resulted from its under-
estimation of the social impacts of the inflow of eastern European 
migrants to Britain, or of the popular perception of these social 
impacts (Watt and Wintour, 2015). The Brexit vote is seen by some 
as the backlash from people whose jobs, incomes and public 
services were undermined by this immigration influx (Travis, 2016).  
 
In the last few decades, the debate about immigration has had to 
accommodate the consequences of immigrant settlement in the form 
of a growing population of people born in the countries that their 
parents migrated to, creating second generation migrants. As second 
generations have produced third, fourth and later generations, the 
resulting population has become ‘ethnic minority’, ‘minority ethnic’, or 
a plethora of associated acronyms; BME (black and minority ethnic), 
BAME (black, Asian and minority ethnic), BAMER (black, Asian, 
minority ethnic and refugee). And so the immigration debate about 
whether, or how to stop more people from some parts of the world 
from coming to live here, is now conducted in parallel with multiple 
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debates about how to manage the results of previous generations of 
immigration. In some places these debates are about understanding 
and addressing inequality (why do ethnic minorities have poorer 
education and employment outcomes?), in other quarters they are 
about managing community relations (are ethnic groups living 
segregated lives in British cities?). Then there are debates about 
loyalty (are some ethnic minority communities harbouring or even 
encouraging terrorist threats?), about national identity (is ethnic 
diversity eroding our core national values and threatening our sense 
of national self?), and about privileging (has multiculturalism put the 
needs of ethnic minorities above those of the majority?).   
 
In Britain, the policy responses to the growth of an indigenous but 
ethnically ‘different’ population have changed over the decades and 
with the prevailing ideologies of successive governments. The focus 
on race relations of the 1960s and 1970s gave way to an emphasis 
on cultural plurality or multiculturalism in the 1980s, moving to race 
equality objectives and legislation in the late 1990s, which were 
enlarged into an ‘equality and diversity’ agenda in the 2000s, and into 
the 2010s with a growing focus on tackling perceived ethnic 
segregation by encouraging or requiring integration. Within this 
changing policy landscape, a liberal, progressive embrace of ethnic 
diversity has seen peaks and troughs. Between the so-called liberal 
hour of the late 1960s (Goulbourne, 1998) and the progressive 
legislation of the 2000 Race Relations Amendment Act, lie a great 
deal of resentment, hostility and organised campaigning against 
ethnic diversity.  
 
The late 1990s perhaps mark a high point in policy acknowledgement 
of racism and discrimination, rather than ethnic identities or cultural 
traditions, as the key factor determining the different, often poorer, 
experiences and outcomes for Britain’s ethnic minority communities. 
The chain of events which began with the murder of Stephen 
Lawrence in 1993 and culminated in the 2000 Race Relations 
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Amendment Act, saw an evolving commitment from the government 
and state institutions, including the police and local authorities, to 
take responsibility for tackling racism. The 2000s saw a gradual 
rowing back from race equality as a policy goal, replaced by a 
broader and, arguably, shallower, diversity agenda which refused to 
‘privilege’ ethnic minorities. Within the new equality and diversity 
agenda all groups with ‘protected characteristics’, from ethnicity to 
disability to sexual orientation, are included, with ‘equality for all’ 
rather for any particular group as the policy goal (HM Government, 
2010).  
 
The immigration and ethnic diversity debates overlap at many points, 
including in a particular discourse on ‘silencing’. It has been claimed 
that Putnam found his findings so discomforting that he delayed 
publishing them for five years in the hope of discovering evidence to 
weigh against them (West, 2013). West believes that Putnam was 
silenced by the forces which have supressed reasoned debate on the 
merits or otherwise of immigration and diversity.  West is just one of 
many contributors to a strident discourse on ‘silencing’ which has 
been a long-standing feature within immigration debates. The claim 
is that any discussion of immigration and diversity has been silenced 
by the forces of liberal, left, progressive, political correctness, 
squeezing out the voices of reasoned discussion. A stream of 
published commentators claim to have been silenced for questioning 
whether immigration and diversity are wholly positive features of 
British life (see, for example, Browne, 2002; Goodhart, 2013). 
Putnam himself warns that ‘politically correct progressivism’ could 
‘deny the reality’ of the ‘challenge…posed by diversity’ (2007, p165). 
The silencing of reasonable debate about immigration became a 
defining vignette of the 2010 general election campaign when 
Gordon Brown described a woman complaining about eastern 
European migration as ‘bigoted’. His throwaway remark became 
emblematic of the heavy handed silencing of ordinary people by a 
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government which was vilified as ‘out of touch’ with the public’s 
concerns about immigration (Watt and Wintour, 2015).  
 
Immigration and ethnic diversity overlap and intersect with concerns 
about social quality which are focused on impacts within defined 
geographic spaces.  The spatial levels have varied over time but the 
constant is a focus on the interplay of ethnic relations and social 
quality within distinct geographic areas. From Enoch Powell’s 1968 
‘rivers of blood’ speech, with its emotive portrait of the last white 
woman living in a once ‘respectable street in Wolverhampton’ 
(Powell, 2007), much of the public debate of the last 50 years has 
been about how immigration and ethnic diversity impact on local 
services and in local areas.  From the late 1960s, the spatial focus of 
this debate was the ‘inner-city’. ‘Inner-city’ became a byword for 
urban decline and the target for government intervention through 
large scale inner-city renewal programmes of the 1970s and 1980s. 
The ‘inner-city’ was where immigrant and ethnic minority populations 
lived and the site of ‘racial tensions’ which exploded in the 1980s 
riots in Brixton and Tottenham. From the late 1980s, the spatial focus 
narrowed from the ‘inner-city’ to ‘estates’, reflected in government 
initiatives such as the Estate Action programme, before broadening 
slightly in the 1990s to a focus on ‘neighbourhoods’. In the late 1990s 
and 2000s, under the Labour government, the ‘neighbourhood’ 
represented the geographic level at which social quality was 
assessed, ethnic diversity measured, and strategies developed for 
‘neighbourhood renewal’ (James and Evans, 2008). Since 2010, 
under successive Conservative-led governments, the 
‘neighbourhood’ as a unit of policy and of analysis has given way to 
the more blurred ‘locality’ and a vision of ‘localism’ as a new 
approach to local self-determination in public services (Department 
for Communities and Local Government, 2016). 
 
Immigration and ethnic diversity overlap and once again share the 
same conceptual and discursive space as social quality within a 
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narrative of decline that runs through all these debates. Putnam’s E 
Pluribus Unum paper is part of his larger, highly influential body of 
work on the decline of social capital in modern societies (Putnam et 
al 1993; Putnam 2000 & 2002). Immigration and ethnic diversity do 
not feature in Putnam’s early work on social capital but begin to play 
an increasingly prominent and causal role from the early 2000s (see 
the conclusions in Putnam, 2002). Hallberg and Lund (2005) note 
that ethnic diversity as a cause of declining social capital became an 
increasingly central theme in Putnam’s public lectures and ‘private 
seminars’, including for Tony Blair, at around this time.  
 
Separate to its use as an explanation for social decline, ethnicity has 
its own discourse of decline; the decline of racial purity through inter-
ethnic breeding. Concerns about racial decline were the motivation 
for early statisticians, like Francis Galton and Karl Pearson, to 
develop quantitative methods for the identification of racial difference 
(Painter, 2010). Painter (2010) demonstrates how, from its inception, 
the science of statistics has played a pivotal role in defining and 
defending hierarchies of racial difference. If this is correct, the 
statistical methods used by Putnam, and in this study, are built on the 
work of pioneering statisticians seeking to prove racial superiority 
and prevent racial decline.  
 
Increasing immigration and ethnic diversity  
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration in the UK have increased in recent 
decades. It is not straightforward to determine exactly how much they 
have increased as the numbers, particularly on immigration, are 
contested. While there is reasonably reliable information about how 
many people come to live in Britain the data about how many leave is 
much poorer, leaving plenty of ground for argument about levels of 
net migration (Dorling, 2011). Nor is the collection of ethnicity data 
without complications. Evolving ideas about what ethnic identity 
means and how it should be defined, in part reflected in the changing 
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ethnic group categories in the UK census, restrict the comparability 
of ethnicity data over time (Jivraj, 2012). However, we know that 
between 1991 and 2011 the proportion of people who categorised 
themselves as ethnic minorities in the census returns more than 
trebled, from about 6% to 20% of the national population. Over the 
same period, the proportion of the population of England which was 
born outside the UK nearly doubled, from around 8% to 14%. We 
also know that ethnic diversity and immigration spread 
geographically over this period, so that more local areas across the 
UK became more ethnically heterogeneous. 
 
The increase and diffusion of ethnic diversity and immigration over 
this 20-year period offers a unique opportunity to examine their 
effects across both spatial and temporal dimensions. As in other 
Putnam studies, we can look at what happens when ethnic diversity 
and immigration differ from place to place, by comparing more and 
less diverse spatial areas. Unlike the Putnam studies, we can also 
look at what happens over time as all areas become more ethnically 
diverse and have higher immigrant populations, as has happened 
throughout England. Additionally, by examining data from 1991 to 
2011, we can consider whether the rate at which ethnic diversity and 
immigration increased in this period has had any effects on social 
quality. 
 
Ethnicity as difference 
 
In his discussion of what Putnam’s findings mean for immigration and 
multiculturalism in the UK, Collier posits that the social 
consequences might well be worse, as the ‘cultural gap’ between the 
immigrant and indigenous populations looks smaller in the US than in 
the UK (2013, p76). He means, I think, that immigrants to Britain are 
more ‘different’ from the people who already live here and that this 
greater degree of difference is a bigger problem.    
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The notion of difference underpins the theoretical framework within 
which studies of ethnic diversity effects are conducted. These 
theories (which will be presented in detail in Chapter Two), contact or 
conflict, pluralism or assimilation, are grounded in notions of 
difference. More precisely, in the construction and categorisation of 
difference. The dimensions of these differences are multiple; they 
variously refer to nationality, culture, religion, race or ethnicity, 
between majority and minority groups, immigrant and indigenous 
groups, recent arrivals and settled communities, host and incoming 
groups. As will be discussed in Chapters Three and Four, there is 
much empirical work in this field that is concerned with quantifying 
these differences and with using quantified difference to explain or 
predict variations in social attitudes or behaviours.   
 
The concept and language of difference saturates the media, policy 
and public debates on immigration and diversity. From prime 
ministerial speeches about the ‘swamping’ of British culture 
(Margaret Thatcher in 1978) or the ‘swarming’ of migrant hordes 
(David Cameron in 2015) through more nuanced debates on whether 
risk-pooling welfare states can be sustained as homogenous 
societies become heterogeneous (in, for example, Banting et al, 
2006). Everything rests on the fundamental concept of difference. 
 
Chapter Two will examine how ethnic difference has played a central 
role in the history of social categorisation; in the ways in which 
societies have organised populations into groups for social or 
economic reasons, or for management and administrative purposes. 
Slave classifications, census categories and ethnic monitoring forms 
are all part of this on-going history of defining and categorising 
groups by ethnic difference. In a parallel historical development, 
ethnic difference has played a prominent role in the history of 
statistics, with breakthroughs in modern statistics resulting from the 
work of pioneers seeking to quantify differences between racial 
groups. The histories of ethnic difference as a mechanism for 
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categorising populations and the statistical analysis of those 
populations meet in the early 20th century, in statistical studies of 
ethnic difference. This interest has endured and flourished through to 
the present day.   
 
Ethnicity as ideological cover 
 
Writing in 1948, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, the political 
theorist Hannah Arendt argued that the interpretation of history as a 
‘natural fight of races’ was one of the few ideologies to survive the 
‘hard competitive struggle for persuasion’ (2004, p211). Arendt’s 
contention was that race conflict provides an ideological weapon in 
the pursuit of other, primary, objectives; totalitarianism in the case of 
the Nazis, imperialism for the 19th century Boers in South Africa.  
 
Race conflict is a powerful and persuasive explanation for many 
events. Patrick Brogan’s review of 92 armed conflicts which took 
place worldwide from 1945 to 1989 concludes that ‘the engine that 
powers most of the wars in today’s world is ethnic hostility’ (quoted in 
Banton, 2000b, p481). Williams (1994) outlines a sociology of ethnic 
conflict which identifies the ethnic group conditions that give rise to 
wars and genocides. The Baltic state wars and the Rwandan 
genocide of the 1990s are defined as ethnic conflicts (Petersen, 
2002). On a less deadly scale, events in Britain which have been 
cast as ethnic conflicts include the Notting Hill riot in the 1950s, the 
Brixton and Tottenham riots of the 1980s (Panayi, 1996) , and the 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham riots in 2001 (Cantle, 2001).  
 
None of the Putnam studies suggest that ethnic violence is an 
outcome of increased ethnic diversity. Yet, the conceptual and 
theoretical frameworks that underpin these studies are the same as 
those that explain ethnically-driven wars and genocides. As I will 
explore in Chapter Two, they are rooted in the same ideas of ethnic 
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difference, of ethnic groups in conflict, and of ethnic group conflict as 
a competitive struggle for power or resources. 
 
Arendt’s argument is that race conflicts are not really about racial 
conflict. Rather, that the ideology of racial conflict provides cover for 
states seeking to assert or preserve power, or for power groups 
seeking to establish states. Arendt’s view of race conflict as an 
ideological cover for expansions in state power suggests that, in 
seeking to understand the origins of conflicts, ‘race’ is not the 
answer. The same contention is applied to the study of ethnic 
relations by Robert Miles (1993), Kenan Malik (1996) and others who 
similarly argue that ‘race’ is not the right explanation. Further, that 
using ‘race’ as an analytic category not only fails to explain the 
problem but perpetuates difference and precludes the possibility of 
equality (Malik, 1996). In current debate on the EU referendum, 
journalists like Owen Jones argue that framing social grievances 
through the prism of immigration, and its concomitant ethnic diversity, 
obscures the real problems of economic insecurity and rising 
inequality (Jones, 2016). 
 
So what does this mean for a study that is focused on ethnic 
difference as a possible explanation for differences in social quality?  
Arendt’s view would be that a focus on ethnic diversity is misplaced. 
That other factors such as deprivation and inequality may better 
explain differences in social quality, but that ethnicity provides a 
persuasive explanation that fits readily into established ways of 
understanding the social world. It might mean that using constructs of 
ethnic difference as if they were fact is fundamentally misguided. 
This study itself may be contributing to the continuing reification of 
ethnicity; strengthening racial and ethnic differences by treating them 
as meaningful, measurable and real. Ultimately, it might mean that 
my research questions are wrong. That the question should not be 
‘What are the social effects of ethnic diversity?’, but rather ‘Why is 
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ethnic difference being rolled out to explain social quality?’ or ‘What 
struggles for power might a focus on ethnic difference be masking?’.      
 
To study or not to study ethnic difference has been a philosophical 
dilemma for this study from the outset. At an early stage I decided 
that rather than rejecting any focus on ethnic difference, it was 
important to follow in Putnam’s footsteps by engaging with his 
analytical approach, but to do this in full recognition of how we have 
arrived at our understanding of what ethnic difference means and 
how we categorise and measure this. This is the approach adopted 
and presented in this thesis.  Whether this approach has worked, 
both in terms of revisiting Putnam’s findings and in resolving this 
fundamental philosophical dilemma, will be considered in my 
concluding chapters.  
 
1.8 The structure of this thesis 
 
This thesis is presented in three parts. Part One looks at the context 
within which my empirical study takes place. I present this context in 
three chapters which flesh out the themes touched on in this 
introduction. Chapter Two maps out the foundations which underpin 
our understanding of differences in ethnicity as properties which can 
be categorised. It explores the historical development of the 
techniques we now use to measure the size and impact of these 
categorised differences. The chapter reviews the theoretical 
approaches which have been developed to explain the social effects 
of this form of categorised difference. The chapter closes with a 
consideration of whether it is possible to get ‘beyond race’. Chapter 
Three explores the historic and contemporary debates on 
immigration and ethnic diversity to consider why the social effects of 
ethnic diversity are of interest to researchers. The chapter highlights 
empirical studies which have shaped these debates and helped pave 
the way for the Putnam studies with their specific focus on the causal 
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effects of ethnic diversity on social quality within distinct geographic 
areas. Chapter Four presents the Putnam studies. The chapter 
considers what is learned from the Putnam studies, whether there 
are differences in findings from the pre- and post-Putnam studies, 
and from the US and UK Putnam studies. Critiques of the Putnam 
study approach are reviewed. The chapter closes with my 
assessment of gaps in the Putnam studies and how these can be 
addressed in my own study.  
 
Part Two of this thesis presents the methodology and findings from 
my empirical research. Chapter Five explains the study methodology, 
including how the data were selected and collected, what methods of 
data analysis are used, and how the outputs from data modelling are 
interpreted.  Chapter Six looks at what the data used for this study 
tell us about how ethnic diversity, immigration and social quality 
changed in Britain from 1991 to 2011. Similar analyses of change 
over this period, particularly in ethnic diversity and immigration, have 
been undertaken by other researchers, and this chapter presents the 
findings of these where appropriate. The results of my own data 
analysis are presented in Chapter Seven with a discussion of these 
findings in Chapter Eight.  
 
The third and final part of this thesis presents the conclusions. 
Chapter Nine considers what conclusions can be drawn from the 
study findings. It answers the central research questions: Do ethnic 
diversity and immigration have any effects on a range of indicators of 
social quality in local areas of England? Do any effects from ethnic 
diversity and immigration on social quality change over time? In the 
final chapter, I reflect on what this study may contribute to our shared 
understanding of the effects of ethnic diversity on social quality and 
whether my philosophical dilemma of whether to study ethnic 
difference at all has been resolved.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF ETHNIC 
RELATIONS 
 
2.1 Underpinning concepts 
 
The Putnam studies rest on the fundamental belief that ‘ethnicity’ is a 
quantifiable social property. That is, that distinct ethnic groups can be 
identified and that measuring populations by these groupings is both 
possible and meaningful. The reality and the measurability of 
ethnicity are the basic building blocks of the Putnam studies. But how 
did this happen? Where does this underpinning concept of ‘ethnicity’ 
come from? How is ‘ethnicity’ not only a measurable social feature, 
but perhaps uniquely, one which has inspired and driven 
advancements in the social science of measurement? Does 
everyone agree that ‘ethnicity’ can and should be measured?  
 
The idea of race 
 
The story of how ‘race’ became the basis of an enduring system for 
categorising humans into groups has often been told.  When English 
voyagers first arrived in Africa in the 1550s they found skin colour to 
be one of the most salient differences between themselves and the 
African people.  And when the English explorers described Africans 
as ‘black’ they were using a term already loaded with intense 
meanings pertaining to dirt, darkness, malignancy and evil. As 
English, and other European traders began to appropriate and exploit 
the resources of Africa in the 16th century, including, most profitably, 
its people, the difference between ‘white’ Englishmen and ‘black’ 
Africans was seen as a natural inequality. Black people were viewed 
as cursed by God; descendants of Canaan whose skin was black as 
a punishment for the sins of his father, Ham, who looked upon the 
nakedness of his own father, Noah. The God-given basis for racial 
difference was evoked by those profiting from the slave trade, and 
informed the racist discourse of the slave owners in the Caribbean 
38 
 
and American plantations. ‘Plantocracy racism’ justified slavery by 
the view that Africans were of a different, degenerate species, suited 
to work like beasts and to be treated as such (Banton, 1977, 2000a, 
2004; Fryer, 1984; Jordan, 2000).  
 
Over the course of the 18th century, as the Enlightenment saw the 
triumph of science over religion, the old beliefs in God-given 
differences gave rise to new, scientific explanations of racial 
difference. Michael Banton charts the emergence of the concept of 
race to denote types of people from the mid-18th century work of the 
Swedish naturalist Carl Linneaus on botanical classification. 
Linneaus’ work was developed in the late-18th century by Georges 
Cuvier to encompass humans, paving the way for the ‘racial 
typologists’ of the 19th century (Banton, 1977). Prominent amongst 
the founders of ‘racial typology’ were Robert Knox, a Scottish doctor 
who published The Races of Men: A Fragment in 1855; Joseph 
Arthur de Gobineau, the French aristocrat who published his Essay 
on the Inequality of Races in 1855; and Josiah Nott, an American 
doctor who translated and published Gobineau’s Essay, with 
considerable embellishment, as The Moral and Intellectual Diversity 
of Races in 1856. 
 
Painter (2010) charts the same historical developments as Banton, 
but roots these in the Western European search for proof that 
whiteness was the ideal form of human beauty, and so dates the 
development of modern racial thinking from the work of the art 
historian, Johann Wincklemann, who was murdered in 1768.  
Wincklemann championed an ideology of ancient Greek beauty, 
promoting the aesthetic of whiteness as the beauty ideal which, 
Painter argues, laid the ground for the scientific search for 
physiognomic differences to prove the superiority of the white or 
Caucasian facial or skull type (Painter, 2010). Painter’s history of 
scientific racism catches up with Banton’s in the 19th century, in the 
work of Knox, Gobineau, Nott and other proponents of racial 
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hierarchies. Painter differs from Banton in emphasising how 
respected and influential these thinkers were. These were not fringe 
ideas, but works from the mainstream of Western European and 
American intellectual society. 
 
Scientific racism reached the pinnacle of its influence in the 
eugenicist policies of Nazi Germany, when the logic of racial thinking 
was implemented to catastrophic effect. The aftermath of the 
Holocaust marks a shift in racial thinking, away from the now 
discredited science of racial hierarchy. Malik (1996) describes this 
pivotal movement when racial discourse was reformulated, arguing 
that the concept of race was transposed from the biological to the 
cultural as the main explanatory framework. Painter (2010) and 
Roediger (2008) follow the progress of racial thinking into 20th 
century America and its robust survival within the age of modern 
liberalism and mass democracy. While the meaning of race in 20th 
and 21st century societies is still a live debate, there is no question 
that the concept of race has endured. 
 
While Banton, Painter and others have mapped the ‘idea of race’ 
through history, Robert Moore highlights that the main feature of this 
idea is ‘its malleability, enabling it to be reworked over the centuries.’ 
(Moore, 2014, p1408). This malleability has seen the idea of race 
survive several historical shifts in language and culture. In 20th 
century Britain, the language of ‘colour’ was overtaken by the idiom 
of race, Banton pinpoints this very precisely as happening in 1954 
(Banton, 2014), to be superseded by the emergence of ‘ethnic’ as a 
separate term. Following a lengthy period of academic reflection on 
the difference between the two, ethnicity has all but replaced race in 
21st century British discourse, although race and ethnicity retain 
separate meanings in the US. 
 
Throughout the changes in terminology, discourse and theories, we 
are, at root, talking about the same thing. That is, the persistent belief 
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that all people have characteristics which they share with others, and 
on the basis of these characteristics we consider ourselves or others 
as belonging to groups that are more or less recognisable as groups 
by everyone else. The nature of these characteristics has always 
been contested, and the dominant view has changed over the 
centuries through a series of Foucauldian epistemes; from the God-
given, to the biologically determined, to the socially constructed or 
culturally ascribed.  
 
In the current episteme, the social constructionist view of race is 
almost universally accepted. We believe that race is an idea which 
originated in modern Western thought, has been universally adopted, 
is deeply embedded and has proved remarkably adaptable to 
changing political and ideological viewpoints. There are dissenters. 
Mallon (2012) for example, argues that recognition of racial 
difference is a fundamental feature of all human societies, including 
those which are untouched by the emergence of racial thinking in 
European-American cultures. Such views, arguably, reach back to 
the biological determinism of the previous episteme. The greater 
challenge, discussed later in this chapter, is whether racial thinking 
can move forward, beyond the current episteme, to a place where 
race no longer carries any social meaning. 
 
Categorising by race 
 
Allport asserts that ‘the human mind must think with the aid of 
categories….Once formed, categories are the basis for normal 
prejudgement. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living 
depends on it.’ (1958, p19). The concept of race has demonstrated 
its adaptability to survive through epistemic shifts in knowledge and 
beliefs. Through these same shifts, the deployment of race within 
systems of categorisation has proved similarly persistent. 
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Historians and sociologists have shown how Western philosophers 
and scientists created the concept of race as a way of classifying 
humans, and Western travellers, colonialists and imperialists 
exported this concept to the rest of the world (Banton, 1977; Outram, 
2005).  There has never been any neutrality about the concept of 
race. From the outset, racial classifications, developed by Western 
theorists, have been shaped by Western values which have seen 
other races as ‘different’ and usually as ‘inferior’ to the Western 
(white) race.  Edward Said links the development of racial 
classification in 19th century Western thought with the Western view 
of Orientals as ‘backward, degenerate, uncivilized and retarded’ 
(Said, 1985, p206). Race and racial difference are embedded in the 
West’s construction of itself. The West is all the things which other 
places and other people are not. Without the concept of the ‘other’, 
made possible by race, there is no West (Said, 1985).   
 
With the scientific ‘proof’ of a racial hierarchy, the concept of racial 
classification gained strength through the 19th, 20th and into the 
current century. The classifications themselves have been constantly 
reviewed, revised and added to, taking different forms and serving 
varying purposes in different societies. Racial classification was used 
by 18th century slave owners to control colonial populations by 
stratifying people by degrees of blackness, thereby creating a class 
of intermediate people who stood between the small number of white 
slave owners and the larger black slave population (James, 2001). 
The classifications and nomenclature varied between colonies. 
C.L.R. James records that before the 1791 slave revolt colonial San 
Domingo was racially stratified into 128 divisions, each division 
representing the number of parts of ‘black’ and ‘white’ blood; a sang-
mêlé, with 127 parts white blood and one part black, was still a man 
of colour (James, 2001).    
 
Racial classification by the amount of ‘white’ or ‘black’ blood that an 
individual was said to possess lasted well beyond the end of slavery. 
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In the US, the ‘one drop rule’, under which ‘any ascertainable 
quantum of Negro blood made one a Negro’ (cited in Nobles, 2000, 
p70), operated as a strict social divide in the southern states 
throughout the 19th century and became law in Georgia and Virginia 
in the 1920s (Nobles, 2000). European travellers in America noted 
the illogicality of a system that classified people by blood but labelled 
them by skin colour. Gustave de Beaumant wrote that when 
attending an American theatre in 1831 he found the audience 
segregated into seats for blacks, whites and coloureds, surprised to 
see a very fair skinned woman in the coloured seats he was told that 
local tradition had classified her as ‘mulatto’ (cited in Painter, 2010, 
p130). 
 
Racial classification as a system for assigning and maintaining 
privilege operated in similarly overt fashion in South Africa during the 
apartheid era and in Germany under Nazi rule. As in racially 
segregated America, the privileges of racial hierarchies were 
enforced by legislation. The German government implemented racial 
classification through a detailed legislative programme, of which the 
1935 Nuremburg laws were just part, and through a large 
bureaucracy set up to organise the population into racial categories. 
It is worth remembering that social researchers and other academics 
were actively involved in the development and application of racial 
classification to implement Nazi Germany’s racist and genocidal 
policies (Burleigh, 1991).  
 
Zygmunt Bauman (1989) shows how race thinking provided the 
rationale for modern methods of ‘boundary building’ to segregate the 
unwanted from the included in modern societies which legislatively 
embrace equality for all. Bauman demonstrates how well the 
‘instrumental rationality’ of modern society supports the bureaucracy 
of racial categorisation which can be deployed by the state in the 
rational pursuit of social engineering. The Holocaust, Bauman 
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argues, was not caused by modern bureaucracy, but this certainly 
provided an efficient delivery mechanism. 
 
Despite its tainted role in Nazi, apartheid and segregationist state 
policies, racial classification remains embedded in the state 
structures of various nations, including the US and the UK. Both 
nations collect racial data through their national census. The census 
is now considered indispensable to efficient, modern government 
(Nobles, 2000) although recent British governments have been keen 
to scrap the national census on the grounds of cost cutting and 
reducing bureaucracy (London Evening Standard, 2010). 
Nevertheless, census taking has been the main mechanism for 
counting populations, in Britain since 1801 and in the US since 1790, 
and thus for providing quantitative data to enable social 
management. Importantly, censuses not only count populations, they 
organise those populations into categories.  In her exploration of the 
use of racial categories in census taking, Nobles demonstrates how 
states use censuses to shape social and political realities. From the 
racial determination of citizenship in the US to the ‘whitening’ of 
Brazilian  society, Nobles shows how censuses have helped to 
establish the categories that stratify societies, and have furnished the 
social statistics that are used in racial policies (Nobles, 2000).  
 
That racial or ethnic categories are seldom constant in national 
censuses, and are particular to each nation, underlines that these 
categories are social and political constructions, and confirms 
Moore’s assertion of the ‘malleability’ of race. There is no set of racial 
or ethnic categories that has been used across nations and over 
time. Rather, where national censuses have included race or ethnic 
categories, these are specific to the social organisation or political 
ideology of that nation state at that time. A question on ethnicity was 
first introduced into the British census in 1991, with nine response 
categories; by 2011 the census offered 18 possible ethnic groups. In 
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contrast, the US has included a race question in every census since 
1790, using very different categories to those used in Britain.  
 
The flexibility of racial classification is demonstrated by Painter 
(2010). To achieve the  ‘enlargement of American whiteness’ 19th 
century racial science and government officials first classified Irish 
immigrants as racially inferior but subsequently moved them into the 
white American majority population. Roediger (2008) charts the same 
history of America’s ‘race management’ of mass immigration through 
the 19th and 20th centuries which accommodated immigrants within 
America’s racial system in a bid to keep America  a country with a 
majority white population. 
 
While race is an established category in the UK and the US, not all 
Western nations recognise race or ethnicity as valid concepts. 
France, for example, in its submission to the European Commission’s 
inquiry on how to measure progress in the fight against 
discrimination, asserted that: ‘In France, the problem lies…in the fact 
that ethnicity and race are unacceptable concepts’ (European 
Commission, 2008, p59).  Spain, Portugal and other European 
countries are similarly opposed to the use of racial classifications, 
mindful of the misuse which this classification has historically 
enabled. Moves by the Italian government in the mid-2000s to 
classify Sinti and Roma people on the basis of race were widely 
regarded as an overtly racist act with direct echoes of Nazi Germany 
(Milne, 2008). In modern societies, racial classification is a political 
choice. 
 
Measuring race 
 
While quantification is thought to date back to the Neolithic era, its 
application as a way of organising and standardising social life took 
root in Western Europe over a 50-year period between 1275 and 
1325. These years saw the development, in Europe, of the first 
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mechanical clock, perspective painting, double entry book keeping 
and other devices that ‘obliged Europeans to think in terms of 
quantified time and space’ (Crosby, 1997, p19).  Some of the tools 
used as the basis for Western quantification had their origins in other 
parts of the world; the Hindu-Arabic numeral system, for example, 
developed in India and Persia by the second century, did not reach 
Europe until the 13th century when its use was strongly promoted by 
the Italian mathematician Leonardo Fibonacci, amongst others 
(Boyer, 1991). But the application of quantitative approaches to the 
organisation of social life commenced in Europe, driven, Crosby 
argues, by the rise of the transaction economy and a Western 
fixation with money: ‘There were no people on earth more concerned 
with coins than Westerners, no people who worried more about their 
weight and purity, who played more tricks with bills of exchange and 
other pieces of paper that represented money – no people on earth 
more obsessed with counting and counting and counting’ (Crosby, 
1997, p74). This early lead in quantitative, transactional thinking put 
Western Europe in the forefront of science, cartography, astronomy, 
navigation, business and banking practices, creating the technology 
that would support the West’s colonial expansion from the early 15th 
century, and the basis for the ‘precise, punctual, calculable, standard, 
bureaucratic, rigid, invariant, finely coordinated, and routine’ 
rationalistic character of modern culture (Eviater Zerubavel, cited in 
Crosby, 1997, p230). 
 
The conceptual elements can be traced back to ancient times, but 
the modes of thought that underpin modern statistical reasoning 
emerged in the 1660s (Hacking, 1975; Kendall, 1970). Statistics 
began as the systematic study of quantitative facts about the state 
(Hacking, 1975). The approach differs from the simple collection of 
quantitative data through social inventories, the use of which in 
Britain goes famously back to the 1086 Domesday survey. From the 
1660s, marked by the publication of John Graunt’s study of 
population data for the city of London, a new approach developed 
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that applied reasoning to quantitative data in order to draw inferences 
that could be applied to the general population (Hacking, 1975). 
 
Stephen Stigler charts the formative period for the development of 
modern statistics from 1805, when Adrien Legrande published his 
work on the least squares method, to 1900, by which time the work of 
Galton, Edgeworth, Pearson and Yule formed the basis of the new 
discipline of statistics (Stigler, 1986). The birth of modern statistics 
took place in Western Europe with British intellectuals playing the 
leading roles. Much of this development was inspired by and 
supported the emerging grand theory of evolution. Francis Galton 
(1822 to 1911), who Stigler describes as ‘perhaps the last of the 
gentleman scientists’ (p266), was a cousin of Charles Darwin. 
Francis Edgeworth (1845 to 1926) was born in Ireland, a distant 
cousin of Francis Galton, but studied in England and held 
professorships at Kings College London and Oxford University. 
Galton’s protégé, Karl Pearson (1857 to 1936), founded the world’s 
first university statistics department in 1911, at University College 
London. George Udny Yule (1871 to 1951) studied under Pearson at 
University College. The work of these men created the statistical 
laws of correlation and regression which are the basis for the 
statistical methods used today in fields as diverse as genetics, 
sociology, astronomy and finance. 
 
The American historian Nell Painter has mapped the intellectual 
development of race thinking in Western societies, highlighting the 
role of mainstream academics in advancing ideas of racial hierarchy 
and the superiority of white people (Painter, 2010). Francis Galton 
and Karl Pearson feature prominently in Painter’s account. Galton 
coined the term ‘eugenics’ and was its ‘founding father’. Pearson was 
an ‘ardent eugenicist’ (Painter, 2010, p269). Galton’s text on 
eugenics, Hereditary Genius, argues for race and class 
characteristics as the basis for natural selection. Galton described 
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the science of eugenics as giving ‘the more suitable races or strains 
of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable’ 
(cited in Zuberi, 2001, p34). 
 
Tukufu Zuberi (2001) offers a more strident critique of Galton and 
Pearson than Painter. Painter’s central point is that the idea that 
white people are superior to other ‘races’ is not a marginal notion, but 
one developed and advanced by respected academics in 
mainstream universities. Zuberi argues that because their statistical 
breakthroughs are founded in their work to establish the proofs of 
human difference, the very methods developed by Galton and 
Pearson (and Zuberi adds Ronald Fisher to this group) are racialised. 
That is, statistical logic is rooted in the ‘numerical analysis of human 
difference’ (Zuberi, 2001, p35), giving the modern use of social 
statistics an inherently racialised character. The legacy of this, Zuberi 
argues, is a continuing misuse of ‘race’ within statistical analysis, with 
‘race’ considered a fixed attribute that reflects racial stratification 
rather than as ‘a dynamic characteristic dependent on other social 
circumstances’ (Zuberi, 2001, p124). Race, therefore, should not be 
used as a causal variable, and studies that attribute causation to 
‘race’ are, basically, wrong.  
 
Painter and Zuberi assert that modern statistical methods were 
developed in the cause of measuring innate racial differences. And 
so has their use continued. Stephen Jay Gould has traced the history 
of the scientific quest to prove that intelligence varies between racial 
groups or, more exactly, to prove that white people are intellectually 
superior to other ‘races’ (Gould, 1996). Statistics and statisticians 
play leading roles in this history. Charles Spearman, for example, 
developed factor analysis, a key technique in modern statistics, in the 
course of his work to isolate the biological factors determining 
intelligence; work which he published in the Eugenics Review (Gould, 
1996). Gould highlights Spearman’s contribution to the reification of 
intelligence as a biological entity, although absolves him of any active 
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role in advancing theories for differences in intelligence among 
human groups (Gould, 1996). Spearman’s methods, though, were 
used by his successor as professor of psychology at University 
College, Cyril Burt, to pursue exactly this aim; to find the evidence 
that intelligence is an innate characteristic that varies between 
human groups. It was claimed, after his death, that Burt falsified data 
in his later studies of twins to show stronger positive correlations in 
their measures of intelligence. Gould does not take issue with Burt’s 
data, but rejects the statistical premise, developed by Spearman and 
utilised by Burt, and subsequently in the US by Herrenstein and 
Murray to prove innate racial differences in intelligence levels. Gould 
refutes the central assumption that intelligence can be reduced to a 
single number, capable of ranking people in linear order, which is 
genetically based and, therefore, immutable (Gould, 1996).  If this 
premise is refuted, then the findings and conclusions of studies that 
prove genetic differences between races (for example, Herrnstein 
and Murray, 1994) are fallacious, as the central logic on which they 
are built is a false one.  
 
Zuberi and Gould share a concern that abstract concepts – race, 
intelligence – have been reified into real entities and then fed into 
statistical analyses as variables that are proven to be significant, or 
even causal, in all manner of social phenomena. But, they both 
argue, these abstract concepts are, variously, too complex, ever-
changing, socially determined, and their reification reduces them to 
fixed entities that cannot begin to reflect the reality they purport to 
represent. Separately, Gould and Zuberi highlight the drive in 
Western intellectualism to reduce the social world to quantifiable and 
therefore measurable entities. Zuberi takes this further than Gould, 
arguing that statistical methods are a form of ‘white logic’, rooted in 
the West’s history of slavery, colonialism, imperialism and continuing 
belief in white racial superiority (Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva, 2008).    
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2.2 Theoretical frameworks 
 
The Putnam studies investigate the effects of ethnic group relations 
on social quality in local areas. Not all of these studies set out a 
theoretical basis for their empirical investigation. Some researchers 
locate their studies in previous empirical findings and discussion of 
these, rather than in any wider theoretical context (including Letki, 
2008; Andrews, 2009; Twigg et al, 2010; Uslaner, 2011). The 
Putnam studies which are explicitly oriented within a theoretical 
framework (including Taylor, 1998; Putnam, 2007; Fieldhouse and 
Cutts, 2010; Laurence, 2011) largely draw on intergroup theories 
from the US. Intergroup theories explain why majority ethnic groups 
display prejudice toward minority groups; they form one strand in the 
very wide field of race theories. This section takes a broad sweep 
across the race and ethnic studies field to show where the Putnam 
studies sit within the wider theoretical trends in UK and US 
scholarship on the social effects of ethnic diversity.  
 
Theories of the social effects of race have evolved somewhat 
separately in different national contexts; a process coined 
‘methodological nationalism’ (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2009). For 
this study, the theoretical approaches from the US and the UK are of 
equal interest; theoretical models from the US provide the context, 
and sometimes the working hypotheses, for many of the Putnam 
studies, while the location of my own study within the UK means that 
the theoretical approaches on this side of the Atlantic should also be 
relevant. Interestingly, and perhaps conversely to methodological 
nationalism, the Putnam studies conducted outside the US or UK  
also use the US theoretical models; including Coffe and Geys’ 
Belgian study (2006) and the transnational studies by Anderson and 
Paskeviciute (2006) and Gerthuizan et al (2008). 
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Classical roots 
 
‘There are few contemporary perspectives on race and ethnic 
relations that cannot be linked, in one way of another, to…Weber’s 
seminal writings.’ (Stone 2003, p31). It is hard to disagree with 
Stone’s assertion, for time and again modern race relations theories 
draw on Weber’s ideas. Stone identifies several areas where 
Weber’s contributions have been critical to the development of 
modern race relations theories but it is perhaps in Weber’s ideas 
about how social groups form boundaries and protect their interests 
that his influence is most marked. Weber saw social groups 
encompassing not only classes, defined as by Marx by their relation 
to the means of production, but a wider range of ‘status groups’ 
which can be based on claimed or ascribed characteristics. Status 
groups seek to maintain their social and economic advantages by 
keeping their social distance from ‘inferior’ status groups. This 
exclusionary tendency becomes particularly acute when there is 
increased competition for scarce resources (Weber, 1947). Weber 
identifies race as one of many characteristics on which status groups 
and the competition between groups can be based: ‘…one group of 
competitors takes some externally identifiable characteristic of 
another group of (actual or potential) competitors – race, languages, 
religion, local or social origins, descent, residence, etc. – as a pretext 
for attempting their exclusion. It does not matter which characteristic 
is chosen in the individual case: whatever suggests itself most easily 
is seized upon….[The purpose of] this monopolization … is always 
the closure of social and economic opportunities to outsiders.’ 
(Weber, quoted in Stone, 2003, p34). 
 
Stone draws a line of association from Weber’s interest in marginal, 
‘pariah groups’ to Robert Park’s writings on ‘the marginal man’ 
(Stone, 2003, p35). Park was a leading figure of the Chicago school 
in the 1920s, whose theoretical work on race was critical to the 
development of assimilation theory, which remains among the most 
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influential theories of race relations.  Park was keenly interested in 
‘the study of the Negro and the race problem’, an interest sparked by 
meeting the black American educator, Booker Washington (Park, 
1950, pvii). Park’s studies were focused on the differences between 
racial groups and on what happens when separate groups come to 
share the same geographic space.  
 
Park’s thinking is similar to Weber’s ideas about competition between 
social groups. Park considered that cities were the site where ‘race 
problems’ emerge ‘because it is here that racial groups meet as 
competitors for jobs and housing and become antagonists in a 
process of social conflict aimed at preserving or changing their 
group’s status’ (Lal, 1986, p286). In Park’s work, racial prejudice is 
seen as an outcome of the shifting relationship between racial 
groups, in the competition for resources between what Park called 
the ‘we groups’ and the ‘other groups’ (Park, 1950).  
 
Weber’s ideas about status groups can also be seen in Frederik 
Barth’s work on ethnic groups and boundaries. Barth (1969) sets out 
a series of premises about the constitution of ethnic groups and the 
nature of the boundaries between them which share the Weberian 
idea of ethnic groups as a form of social organisation based on 
ascribed identity. For Barth, the critical feature of ascriptive groups is 
how they maintain boundaries through a ‘continuing dichotomization 
between members and outsiders’ (p14). According to Barth, the 
cultural content inside the boundary may change, but the 
dichotomization of insiders and outsiders maintains the boundaried 
persistence of ethnic difference, even as the process of contact 
between ethnic groups might be expected to erode these differences. 
 
Barth’s insider/outsider dichotomy echoes Park’s we group/other 
group conflict. Both share Weber’s thinking on social closure as a 
mechanism for preserving privilege by closing opportunities for 
outsiders. These ideas about relations between ethnic groups as 
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essentially conflictual or competitive have been hugely influential in 
race theory. They provide the basic building block for groups of 
theories which were developed in the US to explain how immigrant 
groups integrate into the American population, and in British theories 
of race relations which sought to explain conflicts and inequalities 
between ethnic groups. 
 
Assimilation theory 
 
Assimilation is viewed by some as a theory of integration; Giddens 
and Sutton (2013) present assimilation, melting pot and cultural 
pluralism as three theoretical models under the umbrella of 
integration theory. For others, assimilation and integration are much 
the same theoretical concept, with assimilation dominant in US 
debate and integration favoured in European discussion (Schneider 
and Crul, 2010). Assimilation and melting pot theory are not always 
distinguished from each other, with the ‘melting pot’ of assimilation 
theory held in contrast to the ‘salad bowl’ of cultural pluralism (Paul, 
2008). 
 
Theories of assimilation were developed in US sociology in the early 
20th century to explain how immigrant groups ‘melt’ into the American 
population. Now regarded as ‘classic assimilation theory’, the theory 
is that immigration is a natural, linear process through which new 
immigrants replace the behaviours and traditions of their own 
cultures and adopt the language and values of the receiving society. 
Over one or two generations the differences which mark immigrants 
from natives disappear and they become fully American (Paul, 2008). 
 
The roots of assimilation theory are generally traced back to the 
1920s work of Robert Park and his race relations cycle of ‘contact, 
competition, accommodation, assimilation’, although the centrality of 
this cycle to Park’s work and to the development of assimilation 
theory has been questioned (Lal, 1986; Alba and Nee, 1997). Alba 
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and Nee (1997), pointing to confusion in early sociology about 
definitions and formulation of assimilation, argue that a breakthrough 
came in the early 1960s with Milton Gordon’s assimilation framework 
which provided the basis for subsequent scholarship in this field. 
Gordon’s framework is particularly helpful for understanding the 
difference between ‘acculturation’ and ‘assimilation’, terms which 
sometimes appear as interchangeable. Acculturation, in Gordon’s 
framework, refers to the minority group’s adoption of the culture of 
the host society. Acculturation is the first stage in the assimilation 
process and will always take place. Subsequent stages in the 
process culminate in structural assimilation, whereby the minority 
group join the clubs, groups and institutions of the core society, but 
which is by no means inevitable (Gordon, 1964).  
 
Assimilation theory was further developed in the 1970s with the idea 
of ‘straight line assimilation’ as a process which unfolds through the 
generations, beginning with the first generation of immigrant arrivals. 
Each generation faces a distinct set of issues in its adjustment to the 
host society but gradually becomes absorbed into the general 
population, losing distinctiveness as an ethnic group. Proponents of 
straight line theory include Herbert Gans who suggests that the 
assimilation process may persist into the fifth and sixth generations 
for populations which choose to retain the ‘symbolic ethnicity’ of their 
predecessors (Gans, 1979). Critics of straight line assimilation theory 
accused it of failing to account for the different outcomes 
experienced by immigrant groups, some of which were clearly faring 
better than others within the American melting pot (Paul, 2008). Gans 
accepts these criticisms but argues that straight line theory remains 
valid, albeit with some ‘bumps and waves in the line’ (1979, p17). 
 
To address the critique of classic, straight line assimilation theory, 
variants of assimilation theory have been developed to account for 
the differences in socio-economic outcomes for migrant groups in the 
US. These include segmented assimilation theory, which asserts that 
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assimilation processes differ for immigrant groups depending on the 
interplay of factors which characterise and differentiate groups and 
the social and economic opportunities or barriers which are available 
to those groups. Segmented assimilation theory explains how some 
second or third generation immigration populations enjoy social and 
economic success in the US while others are in deep poverty (Alba 
and Nee, 1997; Paul, 2008). 
 
Spatial assimilation theories offer another dimension of the 
assimilation model. These theories focus on residential mobility as an 
intermediate step towards Gordon’s structural assimilation. The idea 
is that as minority groups acculturate and successfully enter the 
labour market, they move out of their original neighbourhoods and 
buy homes in ‘better’ areas. This process sees the dispersal of ethnic 
groups away from ethnically concentrated neighbourhoods and into 
white areas ‘opening the way for increased contact with members of 
the ethnic majority and thus desegregation’ (Alba and Nee, 1997, 
p837). 
 
Assimilation theories fell from favour in the 1980s and 1990s, 
charged with imposing ethnocentric demands that ethnic minorities 
should shed their own cultural traditions and ethnic identities (Paul, 
2008). Assimilation theory is also subject to criticism for its 
dichotomous model of an ethnically homogeneous majority group 
and an ethnic minority group (Paul, 2008), although some 
assimilation theorists assert that assimilation of minority groups is not 
necessarily into a single majority culture but can be into a pluralistic 
set of sub-cultures and sub-groups (Gans,1979). Assimilation theory 
remains, Alba and Nee argue, critically important for understanding 
‘the course of interaction between majority and minority groups’ 
(1997, p827). 
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Intergroup conflict theories   
 
Contemporary to the development of assimilation theories, and also 
stemming from the work of the Chicago school, a parallel set of 
intergroup relation theories developed in the US. In the 1920s and 
30s, Chicago school researchers, Robert Park in particular, 
examined the effects of increasing ethnic diversity in cities like 
Chicago, resulting from the large scale migrations of black people 
from the Southern states and of foreign-born people from throughout 
Europe. Park considered that race prejudice was not about individual 
attitudes but about conflict between ethnic groups competing for jobs 
and housing within the same city. Lal (1986) argues that the major 
theoretical interest of the Chicago sociologists was in the processes 
of social interaction, and demonstrates how this focus was extended 
by Herbert Blumer.    
 
Blumer rejected the ‘rather vast literature’ (1958, p3) that race 
prejudice is fundamentally about individual attitudes, asserting 
instead that race prejudice is about a sense of group position; race 
prejudice is the outcome of relations between groups, where the 
sense of superior position of the dominant group is threatened by a 
subordinate group (Blumer, 1958). Lal stresses the importance of 
Blumer’s symbolic interactionism to this formulation, which considers 
social life to be constructed through the symbolic meanings which 
people give to and interpret from events and actions (Lal, 1986). For 
Blumer, while race prejudice derives from group and not individual 
position, groups are defined through complex interactions and 
communications between their members; ‘through talk, tales, stories, 
gossip, anecdotes, messages, pronouncements, news accounts, 
orations, sermons, preachments and the like…’ (Blumer, 1958, p5). 
The group position model developed by Blumer asserts that 
intergroup competition and hostility arise from historically shaped and 
collectively formed judgements about the social position that in-
groups perceive they should occupy in relation to outgroups. Blumer 
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emphasises the critical role of ‘intellectual and social elites, public 
figures of prominence, and the leaders of powerful organizations’ 
(1958, p6) as the key figures in forming the sense that the in-group 
position should be dominant and in the characterisation of the 
subordinate, outgroup.  
 
While Lal positions Blumer as carrying forward Park’s work, Lyman 
points to Blumer’s rejection of assimilation theory in general and in 
particular of assimilation as the inevitable and final outcome of Park’s 
race relations cycle. Lyman argues that Blumer’s group position 
theory leads sociology out of the ‘utopia’ of assimilation theory, 
providing a more useful framework for understanding race relations 
as a process of social construction of groups into a perceived racial 
hierarchy (Lyman, 1984). 
 
From the 1960s, various race relations theorists built on Blumer’s 
theory of group position to develop a cluster of theories about ethnic 
intergroup conflict. These intergroup theories share several core 
elements: 
 The formation and consolidation of an in-group identity based on 
a shared racial or ethnic identity; 
 The creation of an out-group, as an abstract, stereotyped, 
generalised group; 
 The relationship between the in-group and out-group is 
essentially a competitive or conflictual one, with groups in 
competition for, or in conflict over resources, status or power. 
 
Key models within the intergroup conflict theoretical framework 
include:  
 Blalock’s racial threat theory. Blalock views race relations as a 
competition for resources. His theory proposes that the dominant 
racial group, the white population, protects its own interests from 
economic, political and symbolic threats from minority 
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populations. The white population, with its greater power, uses 
the state apparatus to control the threat from minorities to its 
dominant position (Blalock, 1967); 
 The simple self-interest model. In this model, there is an objective 
basis for conflict stemming from a clash of (usually) economic 
interests (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996); 
 The stratification beliefs model in which individuals perceive other 
groups as a competitive threat depending on their own beliefs 
about social inequality (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996); 
 Realistic group conflict theory, originated by LeVine and Campbell 
(1972) and advanced by Bobo (1983); This model asserts that 
prejudice and hostility result from conflicting group interests, 
specifically when one group blocks the desired attainment of 
another group; 
 Moscovici’s theory of nomic and anomic groups, in which nomic 
groups are those which are sure of their position and opinions 
and have experience of success, while anomic groups are unsure 
of their position and have experience of failure. The theory is that 
nomic majorities can afford to tolerate minorities and act equitably 
towards then, while anomic majorities cannot (Moscovici, 1976).    
 
Intergroup contact theory 
 
At about the same time as Blumer’s paper on race prejudice as a 
sense of group position was published came Gordon Allport’s study 
of the nature of racial prejudice (Allport, 1958). Allport considers race 
prejudice to be about individual attitudes and his work may well be 
one in the ‘vast literature’ which Blumer dismissed. However, 
Allport’s theory connects individuals with groups (as does Blumer’s) 
and is widely used as a theory of group relations. 
 
Allport supports the conceptualisation of racial or ethnic 
categorisation as an ascribed status for group formation but 
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disagrees with the idea that prejudice arises from group position. 
Allport rejects this ‘collectivism’, maintaining that ‘prejudice is 
ultimately a problem of personality formation and development’ 
although recognising that perhaps the greatest source of influence on 
individual prejudice is the collective view of the ‘in group’ (1958, p13). 
 
After examining a range of evidence on contact between ethnic 
groups, Allport concludes that some forms of contact reduce racial 
prejudice. Contact per se does not reduce prejudice; Allport 
describes a variety of contact situations which have no effect on 
prejudice. But within a given set of conditions, contact between 
majority and minority groups reduces the majority group’s prejudice 
towards the minority. The main conditions are that contact must be at 
equal status (for example in a workplace) and in the pursuit of 
common goals. The effect of contact in reducing prejudice is greatly 
enhanced if given institutional support by law or through local custom 
(Allport, 1958).  
 
Although now best known for his contact theory, Allport’s work on 
racial prejudice looks at other causes, effects and dimensions of 
prejudice. He offers theoretical explanations for why some individuals 
are tolerant while others are prejudiced, about visibility and degrees 
of difference. However, Allport struggles, as do other theorists, to find 
a satisfactory explanation for why some minority groups face no 
prejudice, others experience mild prejudice, and a few are subject to 
extreme hostility. Allport called this last group ‘scapegoat groups’. 
This is Weber’s marginal man and Barth’s pariah group; Appudauri 
calls them the ‘small numbers’ (Appaduri, 2006). All describe the 
process, but struggle to explain why some minority groups are 
merely out-groups while others are reviled and persecuted. 
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Conflict versus contact hypothesis 
 
Conflict (or threat) theory and contact theory are commonly viewed 
as oppositional. Putnam, for example, considers contact theory to be 
‘diametrically opposed’ to conflict theory (2007, p141). Because they 
are seen as opposing, conflict and contact theory are often linked 
within a single, testable hypothesis offering an ‘either/or’ explanation 
for inter-ethnic group relations.  When applied to the effects of ethnic 
diversity on social quality outcomes, the hypothesis runs along these 
lines: If conflict or threat theory is correct, ethnic diversity will have 
negative effects on social quality. If contact theory is correct, ethnic 
diversity will have positive effects on social quality. Variants of this 
hypothesis are tested by some of the Putnam studies (for example, 
Dixon, 2006; Laurence, 2014). Putnam’s own study tests and rejects 
both conflict and contact theory as explanations for the effects of 
ethnic diversity on social capital. Instead, he proposes a new 
theoretical model. 
 
Putnam’s constrict theory 
 
Putnam’s empirical findings show that diversity reduces trust both 
within and across groups. He finds that people living in more 
ethnically diverse neighbourhoods are less likely to trust people from 
other ethnic groups, so he rejects the contact hypothesis. However, 
he also finds that people in more ethnically diverse neighbourhoods 
are less likely to trust people within their own ethnic group, so the 
conflict or threat hypothesis is rejected.  
 
Putnam proposes an alternative explanation for the social effects of 
ethnic diversity; constrict theory. In Putnam’s constrict theory, ethnic 
diversity triggers anomie or social isolation. People retreat from 
associational life, and ‘hunker down’, pulling in ‘like turtles’ (2007, 
p149). 
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Cultural pluralism 
 
Cultural pluralism comprises a more diffuse set of ideas than the 
more clearly delineated assimilation and intergroup theories. Cultural 
pluralism refers to ethnic cultures existing separately, with equal 
validity, within the same society and is viewed as an alternative 
theoretical position to assimilation (Paul, 2008). While cultural 
pluralism is considered a theoretical model and multiculturalism a 
policy approach (Giddens and Sutton, 2013), in practice, 
multiculturalism has eclipsed cultural pluralism to become a broad 
term encompassing both theory and practice. 
 
The theoretical basis for multiculturalism or cultural pluralism is less 
relevant to the Putnam studies than the intergroup theories. 
However, because the swirl of controversy that surrounds 
multiculturalism has kept the question of ethnic diversity’s social 
impacts at the top of the political agenda, and motivated several of 
the later Putnam studies, this theoretical approach is included here.  
 
Key contributors to multicultural theory include Charles Taylor who 
asserts that the politics of multiculturalism are about the demand for 
recognition and that our ‘modern preoccupation with recognition and 
identity’ is an inevitable response to the collapse of the old social 
hierarchies (Taylor, 1994, p26). Taylor argues that multiculturalism 
poses a dilemma for liberal societies in trying to reconcile the 
universalism of the ‘politics of equal dignity’ with the individualism of 
the ‘politics of difference’, and he raises a central conundrum for 
multiculturalism when he suggests that the demand for recognition 
made by minority cultures is premised on the notion that all cultures 
are of equal worth (Taylor, 1994, p72). Kymlicka tackles these 
dilemmas by arguing that liberal societies can and should endorse 
certain ‘group differentiated rights’ for ethnic minorities, but only in so 
far as these minority rights are consistent with liberal values 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p75). In explicit rebuttal of both Taylor and 
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Kymlicka, Kukathas (1998) argues that liberalism can be described 
as the ‘politics of indifference’, meaning that the liberal state should 
take no interest in the cultural, ethnic, religious or other attachments 
of groups, and that these should have no relevance to the state. 
Kukathas asserts that when multicultural policies are articulated as 
the politics of recognition then they ‘quickly descend into the politics 
of interest group conflict’ (Kukathas, 2003, p251). In this debate, the 
effects of multiculturalism are bound up with questions of liberalism 
and of how liberal states should accommodate illiberal cultures. 
However, these views have been developed by academics in 
countries which have endorsed multicultural policies; Canada (Taylor 
and Kymlicka) and Australia (Kukathas). It is not clear how far these 
theoretical positions are applicable to Britain, where the degree to 
which multiculturalism can be said to be a state policy is debatable. 
 
Amongst those seeking to articulate a framework for understanding 
multiculturalism in Britain are Parekh (2000) and Modood (2007). 
Parekh’s report on the future of multi-ethnic Britain argues for a 
‘community of communities’, where cultural differences are 
recognised and valued, but where inequalities between groups must 
be reduced (Parekh, 2000, pxiv). The Parekh report firmly points to 
racism as a key factor in perpetuating inequalities, and argues that 
‘colour blind and culture blind’ approaches do not work, but that 
targeted approaches are required that tackle racism and 
discrimination in housing, employment, education and other policy 
areas (2000, p107). Modood reminds that where multiculturalism has 
been most successful (he cites Canada and Australia as examples) it 
has been integral to the nation building project of those states. He 
challenges the UK’s emerging backlash against multiculturalism with 
a call to embrace the plurality of cultures and citizenships within a 
shared national identity (Modood, 2007). 
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British race relations theories 
 
Contemporaneous to the development of assimilation and ethnic 
intergroup theories in the US, a distinctly British school of race 
relations theoretical work was being developed. This work started in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s in response to the new era of large 
scale migration of visible ethnic minorities from African, Asian and 
Caribbean countries.  Perhaps from the outset, British theory 
conceived relations between racial groups as problematic. Knowles 
characterises the early focus of British race relations theory as 
concerned with weakening social and political cohesion, resulting 
from ‘poor social ‘integration’ in the face of growing, visible, bodily 
and cultural difference.’ (Knowles, 2010, p25). 
 
The early British era in race studies, from the 1950s through to the 
late 1970s, was characterised by a structuralist approach which drew 
on the models of the classical social theorists to explain the social 
impacts for and of the new immigrant populations (Mason, 1999). 
John Rex and Michael Banton were the key contributors to British 
race relations theory in this structural period. Their work introduced 
race and racism into British sociology and established ‘race relations’ 
as a legitimate field of social enquiry. Both Rex and Banton framed 
their early race relations theories within a framework of classical 
sociology, particularly in the Weberian tradition. Jenkins argues for 
Rex’s Social Conflict as a ‘masterpiece’ which developed a theory of 
race relations as essentially conflict relations which are subordinate 
to class as the pre-eminent social conflict. Jenkins stresses that 
Rex’s approach is not based on a Marxist model, but on a Weberian 
understanding of class as a form of group identity (Jenkins, 2005). 
 
Rex’s work, in particular, was subject to considerable criticism, 
including from Banton (2014) but more stridently from race theorists 
committed to a Marxist position. The main charge against Rex was 
that his race relations problematic underplayed the importance of 
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class (‘we were alleged not to be Marxist enough’ writes Rex’s 
research partner, Robert Moore, 2014, p1407). In response, Banton 
argues, Rex tried to do the impossible by spanning a theoretical gulf 
to ‘Marxize Weber’ (Banton, 2014, p1377). But this did not rebuff the 
Marxist critique. Miles argued that the very conceptualisation of ‘race 
relations’ perpetuated discredited notions of ‘race’ as an ontological 
reality (Miles,1993). Within this antagonistic environment, Banton has 
claimed that the increasingly influential race theorists at the Centre 
for Contemporary  Cultural Studies were seeking to destroy Rex’s 
work on race relations (Banton, 2014).  
 
Between them, Rex, Banton and other sociologists in the early race 
relations field produced various theoretical frameworks to explain the 
effects of ethnic diversity in Britain, often by adapting US theories to 
suit British conditions. Examples include Rex and Moore’s use of the 
Chicago school work on residential zoning to develop a theoretical 
model for understanding the centrality of discriminatory housing 
policies in creating ‘twilight zones’ of immigrant segregation and 
disadvantage (Rex and Moore, 1967). A later stab at producing an 
overarching theoretical framework for race relations was taken by 
Michael Banton. Banton borrowed ‘rational choice theory’, an 
economic theory that social behaviour is made up of the decisions of 
individuals, each of which is choosing the option that will optimise 
their objectives. In its application to race relations, Banton asserts 
that rational choice explains racial discrimination as the outcome of a 
zero-sum competition between ethnic groups for resources such as 
jobs or housing (Banton, 1995). This looks very like the ‘simple self-
interest’ theory of intergroup conflict described earlier. Banton 
optimistically wrote that the application of rational choice theory to 
race and ethnic relations ‘raises many doubts but scarcely any 
fundamental objections’ (Banton, 1995, p18). However, this 
theoretical approach generated many fundamental objections for its 
attempt to rationalise the ‘non-rational’ as well as bafflement at this 
misguided application of neo-liberal economic theory to ‘situations 
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that do not remotely resemble self-regulating markets’ (Stone, 2004, 
p841).   
 
Neither Rex and Moore’s housing discrimination theory, nor Banton’s 
rational choice theory were more widely adopted. Nor are there other 
theoretical models which represent a prevailing or dominant trend in 
British race theory in this structural period. However, a continuing 
legacy of the structural theorists is a framework for empirical 
research on ethnic inequalities which remains a strong field of social 
research in the UK. 
 
The post-structural shift in race theory 
 
The unresolved tension between the Weberian perspective on race 
as a meaningful form of social stratification and the Marxist assertion 
that race is a meaningless distraction from the dialectic of class, was 
overtaken by a more fundamental shift in thinking. A new wave of 
post-ism (post-structural, post-modernist thinking) left structural 
theories in the shade. After the dominance of classical sociology in 
the structuralist era came an increasingly inter-disciplinary interest in 
race and ethnicity, with a plethora of new paradigms and 
perspectives from feminism, cultural studies, geography and history. 
The multiple new branches in race studies reflected the wider social 
movement from universalism to individualism and a theoretical shift 
from political and social structures to culture and identity.  
 
The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) was on the 
pivot of this cultural turn. Stuart Hall, Director of the CCCS from 
1968, moved away from Marxist structural theory to look at how 
racist ideologies are constructed and articulated through popular 
culture and media representation, and to deconstruct these cultural 
representations of ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ (Hall, 1997a). The 
construction of ethnic difference as ‘other’ was the major concern of 
colonial and post-colonial discourse theorists exploring the Western 
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construction of knowledge. Examples here include Frantz Fanon’s 
influential work on the colonial creation of the black subject, showing 
how black exists in subjugated opposition to white; ‘not only must the 
black man be black: he must be black in relation to the white man’ 
(Fanon, 1986, p110), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
deconstruction of Western discourse to show how non-Western 
women are silenced by the delimitation of their place within the 
narrative (Spivak,1994).  
 
The cultural representation of race and post-colonial discourse are 
just two strands among many in the post-structural era. Others 
include the formation of cultural identities (e.g. Hall and Du Gay, 
1996; Hall, 1997b); the intersectionality between ethnicity, gender 
and other constructed identities (Phoenix, 2006); the geographies of 
race and racism (Dwyer and Bressey, 2008). The empirical interests 
of the structural race theorists have moved into this new era with 
continuing investigation into the causes and effects of ethnic 
inequalities in housing, education and other policy fields (Modood et 
al, 1997; Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2016). 
 
There may never have been a prevailing theoretical framework within 
the British race and ethnic studies field, and any attempts to forge 
one have certainly now been abandoned. The work by Rex, Moore 
and other early race theorists to develop an over-arching theoretical 
framework for race relations has been overwhelmed by the 
multiplicity of dimensions through which ethnicity is now viewed. In 
the absence of any distinct British theory of ethnic relations, when 
empirical studies of ethnicity in Britain use theoretical frameworks, as 
some of the UK Putnam studies do, these are borrowed from the US.   
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2.3 Beyond race 
 
Recognising that race is a social construction, that racial 
categorisation is susceptible to racist hierarchisation, and that racial 
thinking may itself be at the root of racist behaviour, there have been 
many drives to move beyond race. These challenges to the use of 
race have come from many directions; empirically, theoretically and 
epistemologically.  
 
At the empirical level, various researchers have examined the effects 
of both race and class on a range of outcomes and found class to be 
a more significant predictor. First published in 1978, William Wilson’s 
‘The Declining Significance of Race’ argues that for black people in 
America class has become a greater determinant of life trajectories 
than race (Wilson, 1980). In a later paper, Wilson (2015) argues that 
his original research is supported by more recent evidence of 
widening gaps between the ‘haves and have nots’ in black 
communities (Hochschild and Weaver, 2015). In their review of 
Wilson’s work, Sakamoto and Wang suggest that serious analysis of 
class inequality has been neglected by American sociology; implicitly, 
at the expense of developing the study of race and ethnicity into a 
‘growth industry’ (Sakamoto and Wang, 2015, p1267).  
 
At a theoretical level, Robert Miles (1993) and Kenan Malik (1996) 
have argued for a move beyond race relations, where the use of race 
as a sociological category should be rejected entirely. Miles 
considers that a focus on race relations is a distraction from the 
fundamental struggle for ‘a universal citizenship’ (Miles, 1993, p23). 
In Miles’ view, ‘race’ is a red herring which distracts our 
understanding of the organisation and struggles of society, which we 
can do through the framework of Marxist theory. Miles retains the use 
of ‘racism’ and ‘racialisation’ as useful for understanding the specific 
means through which the capitalist mode of production is reproduced 
but rejects the use of ‘race’ as an analytic category.  
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The 2008 election of Barack Obama as the first black president of the 
US prompted considerable reflection on whether America has 
become a ‘post-racial’ society, moving beyond the race-based 
system that has characterised American society since its founding on 
the back of the slave trade. As part of this discussion, Hughey (2011) 
argues that racial attitudes are as entrenched in American society as 
ever, citing evidence that 25% of white Americans agree that black 
people are less intelligent than white people, and 40% agree that 
black people have a weaker commitment to their families than white 
people. Hughey believe that far from being post-racial, overt racial 
prejudice has moved underground, to places where white people feel 
safe to express such views. Goldberg (2015) agrees, asserting that 
‘race’ as America once knew it is over, but that racism lives on in 
new, ‘neo-racial’ forms.  
 
Nayak tackles the ‘end of race’ at the epistemological level, asking ‘if 
race is an arbitrary sign used to divide up the human population, why 
do social constructionists continue to deploy the term at the same 
time as they refute its existence?’ (Nayak, 2006, p411). Nayak 
searches for, and claims to find, an emergent post-race paradigm in 
the work of scholars including Jacques Derrida, Frantz Fanon and 
Paul Gilroy. But while the refutation of race, or race relations 
paradigms, is easily expressed, Nayak struggles to articulate what 
‘post-race’ thinking entails. Nayak’s own post-race position appears 
to be ‘against an oversimplification of binaries and towards a broader 
recognition of the multi-textured bricolage or genealogy of race 
writing’ and she concludes that ‘only by engaging in the complicated 
clutter of daily life’ can race ‘perhaps eventually be crossed out’ 
(p427). It is not clear from this that Nayak has travelled any further on 
this post-racial line of enquiry than Paul Gilroy had done a decade 
earlier when he declared that ‘race ends here’ (Gilroy, 1998). Gilroy 
similarly questions the tenability of an academic position that refutes 
but then employs the ‘mythic morphology of racial difference’, asking 
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whether we are all complicit in the reification of racial difference. But, 
like Nayak, Gilroy’s post-racial offering provides nothing substantive. 
Gilroy explicitly distances himself from Miles’ renunciation of race for 
analytical purposes, and looks instead to Frantz Fanon’s concept of 
‘epidermilisation’ and the idea that power can be ‘written deeply into 
the body’ (Gilroy, 1998, p847). But what this means in practice is far 
from clear. 
 
Brubaker (2004) joins Nayak, Gilroy and others who point out that the 
continued use of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ in social research contributes to 
the reification of ethnic groups as real and important divisions within 
the social world. Brubaker describes this as ‘groupism’ which he 
defines as ‘the tendency to take discrete, bounded groups as basic 
constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts and 
fundamental units of social analysis’ (p8). His solution is that 
researchers and theorists should step back from ‘over-ethnicized’ 
interpretations. This entails, as Zuberi (2001) also argues, not trying 
to identify race or ethnicity as causal variables of social outcomes. 
The danger of this, Brubaker asserts, is that ethnic-groupist 
interpretations may obscure other interests and dynamics. This is 
much as Arendt argued many years earlier when she asserted that 
race had won the competition for persuasive ideology. It chimes also 
with the view that a focus on race conflict or race relations obscures 
the fundamental social conflict based on class position, as advanced 
by Miles (1993) and Malik (1996), but who of course might be 
considered to be replacing one groupist determinism with another.  
 
Brubaker’s ‘anti-groupism’ is, arguably, a reflection of the post-
modern shift from theorising society in terms of structures and 
groups, to interpreting social phenomena as fluid and dynamic 
processes.  But through this shift from universalism to individualism, 
from structural inequalities to cultural identities, the core concept of 
race remains.  The anti-use-of-race-ists argue that the core concept 
will not disappear until we stop using it. They advocate an end to the 
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use of race but acknowledge the reality of racism (Miles, 1993). 
Others counter that we cannot understand racism without any 
conception of race (Banton, 2014), or that the denial of race is an 
attempt to erode the cultural identity and the historical experience of 
some ethnic groups (Lipstadt, 2006). There seems to be little 
disagreement that we ‘live in an unfolding racial history’ (Winant, 
2000, p686), but there are profoundly differing views on the 
contribution that academic research makes to perpetuating the 
racialisation of the social world. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF ETHNIC 
DIVERSITY 
 
‘One of the most important challenges facing modern societies….is 
the increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all 
advanced countries.’ (Putnam, 2007, p137). His opening sentence 
goes straight to the heart of the issue that motivates the Putnam 
studies; the effects in the neighbourhoods and cities of advanced 
societies which result from immigration of people who are 
categorised as ethnically other than the established, majority, white 
population.  The issue has long been a central focus not only within 
social research, but in political debate and policy making. This 
chapter traces the evolution of empirical research on the social 
effects of ethnic diversity and immigration. It highlights key studies 
which embody the research questions of their day and which have 
had a marked influence on political discourse and policy direction. 
 
3.1 Empirical roots 
 
Studying the urban poor 
 
In the mid-19th century researchers began to investigate the 
conditions of the poor in Britain’s towns and cities. This early 
research includes Friedrich Engels’ study of the Manchester slums, 
published as The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844, 
and Henry Mayhew’s account of the London poor published from 
1849 to 1850. The early studies of the urban poor established the 
roots of British empirical sociology which was to grow along two 
distinct branches, from the quantitative studies of the ‘social 
accountants’ and the qualitative investigations of the ‘social 
explorers’ (Kent, 1981). The social accounting approach applied the 
newly emerging science of statistics to gain a quantitative 
understanding of social conditions, while the social explorers took 
what we now call an ethnographic approach to look at social 
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conditions.  Common to both approaches was a twin focus on, firstly, 
selecting a distinct spatial area as the location for study, and 
secondly, a keen interest in the lives of the poor and disadvantaged. 
These studies were carried out by ‘mostly middle class men who 
were…members of the establishment’ (Kent, 1981, p31). 
 
The social accounting approach was developed through surveys, as 
used by Charles Booth’s Life and Labour of the People of London, 
published in 1902, and Seebohm Rowntree’s Poverty: A Study of 
Town Life, published in 1901 (Kent, 1981). These studies laid the 
ground for the social surveys that have been the major method of 
collecting information about social conditions throughout the 20th and 
into the 21st century. Booth and Rowntree’s work is now critiqued for 
the moral values which influenced their classifications of people into 
different social classes (Tonkiss, 2004), but it is remarkable how little 
these classificatory systems have changed in the last 100 years or 
more. Booth’s system of colour coding streets by social classes 
strongly resembles modern classification systems, such as Acorn 
(CACI, 2011) which is widely used in contemporary social and 
market research, including as a variable in the Citizenship Survey, 
the main data source for my study.  
 
The study of the urban poor, through which empirical sociology was 
developed, has remained a key focus in social research. With the 
arrival and settlement of ethnic minority migrants in both Britain and 
the US, social researchers began to apply the methods developed to 
study the urban poor to the study of immigrants in urban areas.  
 
Studying urban ethnic minorities 
 
The pioneering empirical study in this field is by the black sociologist, 
W.E.B DuBois. DuBois’ study of Philadelphia’s black population in 
the 1890s was carried out through a comprehensive analysis of 
administrative data to produce empirical evidence about ‘the Negro 
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problem’ (DuBois, 1996). DuBois applied a geographic classification 
system which is astonishingly similar to that applied by Booth to 
London’s streets, to show residential areas by the social class of their 
occupants; unlike Booth, but similar to the modern Acorn system, 
DuBois’ classifications are by racial group as well as by class. 
 
DuBois’ work anticipates many of the themes that characterise 
subsequent work on migration impacts and ethnic diversity, both in 
the US and Britain: his focus on an urban environment and the 
influence of physical space on the population; his empirical 
approach, drawing conclusions from his analysis of data, largely 
quantitative; his focus on an immigrant population, in this case 
Negroes, and search for explanations for the social problems that are 
associated with their presence, in this case crime, alcoholism and 
pauperism. All of these themes, common in 20th century and 
contemporary sociology, are present in DuBois’ work.  
 
In Britain, one of the earliest studies of ethnic minority impacts was 
by Sheila Patterson, based on research carried out from 1955 to 
1958 and first published in 1963 as Dark Strangers: A Study of West 
Indians in London (Patterson, 1963). Patterson studied the effects in 
Brixton from the settlement of a large migrant population from the 
Caribbean. Like DuBois, Patterson adopted a ‘social accounting’ 
approach, surveying around 400 Brixton residents through 
questionnaires and face to face interviews.  
 
Patterson’s study is not generally considered ground breaking, but 
three aspects of this work helped to define the parameters and the 
problematics for subsequent empirical research in this field.1 
                                            
1 There is a fourth feature of Patterson’s study which I would like to highlight, for its 
personal rather than sociological relevance. Patterson’s fieldwork included 
interviews with 150 West Indian migrants living in areas of Brixton which include 
the street where my grandmother and mother lived when they arrived from 
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 The framing of the race relations problematic. Originally 
conceived as a study of ‘white-coloured relations’, Patterson’ work 
developed into a study of ‘immigrant-host relations’, as she came 
to view the issue as about how immigrants are absorbed into 
established communities, and not, fundamentally about race. She 
considered skin colour to be a complicating factor, making West 
Indian immigrants more visible and more strange than the 
thousands of other immigrant groups which had settled in Britain 
in the post-war period. ‘In Britain – that insular, conservative, 
homogeneous society – mild xenophobia or antipathy to outsiders 
would appear to be a cultural norm. It is extended in varying 
degrees to all outsiders, to Poles and coloured people, and to 
people from the next village or street.’ (Patterson, 1963, p17).  
 The use of empirical research to test a theoretical proposition. 
Patterson uses the assimilation theoretical model, positing that 
the first generation migrants in her study will be in the 
‘accommodation phase’, not yet reaching ‘ultimate assimilation’. 
She concludes that accommodation was taking place slowly but 
surely and would lead, ultimately, to full assimilation and probably 
to a partial biological absorption of West Indians into the local 
population through inter-marriage. 
 The identification of housing as the flash point for immigrant-host 
tension. Patterson reports widespread concern within the 
established population that migrant incomers were pushing them 
out in the competition for scarce housing.   
 
                                            
Jamaica in 1955. I wonder now, but never asked when she was alive, if my 
grandmother was among Patterson’s interviewees. In a further aside, but providing 
anecdotal support for Patterson’s conclusions about the assimilation and upward 
mobility of Brixton’s West Indian population, the house in which my grandmother 
lived in the 1950s was shared by six families, all with young children. In the early 
1990s I lived in the house directly opposite to this, equal in size, but now home to 
only four adults and one baby.   
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Despite Patterson’s earlier study, ‘truly seminal status’ (Ratcliffe, 
2015, p405) is accorded to John Rex and Robert Moore’s study of 
race relations in the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham, first published 
in 1967 as ‘Race, Community and Conflict’ (Rex and Moore, 1967). 
Ratcliffe considers Rex and Moore’s study ground breaking on two 
fronts; for placing housing as the central issue within debates about 
migrant impacts and in its adoption of a hypothetico-deductive model 
in which empirical investigation tests hypotheses drawn from a 
theoretical position. Patterson’s study not only tested a theory of race 
relations and highlighted housing as the primary source of 
community concerns about immigration, but is also, in my view, the 
more engagingly written of the two studies. It does appear that 
seminal status is accorded to men more readily than to women, even 
in a case such as this, where the earlier study, by a woman, 
accomplishes all the features for which the later study is celebrated. 
However, the Rex and Moore study is interesting, although perhaps 
not ground breaking, for its departure from the conventional use of 
Park’s race relations cycle theory and adaptation of Chicago school 
ideas to posit a British theoretical model. Rex and Moore use a 
Weberian class model to analyse the social impacts of race relations 
in terms of conflict between ethnic groups for resources, particularly 
for housing (Rex and Moore, 1967).  
 
3.2 The problems of ethnic diversity 
 
The social consequences of immigration 
 
Not long after Rex and Moore’s study of race relations in Birmingham 
was published, populist anti-immigration discourse took centre stage 
with Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech (Powell, 2007). 
Delivered to the Birmingham Conservative Association in April 1968, 
Powell’s speech includes all the themes which have subsequently 
come to characterise mainstream debate on immigration: ordinary, 
hardworking people no longer recognise their own country; white 
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people will soon be a minority in their own country; immigrants are 
claiming the state benefits which hard working white people paid for; 
the state puts the interests of immigrants ahead of the white 
population; ordinary people are not allowed to voice their reasonable 
concerns about the effects of immigration. The central anecdote in 
Powell’s speech is of an elderly white woman who lost her husband 
and sons in the war, now living in fear and persecution as the last 
white person left in a once respectable street in Wolverhampton. This 
vignette captures all the elements which drive the enquiry into the 
social effects of ethnic diversity; the focus on place, conflict between 
ethnic groups, the deterioration of social quality. 
 
Powell’s dramatic warnings about rising immigration were an 
unsuccessful attempt to prevent enactment of the 1968 Race 
Relations Act, which would make it illegal to racially discriminate in 
housing, employment and other public services. But legislative 
counter-measures were already in train to restrict the numbers of 
black and other ethnic minority immigrants coming into Britain. Home 
Secretary at the time, Roy Jenkins, argued that ‘good race relations’ 
depended on ‘strict immigration controls’ (Jenkins, 1967). 
Restrictions on immigration have been described as the price of 
progressive race relations legislation (Goulbourne, 1998). The 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act, passed in 1968, required immigrants 
from Commonwealth countries to demonstrate proof that they, their 
parents or grandparents had been born in Britain, and the 
Immigration Act, passed in 1971, ended the automatic right of 
Commonwealth citizens to remain in the UK. New legislation to 
control immigration has been introduced in each subsequent decade. 
 
The public debate about whether further immigration should be 
permitted or halted has been more or less continuous since Powell’s 
speech. And although the language of the debate, at least among 
mainstream politicians, is less overtly racist today than it was in the 
1960s, the arguments on both sides remain the same. On the pro-
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immigration side of the political debate, the main argument is that 
immigrants bring skills that are badly needed in the British economy. 
For example, immigrants make up a large proportion of NHS medical 
staff; Dorling has calculated that more nurses from Malawi are 
working in Manchester than in the whole of Malawi (Dorling, 2011). 
As Prime Minister, Tony Blair used the skills argument to introduce 
the skilled worker scheme, aimed at restricting immigration in general 
while encouraging those with specific skills in areas of shortage 
(Blair, 2005). In the 2010-15 coalition government, Business 
Secretary Vince Cable also used the skills argument to argue that a 
government cap on immigration numbers could damage British 
companies if they were unable to recruit people with the right skills 
(BBC, 2010). 
 
The anti-immigration side of the debate tends to deploy a wider set of 
arguments. Anti-immigrationists point to economic, demographic, 
environmental, social and developmental reasons for preventing 
large scale immigration. Despite their shared concern that they have 
been ‘silenced’ by the forces of progressive liberalism, these 
arguments are fully articulated in published texts by Browne (2002), 
Goodhart (2013), Collier (2013) and West (2013). It is here worth 
remembering Painter’s point about the advancement of ideas from 
respected thinkers at the heart of the establishment (Painter, 2010): 
Anthony Browne and Ed West were both journalists, including for 
The Observer; Browne was economic development adviser to the 
Mayor of London and now leads the British Bankers Association; 
Browne and David Goodhart have both headed well known think 
tanks; Paul Collier is a professor of economics at Oxford University. 
These are influential figures in the academic and policy mainstream. 
But they position themselves as outside ‘the elite’, as risk takers who 
are ‘breaking the taboo’ that ‘blocks serious discussion’ of the 
negative consequences of large scale immigration (Collier, 2013, 
p26). 
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On the economic case for immigration, West (2013) argues that a 
relatively small increase in GDP is attributable to immigration which 
does not offset the costs of providing the additional population with 
education, health and other services. He asserts that any labour or 
skill shortages requiring immigrant labour are short term, while the 
immigrants who arrive to fill these stay long term, creating a surplus 
in the working age population which exceeds the number of available 
jobs. West additionally points to research which demonstrates that 
immigration reduces wage rates for workers at the lowest end of the 
income spectrum, to support his view that the economic arguments in 
favour of immigration are ‘thin’ (West and Collier both cite a study by 
Dustmann et al, 2013, in support of this point). West concludes, as 
do Browne and others, that economic arguments are a ‘red herring’ 
put out to mask the real agenda of liberal universalism.  
 
Collier argues that immigration increases pressure on public housing; 
drives up private sector rents and house prices; and displaces ‘smart 
indigenous children’ from the best schools and universities (Collier, 
2013, p120). Collier’s evidence base is flimsy; the housing assertions 
come from an unreferenced estimate from the Office for Budgetary 
Responsibility (Collier, 2013, p116), no references are cited for the 
education claims. Additional assertions include Collier’s and 
Browne’s claims that immigration is not necessary to counter our 
ageing population and workforce; there is no demographic time 
bomb, no downward trajectory in fertility rates, and so no ageing 
population for immigration to help solve. Browne argues that 
immigration increases inequality; immigration from poorer countries 
increases taxes; immigration to rich countries harms poor countries; 
pro-immigration measures are responsible for promoting fascism in 
Europe; and immigration fuels racial tensions and creates ‘unease’ in 
multi-cultural areas (Browne, 2002).  
 
Goodhart and Collier use Putnam’s 2007 study findings as evidence 
that immigration brings harmful effects to trust and social solidarity in 
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Britain’s neighbourhoods. Collier suggests, again without evidence, 
that Putnam’s findings may have greater threat for European 
countries than for America, as the ‘cultural gap’ between the 
immigrant and indigenous populations is smaller in America (p76). 
Interestingly, Collier recognises that Putnam’s work could be ‘open to 
a myriad of statistical objections’ but claims that they do provide ‘a 
robust result’ (p74). Collier clearly does not find Putnam’s work 
statistically flawed, despite some fairly basic errors pointed out by 
Dawkins (2008) as we shall later see. 
 
The arguments of the anti-immigrationists have been refuted on 
evidential grounds by various academics, including Dorling (2011), 
Finney and Simpson (2009). Finney and Simpson provide detailed 
evidence to challenge the mass-immigration myth that Britain takes 
more than its fair share of immigrants, showing that less than 3% of 
the world’s migrants live in the UK, compared with 20% in the US, 
and that increases in the number of immigrants in Britain since 1961 
are the same as worldwide increases. Dorling uses population data 
to challenge the myth that mass immigration to Britain is from Africa, 
Asia and the Caribbean, showing that by far the greatest numbers of 
immigrants to Britain since 1841 have been from America. The views 
that immigrants increase unemployment by taking jobs and depress 
salary levels by accepting poor wages are rejected in research by, 
amongst others, Lemos and Portes who found no statistically 
significant impacts resulting from eastern European migration on 
wages or unemployment in the UK, for any group of people (Lemos 
and Portes, 2008).  Finney and Simpson also challenge Browne’s 
claim that ‘third world’ immigrants are a drain on the state, with 
evidence that immigrants pay more in taxes than they claim in 
benefits and are therefore net fiscal contributors (Finney and 
Simpson, 2009).  
 
Academics like Finney and Simpson and Dorling have used empirical 
research and data analysis to separate fact from fiction in the 
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immigration debate, exposing many of the claims made for negative 
impacts of immigration as myths. At the same time, other academics 
have used empirical research to draw the opposite conclusions; that 
immigration does have negative impacts. Examples include Samuel 
Huntington’s work in the US, which draws on an extensive array of 
data sources to demonstrate the detrimental effects on American life 
of immigration by Hispanic people (Huntington, 2004). However, 
Huntington’s empiricism seems on shaky ground in his central 
assertion that America’s culture is essentially Anglo-Saxon 
Protestant because the American melting pot of mass immigration 
came after the period of English settlement which gave America its 
culture, language, religion and values. The logic of Huntington’s ‘we 
were here first’ argument cannot stretch to accommodate either 
Native Americans or African Americans, so both are largely excluded 
from his discussion.   
 
The progressive dilemma 
 
David Goodhart (2013) credits the Conservative politician David 
Willets for drawing his attention to the ‘progressive dilemma’. The 
progressive dilemma could describe Goodhart’s self-characterised 
position on the liberal left, where he maintains it is impossible to raise 
concerns about the effects of ethnic diversity without being branded 
‘racist’. But Goodhart himself describes the dilemma as the conflict 
between ethnic diversity and social solidarity. In this dilemma, ethnic 
heterogeneity undermines the bonds of trust and cooperation which 
create social solidarity. Without social solidarity, it is difficult to 
maintain social structures which depend on cooperation and shared 
values. Ethnic diversity, therefore, erodes the legitimacy of the 
welfare state (Goodhart, 2013). 
 
In the UK, Dench, Gavron and Young’s (2006) empirical study of new 
communities in Bethnal Green contributed to the immigration debate 
in general and the progressive dilemma in particular. Dench, Gavron 
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and Young’s study, originally intended to revisit Wilmott and Young’s 
seminal study of family and kinship in East London, became a study 
of ‘race and conflict’ in Bethnal Green. The authors concluded that 
the implementation of welfare state policies has favoured 
Bangladeshi immigrants over the ‘indigenous’ white working class 
population, leading to anger and resentment from the latter. The 
study adopted a ‘social explorer’ approach based on unstructured 
interviews with a variety of Bethnal Green residents. The researchers 
gave most space to the views of the white ‘indigenous’ population 
whose grievances, particularly about access to public housing, were 
presented uncritically, without supporting evidence, and without the 
balance of views from other communities who may feel that they 
equally ‘belong’ to Bethnal Green. The study was strongly criticised 
by academics; Robert Moore called it ‘tendentious’, ‘theoretically 
incoherent’ and ‘simply bad sociology’ (Moore, 2008, p349). But 
flaws in its sociological rigour were overlooked in wider press 
coverage which seized on the work’s themes of racial tension and 
white working glass grievance (for example, Bunting, 2006). 
 
The Dench, Gavron and Young contention that the welfare state 
compact with the British people had broken down in the face of 
Bethnal Green’s ethnic diversity helped evidence Goodhart’s 
progressive dilemma. Additionally, their study fed into and helped 
provide an empirical basis for the narrative of white working class 
grievance, evident in, for example, Trevor Phillips as Chair of the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission calling for more government 
action to help the white working class (Ford, 2008). 
 
The claim that immigration has eroded the trust and solidarity needed 
to sustain the welfare state has been subject to empirical scrutiny. 
Banting et al (2006) call this the ‘heterogeneity/redistribution trade off 
hypothesis’; the larger the ethnic minority or immigrant population the 
more difficult to sustain a robust welfare state. Testing the 
heterogeneity/redistribution trade off hypothesis through cross 
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national analysis, Banting et al found no evidence that immigrant 
population size is an important factor in social spending. They point 
to other, far more powerful factors which shape the welfare state, 
including the strength of left wing political parties and the age 
structure of the population. Interestingly, as this is a factor which my 
own study will consider, Banting et al found that the rate of growth 
rather than the size of the immigrant population is a significant factor; 
higher rates of immigrant population growth have a downward effect 
on social spending, although this can be mitigated by adoption of 
multicultural policies (Banting et al, 2006).  
 
Privileging ethnic minorities 
 
The idea that previous government policies gave special treatment to 
ethnic minorities is a popular one. The idea can be seen in Dench, 
Gavron and Young’s conclusion that Labour welfare policies 
favoured Bangladeshi immigrants, and in assertions that 
multiculturalism privileges ethnic minority interests in legal cases 
(Favell, 2001). Favell (2001) claims that multiculturalism protects the 
rights of ethnic minority groups, even where these rights are contrary 
to the human rights accorded by the liberal state. Favell argues that 
multiculturalism in Britain has shied away from tackling the illiberal 
practices of some ethnic minority groups in favour of ‘a more general 
pragmatic development of loose policies of tolerance’, asserting that 
where such cases come to court, there ‘is a presumption in favour of 
the ethnic minority practice, on the grounds of the ‘reasonableness’ 
of cultural pluralism and tolerance’ (Favell, 2001, p132). The idea 
that multiculturalism allows ethnic minorities to get away with 
practices that do not conform with English law was addressed by 
Sebastian Poulter, legal adviser to the Commission for Racial 
Equality in the 1990s, who found no evidence for this (Poulter,1990).  
 
The view that ethnic minorities have been given special, privileged 
treatment has been characterised by several governments as an 
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explicit policy of the previous government. The 2010 to 2015 coalition 
government rejected ‘special treatment’ for specific groups asserting 
that its own approach ‘moves away from treating people as groups or 
‘equality strands’ and instead recognises that we are a nation of 62 
million individuals’ (HM Government, 2010, p8). A similar view was 
presented by the previous government. The Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion, established by the Labour government in 
2006, urged a move away from thinking about ‘single identities’ 
through which individuals are defined by race or ethnicity, and away 
from seeing the UK as made up of distinctive and separate ethnic 
communities. The Commission recommended an end to funding for 
‘single groups’, meaning groups based on a particular ethnic identity, 
arguing that single identity groups entrench division and segregation 
(Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007). This was also the 
view of the Cantle review, set up some five years previously, in 2001, 
to advise on community cohesion. The Cantle report recommended 
that ‘funding bodies should presume against separate funding of 
distinct communities’ and that ‘funding and support should not follow 
an assumption that all black and ethnic minority needs are greater 
than other sections of the community’ (Cantle, 2001, p50).  
 
So, from at least the early 2000s, government commissioned reports 
were calling for an end to special treatment for ethnic minorities. 
However, none of these reports includes any evidence of how, or 
even if, any special or privileging treatment had taken place.  Where 
research into funding allocations to ethnic minority groups has taken 
place, and very little has, the conclusions have been that black and 
ethnic minority groups receive less, not more than other communities 
(Parekh, 2000; Chouhan and Lusane, 2004).   
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The geography of ethnic diversity 
 
There are several, interweaving strands of debate and research 
concerning the geographies of race, racism and ethnic diversity 
effects.  
 
One strand is focused on whether Britain’s cities are becoming 
racially segregated. Much concern was sparked by the 2001 Cantle 
report findings that ethnic groups were living ‘parallel lives’ in some 
UK cities (Cantle, 2001), resulting in a raft of community cohesion 
policies and programmes from the then Labour government (Home 
Office, 2004 & 2005). Professor Cantle continues to argue that ethnic 
segregation is increasing across Britain, with even greater 
segregation in residential areas, schools and workplaces apparent in 
2016 than in 2001, driving ‘more prejudice, intolerance, mistrust 
among communities’ (Asthana, 2016). The Cantle report was based 
on an investigation into the causes of rioting in Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham in the summer of 2001, widely seen as ‘race riots’. The 
report considered that the social problem which caused the riots was 
summed up by a witness of Pakistani origin who told the review team 
‘When I leave this meeting with you I will go home and will not see 
another white face until I come back here next week’ (Cantle, 2001, 
p10). This anecdote helped the Cantle review team to characterise 
the causes of the disturbances as the polarisation of ethnic 
communities, resulting from the physical segregation of housing 
estates and inner-city areas. 
 
The Cantle report revived longstanding concerns about racial 
segregation in British cities. Fears that concentrations of ethnic 
minority populations drive out white residents have long been part of 
the immigration discourse, illustrated in Enoch Powell’s story of the 
last English woman left on her street in Wolverhampton. Kaufmann 
and Harris (2013) analysed data over a 20 year period, from 1991 to 
2011 to consider whether increased ethnic diversity in Britain 
85 
 
prompts white, UK born residents to move to areas with less ethnic 
diversity – the so-called ‘white flight’ phenomenon. They conclude 
that white people prefer to leave and actually leave areas of greater 
ethnic diversity, while ethnic minority people are equally as likely to 
want to leave but are less likely to actually make the move. 
Kaufmann and Harris acknowledge that the motivations for this 
movement are unknown. Is escaping ethnic diversity the driving 
factor? And is this process leading to greater ethnic segregation? 
These questions are not addressed.    
 
Other researchers have looked at whether British cities are becoming 
more racially segregated. Johnston et al (2002), for example, 
analysed data from the 1991 census to investigate whether ethnic 
enclaves, or ghettos, were being established in English cities, 
concluding that there was some evidence of this for Asian groups, 
especially outside London. Drawing on evidence from Johnston and 
other urban geographers Trevor Phillips, then head of the 
Commission for Racial Equality, claimed that ‘some districts are on 
the way to becoming fully fledged ghettoes’, in a widely reported 
speech where he warned that ‘we are sleepwalking our way to 
segregation’ (cited in Finney and Simpson, 2009, p116). The 
Commission for Racial Equality issued further warnings about 
segregation in 2006 when head of policy Nick Johnson warned that 
the Blair government proposals to increase parental choice in school 
selection would lead to people in the UK leading increasingly 
separate lives (BBC, 2006). Despite the previous government’s  
explicit policy commitment to cohesion as a means of ending this 
perceived ethnic segregation, David Cameron was still able to claim 
in 2011 that Britain had hitherto been tolerating ‘segregated 
communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values’ in a 
speech that brought the segregation issue together with the failure of 
multiculturalism and the decline in social cohesion debates, while 
implicating Muslim communities as a threat to British values and to 
Britain’s security (Cameron, 2011).   
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Finney and Simpson have unpicked the myths of ethnic segregation 
in Britain. Their analysis demonstrates that there are no very high 
concentrations of particular ethnic groups, other than white 
populations, and no ‘ethnic ghettos’ in Bradford or any other part of 
Britain (Finney and Simspon, 2009). These findings are confirmed by 
analysis of the 2011 census data which shows that neighbourhood 
residential integration is increasing and segregation is decreasing in 
most local authority areas (Catney, 2013). 
 
Despite this evidence, ethnic segregation remains an issue of 
concern for the UK government and for researchers in this field. A 
new Social Integration Commission, chaired by Matthew Taylor, was 
established in 2013. The Commission drew on Putnam’s finding that 
diversity erodes trust (Putnam, 2007), and on post-Putnam work by 
Uslaner (2011) which argues that ethnic segregation is the more 
exact cause of this erosion. Ethnic segregation is considered an 
important dimension in the lack of social integration which the 
Commission identified costs the British economy £6 billion each year 
(Social Integration Commission, 2014a, 2014b).  
 
Segregation concerns are underpinned by a conceptualisation of 
Britain as a society comprised of one racial group, white people, into 
which ethnic minorities assimilate or remain segregated from. As 
Johnston et al (2002) argue, this outlook draws on the American 
assimilation model, where successful assimilation into the melting pot 
is the desired goal and concentrations of distinct ethnic groups, 
which have failed to assimilate, are perceived as problematic. When 
applied to a British context, this perception of a ‘host majority’ and 
‘ethnic minorities’ views white majorities as unproblematic but is 
troubled by increases in the size of ethnic minority populations, and 
is alarmed at the possibility that black or Asian populations may 
become the ethnic majority in some areas. This view has been 
challenged. The Greater London Authority, for example, has robustly 
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argued that black or Asian majorities should not be considered any 
more problematic than white majority populations (GLA, 2005).  
 
Another strand in the geographic exploration of ethnic diversity 
effects is concerned with the spatial level of these effects. Research 
commissioned by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation to inform a wide-
ranging study of the relationship between ethnicity and poverty, has 
sought to introduce a ‘place-based’, geographic dimension to this 
work. The research finds that the geographic pattern is much as 
expected; ethnic minority populations are more likely than white 
populations to be living in areas of high deprivation with poorer job 
opportunities (Garner and Bhattacharya, 2011).  
 
The geography of ethnic diversity has also been explored by Michael 
Keith, an influential contributor in this field who was a member of the 
Labour government’s Commission on Integration and Cohesion. The 
Commission’s report placed a strong emphasis on local places, 
particularly local authority areas, as the geographic level at which 
cohesion and integration should be measured and improved 
(Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007). In subsequent 
discussions of this report, Keith has emphasised that the benefits of 
immigration to the UK accrue at national level but that at local-level, 
immigration and ethnic diversity have negative effects as they put 
increased pressure on local services (Keith, 2009). 
 
Keith also promotes the idea that ethnic diversity effects vary by 
spatial levels in a case study of Barking and Dagenham (Keith, 
2008). This case study brings together Keith’s view that migration 
brings national benefits but local problems with the language and 
concepts of the US ethnic intergroup competition theorists, and 
comes close to Banton’s rational choice theory in Keith’s assertion 
that we need to recognise the ‘rational self-interest’ of the established 
white community’s support for anti-immigration politics (Keith, 2008, 
p204). It is particularly interesting that Keith selects Barking and 
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Dagenham for this case study. As Keith highlights, the borough was 
in a state of rapid economic and social transformation throughout the 
nineties and noughties and became politically unique in 2006 when 
the anti-immigration British National Party became the second largest 
elected group on Barking and Dagenham Council. As we will see in 
later chapters, Barking and Dagenham experienced the highest rate 
of increase in immigration in England in the 10 years to 2001, and 
the fifth highest in the 10 years to 2011. While of course there is no 
requirement that case studies should represent average or majority 
circumstances, Keith’s selection of this atypical borough to explore 
ethnic diversity impacts contributes to a sense of the extreme as the 
norm. A case study of ethnic diversity effects in a local area with 
more typical ethnic diversity and immigration might find less to say 
about ‘the realities of inter-ethnic competition in access to goods and 
services’ (Keith, 2008, p195) but equally might more fairly represent 
the local experience across much of England. 
 
3.3 The effects of ethnic diversity on social quality  
 
Since the late 1990s, concerns about the effects of immigration and 
ethnic diversity have become increasingly linked to the concept of 
social capital, in work that originated in the US, notably by Putnam, 
and which found political favour in Britain in the 2000s, and the 
concept of social cohesion, which also enjoyed a high profile in 
British policy making during the 2000s.   
 
The relationship between social capital and social cohesion is 
seldom clearly defined. There is a tendency in much of the literature, 
including in empirical studies that investigate the presence or 
absence of these social qualities, to use the terms interchangeably.  
To add further complexity, the terms ‘social cohesion’ and 
‘community cohesion’ are also often used without clear distinction 
between them. In this section, I will try to unpick the different 
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meanings that are given to these terms while looking at how the 
debate on ethnic diversity impacts has developed.   
 
Social capital 
 
The concept of social capital has been given different meanings by 
different theorists. In Bourdieu’s work, social capital comes through 
social networks to which individuals have different levels of access 
and which are themselves of different value within the social 
stratification of society, and so social capital, like economic capital, 
can be of greater or lesser value in individual social mobility 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  The American sociologist, James Coleman 
defined social capital as ‘the ability of people to work together for 
common purposes in groups and organisations’ (cited in Fukuyama, 
1995, p10).  Putnam characterises social capital as the ‘connections 
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them’ (Putnam, 2000, p19).  Putnam’s 
work on social capital has been highly influential, and the term is 
currently most commonly used in Putnam’s terms, to describe the 
sum total for a given society of the amount of associational activity 
that its members are engaged in. Also in wide common usage are 
Putnam’s characterisation of ‘trustworthiness’ as an integral (and 
measurable) component of social capital, and his distinction between 
bonding social capital (which takes place within groups) and bridging 
social capital (which takes place between groups).  
 
Putnam and others have used the concept of social capital to explain 
why some societies have been more successful than others, with the 
conclusion that social capital is a good thing that creates better and 
more prosperous societies (Putnam, 1993). Fukuyama, for example, 
argues that social capital has major consequences for industrial 
economies in that societies with higher levels of trust (Japan, 
Germany, the US, for example) have higher productivity than those 
with lower levels of trust (Fukuyama, 1995). Putnam’s own analysis 
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of data on community associations, volunteering, political 
participation and other forms of civic engagement, has led him to 
conclude that social capital has declined in America since the 1950s 
(Putnam, 2000).  
 
Peter Hall has tested whether Putnam’s findings on the decline of 
social capital (Putnam, 1993) hold true for Britain, concluding that 
there has not been any appreciable decline in aggregate levels of 
social capital (Hall, 1999). Hall suggests that government policies 
have affected the level of social capital in British society, identifying 
policies on education, changes in the British class system, and active 
encouragement of voluntary associations as particularly important. 
This, Hall contends, is a reversal of the causal relation between 
governments and social capital as posited by Putnam, who 
emphasises how levels of social capital affect governments (Hall, 
1999). Grenier and Wright (2004) revisited Hall’s research and, after 
introducing new variables into his methodological framework, differ 
from Hall by concluding that social capital has declined in Britain in 
the post-war period. Grenier and Wright argue that Hall does not fully 
consider issues such as the rise in income inequality in Britain, 
leading him to underplay the importance of the uneven distribution of 
social capital along the lines of social class.  
 
Because social capital is conceived as a property that belongs to 
social groups, it was perhaps inevitable that it would be applied to 
ethnic groups. Fukuyama does this in his comparison between the 
low levels of entrepreneurial and enterprise success in African 
American populations and the greater business success in America’s 
Chinese and Japanese communities, linking these outcomes to low 
levels of trust between African Americans and high levels of trust 
within the Chinese and Japanese communities (Fukuyama, 1995). 
Putnam, of course, has concluded that ethnic diversity has a 
negative effect on social capital which, in the context of his views 
about the positive virtues of social capital, indicates that ethnic 
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diversity is socially damaging (Putnam, 2007). Grenier and Wright do 
not analyse social capital in relation to ethnic groups but describe this 
as ‘strikingly absent’ from both their own and Hall’s analysis. Despite 
this absence, they suggest that it ‘would not be surprising to 
conclude’ that levels of social trust would be reduced within an 
ethnically diverse country such as Britain (Grenier and Wright, 2004, 
p29). 
 
Putnam’s distinction between bridging and bonding social capital has 
also lent itself to the analysis of relations within and between ethnic 
groups. For example, the Commission for Integration and Cohesion, 
in its argument against funding for single ethnic groups, used 
Putnam’s terms to assert that while single group funding may 
promote ‘bonding capital’ by supporting activities within ethnic 
minority communities, it acts against ‘bridging capital’ and that 
bridging capital is what is needed to achieve an integrated and 
cohesive society (Commission for Integration and Cohesion, 2007, 
pp160-163).  
 
Social cohesion 
 
The study of social cohesion has a long tradition in sociology, 
stretching back to Durkheim (Pahl, 1991). Pahl observes that the 
common belief that social cohesion is in decline has been long held; 
‘In the search for social cohesion there is a consistent tendency for 
some sociologists, both classical and contemporary, to become 
prophètes manqués. They regularly affirm that there has been some 
fall from grace and that the morality of their times is confused and 
impoverished. The golden age of traditional morality is, typically, not 
very precisely described and nor, for that matter are the future 
consequences for society’ (Pahl, 1991, p345).   
 
The concept of social cohesion is also a familiar one in psychology, 
where it is classically defined as the ‘field of forces’ that affect an 
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individual’s attitudes and behaviours in relation to group membership 
(Friedkin, 2004, p409). Socio-psychological conceptualisations of 
social cohesion have a long standing history of operationalisation into 
measurable indicators and of treatment as both causal and outcome 
variables (Friedkin, 2004). This may be an important reason why 
social cohesion features so often in empirical studies of ethnic 
diversity effects, including in many of the Putnam studies.    
 
Community cohesion emerged as a key concept in British policy in 
the early 2000s, where it was inextricably linked with questions of 
ethnic diversity from the outset.  The term was used in the 2001 
Cantle review which concluded that the solution to the ethnic conflicts 
resulting from ethnic segregation lay in an urgent need to promote 
community cohesion. The review offered a definition of community 
cohesion as ‘about helping micro-communities to gel or mesh into an 
integrated whole. These divided communities… need to develop 
common goals and a shared vision.’ (Cantle, 2001, p70). This 
definition, with its dual meanings of community cohesion as a goal 
and as an intervention to achieve that goal, shaped the government’s 
policies on ethnic relations in local areas for the remainder of the 
decade.  Amongst the raft of measures launched by the government 
were a community cohesion pathfinder programme (Home Office, 
2004), a community cohesion practitioners toolkit (Home Office, 
2005), guidance on building a local sense of belonging (Communities 
and Local Government, 2009), and refocusing the questions in what 
was to become the Citizenship Survey, to provide national data on 
community cohesion in local areas.  
 
Over and above the visible community cohesion policy measures, the 
community cohesion agenda crystallised a conceptualisation about 
the relationship between ethnicity and cohesion that remains 
predominant today. That is, that cohesion is about ‘shared values’ 
and that communities lacking in cohesion have failed to adopt a 
common set of values. This focus on values also characterises the 
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language of the multiculturalism debates, where the characterisation 
of multiculturalism as the rejection of a common culture has also led 
to calls for a stronger articulation of common values and for ethnic 
minorities and immigrants to demonstrate their allegiance to these, 
as asserted by then Prime Minister David Cameron (Cameron, 
2011). The Labour government introduced a citizenship test in 2005 
as a response to the demand that immigrants should demonstrate a 
knowledge of British traditions and an allegiance to British values. 
The subsequent, Conservative-led governments continued this move 
towards requiring immigrants to learn and demonstrate their 
commitment to British values. In 2014, the government issued 
guidance to all maintained schools in Britain about how to promote 
‘fundamental British values’ to their pupils (Department for Education, 
2014).  
 
Forrest and Kearns highlight that social cohesion has different 
meanings at different levels of analysis, and that conclusions based 
on macro observations of ‘disorder, dislocation and social and 
economic transformation may underestimate the importance of the 
lived experience of the dull routine of everyday life’ (Forrest and 
Kearns, 2001, p2127).  Writing in 2001, the same year that the 
Labour government’s national strategy for neighbourhood renewal 
was launched (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001), Forrest and Kearns 
examine the way in which the local area, or neighbourhood, was 
introduced into debate about social cohesion and social capital as 
the spatial unit of key interest. They suggest that there is an implicit 
view that ‘successful’ neighbourhoods are distinct from ‘unsuccessful’ 
neighbourhoods in the degree to which there is social cohesion, the 
underlying assumption being that disadvantaged neighbourhoods 
lack the ‘ingredients that foster social cohesion’ (p2133). They 
implicate researchers in perpetuating this assumption, arguing that 
the research focus on what disadvantaged areas may lack has 
skewed empirical research, at least in the UK, towards studies of 
neighbourhoods that are seen as problematic. As we have already 
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seen, empirical social research has always focused on urban areas 
characterised by poverty and social upheaval.   
 
Worley argues that while the Labour government’s community 
cohesion agenda was widely regarded as the new framework 
governing race relations policy in the UK, the concept of ‘community’ 
essentially ‘deracialized’ the language and discussion of cohesion 
(Worley, 2005). Similarly, and more stridently, Ben-Tovim asserts 
that the core concept of ‘community cohesion’ used by the Cantle 
inquiry moved the focus onto cultural difference and away from the 
real problem of ‘overt and institutional racism’ (Ben-Tovim, 2002, 
p46). Both Worley and Ben-Tovim argue that the community 
cohesion discourse took racism off the political agenda, replacing 
anti-discrimination with programmes to promote inter-cultural 
understanding. This reading is in line with other themes explored in 
these chapters, including the loss of ‘race equality’ as a policy 
ambition and the turn from structural theories of race to explorations 
of cultural representation and identity.  
 
In a broader critique of the social capital, social cohesion and 
immigration debate, Cheong et al (2007) argue that the meanings of 
social capital and social cohesion are not fixed but are socially 
constructed and value-based, reflecting the prevailing ideological 
climate in which they are used.   They contest the notion that social 
capital offers ‘a cure’ for poor social cohesion, pointing to work by 
Bourdieu and Portes who regard social capital as the outcome of 
social and ethnic inequalities, not as a solution to them.  They argue 
that the community cohesion agenda imposed a majority agenda on 
minority communities and that issues of power, class and racism 
have not been sufficiently considered. 
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Ethnic inequalities  
 
Within the broad field of empirical research on ethnic diversity, 
perhaps the least contested strand is the study of ethnic inequalities. 
This work continues that of Rex, Moore and other early race 
researchers who identified that ethnic minority populations were 
faring badly in the British education, employment and housing 
systems (for example, Modood et al, 1997). Today, this work covers 
almost all policy areas, including health, mental health, poverty, 
children in care, offending and criminal justice (for example, Equality 
and Human Right Commission, 2016). 
 
In education, for example, empirical studies of racial inequality go 
back to the early 1970s when Bernard Coard found widespread, 
systematic mistreatment of West Indian children in British schools 
(Coard, 1971). These studies continue through the decades to the 
current time, with the Equality and Human Rights Commission 
reporting in 2016 that Black Caribbean children are three times more 
likely to be excluded from school than white children, and only half as 
likely to attend a Russell Group university (Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, 2016). 
 
While not explicitly located in any theoretical framework, this field of 
enquiry draws on the key components of race relations theory 
established by the early British sociologists. Rex’s key components 
of ascribed racial difference, hierarchisation, power and conflict 
provide the basis for this continuing examination of racial inequalities. 
Research into ethnic inequalities deploys what Zuberi (2001) 
advocates as a legitimate use of racialized statistics; generating and 
using statistical data in the pursuit of social justice.  
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3.4 Chapter summary 
 
The debates around the social impacts of immigration and ethnic 
diversity are deeply politicised. Immigration, in particular, is a topic 
that few politicians can ignore and that many champion.  This 
politicisation brings a polarising tendency to the discussions; there 
are left and right wing positions, liberal and extremist positions, pro 
and anti-positions.  The logic of this polarised debate infects 
discussion and thinking on this issue to such a degree that it is now 
difficult to express it in any other terms. The politically entrenched 
positions within these debates have long been apparent in the 
immigration debate and are becoming clear in the multiculturalism 
debate.  This politicisation brings a level of argument that is 
conducted in terms, not just of what the other side has said, but of 
what one side portrays the other side as having said, all the better to 
contrast this with their own position.  Although, clearly, most social 
researchers will strive for neutrality in their own studies, the 
politicisation of these debates make it difficult to frame any 
discussion outside of this polarised ‘for or against’ framework. 
Putnam illustrates this in the conclusions to his study when he rails 
against the ‘politically correct progressivism’ that might challenge the 
‘reality’ of his findings, and the ‘ethnocentric conservatism’ that might 
deny the desirability of acting on them (Putnam, 2007, p165).  
 
This chapter has drawn on work from many contributors to the ethnic 
diversity debates, some of whose ideas are based on empirical 
research and others whose work is more theoretical or philosophical. 
There is no apparent opposition between the empirical and the 
theoretical traditions, although neither is there a great deal of 
connection between them. They appear to exist happily in parallel, 
covering the same subjects from their different academic 
perspectives. This difference in academic positions mirrors the divide 
between the evidence-based and the intuitively-driven, both of which 
are evident in ethnic diversity political debate and policy making. 
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Compare, for example, the evidence-filled reports of the Social 
Integration Commission (2014a, 2014b) with the government’s 
evidence-light guidance to schools on promoting British values 
(Department for Education, 2014). Worryingly, it is the latter of these 
which represents actual policy. 
 
Ethnicity is almost invariably perceived as problematic. Whether for 
or against, left or right, immigration and ethnic diversity are regarded 
as problems that need to be tackled by policy makers or investigated 
by researchers. This problematisation is Arendt’s ‘ideological cover’ 
in action; a mobilisation of race or ethnic difference to provide a 
readily understood and widely accepted explanatory framework for 
social events.  If ethnic diversity as an investigable problem is an 
ideology rather than a reality, then we have to question whether there 
is any validity in researching this subject at all. Does researching 
ethnic diversity add to the ideological cover, helping to mask our 
understanding of the realities of the social world?  There is no right or 
wrong approach here; you are damned if you do (by essentialising or 
reifying the concept of race) and damned if you don’t (by 
deracialising the analysis).   
 
Finally, it is interesting to note how frequently the theme of demise or 
decline occurs in the literature and debates in this field.  The 
discourse of demise, as Pahl noted, has been prominent throughout 
the sociological study of social cohesion (Pahl, 1991). It is also 
frequent in urban sociology and policy, where declining inner cities or 
neighbourhoods in need of renewal have been the focus of much 
research and numerous policy interventions.  The theme of demise is 
there in the history of the construction of race; Arendt notes of 
Gobineau’s race theory ‘the most surprising aspect of the theory, set 
forth in the midst of the optimistic nineteenth century, is the fact that 
the author is fascinated by the fall and hardly interested in the rise of 
civilizations’ (Arendt, 2004, p226).  There is also, although not 
covered in this thesis, a history and literature of racial decline, 
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necessitating the preservation of racial purity enacted, in some 
societies, through prohibitions against inter-racial marriage, and 
driving the 19th century eugenicists to evolve better, statistical 
methods for measuring racial difference. The demise of shared 
values and decline of national identity are core themes of the modern 
political debates of immigration and ethnic diversity in Britain. The 
decline of social capital is a core theme in Putnam’s work; Hallberg 
and Lund characterise Putnam’s work as ‘the literature of doom’ 
(2005, p65). The demise of a shared American identity is the central 
theme of Huntington’s Who Are We? (2004). Decline is a strong 
theme in Dench, Gavron and Young’s study of race and conflict in 
Bethnal Green, their view being that welfare policies are responsible 
for the decline of self-help family and community networks (2006).     
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CHAPTER FOUR:  THE PUTNAM STUDIES 
 
4.1 Findings from the Putnam studies 
 
Table ii: The Putnam studies 
 
Author Date  Country Geographic 
level of analysis 
Key explanatory 
variables 
Key outcome 
variables 
Taylor 1998 US Neighbourhood Ethnic diversity Racial 
attitudes 
Alesina and 
Ferrara 
2000 US Metropolitan area Ethnic diversity & 
linguistic diversity 
Trust 
Glaeser et al 2000 US Not applicable Ethnicity Trust 
Oliver and 
Wong 
2003 US  Neighbourhood Ethnic diversity Inter-racial 
attitudes 
Costa and 
Kahn 
2003 US Metropolitan area Ethnic diversity Social capital 
Duffy 2004 UK Not stated Ethnic diversity Life 
satisfaction 
Trust 
Pennant 2005 UK   Ward  Ethnic diversity Trust 
Flore 2005 UK MSOA* Ethnic diversity Social capital 
Coffe and 
Geys 
2006 Belgium  Municipality Nationality Social capital 
Dixon 2006 US Metropolitan area Ethnic diversity Inter-racial 
attitudes 
Leigh 2006 Australia Postal district Ethnic diversity & 
linguistic diversity 
Trust 
Anderson 
and 
Paskeviciute 
2006 World-
wide 
Country Ethnic diversity & 
linguistic diversity 
Trust, Political 
& Civic 
engagement 
Putnam 2007 US   Neighbourhood & 
metropolitan area 
Ethnic diversity & 
immigration 
Social capital 
Gesthuizen 
et al 
2008 Europe Country Ethnic diversity Social capital 
Laurence 
and Heath 
2008 UK    MSOA Ethnic diversity Community 
cohesion 
Letki 2008 UK   Neighbourhood Ethnic diversity Social capital 
Stolle et al 2008 US & 
Canada 
Neighbourhood Ethnic diversity Trust 
Andrews 2009 UK   Local authority 
district (LAD) 
Ethnic diversity Social 
cohesion 
Twigg et al 2010 UK   MSOA Ethnic diversity Social 
cohesion 
Fieldhouse 
and Cutts  
2010 UK & US Census tract US 
MSOA UK 
Ethnic diversity Social capital 
Sturgis et al 2010 UK   MSOA Ethnic diversity Trust 
Wickes et al 2011 Australia Suburb Linguistic 
diversity  
Social 
cohesion & 
Trust 
Laurence 2011 UK MSOA Ethnic diversity Social 
cohesion & 
Social capital 
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Author Date  Country Geographic 
level of analysis 
Key explanatory 
variables 
Key outcome 
variables 
Gijsberts et 
al 
2011 Nether-
lands 
City Ethnic diversity  Social 
cohesion 
Uslaner 2011 UK and 
US 
Not stated Ethnic 
segregation 
Trust 
Pendakur 
and Mata 
2012 Canada City Ethnic diversity Social capital 
Saggar et al 2012 UK LAD Immigration Social 
cohesion; 
National 
identity, 
Integration 
Laurence 2014 UK MSOA Ethnic diversity Inter-ethnic 
attitudes 
Sturgis et al 2014 UK 
(London) 
MSOA & LSOA**  Ethnic diversity & 
ethnic 
segregation 
Social 
cohesion 
Schmid et al 2014 UK MSOA Ethnic diversity Trust 
*Middle Super Output Area; ** Lower Super Output Area 
 
The group of 30 empirical works shown in Table ii make up the body 
of work which I call the Putnam studies. These can be divided into 
the studies which were published before and those published after 
Putnam’s 2007 E Pluribus Unum; referred to here as the pre-Putnam 
and post-Putnam studies. Robert Putnam’s 2007 publication is very 
much the seminal work in this field, although by no means the first. 
 
The pre-Putnam studies include work by Taylor (1998) in the US to 
measure whether the racial composition of neighbourhoods had any 
association with white attitudes towards other ethnic or racial groups, 
and towards ‘race targeted’ policies. Also from the US is research by 
Alesina and Ferrara (2000) measuring  whether levels of trust vary 
with the ethnic composition of metropolitan areas; work by Oliver and 
Wong (2003) measuring whether perceptions of other racial groups 
vary with the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods; a study by 
Costa and Kahn (2003) measuring the relationship between civic 
engagement and ethnic heterogeneity; and research by Glaeser and 
others (2000) measuring whether ethnic heterogeneity decreases 
trust between social groups. These studies share broadly common 
findings that racial diversity has a negative effect on trust, civic 
engagement and other social qualities. 
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Pre-Putnam studies have also taken place in the UK, Australia and 
Belgium.  Analysing data from the UK Citizenship Survey, Pennant 
(2005) found a significant negative relationship between ethnic 
diversity and generalised trust, although no other relationships 
between ethnic diversity and trust in institutions were statistically 
significant. Flore (2005), also analysing Citizenship Survey data, 
found that ethnic diversity has a strong negative effect on the odds of 
expressing trust in neighbours although, like Pennant, found no 
significant relationships between ethnic diversity and other social 
capital indicators. Duffy (2004) analysed data from the British 
Household Panel Survey and found that life satisfaction is lower for 
people in ethnically diverse areas, although acknowledged that other 
likely explanatory variables were not tested. Coffe and Geys (2006), 
unable to find any suitable survey data for Belgium, used 
administrative data to construct a single measure for social capital 
from three indicators (number of community associations per capita, 
electoral turn out in municipality elections, and crime rate per capita) 
and found a significant, negative relationship between social capital 
and the number of nationalities within Belgian municipalities. 
Although Coffee and Geys conclude that differences in levels of 
social capital cannot be directly attributed to ethnic-cultural 
differences, they are not able to substantiate this in their analysis as 
ethnicity is not included as a variable in their statistical models, 
presumably due to a lack of ethnicity data in Belgium.  A study in 
Australia found that levels of trust were lower in ethnically and 
linguistically heterogeneous areas, with linguistic heterogeneity 
having a stronger effect (Leigh, 2006). Also in this pre-Putnam era, a 
comparative study at national level across 44 countries found that 
ethnic and linguistic diversity decrease levels of interpersonal trust 
but increase interest in politics and the likelihood of belonging to a 
voluntary association (Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006). 
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Putnam’s study, published in 2007, has become the key reference for 
subsequent studies of this subject; of the 17 post-Putnam studies in 
Table ii, only two do not cite Putnam’s 2007 study (Letki, 2008; 
Laurence and Heath, 2008), while seven introduce their studies with 
direct reference to the Putnam study (Gesthuizen et al, 2008; Stolle 
et al, 2008; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Gijsberts et al, 2011; Sturgis 
et al, 2010; Uslaner, 2011;  Wickes et al, 2011).  
 
Using national data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark 
survey and the national census, Putnam modelled the effects of 
immigration and ethnic diversity on a variety of social capital 
indicators including levels of trust, confidence in government and 
other institution, political efficacy (defined as individuals’ confidence 
in their own influence), voter registration and turn out, volunteering,  
perceptions of happiness and quality of life, number of close friends 
and confidants, amount of time spent watching television. Across 
these indicators, Putnam found a pattern of negative association with 
ethnic diversity, leading him to posit that ‘inhabitants of diverse 
communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their 
neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even 
from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its 
leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on 
community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for 
social reform more, but have less faith that they can actually make a 
difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television.’ 
(Putnam, 2007, p151). Putnam concludes that the effect of increased 
ethnic diversity is to reduce social solidarity and social capital as 
residents of all races tend to ‘hunker down’.  He suggests that this 
conclusion supports neither conflict theory nor contact theory and 
labels his ‘hunkering down’ effect as ‘constrict theory’.  
 
Many studies on this subject followed Putnam’s. Responding directly 
to Putnam’s findings in the US, a study by Stolle et al (2008) drew on 
alternative data sources to those used by Putnam and found that 
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while ethnic diversity does have a negative effect on social trust in 
both the US and Canada, the effect is moderated by individual social 
contacts; that is, people with more contacts have higher levels of 
trust. Notably, Stolle’s study is one of the few to differentiate between 
social quality outcomes for ethnic majority and ethnic minority 
populations, and the findings of negative effects on social trust are 
for white majorities (Stolle et al, 2008). In Canada, Pendakur and 
Mata (2012) tested the effects of ethnic diversity on social capital 
which they measure through three indicators; trust in others, 
interactions with others and participation. They report that diversity 
has a negative effect on interactions with others but a positive effect 
on trusting others and participating in organisations. 
 
Various studies have tested whether Putnam’s findings hold true for 
the UK (Letki, 2008; Twigg et al 2010; Sturgis et al, 2010; Laurence, 
2011 and 2014). The general finding is that there is a negative 
relationship between social cohesion or social capital outcomes and 
ethnic diversity in British neighbourhoods, but that this relationship is 
weak and substantially less significant than the effects of deprivation. 
Other post-Putnam studies in the UK include work by Laurence and 
Heath (2008) and by Rhys (2009), and outside the UK, work by 
Wickes et al (2011) in Australia.  Again, the general findings are that 
weak negative relationships between ethnic diversity and various 
aspects of social cohesion or social capital are present, but that other 
indicators have stronger effects than ethnic diversity, notably levels 
of socio-economic deprivation. 
 
Saggar et al (2012) use data from the 2008/09 Citizenship Survey to 
explore the effect of immigration, as distinct from ethnic diversity, on 
social cohesion and integration. Social cohesion is measured by 
combining responses to four questions about neighbourhood 
relations (do local people ‘pull together’ to improve the 
neighbourhood; can people in the neighbourhood be trusted; 
satisfaction with the neighbourhood as a place to live; whether 
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people in the local area get on well together). Integration is measured 
by responses to survey questions on trust in police, local council and 
parliament, sense of belonging to Britain and support for social 
values including equal opportunities and free speech. The analysis is 
conducted at local authority level. Saggar et al conclude that 
immigration has no significant impact on local neighbourhood 
cohesion.  
 
Several studies have sought to examine whether Putnam’s findings 
for the US hold true for the UK by constructing comparative data 
models. Fieldhouse and Cutts (2010) looked at the effects of ethnic 
diversity on attitudinal (e.g. a sense of belonging to a neighbourhood) 
and structural (e.g. involvement in neighbourhood activities) 
indicators of social capital. They found a negative association from 
ethnic diversity on social capital in both the US and the UK, but that 
the negative effects of diversity were smaller for ethnic minorities in 
the UK. Uslaner (2011) undertook a similar US and UK comparative 
study of the effects on social cohesion, but argues that ethnic 
diversity is not a useful explanatory measure and uses instead the 
degree of ethnic segregation within local areas. Uslaner found that 
residential segregation (not ethnic diversity) is responsible for lower 
trust, but that this association is stronger in the US than in the UK. 
Uslaner’s finding that ethnic segregation rather than ethnic diversity 
is the stronger explanatory factor is partly echoed in a study by 
Sturgis et al (2014) which looked at the effects of both on social 
cohesion in London boroughs. The study found that ethnic diversity is 
positively related, and ethnic segregation negatively related, to 
perceived levels of social cohesion at the neighbourhood level.  
 
Some post-Putnam studies have found that ethnic diversity and 
immigration have no relationship with social quality. A cross national 
study of 28 European countries by Gerthuizen et al (2008) found no 
relationship between social capital and ethnic diversity, and firmly 
rejected Putnam’s thesis. 
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Theoretical frameworks 
 
The Putnam studies largely draw on three theoretical frameworks: 
theories of social capital, trust or social cohesion; theories about 
intergroup ethnic relations; and the constrict theory which Putnam 
developed from his own empirical findings.  
 
The theoretical context for Putnam’s study includes his own thesis on 
the decline of social capital in American society (Putnam, 1993, 
2000, 2002). Putnam also uses the contact hypothesis, drawing on 
Allport’s work, to posit that increased ethnic diversity will foster trust 
and solidarity between in-groups and out-groups, and conflict theory 
from the work of Blumer, Blalock and others, to hypothesise that with 
increased ethnic diversity, the more we stick to ‘our own and the less 
we trust “the other”’ (Putnam, 2007, p142). As we have already seen, 
Putnam concluded that neither conflict theory nor contact theory 
explained the findings from his own empirical research, and offered 
instead ‘constrict theory’ to describe a retreat from social contact 
resulting from increased ethnic diversity.   
 
Several of the Putnam studies are located within the ‘contact theory 
vs conflict theory’ framework, including US studies (Taylor, 1998; 
Dixon, 2006) and UK studies (Laurence, 2011 & 2014; Sturgis et al, 
2014; Schmid et al, 2014). Some, Taylor for example, conclude that 
increased ethnic diversity supports conflict theory. Others, Dixon for 
example, reconcile these apparently oppositional theories by 
asserting that conflict exists until reduced through meaningful 
contact, but that the dynamics of this process are complex and vary 
across different sets of inter-ethnic group relations. 
 
Putnam asserts that most empirical studies conducted within the 
theoretical framework of group relations support conflict theory rather 
than the more optimistic contact theory. Putnam’s view that existing 
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empirical evidence more strongly supports the theory that ethnic 
diversity fosters distrust and conflict between groups, is contested by 
some of the post-Putnam studies (for example, Gesthuizen et al, 
2008). 
 
Several of the UK studies which test the contact versus conflict 
hypothesis, conclude that testing ethnic diversity effects within this 
theoretical framework is misleading. They assert that ethnic diversity 
does not lead to negative effects from conflict or positive effects from 
contact, because the measure of ethnic diversity is itself 
misconstrued. Uslaner (2011) for example, argues that ethnic 
diversity in itself does not mean there is any meaningful contact 
between people from different ethnic groups. Other studies build on 
this view, replacing ethnic diversity with a measure of ethnic 
segregation in subsequent studies (Laurence, 2014 for example).  
 
A number of the post-Putnam studies position themselves in relation 
to Putnam’s constrict theory, seeking to test this in other contexts 
including Australia (Wickes et al, 2011) and the UK (Schmidt et al, 
2014).  Wickes et al find tentative support for Putnam’s theory while 
Schmidt et al firmly reject it, concluding that ethnic diversity does not 
inevitably lead people to hunker down, but provides opportunities for 
contact which override any potentially negative effects. A few Putnam 
studies locate themselves in relation to the social capital theories 
developed by Putnam (1993, 2000, 2002) and Fukuyama (1995), 
including Alesina and Ferrara, 2000; Costa and Khan, 2003; 
Pendakur and Mata, 2012. 
 
Trust is a common theme through most of the Putnam studies. Only 
a few of the studies are testing theories about trust (Alesina and 
Ferrera, 2003, for example). However, almost all include trust as an 
outcome variable, either on its own or as a component in an 
aggregated measure of social capital or social cohesion. The trust 
measures vary from study to study. Some use ‘trust in institutions’ 
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such as parliament or the police, others use a measure of 
interpersonal trust derived from ‘the lost wallet question’ (if you found 
a wallet how likely is it that you would return it). The most frequently 
used measure of trust is ‘neighbourhood trust’ (to what extent do you 
trust people in your neighbourhood). 
 
Many of the Putnam studies do not draw on any theoretical model. 
Instead, they describe the scope and conclusions of the empirical 
work (based more or less on the Putnam studies included here) and 
position themselves as testing, challenging or extending this body of 
knowledge. Such studies include pre-Putnam work (e.g. Flore, 2005) 
but tend more often to be from post-Putnam researchers (e.g. Twigg 
et al, 2010; Saggar et al, 2012). 
 
Conclusions of the Putnam studies 
 
There is no consensus on what the findings from the Putnam studies 
point to. Some studies find that ethnic diversity has a negative effect 
on social quality and other studies find that it does not. Broadly, the 
US studies have found stronger negative effects than the studies in 
the UK. However, more of the pre-Putnam studies are in the US and 
more of the post-Putnam studies are in the UK.  As the post-Putnam 
studies have tended to introduce additional data and methodological 
refinements in order to challenge Putnam’s findings, it may well be 
that these differences in approach account for difference in findings, 
rather than intrinsic differences in the American and British situations. 
 
Most of the UK post-Putnam studies have found some negative 
effects on social capital, cohesion or trust from ethnic diversity (Letki, 
2008; Twigg et al, 2010; Sturgis et al, 2010; Laurence, 2011). This 
same group of studies has found that other social factors, particularly 
deprivation, are more important than ethnic diversity for explaining 
reduced social capital or trust (Letki, 2008; Saggar et al, 2012). In 
contrast, Putnam finds that although poverty and other social factors 
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have significant effects on local trust, even when these are controlled 
for, ‘ethnic diversity per se has a major effect’ (Putnam, 2007, p153, 
original italics, my underlining). 
 
Several of the Putnam studies, including Putnam’s, report positive 
effects from ethnic diversity. Putnam (2007) indicates that ethnic 
diversity has a positive effect on several measures of political 
engagement. Pendakaur and Mata (2012) find that ethnic diversity 
increases bridging social capital. Sturgis et al (2014) report that 
ethnic diversity is positively related to perceived social cohesion 
within neighbourhoods. Schmid et al (2014) report an indirect positive 
effect on trust via increased contact resulting from ethnic diversity.  
 
4.2 Critiques of the Putnam studies 
 
External critics 
 
There is a surprisingly limited critique of the Putnam studies. There is 
some critique from within the field itself, primarily methodological. 
The main criticism is Putnam’s use of ethnic diversity rather than 
ethnic segregation as a measure of inter-ethnic contact. Critics argue 
that the fact of ethnic diversity does not in itself mean that there is 
interaction between ethnic groups, and that ethnic segregation is a 
more meaningful indicator in seeking to measure ethnic impacts on 
social outcomes (Uslaner, 2011; Laurence, 2011; Sturgis et al 2014). 
 
The very limited critique from outside this field is directed only at 
Putnam and not at the Putnam studies as a body of work. Dawkins 
(2010) is strongly critical of Putnam’s methodology, including 
Putnam’s use of ethnic diversity rather than ethnic segregation as the 
main explanatory variable of interest. Dawkins also takes issue with 
Putnam’s measurement of local area ethnic diversity using a 
fractionalisation method. Fractionalisation quantifies the amount of 
ethnic variance within a given area but does not distinguish between 
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the ethnic compositions of those areas. A neighbourhood with100% 
white residents will have the same fractionalisation index score as an 
area with 100% black residents. This masks important differences in 
conditions between these areas (Dawkins, 2010). Most of the 
Putnam studies use a fractionalisation index to measure ethnic 
diversity. A notable exception is the study by Laurence and Heath 
(2008) which categorises local areas by their ethnic mix and does 
find some significant differences in levels of community cohesion 
dependent on ethnic group composition. 
 
In a further and most serious criticism of Putnam’s study, Dawkins 
accuses Putnam of a glaring error in his analytical approach. Putnam 
uses linear regression modelling which, Dawkins points out, is 
inappropriate for the ordinal scale of the dependent variables in 
Putnam’s models. The results of Putnam’s study are therefore 
misleading (Dawkins, 2008). 
 
Aside from these methodological concerns, some critics focus on the 
conceptual basis for Putnam’s work. In critiques which pre-figure 
Putnam’s E Plurubis Unum paper, Hero (2003) is concerned that 
Putnam’s analysis of social capital by ethnic group does not take 
ethnic inequalities into account. Putnam advances social capital as 
the measure of a better-off society, where others would consider 
racial equality a more imperative indicator (Hero, 2003). Hallberg and 
Lund (2005) are similarly sceptical about Putnam’s measures of 
social quality and question whether individual attitudes, as drawn 
from survey data, constitute ‘proof’. They point out that these 
individual attitudes are taken out of any historical and cultural 
context. Like Hero, Hallberg and Lund question Putnam’s focus on 
the negative effects of diversity on social capital, arguing that this is 
at the expense of more interesting, more useful questions about the 
relationship between social capital and institutional racism. Rather 
than asking, ‘Why does diversity pose a threat to community?’ they 
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consider the more pertinent question to be ‘Why does community 
pose a threat to diversity?’(Hallberg and Lund, 2005, p65). 
 
Change over time 
 
My primary criticism of the Putnam studies is that they all, without 
exception, analyse the effects of ethnic diversity (or something 
similar) on social quality at one point in time. None of these studies 
attempt to examine ethnic diversity effects as a dynamic process 
which may change over time. Putnam recognises this (2007, pp158-
159). He considers that while the consequences for social capital of 
ethnic diversity and immigration are negative in the immediate and 
short term, there are likely to be longer term benefits (2007, p164). 
However, Putnam is a lone voice in acknowledging that the lack of 
any measure of change over time is an important, missing 
component of this study. The rest of the Putnam study field is quiet 
on this point. 
 
When the relationship between ethnic diversity and social quality is 
measured only at a fixed point in time, there is no way of knowing in 
which direction the relationship might be moving. Are the negative 
effects of ethnic diversity which Putnam identified increasing or 
reducing over time? Further, not only is the relationship measured at 
a fixed time point, but the ethnic diversity component in this 
relationship is measured as a fixed entity and not as a process of 
change. If the level, or stock of ethnic diversity has a negative effect 
on social quality, does the rate of increase, or flow of ethnic diversity 
have the same effect? 
 
The failure of the Putnam studies to measure ethnic diversity flows 
and impacts over time is a major omission. The oversight is 
astonishing given the importance to changing ethnic diversity 
accorded by the studies themselves which, without exception, refer 
to increased ethnic diversity as a starting point for their enquiry. The 
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empirical research is prompted by a process which is acknowledged 
as taking place over time.  Putnam’s own study refers to ‘the 
increase in ethnic and social heterogeneity in virtually all advanced 
countries’. He says that ‘the most certain prediction that we can 
make about almost any modern society is that it will be more diverse 
a generation from now than it is today.’ And that he wants to look at 
‘the implications of that transition’. These references to increase, 
generation and transition powerfully evoke the sense of dynamic 
movement across time, and all appear in his opening paragraph 
(2007, p137).  Without measures of flow and change over time, the 
Putnam studies can neither predict where the relationship between 
ethnic diversity and social quality is headed, nor describe its 
historical path.  
 
The fixed point measure of ethnic diversity is at odds with the 
dynamic conceptualisation of race relations which underpins the 
intergroup theories which are employed by the Putnam studies. 
Intergroup theories conceive race relations as shifting relationships 
between groups. We have already seen that intergroup theories see 
the patterns of these relationships change over time; straight line 
assimilation takes place over generations. In Blumer’s symbolic 
interactionist approach (1958), ethnic group relations are always in a 
state of potential flux, changing through the continual process of 
interaction. There is a profound epistemological conflict inherent in 
reducing Blumer’s dynamic group position model to a static measure 
of group relation effects.   
 
Similarly, fixed point measures of social quality are conceptually at 
odds with the view of social quality in decline. As ethnic diversity 
increase is a process which happens over time, so social quality 
decline is a process which can only take place over time. The 
temporal dimension is essential to both.  
 
112 
 
Even Putnam’s fans seem not to notice that his analysis lacks any 
historical dimension. One of Goodhart’s main arguments is that 
modern liberalism has a ‘thin and unhistorical understanding of 
people and societies’ (2013, p13). But Putnam’s unhistorical analysis 
is a prime source of Goodhart’s evidence for the negative 
consequences that modern liberal multiculturalism has allowed 
through increased ethnic diversity. 
 
If measures of the relationship between ethnic diversity and social 
quality are to be of any value, it is critical that they consider the 
dynamic of this relationship over time.   
 
Measuring social quality 
 
The Putnam studies use a narrow set of measures to demonstrate 
what ethnic diversity is having an impact on. As previously 
highlighted, understanding and analysis of the relationships between 
these various dimensions of social quality are fluid and still evolving. 
The main dimensions included in the Putnam studies, social capital, 
cohesion and trust, are used flexibly, without consistency, and with 
no reference to any wider understanding of what comprises social 
quality and where social capital, for example, fits within this. This 
fluid, untethered approach to social quality creates several 
difficulties. 
 
Firstly, there is no consistency in the measures of social quality 
employed in the Putnam studies. The most commonly used 
measures are of social capital, social cohesion or trust. Some studies 
examine impacts on more than one social quality indicator: Anderson 
and Paskeviciute (2006) look at trust, political and civic engagement; 
Laurence (2011) looks at social cohesion and social capital; Wickes 
et al (2011) look at social cohesion and trust; Saggar et al (2012) 
select social cohesion, national identity and integration. Broadly, the 
US studies tend to focus on social capital, while the UK studies look 
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at social cohesion, but there are exceptions; Letki, for example, looks 
at social capital in the UK (2008).  
 
What these aspects of social quality represent and how they are 
measured differs from study to study. Confusingly, the terms social 
cohesion and social capital are used flexibly and sometimes 
interchangeably within the same studies; examples of this tendency 
include Letki (2008) who measures diversity effects on social capital 
but discusses these effects in terms of social cohesion, and Sturgis 
et al (2014) who summarise Putnam’s 2007 findings on social capital 
as ethnic diversity effects on social cohesion.  Even where studies 
are ostensibly using the same measure of social quality, they 
construct this in different ways. Letki’s (2008) measure of social 
capital is not the same as Putnam’s (2007), for example; some 
indicators within their social quality measures are similar (e.g. do you 
trust people living in this neighbourhood), while others are used by 
Putnam but not Letki (e.g. are you currently registered to vote) and 
others are used by Letki and not Putnam (e.g.receiving unpaid help 
from organisations or individuals).  
 
The use of different measures complicates the comparability of 
findings from the Putnam studies. Does ethnic diversity have a 
positive effect on social capital in Canada (Pendakur and Mata, 
2012) and a negative effect on social capital in the US (Putnam, 
2007) and the UK (Letki, 2008) because of differing national 
circumstances, or because of differences in how social capital is 
measured? 
 
Secondly, the Putnam studies lack any wider framework for 
understanding social quality. The social quality outcomes (social 
capital, trust etc) stand alone in these studies, without reference to 
any complementary or competing ways in which social quality might 
also be defined or perceived. To take just one frequently used 
measure, social capital is explicitly or implicitly presented as an 
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attribute that makes us ‘better off’. But there is little consideration of 
how this better off-ness works in relation to other aspects of social 
quality. Who is better off for having more social capital? Is social 
capital a more important indicator of better off-ness than, say, 
economic equality? These are similar to the concerns that Hero 
(2003) and Hallberg and Lund (2005) level at Putnam, but they apply 
to all the Putnam studies. 
 
Finally, and as a consequence of the lack of any social quality 
framework, there is a tendency within some Putnam studies to apply 
the findings for one measure of social quality to much larger 
conclusions about American or British society. Putnam’s study is 
probably the most egregious example of this. Putnam defines social 
capital as ‘social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity 
and trustworthiness’ (2007, p137). Although he does not locate social 
capital within a wider framework of social quality, we can see from 
this definition that social capital does not represent everything which 
might constitute social quality, but some specific aspects of it. 
Perhaps ‘networks’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘trust’ make up the greater part 
of social quality; it seems doubtful and Putnam makes no case for 
this. Yet Putnam’s conclusions about ethnic diversity effects on social 
capital are written in very grand terms, including ‘America’s historical 
identity as a nation of immigrants’  and the ‘great achievement of 
human civilization’ (2007, pp164-165). There may be no intention of 
‘bigging up’ the research findings, but this discursive extrapolation 
from the modest parameters of the study to the limitless scope of 
human civilization is clearly suggestive of a much wider relevance. 
 
Whose social quality? 
 
There is little or no analysis within these studies of whether social 
quality is differently perceived by different ethnic groups. Exceptions 
are Stolle (2008) in the US and Fieldhouse and Cutts’ comparative 
study of the US and Britain (2010). Both find that the negative effects 
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of ethnic diversity on social capital are true for white majority 
populations but not for ethnic minorities. This finding is stronger in 
Britain than in the US, leading Fieldhouse and Cutts to suggest that 
Britain’s ethnic minorities are considerably more comfortable than 
white people when living in diverse areas, regardless of the ethnic 
composition of the area.  
 
Measuring immigration impacts 
 
Putnam’s study makes an important distinction between immigration 
and ethnic diversity. The study finds that the negative effects on 
social capital are stronger in areas with a high percentage of 
immigrants than they are in areas with high levels of ethnic diversity. 
Other studies which distinguish between immigrants and ethnic 
diversity report the same finding (e.g. Laurence and Heath 2008). 
Surprisingly, not all studies make this distinction in their predictor 
variables, including UK studies which explicitly address Putnam’s 
conclusions (including Rhys 2009, Twigg et al 2010, Sturgis et al 
2010).  Demivera (2015) has highlighted the relative lack of work on 
the social effects of immigration in the UK.  
 
Using subjective and objective measures 
 
The Putnam studies tend to rely on attitudinal data to measure social 
quality. The outcome variables in almost all the studies are taken 
from survey questions which ask people to give their views on 
various aspects of social quality. The findings and conclusions from 
these studies are therefore findings and conclusions about how 
people perceive the social cohesion of the areas they live in. This 
important point, that the conclusions are about attitudes to or 
perceptions of social cohesion, is noted by Fieldhouse and Cutts 
(2010), who distinguish between indicators of structural dimensions 
of social capital and those of attitudinal dimensions.  Only one study 
uses what could be described as objective outcome indicators by 
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using variables derived from administrative rather than survey data; 
Coffe and Geys’ (2006) study of the relationship between social 
capital and the number of nationalities in Flemish municipalities. No 
studies use objective data to corroborate, or review, the attitudinal 
data used to construct their outcome variables. 
 
None of the published work uses both types of indicator in one study. 
This apparent omission has precluded any direct comparison of 
whether structural and self-reported indicators of social quality are 
affected in similar ways, or in any way at all, by ethnic diversity and 
immigration. We do not know whether subjective and objective 
measures tell the same story about the social effects of ethnic 
diversity and immigration. 
 
The applicability of the theoretical models   
 
Where the Putnam studies draw on any theoretical framework, it 
tends to be the conflict versus contact hypothesis, or something 
similar, from the US ethnic intergroup theories. I have a number of 
concerns about the applicability of this theoretical framework to this 
field of enquiry in general and to the UK studies in particular.  
 
Firstly, it is not clear that the common presentation of conflict and 
contact theories as oppositional is appropriate. Putnam calls these 
‘two diametrically opposed perspectives on the effects of diversity on 
social connections’ (2007, p141). On one side, the theory of ethnic 
conflict (sometimes also presented as ‘the power threat’ or ‘real 
conflict’ hypothesis) is presented as a competition between ethnic 
groups in which a dominant or majority group becomes hostile to a 
subordinate or minority group as the subordinate group threatens its 
economic and social position. Contact theory is presented on the 
opposing side, as predicting that inter-group relations can be 
improved through first-hand social contact which corrects negative 
racial stereotypes.  
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But in my reading of Blumer (on conflict theory) and Allport (on 
contact theory) the critical opposition is not conflict and contact, but 
collective and individual. Blumer  (1958) and Allport (1958) offer 
similar explanations for the ascription of racial groups and of 
dominant and subordinate group positions, of how group identities 
are maintained through abstraction (Blumer) or scapegoating 
(Allport) of subordinate groups. The difference is in Allport’s 
psychological approach, which locates the values of racial prejudice 
and actions to overcome this within the individual, and Blumer’s 
sociological approach which situates these within the social position 
of the group. Ultimately, Allport’s outlook is more optimistic, as 
individual attitudes can be changed, with contact as one method for 
this. Blumer suggests that race prejudice only declines when the 
sense of group position is eroded by ‘big events’ (Blumer, 1958, p6). 
 
The contact/conflict hypothesis is resolved in some Putnam studies; 
Dixon (2006), for example, finds that both are supported. However, I 
am not convinced that conflict and contact represent the right 
dichotomy. The individual/collective contrast appears more strongly 
theoretically grounded and perhaps should therefore be the focus of 
these empirical investigations. The Putnam studies which use multi-
level modelling to simultaneously analyse individual-level and area-
level effects are already separately positioning individual attitudes 
and collective features methodologically, although not theoretically. 
In these studies, Putnam’s included, conclusions about conflict or 
contact are drawn from effects measured at area-level which, in my 
view, enables only an acceptance or rejection of Blumer’s group-level 
conflict theory and not Allport’s individual-level contact theory. An 
empirical investigation of Blumer versus Allport would require testing 
whether racial prejudice is overcome by individual contacts or 
collective events; this is not something which any Putnam study has 
yet investigated.        
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Secondly, it seems doubtful whether the US ethnic intergroup model 
is applicable to the UK. Oliver and Wong (2003) highlight that the 
threat or conflict hypothesis was formulated about two specific racial 
groups (whites and blacks) in a sharply defined historical 
relationship, and question whether this is a suitable model for 
explaining white attitudes towards other ethnic groups in the US. We 
should ask the same of the UK, where several of the Putnam studies 
have adopted this theoretical framework (Laurence, 2011; Sturgis et 
al, 2014, for example). Can a model which supposes an ethnically 
heterogeneous majority and an in-coming ethnic minority really be a 
helpful way to conceptualise ethnic relations in 21st century Britain?  
Even in the 1960s, Rex and Moore (1967) argued that the immigrant-
host conceptualisation of the Chicago school assimilation model was 
inappropriate for Britain, as it casts ethnic minorities as outsiders and 
disregards the dynamics of inequality. Fifty years on, in a vastly more 
diverse Britain where half the ethnic minority population was actually 
born, the majority/minority group model is surely less relevant than 
ever.  
 
As a slight aside, if the US intergroup theories are considered 
appropriate for understanding ethnic relations in the UK, it is puzzling 
that the UK Putnam studies draw mainly on the conflict/contact 
hypothesis and not on others within this framework. Moscovici’s 
theory that successful majorities can afford to accommodate minority 
groups, while unsuccessful majorities cannot, certainly would seem 
to warrant closer examination (Moscovici, 1976). This model would 
work well for studies which look at deprivation to explain ethnic 
diversity effects, Letki’s (2008) for example. 
 
A final challenge to the theoretical positioning of the Putnam studies 
is whether the intergroup theories actually lend themselves to 
positivist empiricism. When these studies draw on Blumer’s group 
conflict model, they draw on the theoretical framework of the 
symbolic interactionists. But they do so without adopting the 
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epistemological framework and methodological approaches which 
are intrinsic to this theoretical tradition. The Putnam studies use 
static measures when symbolic interactionism considers that social 
relations are always in a state of change. The Putnam studies use 
scientific quantitative data analysis rather than the participant 
observation and ethnographic methods which are needed to ‘develop 
a familiarity with what is actually going on in the sphere of life under 
study’ (Blumer, cited in Lal, 1986, 284). 
 
4.3 Conclusions from Part One 
 
Part one of this thesis has drawn a contextual map of the ideas, 
theories and studies within which my empirical study is situated. On 
the outer edges of the contextual map lie the concepts that enable 
any quantitative study of ethnicity: the idea of racial difference and 
the establishment of quantification and measurement. Quantitative 
study of ethnic diversity has its roots in the separate but intertwining 
histories of these two themes. Both are creations of early Western 
European ways of seeing the world and of organising the world into 
manageable and profitable components. Both have shared the 
appearance that they are natural or innate ways of doing things, 
although the general belief that this is true of ‘race’ has declined. In 
contrast, our faith in the value of quantification is undiminished. The 
organisation of the social world into entities that can be counted and 
measured is the fundamental basis of key Western intellectual 
traditions, including positivist sociology. Our strong ‘trust in numbers’ 
(Porter, 1995) imbues these approaches with a sense of detachment 
and objectivity. Putnam’s conclusions typify this approach when he 
talks about ‘scientific examination’ to establish ‘the facts’ and ‘the 
reality’ of the negative effects of ethnic diversity (Putnam, 2007, 
p165). 
 
The history of ethnicity meets the history of quantification and 
measurement at frequent points, often in the form of racial 
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classification. This is also the point where administrative processes 
for understanding and managing populations meet the social 
research processes that enable researchers to build theories about 
those populations. The idea and practice of racial classification recur 
regularly as the logical expression of the ways of thinking that enable 
a quantitative study of ethnic diversity and social quality to take 
place. If no other evidence were needed, the development of so 
many different forms of racial categorisation with so few common 
categories demonstrates that racial classification has no innate, 
natural or scientific rationale but, rather, reflects the social and 
political outlooks of the societies they appear in.  
 
Ethnicity and quantification meet again in the emergence of statistics 
as a scientific process for measuring differences between people. 
Statisticians have helped to set the boundaries of group difference, 
by ethnicity, by intelligence, or in other forms. The development of 
statistical methods in pursuit of eugenicist ideals and their continued 
application to measures of ethnic difference and to ethnicity as a 
causal variable mean that the methodology itself may be racialized. 
That is, the use of statistical analysis contributes to the production of 
racial difference and to the maintenance of racial hierarchisation and 
inequality which are integral to this. 
 
Working inwards on the contextual map, concerns about immigration 
and ethnic diversity are frequently articulated in terms of social 
impacts, with a particular focus on localities as the spatial level of 
concern regarding these impacts. The key debates in recent years, 
including those focused on immigration, privileging, social cohesion 
and segregation, have engaged academic researchers and theorists, 
politicians and policy makers, journalists and media commentators. 
These debates are fluid, evolving, intersecting and overlapping. They 
are also highly politicised and are particularly subject to changes in 
political ideology. Statistical data, sometimes the exact same data, 
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are presented as evidence in support of arguments from opposing 
sides of these debates. 
 
The theoretical framework for understanding the social impacts of 
immigration and ethnic diversity is shaped by the work of American 
sociologists and social-psychologists. The framework includes 
conflict and contact theories, the assimilation cycle and, more 
recently, Putnam’s constrict theory. The theories within this 
framework are based on a conceptualisation of society as comprising 
a ‘host majority’, invariably this is the white population, and ‘ethnic 
minorities’. The theoretical propositions concern the ways in which 
the majority population accommodate the minority, or not. While 
some race experts have rejected this framework as inappropriate to 
the British context, it is still applied to UK empirical studies. The lack 
of any agreed theoretical framework for understanding ethnic 
relations in Britain in part explains why the US theories are borrowed, 
although perhaps a greater part of the explanation lies in how well 
the intergroup theories lend themselves to operationalisation as 
variables within statistical analysis. The search for a distinctly British, 
testable theory of ethnic diversity effects has long since been 
eclipsed by the post-structural diffusion of ethnic studies along 
multiple epistemological, theoretical and empirical branches.   
 
At the centre of the contextual map lie the Putnam studies; a growing 
body of quantitative empirical studies of the relationship between 
ethnic diversity and social quality. The benchmark study in this field 
is Putnam’s 2007 investigation into the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and social capital. Putnam’s finding that ethnic diversity 
reduces social capital has prompted other researchers to explore 
whether this holds true for other societies or for other aspects of 
social quality. The conclusions from this body of work are mixed and 
there are some aspects of the topic that clearly merit further 
investigation.   
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Across this contextual map, race and ethnicity are always perceived 
as problematic. Whether ethnic diversity causes social problems, 
even wars, or whether social structures cause ethnic inequalities, 
whether individual identities are shaped by racialized cultural 
representations or whether race is an ideological diversion from 
economic exploitation. There is no apparent way of looking at 
ethnicity without associating it with trouble, conflict, problems. 
Perhaps the only way to stop conceiving of ethnicity as problematic is 
to stop investigating it. Or perhaps we need to investigate the 
problem in order to solve it. My own study takes place within this 
problematised arena.       
 
My study 
 
My empirical study contributes to this field by developing a 
methodological approach which shares the characteristics of the 
Putnam studies while seeking to address the gaps which are evident 
in this body of work. My study addresses the same question as the 
Putnam studies: does increasing ethnic diversity have any 
measurable effect on social quality in local neighbourhoods? It works 
within the methodological approach adopted by the Putnam studies, 
using multi-level modelling of large datasets.  
 
Because my study rests on the conceptual assumption that ethnic 
relations can be conceived as a measurable relationship between 
groups (Brubaker’s groupism), my research is implicitly operating in 
the same theoretical space as the intergroup theories utilised by the 
Putnam studies. However, in a departure from the positivist 
convention, my study does not draw on this theoretical framework to 
posit a testable hypothesis. This is because, having questioned the 
validity of applying these theories to the UK, it makes no sense to 
then adopt them for my own study. In the absence of a testable 
theorisation of race relations in a British context, I find that my study 
lacks any theoretical model from which to derive testable 
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hypotheses. As a theoretical basis, my study follows the convention 
established by the post-Putnam field, which loosely asks ‘Is Putnam 
right?’  
 
My study seeks to address those gaps in the Putnam studies which I 
consider most significant and which can be tackled within a single 
study. There are three, two of which are articulated in the primary 
research questions for this study and a third which offers an 
interesting, additional area of supporting enquiry.  
 
Firstly, my study addresses the lack of a wider framework to underpin 
the elements of social quality being examined. The Putnam studies 
are concerned with measuring the relationship between ethnic 
diversity and a variety of indicators, most of which are intended to 
signify social cohesion or social capital. Although both social 
cohesion and social capital can be viewed as broad concepts, 
covering a range of social dimensions, they are reduced to fairly 
narrow measures within these studies, in some cases to a single 
survey question (e.g. Stolle et al 2008, Rhys 2009). Little of the 
existing work defines social quality more widely to include, for 
example, measures of efficacy, empowerment or equality. Putnam 
uses a wider range of social quality indicators than most, although 
reports more extensively on findings for the social capital measures. 
My study employs a social quality framework which locates social 
capital, social cohesion and trust as components within a broader set 
of elements which could comprise social quality. The use of a wider 
social quality framework allows for a wider set of social quality 
outcomes to be investigated. In this way, my study seeks to broaden 
the narrow scope of the Putnam studies. 
 
Secondly, my study will rectify the lack of any time dimension within 
the existing studies. All use cross-sectional survey data to look at the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and aspects of social quality at 
a fixed point in time. None consider whether these relationships 
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change over time, although Putnam acknowledges that this may be 
critical. My study develops measures to account for both the change 
over time in local areas (a dynamic measure of ethnic diversity) and 
the rate of change in ethnic diversity within local areas (the flow of 
ethnic diversity). Using these measures, the study explores the 
trajectory of the relationship between ethnic diversity and measures 
of social quality, to consider what this can tell us about ethnic 
diversity as a process. To support this investigation, my study 
examines the effects of both ethnic diversity and immigration. If we 
consider that immigration is a process which leads to ethnic diversity, 
then it makes sense to look at whether these processes have the 
same or different effects on social quality, and whether those effects 
change in the same direction over time.  
 
Finally, my study addresses the over-reliance of the Putnam studies 
on individual level, self-reported survey data to provide measures of 
social quality. With only one exception (Coffe and Geys, 2006), the 
empirical studies in this field rely on survey data to construct their 
social outcome variables. Most of the variables derived from this 
survey data are attitudinal (e.g. Do you think your neighbourhood is a 
safe place to live?), although some measure behaviours such as 
frequency of contact with neighbours, membership of community 
associations, or amount of time spent volunteering. 
 
The key issues here are, firstly, that the use of attitudinal indicators 
means that studies are measuring the impact of ethnic diversity on 
individual perceptions of social quality. A negative effect on social 
quality says something about how ethnic diversity or immigration may 
influence individual perceptions of aspects of social quality, but 
leaves much unsaid about how social quality behaves outside of 
those perceptions. It is entirely possible that a perception of social 
quality in decline is not supported by objective, or structural 
measures of social quality; the subjective perceptions and the 
objective data may tell different stories. Secondly, measuring social 
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quality at the individual level, through survey data, and the factors 
which may influence this at area level, allows for an exploration of 
area effects on individual outlook. This multi-level analysis is made 
possible by multi-level statistical modelling software, as used in this 
study. But the multi-level conceptualisation overlooks what area level 
effects there may be on area level social quality outcomes; do area 
level ethnic diversity and immigration effect area level social quality 
in the same way as individual perceptions of social quality?  
 
Of these three areas for examination, the first two are original areas 
of research which have not previously been investigated. They are 
framed in the primary research questions of this thesis: 
 
 Do ethnic diversity and immigration have any effects on a range 
of indicators of social quality in local areas of England? 
 
 Do any effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality change over time?  
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PART TWO: THE STUDY 
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CHAPTER FIVE:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the research design and methodology used to 
address the primary research questions:  
 Do ethnic diversity and immigration have any effects on a range 
of indicators of social quality in England?  
 Do any effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality change over time? 
The chapter begins with a brief recap of the gaps in this field of work 
and how they are addressed in this study. The chapter moves on to 
explain the variables selected for the study, which data sources they 
are derived from and how the study datasets were constructed. The 
final sections in this chapter explain the methods used to analyse the 
data, how the outputs from the data analysis are interpreted, and the 
results from preliminary data testing and analysis. 
 
5.1 Research design 
 
This study addresses three shortcomings which are apparent in the 
existing body of empirical research in this field. These are: 
1. The absence of any framework for social quality within which to 
locate distinct aspects of social quality and, linked to this, the 
narrow range of social outcomes which are commonly 
investigated; 
2. The lack of any temporal dimension within existing studies;  
3. The over-reliance on individual-level, self-reported survey data to 
measure social quality. 
 
The study aims to develop the methodology for measuring the 
relationship between social quality and ethnic diversity/immigration 
by addressing these issues, specifically by: 
 Using a social quality framework as the basis for selecting a 
comprehensive set of social quality outcome indicators. The study 
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uses a social quality framework developed by Berman and 
Phillips (2000) to operationalise Beck’s (1997) concept of social 
quality; 
 Measuring the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on a 
wide range of social quality indicators, as derived from the 
Berman and Phillips social quality framework. The study 
measures ethnic diversity and immigration effects on eleven 
separate indicators of social quality; 
 Examining changes in the relationship between ethnic diversity 
and immigration and social quality over time, by (a) comparing 
data from two time points, 2001 and 2011, and (b) measuring the 
effects of rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration on 
social quality; 
 Recognising immigration and ethnic diversity as separate 
indicators and including both within the study; 
 Using both individual-level, self-reported data and area-level, 
structural data to measure social quality. 
 
Main data source 
 
The main source of data used in this study is the Citizenship Survey 
(Home Office Communities Group BMRB Social Research, 2003; 
Department for Communities and Local Government, Ipsos MORI, 
2012).2  
 
                                            
2 The dataset for the final Citizenship Survey was approved for use in this research 
study by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) in June 
2012, prior to public release. Geographic variables below regional level are not 
included in the Citizenship Survey data on public release, so permission from 
DCLG to obtain and use LAD and MSOA variables for the 2001 and 2011 datasets 
was required. This process, from requesting permission to receiving the LAD 
variables (the MSOA variable was also provided for the 2001 dataset but was not 
available for the 2010/11 data), took eleven months. 
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The Citizenship Survey was a national survey commissioned by the 
UK government to provide an evidence base on the state of 
community cohesion across local areas in England. The Citizenship 
Survey first took place in 2001 and was repeated in 2003 and 2005. 
From 2005, the survey moved to a continuous design. In January 
2011, the government announced the cancellation of the Citizenship 
Survey and field work was concluded on 31 March 2011. Around 
10,000 individuals were surveyed in each round, with an additional 
booster of about 5,000 ethnic minority respondents. The Citizenship 
Survey provides an ideal data source for studies of ethnic diversity 
and social quality and has been used for many of the UK Putnam 
studies (Pennant, 2005; Flore, 2005; Laurence and Heath,2008; 
Letki, 2008; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Uslaner, 2011; Laurence, 
2011& 2014).  
 
The spatial level for measurement 
 
This study looks at the relationship between immigration, ethnic 
diversity and social quality at a local-level. The selection of an 
appropriate spatial level for local-level analysis is problematic.  
 
There is no shared understanding of how ‘local’ should be defined. 
The Putnam studies use different spatial levels of analysis. Many of 
the US studies, including Putnam’s, use census tracts while others 
use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) (e.g. Alesina and Ferrara, 
2000; Costa and Khan, 2003). There are 65,443 census tracts in the 
US, each with a population of around 4,000 and 367 MSAs each 
made up of adjoining counties and including an urban core area of at 
least 50,000 population. By population size, US census tracts 
correspond roughly to the UK’s Middle Super Output Areas (MSOA) 
which have an average population of 7,200. MSOA is the spatial 
level of analysis used in most of the UK studies (as shown in Table ii, 
page 99). The US MSAs roughly correspond to the UK’s local 
authority districts (LAD) for which population sizes range from 2,200 
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(Isles of Scilly) to over 1 million (Birmingham) with a mean population 
of around 160,000 using 2011 population figures. In the UK studies, 
LAD-level analysis is used by Andrews (2009) and by Saggar et al 
(2012). The cross-national studies use the country as the spatial 
level of analysis (Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006; Gerthuizen et al, 
2008). There do not appear to be any systematic differences in study 
findings linked to the spatial level of analysis. 
 
Given the concerns that are expressed about concentrations of 
ethnic minority populations in urban or inner-city areas, it does seem 
likely that the spatial level selection will be an important factor in the 
research design, as the level of ethnic diversity will differ by 
geographic level. If ethnic minority populations are concentrated in 
very specific geographic areas then smaller spatial areas will show 
greater extremes of ethnic diversity, with some areas having very 
high ethnic minority populations and others having almost none. In 
larger spatial areas these extremes will be averaged out, so the 
larger area may show moderate levels of ethnic diversity, while the 
smaller areas within them will indicate very high or very low levels. 
The studies in this field tend to skate over this issue and generalise 
from the findings generated from one level of spatial analysis to 
conclude that this represents a pattern for all areas but which may 
actually only hold true for the spatial level of the analysis; for 
example, Stolle et al, 2008, analyse data at neighbourhood level but 
discuss conclusions about the US and Canada; Gijsberts et al, 2011, 
analyse data at city level but discuss conclusions about the 
Netherlands. This conflation of area-level analysis with country-level 
conclusions is another part of the critique that Dawkins (2008) makes 
of Putnam’s (2007) methodology.  
 
The main options for spatial level within the UK data are LAD and 
MSOA. Both offer advantages and disadvantages. The main 
drawback of using LADs as the spatial level of analysis is that they 
are larger than neighbourhoods or localities, both geographically and 
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demographically. Much of the data used in this and similar studies is 
collected from surveys which ask people to say how they feel about 
their local area or their neighbourhood. For example, the Citizenship 
Survey asks questions about ‘your immediate neighbourhood’ and 
‘your local area’ and while ‘immediate neighbourhood’ is not defined, 
‘local area’ is described as being ‘the area within a 15 to 20 minute 
walk from your home’ (Ipsos MORI and TNS-BRMB, 2010, Annex E, 
p15). While LADs vary in size, all are substantially larger than a 15 to 
20 minute walk. LADs also have considerably larger populations than 
would be expected of a neighbourhood. There is no agreed definition 
of neighbourhood, but populations of 5,000 to 10,000 inhabitants are 
considered to be at the upper end of the scale (The Young 
Foundation, 2010). LAD, therefore, is a larger geographic area than 
some attitudinal indicators of social quality are designed to measure. 
What people think about their local areas, meaning the area within a 
15 to 20 minute walk of where they live, may be very different to what 
they think about the much wider area of the LAD. Applying LAD-level 
measures of social features such as ethnic diversity and immigration, 
to local-level measures of attitude and behaviour, may be 
problematic.  
 
Because they are smaller, MSOAs are a better fit with the design of 
the survey questions which refer to neighbourhood and locality. 
However, not all data is available at MSOA level including, at the 
time that this study was conducted, the 2010/11 Citizenship Survey 
data. The LAD is the lowest geographic level for which data are 
available across all the variables identified for inclusion in this study. 
The LAD-level also ensures a minimum number of lower level units 
(i.e. individuals) within the higher-level units (i.e. LADs), which is a 
factor for consideration in mutli-level modelling, as discussed later in 
this chapter. For these reasons, and despite recognising that in other 
ways this level of spatial analysis is not ideal, this study uses LAD as 
the level of analysis. 
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A final spatial point to highlight is that the various data sources used 
in this study differ in terms of their geographic coverage. It would be 
ideal for this study to cover all of the UK. After all, the relationships 
between ethnic diversity and immigration and social quality are 
relevant across the entire country. But the constraints of the data 
mean that only LADs in England are included. The study findings are 
applicable only to England and any references to ‘national’ in the 
discussion refer to England only. 
 
Measuring change over time 
 
Finding suitable data to measure change over time has been a major 
challenge for this study. The chief difficulty is the lack of social quality 
data which are consistent and therefore comparable across different 
time points.  
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration data are available from the UK 
census and are relatively straightforward to obtain and use. A 
question about ethnicity was first included in the 1991 census, 
enabling a consistent measure of ethnic diversity for the 20-year 
period from 1991 to 2011. Questions about country of origin have 
been asked in each census since 1841. So if immigration is 
measured by the number of people who were born outside the UK, 
reliable data is available for a very long time span.  
 
It is more difficult to find data which measure social quality indicators 
consistently and with large enough samples to enable LAD level 
analysis over any significant timespan. The longest period for which 
relevant and comparable data are available is from 2001 to 2011, 
using data from the Citizenship Survey (for convenience, the 2010/11 
Citizenship Survey data year is referred to as 2011 throughout this 
thesis). Fortuitously, these time points correspond with the national 
census, enabling the study to measure the relationships between the 
ethnic diversity and immigration variables derived from the 2001 and 
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2011 censuses with social quality variables obtained from the 2001 
and 2011 Citizenship Surveys.  
 
The Citizenship Survey offers a wealth of data on social quality, 
covered by a wide range of questions about social capital, social 
cohesion, trust in other people and trust in public institutions. 
Unfortunately for this study, very few of the same questions were 
asked in every survey round. Although the survey offers a data 
source which is comparable over a ten-year time span it provides 
only a limited number of questions for which data can be used to 
track changes on social quality measures over this period.  
 
Measuring ethnic diversity  
 
Most of the Putnam studies test the effects on social quality of 
ethnicity as measured by ethnic diversity, although some researchers 
argue that ethnic segregation is a more appropriate measure (for 
example, Uslaner, 2011; Sturgis et al 2014). The distinction is 
particularly relevant for studies which address the conflict versus 
contact hypothesis (for example, those by Fieldhouse and Cutts, 
2010; Laurence, 2011). Clearly, when seeking to measure whether 
inter-ethnic contact has significant effects on social quality outcomes, 
it is important that the variables which represent ‘contact’ should 
measure this as accurately as possible. Arguably, contact (or lack of 
it) is better measured by ethnic segregation than by ethnic diversity. 
However, contact is not of interest for this study, so ethnic diversity is 
the more suitable measure.  
 
Almost all of the Putnam studies use a fractionalisation method to 
construct an ethnic diversity variable (Laurence and Heath, 2008 and 
Saggar et al, 2012, are exceptions to this). Fractionalisation 
produces a single figure derived from the percentage shares of each 
ethnic group within the population. The advantage of adopting this 
approach is that it is consistent with much of the work in this field. 
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However, there are disadvantages. A fractionalisation measure does 
not reflect the nature of ethnic diversity. Using the fractionalisation 
approach means that studies are unable to consider whether the 
relationship between ethnic diversity and social quality is affected by 
the nature of that diversity. In Britain, the fractionalisation approach 
cannot answer whether areas with White British, Black Caribbean 
and Black African populations, for example, are more or less socially 
cohesive than areas with White British, Indian and Pakistani 
populations. Of the UK Putnam studies, Laurence and Heath (2008) 
and Saggar et al (2012) look at the nature of the ethnic diversity of 
local areas. Both studies identify significant differences in community 
cohesion outcomes depending on the composition of the ethnic mix, 
providing a richer understanding of how the make-up of ethnically 
diverse populations influences social quality outcomes.  
 
Despite its advantage over the fractionalisation measure, analysing 
effects for different ethnic groups (the approach adopted by Laurence 
and Heath and Saggar et al)  is not adopted for this study. Grouping 
local areas by the nature of the ethnic make-up of the population 
introduces an additional layer into the data analysis which greatly 
complicates the interpretation of the data output. It would require 
results to be interpreted by social quality outcome indicators, by 
change over time, and by ethnic make-up categorisations. This is too 
complex for the study to accommodate. In order to keep the data 
output interpretation manageable, and to be consistent with other 
empirical work in this field, a fractionalisation approach is used to 
calculate the ethnic diversity of each LAD.  
 
Measuring social quality 
 
This study uses Beck et al’s (1997) concept of ‘social quality’ as an 
overarching term to encompass social cohesion and social capital 
(the key terms of interest for other studies in this field) and other 
social dimensions such as social inclusion. This provides a 
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theoretical basis for operationalising social quality into measurable 
components, and a frame of reference lacking in the Putnam studies. 
 
It is implicit within the Beck et al definition that social quality operates 
at both collective and individual levels. The first part of the definition 
‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and 
economic life of their communities…’ indicates social quality at the 
collective-level, while the second part ‘…under conditions which 
enhance their well-being and individual potential’ looks to the 
individual-level. The multiple levels at which social quality is 
conceptualised raises important considerations for how it is 
measured and how any effects on this are analysed and interpreted. 
The collective and individual-levels in the Beck et al definition tend to 
be mirrored in social quality variables which are regarded as 
objective and subjective, with collective-level, objective measures 
associated with social indicators, and individual-level, subjective 
measures connected with well-being (Diener and Suh, 1997). The 
focus in this study, in common with the Putnam studies, is on 
collective, area-level effects; that is, on how area-levels of ethnic 
diversity and immigration affect area-level social quality. The 
variables used in this and similar studies combine social features 
measured at area-level, like ethnic diversity, with features measured 
at individual-level, like local trust. The multi-level modelling 
techniques used in these studies allows both individual and 
collective-level measurement of effects on social quality outcomes. 
This complex interplay of subjective and objective, individual and 
collective, actual area-level and aggregated area-level measures has 
the potential to both enrich and confuse the exploration of ethnic 
diversity effects on social quality. This multi-layered analysis provides 
the opportunity to investigate whether objective, area-level measures 
of social quality are affected by ethnic diversity in the same way as 
subjective measures derived from individual attitudes.  
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Berman and Phillips have translated Beck et al’s social quality 
framework into a set of measurable indicators organised within four 
dimensions of social quality; socio-economic security, social 
inclusion, social cohesion and empowerment. Berman and Phillips 
translate social quality into 20 domains, with suggested indicators for 
each of these. Almost entirely these are area-level measures. Table 
iii shows the dimensions, domains and indicators developed by 
Berman and Phillips as a framework for social quality (Berman and 
Phillips, 2000; Phillips and Berman, 2003). 
 
For this study, the ideal would be to use Berman and Philips’ social 
quality framework to guide selection of at least one indicator for each 
domain. Unfortunately, this is not possible. Not all of Berman and 
Philips’ suggested social indicators work at LAD-level, the social and 
cultural empowerment domain for example. For others, LAD-level 
data exists but not for both time points in this study; the social status 
cohesion domain for example. Some changes are also needed to 
incorporate the social capital and civic engagement indicators from 
Putnam’s study.  
 
Taking Berman and Philips’ framework as the starting point, I have 
developed an adjusted social quality framework, shown in Table iv. 
To accommodate the social capital indicators examined by Putnam, 
the adjusted framework adds a ‘social capital’ dimension to Berman 
and Philips’ framework. Within social capital, I have incorporated 
‘civic participation’, which could also fit within the altruism domain on 
the Berman and Philips framework, but which offers a measure of the 
civic engagement activities that Putnam and others associate with 
social capital (Putnam, 2000), and a ‘local trust’ indicator, also 
commonly used as a measure of social capital, but which could also 
fit within the ‘social psychological empowerment’ domain of the 
Berman and Philips framework. Finally, in the social capital 
dimension, I have added the ‘watching TV’ indicator. Time spent 
watching television does not fit anywhere on the Berman and Philips 
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framework, and LAD level data for this is only available for 2001, two 
factors which should exclude it from the study. But this outcome is 
included because Putnam’s finding that people in more ethnically 
diverse areas watch more television contributes to his vivid 
characterisation of how ethnic diversity leads inhabitants ‘to withdraw 
from collective life…and to huddle unhappily in front of the television’ 
(Putnam, 2007, p151). Although no time comparison is possible for 
this outcome, this is outweighed by the opportunity to test this 
particular aspect of Putnam’s study.   
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Table iii:  Berman and Phillips social quality dimensions, domains and 
indicators  
 Domain Social indicator 
Dimension 1: Socio-economic security 
Material security Distribution of net income – by quartiles, deciles etc. 
Employment security Unemployment, temporary, part time employment rates: 
industrial injuries etc. – all by employment sectors 
Housing security Homelessness, housing insecurity: lack of amenities 
Maintenance of health Morbidity and mortality rates 
Dimension 2: Social inclusion 
Inclusion in social 
security system 
Distribution of access to social security services; low 
income by demographic variables (age, sex, region, 
ethnicity, employment status etc.) 
Labour market 
inclusion 
Distribution of discrimination in access to jobs, full time 
and part time employment etc. by demographic variables 
Housing market 
inclusion 
Distribution of access to neighbourhoods, subsidised and 
protected housing: homelessness etc. by demographic 
variables 
Inclusion in education 
system and services 
Distribution of access to and discrimination in educational 
and cultural services by demographic variables 
Political inclusion Franchise. Restrictions on eligibility to stand as an 
elected representative or member of a government 
Inclusion in 
community services 
Distribution of access to leisure facilities and 
neighbourhood services 
Social status inclusion Equal opportunities and anti-discrimination legislation. 
Distribution of access to social and leisure facilities 
Economic cohesion Gini coefficient. Distribution of income and wealth. 
Labour market participation rates 
Social status 
cohesion 
Levels of discrimination by sex, ethnicity, disability etc. 
Subjective perceptions and experiences of discrimination 
Dimension 3: Social cohesion 
Political cohesion Participation rates in elections 
Public safety Crimes against property and individuals in public places. 
Subjective perceptions of safety and risk of crime 
Altruism Participation in and contributions to solidaristic voluntary 
organisations and charities 
Dimension 4: Empowerment 
Social and cultural 
empowerment 
Membership of socially visible and respected groups – 
e.g. police, armed services, judiciary, TV presenters etc. 
and acknowledged contributions to cultural life by 
demographic groups 
Political 
empowerment 
Gender, ethnicity etc. distribution of elected politicians, 
cabinet ministers and prime ministers 
Economic 
empowerment 
Distribution of wealth, business directorships etc. by 
demographic variables 
Social psychological 
empowerment 
Self-reported subjective and holistic evaluations of 
personal empowerment and quality of life. 
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Table iv: Adjusted social quality framework  
 
Domains Indicators for this study 
 
Dimension 1: Socio-economic security 
Material security Income 
Employment security Economic status 
Housing security Deprivation (barriers to housing)  
Residential stability 
Maintenance of health Limiting illness or disability 
Dimension 2: Social inclusion 
Inclusion in social security system Income  
Economic status 
Labour market inclusion Deprivation  (employment) 
Housing market inclusion Deprivation  (barriers to housing) 
Inclusion in education system and 
services 
Qualification level 
Political inclusion Trusting parliament 
Inclusion in community services Trusting the local council 
Trusting the police 
Social status inclusion None identified 
Economic cohesion Economic status 
Deprivation (employment) 
Social status cohesion None identified 
Dimension 3: Social cohesion 
Political cohesion Voter turnout in local elections 
Public safety Feeling safe in local area 
Crime rate 
Altruism Number of registered charities in local 
area 
Dimension 4: Empowerment  
Social and cultural empowerment None identified 
Political efficacy Feeling able to influence decisions 
about local area 
Political empowerment None identified 
Economic empowerment New business formation rate in local 
area 
Social psychological empowerment None identified 
New dimension: Social capital  
Local trust Trusting other people who live in the 
local area 
Civic engagement Civic participation 
Watching TV Watching a lot of TV 
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Identifying outcome and control variables 
 
This study looks at the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on 
indicators of social quality. The aspects of social quality for which 
these effects can be tested are the outcome variables for this study. 
While all the indicators which I have mapped on to Berman and 
Philips’ social quality framework can be considered to reflect aspects 
of social quality, not all are suitable as outcome variables within this 
study. For some indicators, it has already been firmly established that 
there is a significant relationship with ethnicity and/or immigration. It 
makes no sense to re-examine these indicators as social quality 
outcomes, as we already know that there will be effects related to 
ethnic diversity and immigration. For this reason, the indicators need 
to be included in the study as control variables, in order that any 
effects on the social quality outcome variables from ethnic diversity 
or immigration have already taken into account the known effects of 
these variables. 
 
The social quality indicators which need to be considered as control 
rather than outcome variables for this study are those for deprivation, 
ill health, qualifications and crime. The known relationships between 
these social quality indicators and ethnic diversity and immigration 
include the following: ethnic minority groups are more likely than the 
white British population to live in deprived neighbourhoods (Jivraj and 
Khan, 2013 ); some ethnic minority groups have lower than average 
qualification levels, while a greater proportion of immigrants have 
higher-level qualifications than the UK-born population 
(Lymperopoulou and Parameshwaran, 2014); some ethnic groups 
have poorer health outcomes, particularly among older age groups 
(Becares, 2013). There is also a clearly established relationship 
between crime and deprivation, with higher crime rates recorded in 
areas of greater deprivation (Higgins et al, 2010).  
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When the identified social quality indicators are separated into 
outcome and control variables, this results in eleven outcome 
variables across four social quality dimensions and seven control 
variables across three social quality dimensions, as shown in Table 
v.  
 
Table v: Social quality indicators as outcome or control variables  
 
OUTCOME VARIABLES CONTROL VARIABLES 
Dimension 1: Socio-economic security 
 Income 
Economic status 
Deprivation 
Residential stability 
Limiting illness or disability 
(LLI) 
Dimension 2: Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament Qualification level 
Trusting the local council 
Trusting the police 
Dimension 3: Social cohesion 
Voter turnout in local elections Crime rate  
Feeling safe in local area 
Number of registered charities in local 
area 
Dimension 4: Empowerment 
Feeling able to influence decision about 
local area 
 
New business formation rate in local area 
New dimension: Social capital 
Trusting other people who live in the local 
area 
 
Civic participation 
Watching a lot of TV 
 
 
It makes sense to treat the social quality indicators for which ethnic 
diversity and immigration have known effects as control rather than 
outcome variables. This approach is consistent with Putnam’s and 
other studies in this field; for example, Letki (2008) controls for 
deprivation, as do Twigg et all, 2010, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010, 
Saggar et al, 2012). However, this leaves the socio-economic 
security dimension with no outcome variables, so the study is only 
able to explore the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration in non-
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economic spheres of social quality. Indeed, the entire socio-
economic security dimension, because it lacks any outcome 
indicators, will not feature in the main findings from this study. 
Although new business formation is included as an outcome indicator 
of economic empowerment, and so allows for some exploration of 
economic issues, the absence of any socio-economic dimension both 
distorts the original intention of Berman and Phillips’ social quality 
framework, it is now a partial rather than overarching framework, and 
moves the discussion into the realms of personal and social 
behaviours, away from consideration of economic factors and, 
critically, of economic inequalities. These points will be considered 
again in Part Three of this thesis. 
 
Measuring social quality at individual and area-level   
 
The Putnam studies tend to rely on a small number of attitudinal 
indicators to represent aspects of social quality, most commonly 
measures of trust, as self-reported in survey data; for example, 
Alesina and Ferrara, 2000, use generalised trust; Leigh, 2006, uses 
generalised trust and localised trust; Stolle et al, 2008, use 
interpersonal trust. To test whether social quality is affected by ethnic 
diversity and immigration when measured on indicators other than 
those which are self-reported by individuals, this study incorporates 
some area-level indicators of social quality. The self-reported 
indicators are derived from the responses which individuals have 
given in surveys and the area-level indicators are derived from 
administrative or census data which is collected about local areas.  
 
The ideal would be to triangulate the effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration using both individual and area-level measures for the 
same social quality domain, to consider whether individual, 
subjective perceptions of local areas are consistent with objective, 
area-level measures. Data limitations, as ever, mean that not all of 
the social quality dimensions can be tested with both individual and 
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area-level indicators. There are area-level indicators in the social 
cohesion dimension (voter turnout and registered charities) and in 
the empowerment dimension (new business formation), but none 
available for social inclusion or social capital. Although limited, this 
does provide at least some opportunity to test whether individual and 
area-level indicators of social quality tell the same story in terms of 
any effects and changing effects over time of ethnic diversity and 
immigration. 
 
Table vi: Individual and area-level indicators for the social quality 
dimensions  
 
Social quality 
dimensions 
Outcome indicators 
Individual-level Area-level 
Social inclusion   Trusting parliament 
Trusting local council 
Trusting the police 
NONE 
Social cohesion   Feeling safe Voter turnout 
Registered charities 
Empowerment Feeling able to influence  New business 
formation  
Social capital  Local trust 
Civic participation 
Watching a lot of TV 
NONE 
 
 
5.2 Data selection 
 
To meet the methodological challenges described above, the data 
which can be included within this study need to meet two basic but 
fundamental criteria: 
 Measurable at LAD level; 
 Comparable for 2001 and 2011. 
 
The availability and selection of data meeting these criteria are 
discussed in this section. The data required for this study are 
grouped into three types of variable;  
 Explanatory variables. These are the ethnic diversity and 
immigration variables. They are also sometimes referred to as the 
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independent or predictor variables. The study is testing whether 
these variables have any explanatory effect on social quality; that 
is, do ethnic diversity and immigration explain variances between 
LADs in social quality outcomes? 
 Outcome variables. These are the indicators of social quality. 
They are occasionally referred to as the dependent variables. The 
study is testing whether the explanatory variables play any 
significant part in differences in social quality between LADs. 
 Control variables. These are the characteristics which are known 
to have an effect or thought likely to have some effect on social 
quality. The study needs to consider whether any effects on the 
outcome variables from the explanatory variables are 
independent from the effects on the outcome from the control 
variables. 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
Ethnic diversity 
Data on ethnic diversity is from the censuses for 1991, 2001 and 
2011, accessed from the Office for National Statistics’ NOMIS 
service (NOMIS, 2013a). 
 
Ethnic diversity is measured using a fractionalisation method. 
Fractionalisation calculates the probability that two random 
individuals within a given geographic area will be from different ethnic 
groups. The fractionalisation calculation for the 2001 and 2011 ethnic 
diversity variables uses the ethnic origin categories from the 1991 
census. The number of ethnic categories increased for the 2001 
census and again for the 2011 census so, regardless of any real 
increase in ethnic diversity, the level of ethnic diversity would appear 
to be increasing simply because the population is being divided into a 
greater number of categories. The alignment of the 2001 and 2011 
census categories with the 1991 groupings is shown in Table vii. 
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Table vii: UK census classifications for ethnicity 
 
1991  2001  2011  
White White British White: 
English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern 
Irish/British 
White Irish White: Irish 
Other White White: Gypsy or Irish Traveller 
White: Any other White 
Black Caribbean Black Caribbean Black: Caribbean 
Black African Black African Black: African 
Black Other Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
Mixed: White and Black 
Caribbean  
Mixed White and Black 
African 
Mixed: White and Black African 
Other Black Mixed: Any other 
Black/African/Caribbean 
Indian Asian or Asian British - 
Indian 
Asian: Indian 
Pakistani Asian or Asian British - 
Pakistani 
Asian: Pakistani 
Bangladeshi Asian or Asian British - 
Bangladeshi 
Asian: Bangladeshi 
Chinese Chinese or other - Chinese Chinese 
Asian Other Mixed – White and Asian Mixed: White and Asian 
Other Asian Asian: Any other Asian 
Other Mixed – Other Mixed Other: Arab 
Other Other: Any other group 
Mixed: Any other mixed/multiple 
ethnic background 
(10 CATEGORIES)  (16 CATEGORIES) (18 CATEGORIES) 
 
 
An ethnic diversity fractionalisation index score (ED) for each LAD is 
calculated by summing the squared total of the percentage share of 
each of ten ethnic groups within the LAD population. This is shown in 
the following formula, where EG = ethnic group:  
 
ED = (share EG1)2 + (share EG2)2 + (share EG3)2 …+… (share EG10)2 
 
This produces an ethnic diversity score on a scale from 0 to 1 where 
lower scores indicate greater diversity and higher scores indicate 
greater concentration (i.e. less diversity). This is opposite to the way 
that we think about ethnic diversity, where a higher value would 
intuitively indicate more rather than less ethnic diversity, and is also 
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on a reverse scale to the immigration variable. To make the ethnic 
diversity variable consistent with the immigration variable, I have 
reversed the scale and multiplied by 100: 
 
ED = 100 - [(share EG1)2 + (share EG2)2 …+… (share EG10)2 ]*100  
 
The end result is a measure of ethnic diversity on a scale from 0 to 
100, where 0 means no ethnic diversity (i.e. everyone belongs to the 
same ethnic group) and 100 means total diversity (i.e. everyone 
belongs to a different ethnic group).3  
 
Immigration 
Data on immigration is from the censuses for 1991, 2001 and 2011, 
accessed from the Office for National Statistics’ NOMIS service 
(NOMIS, 2013a). 
 
Given the politicised nature of immigration, it is unsurprising that 
methodologies for measuring immigration are strongly contested 
(Dorling, 2011). This study uses a measure of immigration that is 
consistent over the time period and available at LAD level; the 
percentage of the LAD population born outside the UK. This measure 
is not perfect. It includes, for example, British citizens born overseas 
who would not be categorised as ‘immigrants’ in other measures 
(e.g. the children of armed forces personnel serving abroad). But it 
provides a consistent and reliable measure.  
 
To enable closer examination of any overlapping effects from 
immigration and ethnic diversity, two additional immigration variables 
                                            
3 The upper end of the scale is actually nearer to 90. The upper bound is 
determined by the number of ethnic groups in the equation. The upper bound can 
only be 100 if the number of ethnic groups allows for ‘total ethnic diversity’; that is, 
if the number of ethnic groups is the same as the number in the population and if 
the population is evenly distributed across the ethnic groups.  
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are used in this study; black immigration and white immigration. The 
intention is to distinguish between the immigrant population which is 
visibly different from the majority white British population (black 
immigration) and the immigrant population which, in appearance at 
least, may not be distinct from the majority population (white 
immigration). This allows for consideration of whether any effects on 
social quality from ethnic difference are separate from the effects of 
being born outside the UK. 
 
The black immigration and white immigration variables do not 
represent ‘natural’ populations; they are my constructions, based on 
my decisions about what to include and exclude from these 
categories. The black and white immigration variables do not sum to 
the immigration variable. Some countries of birth are excluded 
because it is not clear whether people born there are likely to sit on 
the ‘black’ or ‘white’ end of the visible ethnicity spectrum; people born 
in Central America, South America and the Middle East are not 
included in either the black immigration or white immigration variable. 
 
For this study, black immigration is defined as the population born in 
African, Asian and Caribbean countries. White immigration is defined 
as the population born in Europe or America. Clearly, this is a crude 
approach. It does not account for people born in African, Asian and 
Caribbean countries who identify as ethnically ‘white’ or people born 
in Europe or America who identify as ethnically ‘black’. The approach 
is also somewhat arbitrary in terms of inclusions and exclusions; the 
‘black immigration’ group excludes people from the Middle East who 
are, arguably, a visible population and should therefore have been 
included. Similarly, the ‘white immigration’ group excludes people 
from Australia, an invisible population which should perhaps have 
been included.  
 
Given the arbitrary and changing nature of ethnicity categorisations, 
as discussed in earlier chapters, it is neither possible nor useful to 
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determine ethnicity by country of birth with any accuracy. Although 
the measures constructed for this study are imperfect they 
nonetheless give some indication of the size of the black immigrant 
and white immigrant population in each LAD 
 
Rate of change of ethnic diversity and immigration 
The availability of comparable immigration and ethnic diversity data 
for 1991, 2001 and 2011 enables change over time to be examined 
in two ways. Firstly, by comparing any effects on social quality from 
levels of ethnic diversity and immigration in 2001 with any effects 
from levels in 2011. Secondly, a ‘rate of increase’ variable can be 
constructed to show the increase in the level of ethnic diversity and 
immigration within the LAD.  Two rate of increase variables are used 
in this study, one for ethnic diversity and one for immigration. They 
measure the percentage increase in the level of ethnic diversity or 
immigration within each LAD in the previous 10 years.  So, the ethnic 
diversity rate of increase variable for 2001 shows the percentage 
increase in the LAD ethnic diversity index score from 1991 to 2001 
and the 2011 variable shows the percentage increase in the LAD 
ethnic diversity index score from 2001 to 2011.  
 
Summary of explanatory variables 
The six explanatory variables used in this study are: 
 Ethnic diversity (ED) is the LAD ethnic diversity index score on a 
scale of 0 to 100 where 0 means no ethnic diversity and 100 
represents total ethnic diversity. 
 Immigration (IMM) is the percentage of the LAD population 
which is born outside the UK, where 0% indicates no one is born 
outside the UK and 100% indicates that everyone is born outside 
the UK.  
 Black immigration (Black IMM) is the percentage of the LAD 
population which is born in African, Asian or Caribbean countries, 
where 0% indicates no one is born in Africa, Asia or the 
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Caribbean and 100% means that everyone is born in Africa, Asia 
or the Caribbean. 
 White immigration (White IMM) is the percentage of the LAD 
population which is born outside the UK in Europe or the US, 
where 0% means no one is born in Europe or the US and 100% 
means that everyone is born in Europe or the US. 
 ED rate of increase (EDinc) is the percentage increase from 10 
years previously in the LAD ethnic diversity index score. The 
scale is open-ended. 
 IMM rate of increase (IMMinc) is the percentage increase from 
10 years previously in the percentage of the LAD population born 
outside the UK. The scale is open-ended.  
 
Social quality outcome variables 
 
Operationalising the social quality framework domains into 
measurable indicators of social quality is strongly constrained by the 
availability of data meeting the two basic criteria: measurable at LAD-
level and comparable for 2001 and 2011. The result is that some 
indicators are a better fit for the domain than others. For example, 
Berman and Philips suggest that the economic empowerment 
indicator could be measured as the distribution of wealth and 
business directorships by demographic variables. This data is not 
available at LAD level in England. Instead, the selected indicator for 
this domain is new business formation at local-level. This is a good 
measure for local economic health and does reflect economic 
empowerment to some degree in that new business activity is a 
measure of individual business start-ups, but is missing any measure 
of how that start up activity is distributed across the local population, 
which is what the empowerment domain is driving at. Similarly, 
Berman and Philips suggest that a measure of inclusion in 
community services would be the distribution of access to leisure 
facilities and neighbourhood services. There is no LAD level measure 
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for this and the alternative used here, trusting the local council and 
trusting the police, are not very close to reflecting barriers to 
accessing local services. However, they do provide some indication 
of how people feel about local service providers, and are the closest 
approximations derivable from the available data.  
 
Social inclusion dimension  
Trusting parliament. This variable is constructed from responses to 
the Citizenship Survey question: “Do you trust [parliament] a lot, a 
fair amount, not very much, or not at all?”. For the data modelling the 
response data is collapsed into a binary variable (trusts a lot or a fair 
amount/does not trust very much or at all). 
 
Trusting the local council. This variable is constructed from 
responses to the Citizenship Survey question: “Do you trust [the local 
council] a lot, a fair amount, not very much, or not at all?”. For the 
data modelling the response data is collapsed into a binary variable 
(trusts a lot or a fair amount/does not trust very much or at all). 
 
Trusting the police. This variable is constructed from responses to 
the Citizenship Survey question: “Do you trust [the police] a lot, a fair 
amount, not very much, or not at all?”. For the data modelling the 
response data is collapsed into a binary variable (trusts a lot or a fair 
amount/does not trust very much or at all). 
 
Social cohesion dimension   
Voter turnout in local elections.  Local election turnout has been 
selected as this better reflects the spatial level of analysis for this 
study than general election turnout. This is a continuous variable 
which uses data published by the University of Plymouth Election 
Centre showing the percentage of the registered electorate voting in 
local government elections (Rallings and Thrasher, 2003 & 2011). 
Because local elections are held in different years in different LADs 
the figures are for the year of interest plus or minus one year. So 
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2001 includes turnout data for 2000 to 2002 and 2011 is data for 
2010 to 2012. Data for both time points includes a general election 
year (2001 and 2010) when local election turnouts are always higher 
(Rallings and Thrasher, 2010), so the data can be considered 
comparable between the two time points  
 
Feeling safe. This variable is constructed from responses to the 
Citizenship Survey question “How safe would you feel walking alone 
in this neighbourhood after dark?” The survey responses are in four 
categories which are collapsed into a binary variable for this study 
(feels safe/does not feel safe). 
 
Registered charities. This is a continuous variable constructed from 
unpublished data supplied on request by the Charity Commission. 
The Charity Commission data shows the address of all registered 
charities in England. I used geo-coding software to sort the address 
postcodes into LADs and then calculated the number of registered 
charities by 1,000 population to give a rate of charities per LAD. The 
City of London is an outlier in this data, with many more registered 
charities and a smaller population than most LADs, but would have 
been excluded from the analysis anyway because it is not included 
as an LAD in all datasets. The data for this variable was supplied as 
current in 2013 and is only applied to the 2011 time point. 
 
Empowerment dimension   
Feeling able to influence decisions about the local area. This 
variable is constructed from responses to the Citizenship Survey 
question “Do you agree or disagree that you can influence decisions 
affecting your local area”. The four response categories in the survey 
(definitely agree, tend to agree, tend to disagree, definitely disagree) 
are collapsed into a binary variable (agree/disagree). 
 
New business formation. This is a continuous variable using data 
from the 2001 census (NOMIS 2013b) and the Office for National 
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Statistics (2011a) which shows the number of new businesses 
formed in the past year in each LAD. The number is divided by the 
LAD population and multiplied by 1,000 to calculate the rate of new 
business formation per 1,000 population. The 2001 and 2011 figures 
are not strictly comparable as the measure differs between the two 
time points. The 2001 figures only include new businesses 
registering for VAT while the 2011 figure uses wider measures to 
include smaller, non-VAT registered businesses.  
 
Social capital dimension   
Local trust. This variable is constructed from responses to the 
Citizenship Survey question: “Would you say that many/some/a 
few/none of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted”. The 
responses are collapsed into a binary variable (many or some can be 
trusted/few or none can be trusted). 
 
Civic participation. This is a composite variable within the 
Citizenship Survey datasets. The variable is constructed from 
responses to multiple questions in the Citizenship Survey about 
participation in formal and informal political and volunteering activities 
within the past 12 months. It is a binary variable where yes means 
participated in any activity and no means did not participate in any 
activity.  
 
Watching a lot of TV. This is a binary variable constructed from 
responses to the Citizenship Survey question about the number of 
hours respondents spend watching TV. This question was only asked 
in the 2001 survey. The variable indicates whether respondents 
watch television for more or less than four hours per day. I have 
categorised those watching four hours or more per day as ‘watching 
a lot of TV’. Definitions of what constitutes ‘a lot of TV’ vary across 
research studies and are not always given. My selection of four or 
more hours per day to indicate a lot of TV viewing is arbitrary but not 
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dissimilar from studies of ‘heavy TV viewing’ (for example, Jordan, 
2007). 
 
Of the eleven outcome variables used in this study, eight are 
constructed as categorical (binary) and three as continuous. These 
are the forms that the variables take when used in the data 
modelling. However, the categorical variables are also treated as 
area-level continuous variables for some purposes. For some parts 
of the analysis and discussion it is helpful to compare all the outcome 
variables with each other and this is only possible if the variables 
take the same measurement level. So the eight individual-level 
categorical variables (trusting parliament, trusting the council, trusting 
the police, feeling safe, feeling able to influence, local trust, civic 
participation, watching TV) are occasionally shown as area-level 
continuous variables for this purpose.  In their continuous form, they 
indicate the percentage of survey respondents within the LAD giving 
a positive response to the outcome questions.  
 
To recap, the three area-level social quality indicators (voter turnout, 
registered charities, new business formation) are always in the form 
of continuous variables. The eight individual-level outcome variables 
are measured as categorical, binary variables within the data 
modelling but occasionally take the form of area-level continuous 
variables, to illustrate some points or to make comparisons with the 
area-level variables. Unless otherwise stated, it should be assumed 
that these outcome variables are in their categorical, binary form. 
 
Control variables  
 
To ensure that all dimensions of the social quality framework are 
accounted for, and to be consistent with other empirical studies in 
this field, a series of control variables is included in this study. The 
inclusion of the control variables is intended to account for known or 
likely effects on the social quality outcome variables from the ethnic 
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explanatory variables, so that any statistically significant effects from 
ethnic diversity and immigration can be regarded as additional to the 
effects from other, known factors.  
 
The adjusted social quality framework identifies that the following 
indicators should be included as controls in this study: 
 Income 
 Economic status 
 Deprivation 
 Residential stability 
 Limiting illness or disability 
 Qualifications 
 Crime rate  
 
Beyond the social quality framework, drawing on the literature in this 
field, it is relevant to consider the inclusion of a number of additional 
control variables:  
 Sex  
 Ethnic origin 
 Population density 
 Rural/urban area type 
 Region 
 Age 
 
The control variables are at two levels: individual and area-level. The 
distinction between individual and area-level measurement is critical 
for the data modelling procedures, as explained later in this chapter.  
 
Individual-level control variables 
The individual-level variables are all derived from the Citizenship 
Survey and correspond exactly to the 2001 and 2011 time points 
used in this study. They are:  
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Sex. This variable is included as gender may have a significant effect 
on the outcome variables, particularly for the Feeling safe outcome, 
as women are far less likely to report feeling safe than men. This is a 
binary variable with categories: 
 Male 
 Female.  
 
Qualifications. Qualification level is included at both individual and 
area-level in this study. At individual-level, this is a categorical 
variable with three categories:  
 Degree or higher qualifications;  
 A level or GCSE or equivalent qualifications;  
 No qualifications. 
 
Economic status reflects the employment security domain in the 
social quality framework. This dimension might also have been 
represented by an area-level measure of unemployment. It is used in 
this study to check for any effects from unemployment, which may 
well reduce positive experience of social quality. This is a categorical 
variable with three categories: 
 Employed;  
 Unemployed;  
 Economically inactive. 
 
Ethnic origin.  Although not the primary focus of this study, it is 
within the scope of the research to consider whether social quality 
differs by ethnicity and by immigration status. This variable merges 
data on ethnicity and country of birth to create a categorical variable 
with four categories: 
 UK-born - white;  
 UK-born - visible ethnic minority; 
 Born outside the UK - white; 
 Born outside the UK - visible ethnic minority.  
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Residential stability is included in the social quality framework and 
measured at both individual and area-level in this study. At individual-
level residential stability is measured by the length of time 
respondents report living within their current neighbourhood. This is a 
categorical variable with four categories: 
 Less than 1 year; 
 1 to 5 years; 
 6 to 29 years; 
 30 years or more. 
 
Age. Although not in the social quality framework, age is included as 
a control variable in some Putnam studies where it has been shown 
to have a significant effect in mediating any effects from ethnic 
diversity on social quality (Sturgis et al, 2014). Age is a categorical 
variable with three categories:  
 Younger (age 0 to 24); 
 Middle (age 25 to 64); 
 Older (age 65 or older). 
 
Area-level control variables 
The area-level control variables are derived from different sources, 
as summarised below. In some instances, data was not available for 
the exact 2001 and 2011 points, in which case data from the closest 
available time point was used.   
 
Deprivation.  The key data source for deprivation is the Indices of 
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) (Department for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions, 2000; Department for Communities and 
Local Government, 2011) This data source is used in almost all the 
UK Putnam studies. The IMD is commissioned by the government 
and updated every two years. The IMD data for 2010 uses 38 
separate indicators combined into seven domains to calculate the 
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overall measure of multiple deprivation experienced by people living 
in each local area in England. The IMD domains are: Income; 
Employment; Health and Disability; Education, Skills and Training; 
Barriers to Housing and Other Services; Crime; Living Environment. 
The IMD provides a single deprivation score for each LAD, ensuring 
that all seven of the deprivation domains it covers are controlled for 
in any analysis. In this study, deprivation is a continuous variable 
using IMD scores for Average of Lower Super Output Area (LSOA). 
The IMD 2000 data is used for the 2001 time point and IMD 2010 
data used for the 2011 time point.   
 
The deprivation variable is constructed from data that is additionally 
included in this study as separate variables. It is recognised that a 
single deprivation indicator may have served to cover many of the 
social quality controls identified in the social quality framework. 
However, additional indicators are used in this study, partly to better 
reflect the domains in the social quality framework and partly to give 
pointers as to what area-level factors other than ethnic diversity and 
immigration may account for variances in the social quality 
outcomes. Relying only on a single, broad measure of deprivation to 
explain outcome variance closes off the exploration of other factors 
which may explain why social quality varies. The inclusion of 
deprivation as a single variable and some of its constituent data as 
additional variables may double count some measures. However, 
including the additional variables (as shown below) along with 
deprivation was justified by early testing which showed that their 
inclusion did not effect whether the ethnic diversity/immigration 
explanatory variables had any significant effect on the outcome 
variables, but provided more information about other area-level 
effects on social quality.   
 
Qualifications. This is a continuous variable derived from 2001 and 
2011 census data (NOMIS 2013a) to show the percentage of the 
LAD population with a degree or higher-level qualification.  
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Crime rate. This is a continuous variable constructed from reported 
crime data for each LAD (Home Office, 2010). I have calculated the 
number of all reported crimes as a rate per 1,000 population. ONS 
crime data for 2003 is used for the 2001 time point, data for 2011 is 
used for the 2011 time point. 
 
Income. This is a continuous variable using data for the Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) (NOMIS, 2013c). The variable 
indicates the median weekly income for LAD residents. ASHE data 
for 2002 is used for the 2001 time point, data for 2011 is used for the 
2011 time point. 
 
Limiting illness or disability (LID). This is a continuous variable 
using 2001 and 2011 census data (NOMIS, 2013a) to show the 
percentage of the LAD population with a long term limiting illness or 
disability. The census data classifications changed between the two 
time points so data are not directly comparable. The 2001 data is for 
percentage of population with a long term limiting illness, while the 
2011 data is for percentage of population with a long term limiting 
illness or disability, so includes a greater proportion of the population.  
 
Population density.  Although not in the social quality framework, 
population density is such a powerful part of the ethnic diversity and 
immigration discourse that it seems important to include this within 
the data analysis. This is a continuous variable using the 2001 and 
2010 ONS mid-year estimates number of persons per square 
kilometre in each LAD (Office for National Statistics, 2012).  
 
Area type. Neither area type nor region are included in the social 
quality framework. But because there are distinct geographic 
patterns in immigration settlement and movement, and in the growth 
of ethnic diversity, it is important to consider these in terms of an 
urban/rural typology and in terms of regional differences. The area 
161 
 
type variable is derived from the Department for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) post-2009 classifications 
(Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2009). The 
classifications indicate different levels of rural settlement across 
LADs. The DEFRA classification system groups LADs into six 
classes:  
 Major urban (LADs with either 100,000 people or 50% of 
population in urban areas with a population of more than 
750,000); 
 Large urban (LADs with either 50,000 people or 50% of their 
population in or of 17 urban areas with a population between 
250,000 and 750,000); 
 Other urban (LADs with fewer than 37,000 people or less than 
26% of their population in in rural settlements and larger market 
towns); 
 Significant rural (LADs with more than 37,000 people or more 
than 26% of their population in rural settlements and larger 
market towns); 
 Rural-50 (LADs with at least 50% but less than 80% of population 
in rural settlements and larger market towns); 
 Rural-80 (LADs with at least 80% of population in rural 
settlements and larger market towns).  
 
Region. This is a categorical variable with each LAD classified by 
region using the nine Government Office for the Regions (GOR) 
groupings in use by ONS until March 2011. The nine GOR regions 
are: 
 London;  
 South East;  
 South West; 
 East;  
 West Midlands;  
 East Midlands; 
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 Yorkshire & the Humber; 
 North East;  
 North West.  
 
Residential stability is included in the social quality framework and 
is measured at area-level by population turnover; that is, migration 
into and out of local areas.  Research on local impacts of migration in 
England suggests that high population churn is associated with some 
migrant populations and has an influence on social cohesion in terms 
of levels of trust and neighbourliness (Poppleton et al, 2013). This 
variable uses the Special Migration Statistics (Office for National 
Statistics, 2009) available only from the 2001 census at the time this 
study was carried out.   
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Table viii: All variables: data sources and variable type 
 
Variable Data source Measure-
ment 
level 
Variable 
type 
Data year 
2001 2011 
OUTCOME VARIABLES 
Social inclusion dimension     
Trusting parliament Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Trusting local 
council 
Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Trusting the police Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Social cohesion dimension     
Voter turnout  University of 
Plymouth  
Area Continuous 2000-
02 
2010-12 
Feeling safe   Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Registered 
charities  
Charity 
Commission 
Area Continuous n/a 2013 
Empowerment dimension     
Feeling able to 
influence local 
decisions 
Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
New business 
formation 
ONS Area Continuous 2001 2011 
Social capital dimension     
Local trust Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Civic participation Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Watching a lot of 
TV 
Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 n/a 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Ethnic diversity  Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
Immigration  Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
Black immigration Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
White immigration Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
ED rate of increase Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
IMM rate of 
increase 
Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Sex Citizenship Survey Individual Binary 2001 2010/11 
Qualifications  Citizenship Survey Individual Categorical 2001 2010/11 
Economic status Citizenship Survey Individual Categorical 2001 2010/11 
Ethnic origin Citizenship Survey Individual Categorical 2001 2010/11 
Age Citizenship Survey Individual Categorical 2001 2010/11 
Residential stability Citizenship Survey Individual Categorical 2001 2010/11 
Deprivation IMD Area Continuous 2000 2010 
Qualifications Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
Crime rate ONS  Area Continuous 2003 2011 
Income  ASHE Area Continuous 2002 2011 
LID Census Area Continuous 2001 2011 
Population density ONS Area Continuous 2001 2011 
Residential stability  Census Area Continuous 2001 n/a 
Area type DEFRA Area Categorical 2009 2009 
Region ONS Area Categorical 2011 2011 
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5.3 Constructing the datasets 
 
Five main datasets were constructed for this study:  
 
Area-level datasets for 2001 and 2011 
These are two separate datasets, one for each time point in the 
study. These datasets are comprised of all the variables which are 
measured at area-level. That is: the six explanatory variables, the 
nine area-level control variables, the three area-level outcome 
variables (voter turnout, registered charities, new business formation) 
and the eight individual-level outcome variables as aggregated area-
level variables in continuous form. The area-level datasets are 
organised by LAD, so the data represent the values for each LAD. 
The area-level datasets were constructed in Excel and transferred to 
SPSS for analysis.  
 
Multi-level datasets for 2001 and 2011 
These are two separate datasets, one for each time point in the 
study. They include all the area-level explanatory and control 
variables and all the individual-level outcome and control variables. 
These datasets are organised by individual survey respondent. Area-
level data was merged with the individual-level data using LAD as the 
matching variable. These datasets were constructed in SPSS and 
transferred to MLwiN for analysis.  
 
Single multi-level dataset  
A single dataset for the multi-level data was created by merging the 
multi-level datasets for 2001 and 2011 data and adding a binary 
variable for year (2001/2011). This dataset is organised by individual 
survey respondent. The dataset was constructed in SPSS and 
transferred to MLwiN for analysis.   
 
Chapter Seven presents output from statistical modelling using the 
area-level datasets in both years and from the single multi-level 
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dataset. The separate multi-level datasets for 2001 and 2011 were 
used for preliminary testing and did not generate the output reported 
in Chapter Seven. 
 
The number of individual and area-level units in each dataset is 
shown in Table ix.  Not all LADs are represented in the Citizenship 
Survey.4 To check whether the missing LADs had any effect on the 
modelling output, three single multi-level datasets were constructed 
with different combinations of LADs, as follows: 
 LADs with any individual units in either year (314 LADs);  
 LADs with individual units in both years (240 LADs);  
 LADs with more than 20 individual units in both years (158 LADs). 
 
When tested using these different datasets, the overall effects of the 
explanatory variables on the social quality outcome variables were 
no different.  So the dataset with the highest number of units was 
used for the final modelling. 
 
Table ix: Datasets constructed for this study 
 
 Number of units in 
dataset (n) 
Output 
reported 
Individual-
level 
Area-
level 
Area-level dataset 2001 n/a 325 Yes (Chapter 7) 
Area-level dataset 2011 n/a 325 Yes (Chapter 7) 
Single multi-level dataset 31,068 314 Yes (Chapter 7) 
Multi-level dataset 2001 14,820 267 No 
Multi-level dataset 2011 16,281 292 No 
TEST single multi-level dataset 
(only LADs with individual units in 
both years) 
29,024 240 No 
TEST single multi-level dataset  
(only LADs with more than 20 
individual units in both years) 
25,398 158 No 
                                            
4 Some of the Citizenship Surveys LAD omissions are surprising. They include 
LADs with substantial populations such as Knowsley (population 150,000) from the 
2001 survey and Wokingham (population 158,000) from the 2011 survey. 
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5.4 Statistical modelling  
 
The analysis of the relationship between the explanatory and the 
outcome variables uses two statistical modelling methods, reflecting 
the different structures of the datasets. This study is looking at area 
effects (from ethnic diversity and immigration) on both individual and 
area-level indicators of social quality. Where the social quality 
indicators are measured at individual-level, multi-level modelling was 
used. Where the social quality indicators are measured at area-level, 
linear regression models were used. The data modelling and 
interpretation of findings for these two different approaches are 
explained in detail below. 
 
Multi-level modelling 
 
Multi-level modelling is essentially a multilevel extension of multiple 
regression analysis (Maas and Hox, 2005) which recognises the 
hierarchical structure of data that includes more than one level of 
analysis. The multi-level datasets constructed for this study include 
both individual-level responses to survey questions and area-level 
data. Multi-level modelling nests the lower level units (individuals) 
within the higher-level units (LADs) to enable analysis of how 
individual survey responses differ between LADs. The multi-level 
modelling uses logistic regression, carried out in MLwiN.  
 
The models use the logit link. In logit models, the coefficients are the 
log odds of the explanatory effect on the outcome variable. When 
coefficients from the logit model are exponentiated they can be 
interpreted as odds ratios which compare the odds of the outcome 
occurring with the odds of the outcome not occurring. The logit model 
takes the form: 
       i       
   1-i 
 
Logit(i) = log   
 
=0+1xi 
(Rasbash et al 2009) 
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The multi-level modelling for this study followed the five-step 
approach developed by Hox (2002) and recommended by Tarling 
(2009): 
 
Step one: no explanatory variables: the variance components model.  
This is the model with only the outcome variable and no explanatory 
variables. When the number of levels is specified, two in this study, 
MLwiN decomposes the variation in the outcome variable into two 
sources: the variation at level 2 (between LADs) and the variation at 
level 1 (between individual survey respondents). Looking at how 
much variance is at level 2 serves two key purposes. Firstly, it allows 
a judgement to be made as to whether the area-level variance is of 
sufficient significance to warrant a multi-level modelling approach. If 
the level 2 variance is zero, or negligibly small, there is no 
justification for continuing with multi-level modelling. Secondly, the 
level 2 variance at this stage provides a baseline against which the 
contribution of level 2 variables which are introduced into subsequent 
models can be measured. The amount of level 2 variance in multi-
level logistic regression models is indicated by the intra-class 
correlation, which is explained below. 
 
Step two:  random intercepts model with level 1 variables. 
This step introduces the level 1 (individual-level) variables into the 
model. The random intercepts model shows the variance between 
the area-level units. The individual characteristics within the area 
units are fixed, so the effects on the outcome variable are constant 
for all individuals within each area.  
 
Step three:  random intercepts model with level 2 variables.  
At this step, the level 2 (LAD-level) variables are introduced into the 
model. The contribution of the level 2 variables in explaining the 
outcome variance is indicated by the intra-class correlation. 
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Step four: random coefficients model. 
In the random coefficients model, the coefficients of the level 1 
variables are allowed to vary, rather than held constant as in the 
random intercepts model. The focus of interest for this study is 
variation between areas, rather than variation within areas. Between-
area variance is explained by the random intercept model. Random 
coefficients models were also fitted but provided no better 
explanation of outcome variance and are not reported in this study.  
 
Step five: including cross-level interactions. 
The recommended final step is to include interactions between level 
1 and level 2 explanatory variables.  
 
Intra-class correlation 
An intra-class correlation (ICC) value was calculated for each model 
at three stages:  the variance components model; the random 
intercepts model with control variables only; the random intercepts 
model with the explanatory variable included. MLwiN guidance 
shows that the ICC is equivalent to the variance partition coefficient 
in multi-level models using continuous data to show the proportion of 
the unexplained variance in the outcome variable that is accounted 
for by higher-level variables (Rasbash et al, 2009). This means that 
comparing the ICCs for the models with and without the explanatory 
variables gives an indication of whether the explanatory variable is 
helping to explain any variance in the outcome variable, or not.   
 
The ICC calculation follows guidance from Rasbash et al (2009). This 
advises that the measure can be obtained by casting the logistic 
model in the form of a linear threshold model which assumes a 
continuous unobserved variable underlying the binary response and 
for which the logistic distribution for the level-1 residual (εij) has a 
variance of ⅔ ≈ 3.29 (where  = the probability of an event 
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occurring). The ICC can therefore be calculated by the equation 
below, where 20 is the level 2 coefficient.   
 
ICC = 
 
     20 
20 + 3.29 
(Rasbash et al 2009, p132) 
 
Determining statistical significance in the multi-level models 
The probability of a statistically significant effect of the explanatory 
variable on the outcome variable is determined by dividing the 
coefficient by the standard error (both are given in the MLwiN output) 
to produce a Z score. A Z score for the explanatory variable which is 
greater than 1.96 denotes a statistically significant effect at 0.05 level 
of probability and a Z score greater than 2.58 denotes a statistically 
significant effect at 0.01 level of probability. 
 
The Z score calculated in this way is equivalent to a Wald test 
statistic (UCLA, 2016). Field (2005) urges caution in using the Wald 
statistic to determine whether a variable is a significant predictor of 
the outcome, because large regression coefficients tend to inflate the 
standard errors leading to underestimates in the Wald statistic and 
an increased probability of a Type II error occurring (that is, that a 
predictor variable will be found non-significant when it is in fact 
making a significant contribution to the model). However, because 
the regression coefficients in all the models reported in this study are 
small, the Z statistics provide a reasonable indication of variable 
significance, so they are used for this purpose and shown in the 
model output.   
 
Weighting 
The Citizenship Survey datasets include weights which enable 
adjustment of the data to account for the over-sampling of ethnic 
minorities in both survey years. The individual weighting variables 
were included within the multi-level datasets constructed for this 
study. The weights were applied in the MLwiN analysis. The results 
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of the multi-level modelling reported in Chapter Seven (and in Annex 
One) are for the models with the survey weighting applied. 
 
Fitting the multi-level models 
Model fitting for each of the outcome variables followed the five-step 
procedure outlined above. The modelling results are reported in 
Chapter Seven, which presents summary output showing the ICC 
and the coefficients and statistical significance of the explanatory 
variables on each outcome. The full output from the multi-level 
models is in Annex One. 
 
In order to compare the effects of the explanatory variables, the 
same level 1 and level 2 control variables are included in each 
model. The control variables included and excluded from the final 
models are shown in Table x. The decision to keep the same control 
variables when modelling each outcome variable means that not all 
models are the best fit for the outcome variables. Some models 
include control variables that have no effect on the outcome while 
others exclude significant variables. Losing the best fit model for 
each outcome was judged to be a necessary trade-off for ensuring 
that the effects of the explanatory variables are comparable across 
the models. The control variables retained in the final models were 
those that were significant for most outcomes.  
 
Table x:  Control variables in final multi-level models 
 
Included in final models Excluded from final models 
Individual-level Area-level Individual-level Area-level 
Sex Deprivation Age Income 
Economic status Crime rate Residential 
stability 
Limiting illness or 
disability 
Qualifications Qualifications  Population density 
Ethnic origin   Residential stability 
   Area type 
   Region 
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Each of the six explanatory variables was separately modelled for 
each of the eight multi-level outcome variables, producing 48 final 
models. 
 
The effect of year in multi-level models  
A binary variable for year is included in the single multi-level dataset. 
The reference year in all models is 2001. In the modelling output, the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable is the effect of the explanatory 
variable on the outcome in 2001. To consider how this changes over 
time, each model includes an interaction of the explanatory variable* 
Year. In the modelling output, the coefficient of the explanatory 
variable*Year indicates whether the explanatory variable in 2011 has 
any additional effect on the outcome variables to that in 2001.  
 
Illustrating effect sizes for multi-level models 
In some cases, the size of statistically significant effects from the 
explanatory variable on the outcome variable are illustrated using the 
values of the ethnic diversity or immigration explanatory variables for 
three case study LADs which represent low, average and high levels 
of ethnic diversity and immigration (these case study areas are 
introduced in the following chapter). The purpose of these 
illustrations is to demonstrate the size of the effect of the explanatory 
variable on the social quality outcome when the explanatory variable 
values change but all other variables are held steady.  
 
These illustrations do not reflect the actual effect of ethnic diversity or 
immigration in the case study LADs because the illustrative analyses 
employ the sample mean value for each of the other area level 
variables (deprivation, crime rate and qualifications). In reality these 
area level variables will also vary for the case study LAD and this will 
affect the size of the effects of the ethnic diversity/immigration 
variable of interest. However, a decision was made to adopt this 
approach to illustrate how the size of any effects from ethnic 
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diversity/immigration vary with the levels of ethnic 
diversity/immigration which actually occur within local areas.  
 
These illustrative effects are calculated by multiplying the coefficient 
of the explanatory variable by the value of the explanatory variable 
for the case study LAD. The calculations for 2001 and 2011 are 
represented in the equations below, where ethnic diversity (ED) is 
the explanatory variable, AreaED is the ED value for a case study 
LAD and ED*Year  is the coefficient of the interaction of ED* Year in 
the model. 
 
2001 log odds of ED on outcome = Cons + (ED*AreaED) 
 
2011 log odds of ED on outcome = (Cons + Year)+((ED 
+ED*Year)*AreaED) 
 
The log odds are then exponentiated to give the odds ratio. To 
facilitate the interpretation of these findings, the odds are then 
converted to probabilities, as expressed below:  
 
 = 
odds 
1 + odds 
 
In the discussion of findings, the predicted probabilities which are 
calculated for the effect of each explanatory variable on the outcome 
variable are expressed as percentages. These predicted probabilities 
can be understood in the following way:  
 A predicted probability of 50% means that the outcome is as likely 
to occur as not occur for the reference group. For example, a 
person in the reference group is as likely to feel safe as not feel 
safe.   
 A predicted probability which is greater than 50% means that the 
outcome is more likely to occur than not occur, so a person in the 
reference group is more likely to feel safe than not feel safe. 
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 A predicted probability which is less than 50% means that the 
outcome is more likely to not occur, so a person in the reference 
group is more likely to feel not safe than safe.  
 
To demonstrate how these illustrative examples are calculated, we 
can take the value of ethnic diversity (ED) for the case study LAD of 
Eastleigh to consider the effect of ED on the outcome feeling safe in 
2001 and 2011. Eastleigh illustrates average values for ethnic 
diversity and immigration; the ED values for Eastleigh are 6.32 in 
2001 and 11.50 in 2011. The coefficients in the model with feeling 
safe as the outcome and ED as the explanatory variable are: 
 
Cons       =   2.196 
Year        =   0.233 
ED           =  -0.011 
ED*Year =  -0.003 
 
The effect of ethnic diversity on feeling safe in Eastleigh is calculated 
by: 
 
2001 log odds 
= 
2.196 + (-0.011*6.32) = 2.126 
 odds = 2.126ex = 8.381 
  = 8.381/(1+8.381) = 0.89 
 
2011 log odds = (2.196+0.233) + ((-0.011+-0.003)*11.50) = 2.271 
 odds = 2.271 ex = 9.692 
  = 9.692/(1+9.692) = 0.91 
 
 
The predicted probabilities of feeling safe in an LAD with the ED 
value for Eastleigh and sample mean values for all other area-level 
characteristics are 0.89 in 2001 and 0.91 in 2011. This is interpreted 
as showing that a reference group person (white, male, employed, 
degree educated, UK-born) has a predicted probability of feeling safe 
of 89% in 2001 and 91% in 2011.  
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The reference group for multi-level models 
The multi-level models are interpreted by considering the effect of 
unit increases in the explanatory variable on the outcome variable for 
the reference group. The reference group in all models is the 
composite of the reference categories for each individual-level 
categorical variable, as shown in Table xi. The reference group in all 
models is male, educated to degree-level or higher, employed, UK-
born-white.  
 
Table xi: Reference groups in multi-level models 
 
Variable Reference 
category 
Other categories 
Sex Male Female 
Education Degree or higher A level/GCSE/other 
qualifications 
No qualifications 
Economic status Employed Unemployed 
Economically inactive 
Ethnic origin UK-born-white UK-born-ethnic minority 
Born outside UK-white 
Born outside UK-ethnic minority 
 
Single-level modelling 
 
Three social quality outcomes were modelled using single-level 
regression analysis. The data for these outcome variables is all at 
area-level. The outcome variables are all continuous. The unit of 
analysis is the LAD and the number of units in the analysis is 
325.The single-level modelling was carried out in SPSS. 
 
As with the multi-level models, the single-level models fit each 
explanatory variable for each outcome, keeping the control variables 
constant across all models. More of the area-level control variables 
were significant in the single-level models than in the multi-level 
models. The control variables retained in these models are: 
deprivation, qualifications, crime rate, income, limiting illness or 
disability, population density, area type, region. Residential stability 
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was excluded from these models as it was not significant in 2001 and 
unavailable for 2011.  
 
As with the multi-level models, the inclusion of the same control 
variables in all models means that in few cases do the variables 
provide the best fit, or best explanation for the outcome variable. The 
priority concern for this study is the comparability of the effects of the 
explanatory variables, and not identifying the causes of variance in 
the outcome variables, so consistency across the models is more 
important than finding the best fit variables for each model. Having 
said this, a great deal of preliminary testing was carried out to 
determine which variables best explained the outcome variance and 
all of the selected control variables are significant in most models.  
 
In contrast to the multi-level models, where data for both years was 
modelled within a single dataset, the single-level data was modelled 
separately for 2001 and 2011. With six explanatory variables for two 
outcome variables in two separate years (voter turnout and new 
business formation) plus one outcome variable for 2011 only 
(registered charities), the single-level modelling produced 30 final 
models. 
 
Calculating effects for single-level models     
The effect on the outcome in the single-level models is considered in 
terms of the effect of a one standard deviation () increase in the 
explanatory variable on the outcome variable. The size of the effect 
is calculated by multiplying the unstandardised coefficient of the 
explanatory variable by one standard deviation in the explanatory 
variable.    
 
To demonstrate, using the rate of new business formation outcome 
(Bus) in 2001 with immigration (Imm) in 2001 as the explanatory 
variable: 
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Imm = 0.119 
Bus = 2.205 
Imm = 7.959 
 
The Imm coefficient has a positive value and a t value of 3.998 
indicating that it has a positive effect on the outcome variable which 
is significant at a 0.001 level of probability. The effect of Imm on Bus 
can be interpreted as showing that for every 7.959 percentage point 
increase in immigration, new business formation increases by 0.947 
(0.119 * 7.959) per 1,000 population.   
 
Interpreting the effects for single-level models 
The effects of the explanatory variables are shown in terms of the 
effect of a one standard deviation increase in the explanatory 
variable on the area-level outcomes. This enables the effect sizes of 
the explanatory variables to be compared.  
 
5.5 Data testing 
 
Sample size 
 
Sample size is considered critically important for multi-level 
modelling, although guidance on actual sizes varies. There is general 
agreement that a large number of higher-level units is required, with 
a minimum of 30 to 50 units recommended (Maas and Hox, 2005; 
Tarling, 2009). The 314 higher-level units in the single multi-level 
dataset used in this study comfortably exceeds the highest 
recommendations for the minimum number required for multi-level 
modelling.  
 
Guidance is mixed on the number of lower-level units required within 
each higher-level unit. Earlier studies suggest that at least 20 or 30 
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observations are required within each higher-level unit, depending on 
the nature of the research, but more recent work demonstrates that 
multi-level models provide accurate predictions even when higher-
level units contain only one lower-level unit (Bell et al, 2008). 
However, multi-level modelling guidance assumes that all higher-
level units include at least some lower level units (Maas and Hox, 
2005). Using the LAD spatial level meant that my single multi-level 
dataset comprised 31,000 lower-level units distributed across 325 
higher-level units. This left 11 higher-levels unit empty, which I 
removed from the dataset. If MSOA had been selected as the spatial 
level, and 31,000 lower level units distributed across 6,700 higher 
units, many more empty units would have resulted. It is unclear how 
Putnam studies using the lower spatial level of analysis deal with this 
problem of numerous higher-level units containing no lower-level 
observations (for example, Twigg et al, 2010; Sturgis et al, 2010; 
Laurence, 2011).  
 
Overall, the main rule for sample sizes in multi-level models appears 
to be ‘the more units the better’ at all levels (Browne, 2016). In the 
multi-level modelling dataset used to generate final models for this 
study there are 314 higher-level units which each contain from three 
to 1,209 individual observations. This amply satisfies all guidance on 
sample size requirements. 
 
Data distribution  
 
The explanatory variables do not follow a normal distribution.  Ethnic 
diversity and immigration levels are unevenly distributed across 
LADs; a small number of LADs have very high ethnic diversity and 
immigration levels and large numbers have much lower levels. 
Consequently, all six of the ethnic diversity and immigration variables 
are positively skewed. Histograms for the ethnic diversity variable in 
178 
 
2001 and 2011 are shown in Figure i to illustrate the skewness of the 
data.  
 
Figure i: Ethnic diversity variable distribution by LADs, 2001 and 2011 
 
The regression analysis used in this study assumes that data are 
from normally distributed populations; skewed data may violate this 
assumption. 
 
Following guidance from Hox (2002), Field (2005), Benoit (2011) and 
Cornell Statistical Consulting Unit (2012), considerable efforts were 
made to correct the data distribution, including through log, square 
root and reciprocal transformations of the explanatory variables and 
by removing some area types from the dataset. While log 
transformation in particular did produce a more normal distribution in 
the data, the need to then transform back the data output in order to 
interpret the findings was rendered tortuously complex for the multi-
level models where the output was also in log odds which needed 
exponentiating to produce meaningful results. And although 
removing major urban areas from the dataset also normalised the 
distribution of the explanatory variables to some degree, this 
approach makes no sense at all when the focus of interest is 
precisely on whether higher values in these variables have a greater 
effect on social quality. So, the explanatory variables were used in 
the data analysis in their untransformed state in order to retain the 
data of primary interest.  
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It is also worth noting here that the skewness of the data distribution 
when ethnic diversity and immigration are measured at LAD-level, is 
replicated when these variables are measured at MSOA-level, the 
more frequently used spatial level in the UK Putnam studies. The 
distribution of ethnic diversity in 2011 over 6,791 MSOAs is shown on 
the left, and by 326 LADs on the right.  
 
Figure ii: Ethnic diversity in 2011: data distribution by MSOAs and LADs 
 
 
There is little guidance on assumptions for logistic regression. Field 
classes logistic regression as a parametric test and advises that all 
parametric tests must meet four assumptions; normally distributed 
data, homogeneity of variance, interval data and independence 
(Field, 2009, p64). However, other sources indicate that these 
assumptions are not necessary for logistic regression; independent 
variables in logistic regression models do not need to be normally 
distributed, nor do residuals need to be normally distributed (Burns 
and Burns, 2008, p569).   
 
Multicollinearity 
 
It is important for multiple regression to avoid collinearity between 
predictor variables. High-levels of collinearity increase the probability 
of the explanatory variables being found non-significant. Overly-high 
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correlation levels, or multi-collinearity, would be shown in R values of 
higher than .80 or .90 (Field, 2005). 
 
The correlations between the area-level predictor variables are 
shown in Tables xii and xiii. Unsurprisingly, there is a very high 
correlation between ethnic diversity and immigration (r = .911 in 2001 
and .922 in 2011). This is not a problem for the modelling, as each of 
the ethnic diversity and immigration variables was modelled 
separately, precisely in order to obtain separate estimates for their 
effects.  The other variables show only one correlation at possible 
danger level; the correlation between LLI and deprivation in 2001 is 
.850, although only .321 in 2011. However, collinearity diagnostics 
carried out on linear regression models of all variables showed no 
indications of multicollinearity for any variables, so all the control 
variables could be safely included in the models. 
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Table xii: Bivariate correlations between area-level predicator variables 
2001 
 
 ED IMM EDinc IMinc Crime LID Deprv Incom Quals Popdn 
ED 1 .911** -.424** .194** .536** -.037 .365** .319** .475** .779** 
IMM .911** 1 -.339** .147** .484** -.195** .186** .486** .690** .808** 
EDinc -.424** -.339** 1 .061 -.377** -.126* -.265** -.135* -.083 -.336** 
IMMinc .194** .147** .061 1 .140* .041 .128* .090 .134* .188** 
Crime .536** .484** -.377** .140* 1 .370** .620** -.062 .127* .671** 
LID -.037 -.195** -.126* .041 .370** 1 .850** -.662** -.532** .124* 
Deprv .365** .186** -.265** .128* .620** .850** 1 -.454** -.295** .473** 
Income .319** .486** -.135* .090 -.062 -.662** -.454** 1 .735** .302** 
Quals .475** .690** -.083 .134* .127* -.532** -.295** .735** 1 .483** 
Popden .779** .808** -.336** .188** .671** .124* .473** .302** .483** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
 
Table xiii:  Bivariate correlations between area-level predicator variables 
2011 
 
 ED IMM EDinc IMinc Crime LID Deprv Incom Quals Popdn 
ED 1 .922** -.366** .004 .662** -.560** .395** .325** .369** .753** 
IMM .922** 1 -.332** -.008 .670** -.605** .285** .444** .531** .809** 
EDinc -.366** -.332** 1 .440** -.176** .039 -.177** -.072 -.226** -.291** 
IMMinc .004 -.008 .440** 1 .249** .076 .300** -.317** -.403** -.013 
Crime .662** .670** -.176** .249** 1 -.241** .653** .068 .109 .755** 
LID -.560** -.605** .039 .076 -.241** 1 .321** -.695** -.648** -.375** 
Deprv .395** .285** -.177** .300** .653** .321** 1 -.447** -.379** .501** 
Income .325** .444** -.072 -.317** .068 -.695** -.447** 1 .762** .336** 
Quals .369** .531** -.226** -.403** .109 -.648** -.379** .762** 1 .404** 
Popden .753** .809** -.291** -.013 .755** -.375** .501** .336** .404** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
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5.6 Preliminary data analysis 
 
My preliminary examinations of the data included univariate and 
bivariate analysis of all variables and single-level regression 
modelling on each outcome variable. This testing was extensive and 
produced far more information than can be reported here. This 
section reports on key elements of the preliminary testing which 
helped to inform the final modelling approach.  
 
How well the outcome variables represent the social quality 
framework 
 
An indication of how well the selected outcome variables represent 
different facets of social quality was gleaned by looking at how 
closely correlated they are with each other. Very high correlations 
between outcomes would suggest that they are measuring the same 
thing, which would not be useful as I am looking for indicators to 
measure different things. However, it would be helpful if the outcome 
indicators within each social quality dimension were more closely 
correlated with each other than with outcomes from other 
dimensions. This would indicate a relationship within the dimension 
and help to validate the selected variables as good indicators of 
these social quality dimensions.  The bivariate correlations between 
the outcome variables are shown in Tables xiv and xv. Correlations 
for variables within the same dimension are highlighted. 
 
There are several points to highlight about these correlations. Firstly, 
and most importantly for the study methodology, none of the 
correlations are very high, so I am confident that each outcome 
variable is measuring something distinct from all the other outcome 
variables. This helps to justify the inclusion of such a wide range of 
outcome variables within the study; each of them is indicating a 
separate aspect of social quality. Secondly, the correlations of 
variables within the same social quality dimensions are reasonably 
183 
 
good; there are significant correlations between all the variables 
within their shared dimensions. Finally, the correlations hold the 
same pattern in the 2001 and 2011 data. There are some 
differences, new business formation tends to be negatively correlated 
with other outcome variables in 2001 and positively correlated in 
2011 (possibly because the 2001 measure is more stringent while 
the 2011 measure includes smaller new businesses not yet meeting 
the VAT registration threshold). But broadly, the relationships are the 
same over the time period, which is helpful for the study 
methodology. As the relationships between different aspects of social 
quality are basically unchanged over the time period then any 
changing effects from increasing ethnic diversity and immigration are 
simpler to identify and explain, without the complicating ‘noise’ of  
other changes in the relationships between the social quality 
variables.   
Table xiv: Bivariate correlations between outcome variables, 2001     
 
 Social inclusion Social 
cohesion 
Empower-
ment 
Social capital 
 Trust 
parl 
Trust 
councl 
Trust 
police 
Voting Feel 
safe 
Influ-
ence 
New 
bus 
Local 
trust 
Civic 
part 
Watch 
TV 
Trust parl 1 .293** .258** -.080 .015 .200** -.114 .009 -.074 -.086 
Trust councl .293** 1 .332** .164** .113 .246** -.181** -.042 .087 -.329** 
Trust police .258** .332** 1 .270** .368** .087 -.412** .241** .138* -.234** 
Voting -.080 .164** .270** 1 .314** .142* .171** .300** .172** -.213** 
Feeling safe .015 .113 .368** .314** 1 .003 -.268** .323** .240** -.281** 
Influence .200** .246** .087 .142* .003 1 .243** .051 .218** -.156* 
New bus   -.114 -.181** -.412** .171** -.268** .243** 1 .101 -.146* .192** 
Local trust .009 -.042 .241** .300** .323** .051 .101 1 .283** -.136* 
Civic part  -.074 .087 .138* .172** .240** .218** -.146* .283** 1 -.296** 
Watch TV -.086 -.329 -.234 -.213 -.281 -.156* .192** -.136* -.296** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
 
Table xv: Bivariate correlations between outcome variables, 2011   
 
 Social inclusion Social cohesion Empower-
ment 
Social capital 
 Trust 
parl 
Trust 
councl 
Trust 
police 
Voting Feel 
safe 
Reg 
chars 
Influ-
ence 
New 
bus 
Local 
trust 
Civic 
part 
Trust parl 1 .412** .232** .110 .038 .147* .255** .316** -.200** -.032 
Trust councl .412** 1 .331** .235** .211** .143* .215** .249** -.023 -.004 
Trust police .232** .331** 1 .289** .269** .214** .059 .089 .301** .217** 
Voting .110 .235** .289** 1 .401** .679** .098 .332** .414** .373** 
Feeling safe .038 .211** .269** .401** 1 .360** .072 .122* .503** .420** 
Reg. chars .147* .143* .214** .679** .360** 1 .116** .516** .235** .257** 
Influence .255** .215** .059 .098 .072 .116* 1 .161** -.023 -.091 
New bus   .316** .249** .089 .332** .122* .516** .161** 1 -.157** .040 
Local trust -.200** -.023 .301** .414** .503** .235** -.023 -.157** 1 .406** 
Civic part  -.032 -.004 .217** .373** .420** .257** -.091 .040 .406** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
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Relationships between the explanatory variables 
 
The bivariate correlations between the ethnic diversity and 
immigration variables reveal interesting and some unexpected 
patterns in these relationships.  
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration are highly positively correlated with 
each other (r=.911 in 2001 and .922 in 2011).  Unsurprisingly, both 
variables are highly positively correlated with themselves over the 
time period (r=.979 for ethnic diversity and .975 for immigration).  
 
Table xvi: Bivariate correlations between explanatory variables 
 
 
ED2001 ED2011 
EDinc 
2001 
EDinc 
2011 
IMM 
2001 
IMM 
2011 
IMMinc
2001 
IMMinc
2011 
ED2001 1 .979
** -.424** -.450** .911** .932** .194** -.078 
ED2011 .979
** 1 -.443** -.366** .870** .922** .261** .004 
EDinc2001 -.424
** -.443** 1 .214** -.339** -.356** .061 -.005 
EDinc2011 -.450
** -.366** .214** 1 -.411** -.332** .179** .440** 
IMM2001 .911
** .870** -.339** -.411** 1 .975** .147** -.174** 
IMM2011 .932
** .922** -.356** -.332** .975** 1 .232** -.008 
IMMinc2001 .194
** .261** .061 .179** .147** .232** 1 .289** 
IMMinc2011 -.078 .004 -.005 .440
** -.174** -.008 .289** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
Ethnic diversity levels and ethnic diversity rates of increase show a 
moderately strong negative correlation (r = -.424 in 2001 and -.366 in 
2011), indicating that LADs with high levels of ethnic diversity are 
likely to have low rates of increase, and vice versa. The reasons for 
this are examined more closely in the following chapter. At this stage, 
it is important to note that the level of ethnic diversity and the rate of 
increase in ethnic diversity move in opposite directions and may 
therefore be likely to have opposite effects on social quality.  
 
Immigration levels and immigration rates of increase are significantly 
but weakly positively correlated in 2001 (r = .147) and not 
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significantly correlated in 2011. That the negative correlation for 
ethnic diversity levels and rates of increase is not mirrored in the 
immigration variables is surprising, given the very high degree of 
correlation between immigration and ethnic diversity levels. However, 
the difference in these relationships is explained by the differing 
patterns in the growth and spread of ethnic diversity and immigration 
across LADs over the study time period, which are discussed in 
detail in the following chapter.  
 
The rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration are not 
correlated in 2001 (r = .061) but have a moderately strong, positive 
correlation in 2011 (r = .440). This is surprising, given that levels of 
ethnic diversity and immigration are so highly correlated in both 
years, but reflects the major difference in rates of increase from 1991 
to 2001 when ethnic diversity rates of increase were very high in 
many LADs and immigration rates of increase were much lower. By 
2011, the rates of increase in ethnic diversity had slowed down and 
the immigration rates of increase had increased, bringing the two 
variables into closer correlation. 
 
All the immigration variables are closely correlated, as would be 
expected. The strong positive correlation between black immigration 
and white immigration indicates that both are happening within the 
same LADs. The correlation between black and white immigration is 
virtually unaltered over the time points (r = .750 in 2001 and .725 in 
2011) showing that as immigration increases and spreads over this 
period, the occurrence of black and white immigrant populations 
within the same LADs is unchanged. 
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Table xvii: Bivariate correlations between immigration explanatory variables 
 
 
IMM 
2001 
IMM 
2011 
Black 
IMM 
2001 
Black 
IMM 
2011 
White 
IMM 
2001 
White 
IMM 
2011 
IMM 2001 1 .975** .955** .905** .906** .899** 
IMM 2011 .975** 1 .955** .951** .852** .900** 
Black IMM 2001 .955** .955** 1 .964** .750** .775** 
Black IMM 2011 .905** .951** .964** 1 .681** .725** 
White IMM 2001 .906** .852** .750** .681** 1 .939** 
White IMM 2011 .899** .900** .775** .725** .939** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
Relationships between area-level and individual-level outcome 
variables 
 
The relationships between the area-level and aggregated individual-
level outcome variables are shown in Table xviii for 2011 only (the 
2001 relationships are similar). Generally, the area-level indicators 
are more closely correlated with each other than they are with the 
aggregated individual-level indicators, even across different 
dimensions of social quality. This is true for registered charities and 
new business formation, both of which are more strongly correlated 
with the area-level variables than with any aggregated individual-
level variables. Voter turnout is positively correlated with some 
aggregated individual-level variables, but its strongest correlation is 
with the area-level variable for registered charities. Both voter turnout 
and registered charities could be regarded as indicators of civic 
engagement, but neither is particularly strongly correlated with the 
aggregated individual-level civic participation indicator, which is an 
obvious measure of civic engagement. This pattern of relationships 
underlines that even when the individual and area-level indicators are 
measuring very similar things, they are measuring social quality in 
very different ways, and may well be differently affected by ethnic 
diversity and immigration. 
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Table xviii:  Bivariate correlations between all outcome variables, 2011  
 
 Individual-level Area-level 
 
Trust 
parl 
Trust 
councl 
Trust 
police 
Feel 
safe 
Influ-
ence 
Local 
trust 
Civic 
part Voting 
Reg 
chars 
New 
bus 
Trust parl 1 .412** .232** .038 .255** -.200** -.032 .110 .147* .316** 
Trust councl .412** 1 .331** .211** .215** -.023 -.004 .235** .143* .249** 
Trust police .232** .331** 1 .269** .059 .301** .217** .289** .214** .089 
Feeling safe .038 .211** .269** 1 .072 .503** .420** .401** .360** .122* 
Influence .255** .215** .059 .072 1 -.023 -.091 .098 .116* .161** 
Local trust -.200** -.023 .301** .503** -.023 1 .406** .414** .235** -.157** 
Civic part -.032 -.004 .217** .420** -.091 .406** 1 .373** .257** .040 
Voting .110 .235** .289** .401** .098 .414** .373** 1 .679** .332** 
Reg. chars .147* .143* .214** .360** .116** .235** .257** .679** 1 .516** 
New bus .316** .249** .089 .122* .161** -.157** .040 .332** .516** 1 
** correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) *. correlation is significant at the 0.05 
level (2-tailed).  
 
Relationships between the explanatory and outcome variables 
 
Preliminary exploration of the relationship between the explanatory 
and outcome variables examined their bivariate correlations and 
compared these between years. The results of this are summarised 
in Table xix.  
 
Table xix:  Bivariate correlations between ethnic diversity/immigration and 
social quality outcome variables 
 
 Social inclusion Social cohesion Empower-
ment 
Social capital 
 
 Trust 
parl 
Trust 
counc 
Trust 
police 
Vote Feel 
safe 
Reg 
chars 
Influ-
ence 
New 
bus  
Local 
trust 
Civic 
part 
TV 
watch 
ED 
2001 
Pos None Neg  None Neg  n/a None None Neg  None None 
ED 
2011 
Pos Pos None Neg Neg  None Pos None Neg  Neg n/a 
IMM 
2001 
Pos None Neg None None n/a None Pos Neg  None None 
IMM 
2011 
Pos Pos None Neg None None Pos Pos Neg  None n/a 
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The results shown in Table xix revealed the following: 
 
 There were significant correlations between ethnic diversity and 
some outcome variables, and between immigration and some 
outcome variables. For some outcomes, the correlations were 
negative, indicating that the social quality outcome decreased as 
ethnic diversity or immigration increased. For other social quality 
outcomes the relationship was positive, indicating that the social 
quality outcome increased with increasing ethnic diversity and 
immigration. This suggested that ethnic diversity and immigration 
do have some significant effects on social quality and that these 
are both positive and negative.  
 
 The varied positive and negative correlations across the social 
quality indicators suggested that the inclusion of so many 
outcome indicators was justified. The appearance of positive, 
negative and non-significant correlations within the same social 
quality dimensions led to the decision to keep each social quality 
indicator separate and not to aggregate these to produce 
composite social quality outcomes. The difference in the ethnic 
diversity and immigration relationships between the social quality 
outcomes appeared both interesting and meaningful and it was 
decided that these should be further explored. 
 
 The explanatory and outcome variable correlations were not 
always the same in 2011 as they were in 2001. Some significant 
correlations disappeared in 2011 and others appeared. This 
indicated that the relationships had indeed changed over time and 
that this critical dimension of the study was fully justified. 
 
 Finally, the correlations of outcome variables with ethnic diversity 
were remarkably similar to the correlations with immigration. This 
may have justified dropping one or other of these explanatory 
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variables in order to fully focus on either ethnic diversity or 
immigration. However, it was considered useful to retain both 
within the study, as a finding that there are no substantive 
differences in their effects on social quality would in itself make a 
useful contribution to the work in this field. 
 
5.7 Chapter summary 
 
To summarise the main research design and methodological features 
of this study: 
 
 The study measures social quality using eleven outcome 
indicators to represent four dimensions of social quality: social 
inclusion, social cohesion, empowerment and social capital. 
 
 The study measures the relationship between levels of ethnic 
diversity and immigration and the social quality indicators at two 
time points, 2001 and 2011. The study additionally measures the 
relationship between the social quality indicators and the rates of 
change in ethnic diversity and immigration from 1991 to 2001, 
and from 2001 to 2011. 
 
 The study uses logistic regression to model the multi-level 
relationships between ethnic diversity and immigration, which are 
measured at area-level, and the eight social quality outcomes 
measured at individual-level. Linear regression modelling is used 
for the area-level relationships between ethnic diversity and 
immigration and the three social quality outcomes measured at 
area-level. 
 
 Preliminary data analysis indicates that ethnic diversity and 
immigration are positively correlated with some social quality 
indicators and negatively correlated with others. The pattern of 
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these correlations changes between 2001 and 2011, suggesting 
that change over time may be an important aspect of these 
relationships. 
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CHAPTER SIX:  ETHNIC DIVERSITY, IMMIGRATION AND 
SOCIAL QUALITY IN ENGLAND: 2001 TO 2011 
 
This chapter considers what the datasets used in this study show us 
about changes in England over the 2001 to 2011 period. The 2001 to 
2011 decade is the primary focus for this study, but the availability of 
comparable ethnic diversity and immigration data from 1991 also 
enables the effects of increases over the preceding decade to be 
considered.  
 
The chapter moves on to examine what the Citizenship Survey and 
other data tell us about changes in social quality between 2001 and 
2011. Descriptive statistics of the social quality variables used in the 
data modelling are presented and compared across the 2001 and 
2011 timespan. The chapter also considers how social quality might 
be measurably different for different populations by examining 
differences in measures of social quality by ethnic origin.   
 
The chapter concludes with three case studies. These illustrate the 
scale of ethnic diversity and immigration increases, along with 
changes in social quality, in three LADs in England. The case study 
LADs have been selected to show the extremes of very high ethnic 
diversity and immigration in the London borough of Newham, and 
very low ethnic diversity and immigration in the north east LAD of 
Allerdale. The third case study area is Eastleigh where ethnic 
diversity was at the median level for all LADs in 2011, and although 
immigration in Eastleigh was slightly lower than average, Eastleigh 
nevertheless represents a reasonable average for England. The case 
study LADs introduced here are used in subsequent chapters to 
illustrate how the scale of any causal effects of the increases in 
ethnic diversity and immigration can be understood and compared.  
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6.1 A decade of unease 
 
Before considering what the data show about social and 
demographic change, it is worth briefly recapping some of the 
defining events of the 2001 to 2011 decade, and remembering how 
frequently these were linked to issues of immigration or ethnic 
difference. 
 
Bookended by riots, the period from 2001 to 2011 was a time of rapid 
social change and considerable social unease. The 2001 rioting of 
young white and Asian people in Bradford, Oldham and other 
northern towns sparked concerns about the state of race relations in 
the UK. These fears were confirmed by findings of the Commission 
on Community Cohesion which pointed to polarised and segregated 
communities as the key cause of the riots (Cantle, 2001).  
 
The 2003 decision by the Labour government to support the US 
invasion of Iraq met with widespread and large scale protests across 
Britain. British military involvement in Iraq was widely viewed as 
linked to the 2005 London bombings and subsequent acts 
characterised as ‘Islamic terrorism’. The 2005 bombings, which killed 
52 people and injured many hundreds, brought the causes and 
consequences of terrorism to the top of the political agenda and 
marked an increasingly vocal renunciation of multiculturalism (by, for 
example, Portillo, 2005). 
 
Two waves of European Union enlargement took place in this 
decade, with ten countries joining in 2004 followed by Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007. In large part resulting from this, annual net 
migration to the UK quadrupled between 1997 and 2010. The 
government’s underestimate of the number of people from new 
accession states who would migrate to Britain has since been 
regarded as a grave miscalculation which strongly contributed to its 
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downfall and fuelled the rise of the UK Independence Party (Watt and 
Wintour, 2015).  
 
The UK came to the brink of financial meltdown in 2007 precipitating 
the deepest economic recession of the post-war period. The 
Coalition government elected in 2010 ushered in the so-called 
‘austerity era’ in public spending. Unemployment rose rapidly from a 
national rate of 5% in 2007 to over 8% in 2011, with youth 
unemployment reaching 21% by 2011 (Office for National Statistics, 
2011b).  
 
The 2001 to 2011 decade ended, as it began, with outbreaks of 
public rioting, more intense and more widespread than in 2001. 
Although determinedly not viewed as race riots, the 2011 troubles 
flared up in the aftermath of an incident in Tottenham in which a 
young black man, Mark Duggan, was shot dead by the police.  
 
6.2 Changes in ethnic diversity  
 
From 1991, the year when ethnicity was first recorded in the national 
census, to 2011, when the most recent census was taken, ethnic 
diversity increased steadily across England.  In 1991, slightly more 
than 6% of the population recorded their ethnic group as other than 
white. By 2011, visible ethnic minorities made up almost 15% of 
England’s population, while people from all ethnic minority groups 
made up 20% of the total.   
 
Looking only at England’s visible ethnic minority population: in 1991, 
around 3 million people were from visible ethnic minority groups, 
representing about 6% of the total population. By 2001, this 
population had increased by 50% to around 4.5 million people (or 9% 
of the population) and by 2011 had increased by a further 45% to 
almost 8 million (or 14% of the population). 
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When white ethnic minorities are included in the ethnic minority total, 
the 1991 ethnic minority population was 3.6 million (almost 8% of the 
population). This population increased by around 80% to reach 6.4 
million by 2001 (representing 13% of the population) and increased 
by a further 70% to reach 10.7 million in 2011, making up 20% of the 
total population. 
 
Changes to the ethnicity questions and response categories since 
the 1991 census make it difficult to compare ethnic populations over 
time. The 1991 census did not record whether people were of mixed 
ethnic origin, nor was there any breakdown of people from white 
ethnic groups, other than ‘born in Ireland’. Despite the challenges in 
comparing ethnicity data over time, we can see that the increase in 
ethnic diversity across England was the consequence of significant 
increases in the population size of a diverse range of ethnic groups.  
 
Between 1991 and 2011, every ethnic group population increased in 
size other than the white British and the white Irish populations, 
which decreased in number by 2.5% and 33% respectively. These 
reductions in actual population size, within the overall increase of 
around 12% in England’s population, meant that the white British 
share of the national population fell from 92% in 1991 to 80% in 
2011. Over the same period, there were substantial increases in the 
population number of all other ethnic groups, from a 19% increase in 
the black Caribbean population (up from 0.5 million in 1991 to almost 
0.6 million 2011) to a fourfold increase in the black African population 
(up from 0.2 million to 0.9 million in 2011). The Indian population 
increased by 70% (to 1.4 million), the Pakistani population by 147% 
(to 1.1 million) and the Bangladeshi population by 176% (to 0.4 
million). 
 
Overall, England’s visible ethnic minority population increased in size 
by 47% from 1991 to 2001 and by a further 62% from 2001 to 2011. 
By contrast, growth in the total ethnic minority population was greater 
197 
 
in the 1991 to 2001 decade, at 66%, than in the 2001 to 2011 
decade, at 56%.  
 
The composition of the ethnic minority population changed over the 
period 1991 to 2011. In 1991, six ethnic minority groups (black 
Caribbean, black African, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Irish) made 
up almost 80% of the total ethnic minority population. By 2011, these 
six groups made up only 50% of the total. Some of this change in 
population share results from the expansion of ethnicity categories in 
the 2001 census. But the population change is also accounted for by 
new ethnic minority populations, notably the ‘white other’ population 
arriving from eastern European countries between 2001 and 2011. 
The ‘white other’ population (not recorded in 1991) grew from 23% in 
2001 to represent 27% of all ethnic minorities by 2011. By 2011, the 
visible ethnic minority population made up a slightly larger proportion 
of the ethnic minority population than in 1991 (19% compared with 
16%). The growth in the black population over this period was mainly 
within the population of people of African rather than Caribbean 
origin. The Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations all grew 
over the period, but as a share of the total ethnic minority population, 
the Indian group decreased while the combined Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi population remained virtually unchanged. The 
population of people from mixed ethnic groups (not recorded in 1991) 
almost doubled over the 2001 to 2011 decade to reach 1.2 million, 
increasing its share of the ethnic minority population from 12% to 
14%. 
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Chart i; England’s main ethnic minority groups as a proportion of the total 
ethnic minority population  
 
 
 
As well as increasing, ethnic diversity spread geographically across 
England, as illustrated in Figure iii. Between 1991 and 2011 ethnic 
diversity increased within every LAD in England. The concentration 
of ethnic minority populations in major urban areas such as London, 
Birmingham and Manchester is apparent on the 1991 map. By 2011, 
many LADs which had low or moderate ethnic diversity in 1991 had 
become more diverse and areas with no diversity in 1991 were now 
diverse. Analysts have shown that the direction of movement of most 
ethnic groups during this period was away from urban areas and 
towards suburban and rural areas (Jivraj, 2012). The 2011 map 
shows how ethnic diversity radiates out from the core areas, 
particularly from London, so that the entire south-east of England has 
become more ethnically diverse. 
 
The growth and diffusion of England’s ethnic minority population 
meant that by 2011 more LADs were experiencing increasing ethnic 
diversity. In 1991, one in ten of the LADs in England had a visible 
ethnic minority population of more than 10% and only six LADs could 
be described as ‘super diverse’, with visible ethnic minorities making 
up 30% or more of the population, all of them in London: Brent 
(45%), Newham (42%), Tower Hamlets (36%), Hackney (34%), 
Ealing (32%) and Lambeth (30%).   
13
9 66 7
10
22
16 1416 15 15
21
10
5
22
43
50
1991 2001 2011
Black Caribbean Black African Indian Pakistani & Bangladeshi Irish Other
199 
 
Figure iii: Ethnic diversity in England in 1991 (top) and 2011 (bottom) 
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By 2011, one in three LADs in England had a visible ethnic minority 
population of more than 10%; all of London, most of the south-east, 
midlands and north-east. And 33 LADs had become ‘super diverse’ 
including a majority of London boroughs and large metropolitan 
areas such as Birmingham (42%) and Manchester (33%). In seven 
LADs, visible ethnic minority groups made up more than half the 
population: Newham (71%), Brent (64%), Harrow (58%), Redbridge 
(57%), Tower Hamlets (55%), Slough (54%), Ealing (51%). 
 
Chart ii: Number of LADs with visible ethnic minority populations of more 
than 5, 10, 30 and 50% of total population 
 
 
The increase and spread of ethnic diversity between 1991 and 2011 
took place across all regions and within all types of area, from major 
urban to predominantly rural LADs. All regions saw large increases in 
ethnic diversity, with the largest increases taking place within the 
regions where ethnic diversity was lowest. In the south-west region, 
the average ethnic diversity index score rose from 2.04 to 7.91 over 
the 20-year period, and although retaining the lowest regional ethnic 
diversity in England this increase of almost 300% was the highest of 
any region. Conversely, London retained the highest ethnic diversity 
index score, which rose from 32.65 to 60.22, but at below 100%, this 
was the lowest increase of any region. 
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Chart iii: Level of ethnic diversity: average by region [regional average 
ethnic diversity index score]
 
 
Considered by area type, levels of ethnic diversity remained higher 
over the time period within urban areas, with the highest levels in 
major urban areas. But the largest increases were in rural areas, with 
a near 300% increase in the ethnic diversity index score in Rural50 
areas over the 20-year period.     
 
 
Chart iv: Level of ethnic diversity: average by area type [area type average 
ethnic diversity index score] 
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6.3 Changes in immigration 
 
The number of people living in England who were born outside the 
UK increased considerably between 1991 and 2011. At the time of 
the 1991 census almost 8% of the population was born outside the 
UK. By 2011 this had increased to 14% of the population.  Like ethnic 
diversity, immigration both increased and spread geographically over 
the 1991 to 2011 period, as illustrated in Figure iv. Immigration 
increased in every LAD in England bar three: Suffolk Coastal, South 
Northamptonshire and Forest Heath. 
 
The population born outside the UK had been increasing steadily 
since the 1930s. Dorling (2011) has shown how immigration rates 
decreased between the 1860s and 1930s but then, as the birth rate 
fell and the British government encouraged immigration from the 
colonies, steady increases in the population born outside the UK are 
recorded in the census data from 1931 onwards. In more recent 
times, the immigration rate increased steadily from 1971 to 1991 and 
then more sharply between 1991 and 2001. The rate of increase 
more than doubled in the next decade, to produce a bigger increase 
in immigration between 2001 and 2011 than had been seen in the 
previous 30 years. While the increase in the total population born 
outside the UK was sharpest between 2001 and 2011, the rise for 
those born in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean was lower between 
2001 and 2011 than it had been between 1991 and 2001. 
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Chart v: Population in England born outside the UK (%)
 
 
[Source: Census data from NOMIS, 2013a] 
 
 
 
The large increase in people born outside the UK over the 2001 to 
2011 decade was accompanied by significant changes in where 
people were born. The most notable feature was a huge increase in 
the population born in other European countries and particularly in 
the eastern European countries which joined the EU during that 
decade. There was a ten-fold increase in the size of the population 
born in Poland, from around 56,000 recorded in the 2001 census to 
over 560,000 in the 2011 census. By 2011, Polish had become the 
most frequently spoken language after English.   
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Figure iv: Immigration in England in 1991 (top) and 2011 (bottom) 
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Aside from the rise in eastern European migration, the main 
countries of origin for people born outside the UK were largely 
unchanged from 1991 to 2011. Seven of the top ten countries of 
origin were the same in all three census years and Ireland, India, 
Pakistan and Germany were within the top five countries of origin in 
all years. There were some changes in African countries of origin 
with Nigeria overtaking Kenya as the main African country of origin. 
The Caribbean-born population was unchanged, with the majority of 
Caribbean-born people coming from Jamaica; the population of 
almost 160,000 people who were born in Jamaica made up just 0.3% 
of England’s population in 2011 (although equivalent to 
approximately 10% of Jamaica’s 2011 population). 
 
Table xx: Most frequent country of birth for population in England born 
outside UK 
1991  2001  2011 
 Number % of 
total 
pop 
  Number % of 
total 
pop 
  Number % of 
total 
pop 
Rep Ireland 555,805 1.18  Rep Ireland 460,287 0.94  India 682,274 1.29 
India 395,563 0.84  India 450,493 0.92  Poland 561,098 1.06 
Pakistan 221,776 0.47  Pakistan 304,706 0.62  Pakistan 476,684 0.90 
Germany 193,346 0.41  Germany 233,418 0.48  Rep Ireland 395,182 0.75 
Jamaica 141,352 0.30  Bangladesh 150,057 0.31  Germany 262,356 0.49 
US 128,337 0.27  Jamaica 145,234 0.30  Bangladesh 206,231 0.39 
Kenya 109,610 0.23  US 141,198 0.29  Nigeria 188,690 0.36 
Bangladesh 101,829 0.22  S Africa 129,302 0.26  S Africa 186,355 0.35 
Italy 83,724 0.18  Kenya 126,119 0.26  US 173,470 0.33 
Cyprus 75,799 0.16  Italy 98,757 0.20  Jamaica 159,170 0.30 
[Source: Census data from NOMIS, 2013a] 
 
Germany and the US are high on the list of countries of origin in all 
years, but these populations attract very little attention within 
immigration debates. Many among the German-born population are 
the children of British soldiers stationed in Germany, born abroad but 
never considered to be ‘immigrants’. The US was in the top ten 
countries of origin in all three census years. Approximately the same 
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number of people living in England are born in the US as in Jamaica, 
but Americans are rarely featured in discussions about immigration. 
This is despite, as Dorling highlights, taking many of the best-paid 
jobs in London and accounting for the greatest concentrations of 
immigrant children in some London boroughs (Dorling, 2011). 
 
As well as increasing, immigration became more geographically 
widespread between 1991 and 2011. More LADs became areas with 
significant non-UK-born populations. The number of LADs in England 
where more than 10% of the population was born outside the UK 
more than doubled from 47 in 1991 to 120 in 2011.   
 
Chart vi: LADs with populations born outside the UK of more than 5,10, 30 
and 50% of total population  
 
Similar to ethnic diversity, immigration remained higher over time in 
London and major urban areas. 
 
Chart vii: Level of immigration: average by region [regional average 
immigration percentage] 
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Chart viii; Level of immigration: average by area type (area type average 
immigration percentage) 
 
 
 
6.4 Immigration and ethnicity 
 
By 2011, the proportion of ethnic minorities and proportion of those 
born outside the UK were similar; both made up approximately 14% 
of the total population. But while there was considerable overlap, the 
two populations were different. In 2011, about half of the population 
born outside the UK was made up of visible ethnic minority groups 
and half was white. In terms of the ethnic minority population in 
England, about half of the ethnic minority population in England was 
born within the UK and half born outside the UK.  
 
Table xxi: Population of England 2011  
  
White ethnic 
groups 
Visible ethnic 
minority groups 
Total 
 
Born in UK 41,939,082  
(79.11%) 
3,736,235  
(7.05% 
45,675317 
Born outside 
UK 
3,342,060 
(6.30%) 
3,995,079  
(7.54% 
7,337,139 
Total 45,281,142 7,731,314 53,012,456  
(100%) 
[Source: Census data from NOMIS, 2013a] 
 
Populations born outside the UK were more dispersed across LADs 
than ethnic minority populations. In 1991, less than one quarter of 
England’s LADs had an ethnic minority population of 5% or more, 
while almost half of all LADs had a population of 5% or more people 
born outside the UK. By 2011 this had increased to half of all LADs 
13.41
5.18 5.67 4.67 3.91 4.14
22.85
10.12 11.22 8.08 6.27 6.11
Major urban Large urban Other urban Significant
rural
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with 5% or more ethnic minority populations and three quarters with 
5% or more population born outside the UK. 
 
The changes in black immigration (the population born in Africa, Asia 
and the Caribbean) and white immigration (the population born in 
Europe and America) are illustrated in Figure v. The maps show that 
in 1991 black immigration was more densely concentrated than white 
immigration. In 1991 the black immigrant population was strongly 
concentrated in London with some notable populations in the 
midlands and north-west. In the same year, the white immigrant 
population was more geographically diffused with significant 
populations in London and other south-east, midland and eastern 
LADs.5 By 2011, the black and white immigrant populations had both 
spread geographically, with the white immigrant population reaching 
higher proportions across a far greater area. By 2011, very few LADs 
in England had a white immigrant population below 2.5%, while black 
immigration populations were smaller than this in most of the south-
west, far north and east of England LADs.    
                                            
5 There is a remarkably large white immigrant population in Forest Heath, very 
visible on the maps in Figure v, resulting from the large number of American 
service personnel at the US air force bases in Lakenheath and Mildenhall. 
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Figure v: Black immigration 1991 & 2011 (top left & right) and white 
immigration 1991 & 2011 (bottom left & right) 
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6.5 Rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration 
 
We have already seen that between 1991 and 2011 the level of 
ethnic diversity increased in all LADs and the level of immigration 
increased in all but three LADs. This study considers these increases 
in ethnic diversity and immigration in two ways. Firstly, by comparing 
the levels within LADs at the different time points and, secondly, by 
measuring the rate at which ethnic diversity and immigration 
increased over the 10 years previous to the 2001 and 2011 time 
points. The rate of increase measure helps to explore the rapidity of 
change in ethnic diversity and immigration within LADs over the 
study period.  The rates at which ethnic diversity and immigration 
grew across England’s LADs are illustrated in Figures vi and vii, and 
summarised in Table xxii.  
 
The rate of increase for ethnic diversity was much higher from 1991 
to 2001 than from 2001 to 2011, and the rate of change in 
immigration was higher from 2001 to 2011 than for the previous 
decade. In other words, the rate of increase in ethnic diversity slowed 
down after 2001 while the rate of increase in immigration increased 
from 2001. Despite this slow-down, the rate of increase in ethnic 
diversity was higher than the rate of increase in immigration in both 
decades; the slower rate of increase in ethnic diversity from 2001 to 
2011 is higher than the higher rate of increase in immigration in this 
decade. 
 
The slow-down in the ethnic diversity rate of increase is in contrast to 
ethnic diversity levels, which increased steadily from 1991 to 2011. 
Ethnic diversity level and ethnic diversity rate of increase have a 
moderately strong, negative correlation in 2001 (r = -.424) which 
remains moderately strong, although slightly weaker in 2011 (r = -
.366).   
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The inverse relationship between the level and rate of change in 
ethnic diversity results from the starting position from where change 
is measured. In the main, LADs which had high levels of ethnic 
diversity in 1991 did not experience any rapid change in this over the 
following ten years. The largest rates of increase from 1991 to 2001 
were in LADs where ethnic diversity was lowest to start with. These 
LADs are all in rural areas, mainly in the south-west, north-west or 
east of England regions. They include North Dorset, where the ethnic 
diversity index score of only 0.92 in 1991 rose by over 300% to 3.76 
in 2001, and Ryedale where ethnic diversity similarly increased by 
over 300% from 0.54 to reach 2.19 in 2001. By 2011, the rapid rate 
of increase of the previous decade had slowed and diversified. The 
highest rates of increase to 2011 were not only in rural areas but also 
seen in urban LADs such as Barking and Dagenham, Havering and 
Gateshead.   
 
 
Table xxii: Ethnic diversity and immigration rates of increase (%) 
 
 
Ethnic diversity 
Rate of increase 
 
Immigration 
Rate of increase 
  
1991 to 
2001 
2001 to 
2011 
1991 to 
2001 
2001 to 
2011 
Mean 124.82 60.21 19.27 51.39 
Median 117.85 58.57 17.60 43.67 
Std. Deviation 93.84 26.59 12.74 34.87 
Range 1440.94 170.66 125.90 393.76 
Minimum 6.80 4.60 -49.52 -2.80 
Maximum 1447.74 175.25 76.39 390.96 
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Figure vi: Ethnic diversity rate of increase 1991 to 2001 (top)  
& 2001 to 2011 (bottom)    
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The inverse relationship between levels and rates of increase in 
ethnic diversity can be seen particularly clearly in London. For 
London LADs, the negative correlation between ethnic diversity level 
in 2001 and ethnic diversity rate of increase from 1991 to 2001 is the 
highest of all regions (r = -.822).  
 
Figure vii: London ethnic diversity 2001 (left) and ethnic diversity rate of 
increase 1991 to 2001 (right) 
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The London boroughs with the highest rates of increase in ethnic 
diversity were Barking & Dagenham, Richmond, Sutton and Bromley 
(1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th highest in London). The same boroughs had the 
lowest levels of ethnic diversity (27th, 29th, 28th and 30th out of 32 
London boroughs). The London boroughs which have a long history 
of migrant settlement and consequently higher-levels of ethnic 
diversity since long before 1991 were those where the increases 
were lowest. Among the lowest rates of increase from 1991 to 2001 
were Tower Hamlets, Hackney and Brent (1st, 2nd and 4th lowest), 
boroughs with among the highest ethnic diversity levels (6th, 4th and 
2nd highest). There are some anomalies here; Wandsworth 
experienced the 3rd lowest rate of increase in ethnic diversity but was 
not a borough with particularly high levels of ethnic diversity (22nd out 
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of 32 in 2001).  But generally, the greatest rates of increase were in 
the areas of lowest ethnic diversity. 
The immigration rates of increase were smaller than the ethnic 
diversity rates of increase, in both decades. Over the 20-year period 
from 1991 to 2011, immigration levels increased by an average of 
66% across all LADs, while ethnic diversity increased by around 
280%. Over this time span, 80 LADs saw their immigration levels 
increase by 100% or more, while 100% or higher increases in ethnic 
diversity took place in 292 LADs.  
 
While the ethnic diversity rate of increase was greatest between 
1991 and 2001, more than double the rate of increase than in the 
subsequent decade, the immigration rate of increase was much 
greater between 2001 and 2011 than it had been in the previous 10 
years. As the maps in Figure viii illustrate, high rates of immigration 
increase took place across England, particularly in the 2001 to 2011 
decade. 
 
Unlike ethnic diversity, any correlation between the rate of increase 
in immigration and the level of immigration in LADs is very weak; 
there is a weak, positive correlation in 2001 (r=.147) and no 
correlation at all in 2011 (r = -.008). 
 
It is worth remembering that in the ethnic diversity index score, all 
white ethnic groups are treated as one, so the spread and increase in 
ethnic diversity shown in the preceding maps is of visible ethnic 
minorities. The rapid increase in ethnic diversity from 1991 to 2001 
results from immigration settlement in previous decades, but there is 
no ethnicity data from earlier time points, so it is not possible to look 
back at how the rates of increase in ethnic diversity and levels of 
immigration are related. Looking forward, it will be instructive to see 
whether the rapid increases in immigration levels during the 2000s, 
lead to another rapid rate of increase in ethnic diversity in later 
decades.  
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Figure viii: Immigration rate of increase 1991 to 2001 (top) & 2001 to 2011 
(bottom)    
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Tables xxiii and xxiv show the 10 LADs with the highest levels and 
highest rates of increase for ethnic diversity and immigration in 2001 
and 2011. For both ethnic diversity and immigration, the LADs with 
the highest levels are London boroughs which have long been 
associated with migrant settlement. The LADs with the highest rates 
of change in ethnic diversity and immigration are mainly rural areas, 
although include some urban areas such as London borough of 
Barking and Dagenham, Kingston upon Hull and Newcastle upon 
Tyne, which have no recent history of migrant settlement.   
 
Table xxiii: LADs with highest levels and rates of increase in ethnic diversity   
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY LEVEL 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE 
2001   2011   2001   2011   
Newham Newham Isles of Scilly Rushmoor 
Brent Brent North Dorset Exeter 
Ealing Redbridge Ryedale Norwich 
Hackney Harrow Purbeck Thurrock 
Harrow Ealing Mendip Kingston upon Hull 
Tower Hamlets Slough Wyre Ashford 
Lambeth Waltham Forest Malvern Hills York 
Southwark Hounslow West Dorset Isles of Scilly 
Haringey Tower Hamlets Derbyshire Dales Richmondshire 
Redbridge Luton Corby Barking&Dagenham 
 
Table xxiv: LADs with highest levels and rates of increase in immigration   
 
IMMIGRATION LEVEL  IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE 
2001 2011   2001   2011   
Brent Brent Barking&Dagenham Boston 
Kens’ton&Chelsea Newham Gateshead Kingston upon Hull 
Westminster Westminster NewcastleuponTyne South Holland 
Newham Kens’ton&Chelsea Sheffield Fenland 
Ealing Ealing Broxtowe Barking&Dagenham 
Haringey Harrow Boston Corby 
Camden Haringey Greenwich Thurrock 
Tower Hamlets Hounslow Canterbury Stoke-on-Trent 
Hackney Tower Hamlets Portsmouth Salford 
H’smith & Fulham H’smith & Fulham EastCambridgeshire Great Yarmouth 
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By area type, the average increase in ethnic diversity from 1991 to 
2011 was greatest in rural areas and smallest in major urban areas. 
Immigration rates of increase over this period were greatest in large 
and other urban areas and lowest in the most rural areas. 
 
Chart ix: Average rates of increase from 1991 to 2011 in ethnic diversity 
and immigration by area type (%) 
 
 
Comparing across regions, average rates of increase in ethnic 
diversity and immigration between 1991 and 2011 were both lowest 
in London. The highest average increases in ethnic diversity were in 
the south west and north east regions, while immigration increases 
were highest in the north east and Yorkshire & Humberside regions. 
 
Chart x: Average rates of increase from 1991 to 2011 in ethnic diversity and 
immigration by region (%) 
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6.6 Changes in social quality  
 
Between 2001 and 2011 ethnic diversity and immigration grew and 
became more widespread throughout England. What happened to 
social quality over the same period?  
 
Changes in the selected social quality indicators 
 
On the indicators included within this study, social quality generally 
improved over the period. Table xxv shows the mean values across 
all LADs for the 11 social quality indicators. The means are 
comparable for all but three of these indicators: no comparison is 
possible for registered charities (for which data is only available for 
2011); watching a lot of TV (data only available for 2001); and new 
business formation (change in measure between 2001 and 2011).  
 
Table xxv: Social quality change from 2001 to 2011 
 
 Mean for all LADs Change 
2001 to 2011 2001 2011 
Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament 39.7 41.6 Increase 
Trusting the local council 53.4 67.4 Increase 
Trusting the police 76.5 82.4 Increase 
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout 31.7 41.8 Increase 
Feeling safe 66.7 72.6 Increase 
Registered charities n/a 3.3 Not comparable 
Empowerment 
Influencing 44.5 40.7 Decrease 
New business formation 5.3 7.2 Not comparable 
Social capital 
Local trust 69.3 77.7 Increase 
Civic participation 35.7 30.7 Decrease 
Watching a lot of TV 44.7 n/a Not comparable 
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Social quality was higher in 2011 than in 2001 on all but two of the 
comparable indicators; civic participation and feeling able to influence 
decisions about the local area, where positive responses decreased. 
Considered across the social quality domains; social inclusion and 
social cohesion increased over the decade, empowerment 
decreased and social capital declined on one measure (civic 
participation) and increased on the other (local trust). 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, there were increases on all the trust measures. 
From a fairly low base of just under 40%, trust in parliament 
increased slightly to almost 42% in 2011. This is in spite of the 
parliamentary expenses scandal which broke in 2009 leading to 
criminal prosecutions against eight MPs and media claims about the 
‘huge loss of faith’ in British institutions (Slack, 2013). Trust in local 
councils also increased from around 53% in 2001 to over 67% in 
2011. This substantial increase again seems surprising against the 
media backdrop of persistent negative coverage of local authorities 
during the 2000s, focused particularly on failings in local council child 
protection services, as in the Victoria Climbie and Baby P cases.  
 
Local trust increased over the decade. This is the indicator which is 
most strongly associated with Putnam’s theory of declining social 
capital, so this is an important point to remember; more people said 
that they trust the people who live around them in 2011 than did in 
2001. This indicator is second only to trusting the police in the 
proportion of people who responded positively; 69% in 2001 rising to 
78% in 2011. And the increase in positive responses over the decade 
is the second largest, behind the increase for trusting the local 
council. Especially when they are taken together with the increases 
in trust in the police, parliament and local councils, these figures 
point to the opposite of the decline in social quality identified by 
Putnam (Putnam, 2000, 2002, 2007). 
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The proportion of people feeling safe in their local areas also 
increased over the decade, from 67% to 73%. It is no surprise to find 
that men had a higher positive response rate on this indicator than 
women. In 2011, 82% of men reported feeling safe walking alone 
after dark in their local area but only 64% of women. The increase in 
feeling safe largely resulted from women, who showed an eight 
percentage point increase on this indicator between 2001 and 2011 
(from 56% to 64%) compared with only a two percentage point 
increase for men (80% to 82%). 
 
Two indicators showed a decline from 2001 to 2011; civic 
participation, where the proportion engaged in civic activity 
decreased from 36% to 31%, and feeling able to influence decisions 
about the local area, where the proportion decreased from 45% to 
41%. These decreases would appear to concur with Putnam’s 
‘bowling alone’ thesis of declining engagement in public and social 
spheres (Putnam, 2000). 
 
For the three area-level indicators of social quality included in this 
study, only voter turnout rates are comparable for 2001 and 2011. On 
this indicator, social quality increased over the period, from an 
average turnout of 31% for local elections in the year nearest to 2001 
to 36% in the year nearest to 2011. This increase is consistent with 
the trend in general election turnout which increased from 59% in the 
2001 election to 66% in the 2010 election (Rallings and Thrasher, 
2010), although the longer-term trend in voter turnout has been 
downward since the 1990s (Tetteh, 2008). 
 
Other changes in social quality  
 
There is a wealth of additional social quality data which did not meet 
the requirements for this study but which nonetheless helps to build a 
picture of social quality in early 21st century England. Three variables 
from the Citizenship Survey which could not be used as social quality 
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outcomes for this study are considered here; residential stability, 
satisfaction with local areas and feelings of belonging.   
 
Residential stability could be an indicator of social quality. Arguably, 
people will live for longer in areas which have high social quality and 
will move away more quickly from areas where social quality is lower. 
Or, a more rapid population turnover may be a cause of lower social 
quality, while greater stability in the residential population may lead to 
higher social quality. Either way, it is worth considering whether 
residential stability changed over the 2001 to 2011 period. 
 
If residential instability is measured by the proportion of survey 
respondents who have lived in a local area for less than one year, 
then this was unchanged over the decade. In 2001, 6% of 
respondents had lived in the local area for less than one year. By 
2011, 7% had lived in the area for less than one year. Nor was there 
any change at the other end of the scale. In both 2001 and 2011 15% 
of respondents had lived in the local area for more than 30 years. 
This virtually unchanging picture is backed up by census data which 
shows that internal migration in 2011 (when 87.7% of the population 
of England lived at the same address as one year previously) was 
almost identical to 2001 (87.8%). Residential stability did not change 
over the study period, remaining high across England with no 
significant variances between regions or between urban/rural area 
types. 
 
Most people like living in their local area. Only a small minority 
express any strong dissatisfaction with the area where they live. This 
did not change between 2001 and 2011, as far as responses to the 
Citizenship Survey show. Different questions were asked in the two 
surveys; the 2001 survey asked whether people enjoyed living in 
their local area, while the 2011 survey asked how satisfied people 
were with their local area as a place to live. In 2001, 8% of 
respondents said they did not enjoy living in their local area. In 2011, 
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7% said they were dissatisfied with their local area as a place to live 
(these negative responses are better compared than the positive 
responses as only the negative reply options are the same while the 
positive and neutral categories differ in the 2001 and 2011 
questions). Because there was no change in outright dissatisfaction 
with local areas, it is reasonable to infer that the great majority of 
people like living in their local area, and there was no change in this 
from 2001 to 2011. 
 
Finally, the degree to which people feel they belong to their local 
area could also be considered an indicator of social quality, 
notwithstanding the difficulties of defining how ‘local’ and ‘belonging’ 
should be measured. A question about belonging to the local area 
was asked in the 2011 Citizenship Survey, to which 79% of 
respondents felt that they very strongly or fairly strongly belonged. 
The nearest equivalent question in the 2001 survey asked whether 
neighbours look out for each other in this area, to which 78% of 
respondents replied ‘yes’, ‘definitely’ or ‘to some extent’. The high 
percentage of positive responses to both questions suggests that a 
large majority of people felt positively attached to the areas where 
they live, and that this was unchanged over the 2001 to 2011 period. 
 
Qualifications and social quality 
 
The strongest and most consistent factor correlating with social 
quality is the level to which people are educated. People with higher 
educational qualifications are more likely to give positive responses 
to social quality questions, and area-measures of social quality are 
higher in places where a greater proportion of the population has 
higher-level qualifications. Like ethnic diversity and immigration, and 
in part related to immigration, the population with higher-level 
qualifications grew over the 1991 to 2011 period and spread across 
England. This increase helps to explain why social quality rose over 
the 2001 to 2011 decade. 
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The proportion of people educated to degree or higher-level 
increased considerably over the 2001 to 2011 decade, the continuing 
result of university expansion initiated by the Conservative 
government in the 1980s. Across England slightly more than 7% of 
the population had a degree or higher-level qualifications in 1991, 
rising to almost 20% in 2001 and 27% in 2011.  
 
As the maps in Figure ix illustrate, in 1991 only a small number of 
LADs had a sizeable population of people with higher-level 
qualifications. By 2011, this picture was reversed, with only a small 
number of LADs having a relatively low population with higher 
qualifications. In 1991, only six LADs had a higher-level qualified 
population of over 20%; by 2011, 271 LADs had at least 20% 
degree-qualified populations. In both years, the LADs with the largest 
populations of highly qualified people were the wealthier London 
boroughs and the university cities of Oxford and Cambridge. A strong 
association between qualification levels and income also explains the 
variance between LADs; higher average income LADs have higher 
qualified populations. In 2011, in poorer LADs like Sandwell, 
Kingston upon Hull and Knowsley only 15% of those populations had 
a higher-level qualification, compared with over 50% of the 
populations in wealthier Wandsworth, Richmond upon Thames and 
Kensington & Chelsea.   
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Figure ix: Higher-level qualifications in England 1991 (left), 2001 (centre) 
and 2011 (right) 
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The geographic variance in higher-level qualifications is linked to 
ethnic diversity and immigration. Educational attainment varies by 
ethnicity. All ethnic groups experienced improvements in educational 
outcomes between 1991 and 2011, with the bigger increase in the 
2001 to 2011 decade, and the largest increases for people from 
Indian, Pakistani, Chinese and Black Caribbean groups. Some of this 
increase reflects differences in the education levels of migrant 
populations; in 2011, over one third (35%) of people born outside the 
UK had a degree compared with one quarter (26%) of the UK-born 
population (Lymperopoulou and Parameshwaran, 2014).  
 
Local areas which have greater ethnic diversity and higher 
immigration have more highly educated populations. In the dataset 
for this study, there are positive correlations between the levels of 
ethnic diversity and higher qualifications in LADs (r = .475 in 2001 
and .369 in 2011), and even stronger correlations between higher 
qualifications and immigration levels (r = .690 in 2001 and .531 in 
2011). More ethnic minority people had higher qualifications in 2011, 
whether born in the UK (29%) or outside the UK (27%), than white 
people born in the UK (19%). The highest qualified group in this 
study was white people born outside the UK, of which 31% had at 
least degree-level education in 2011. 
 
For every social quality indicator measured at individual-level, in both 
2001 and 2011, people with higher-level qualifications were most 
likely to respond positively. For example, in 2011, 78% of 
respondents with a higher-level qualification said that they trust 
people in their local area compared with 65% of people with no 
qualifications, and 41% of people with higher qualifications had 
engaged in civic activities compared with 20% of those with no 
qualifications.   
 
The greater prevalence of higher qualifications within the immigrant 
and ethnic minority populations, the greater tendency for people with 
226 
 
higher qualifications to give positive responses to social quality 
questions, and the increase in the ethnic minority and immigrant 
populations, combine to increase the positive social quality outlook 
over the 2001 to 2011 period. 
 
What of the two social quality outcomes which declined over this 
period; civic participation and feeling able to influence decisions 
about local areas? Both outcomes have a statistically significant 
relationship with qualification-levels; graduates were more likely than 
non-graduates to report civic participation and feeling able to 
influence local decisions. But the large increase in the higher-
qualified population was offset by bigger decreases for people with 
higher-level qualifications on both indicators. In fact, feeling able to 
influence local decisions actually increased among people with no 
qualifications over the period, from 29% to 32%, in contrast to the 
large decline from 57% to 48% for those with higher-level 
qualifications. The reasons for this are not explained by the data and 
would need further investigation which, although interesting, is 
tangential to the focus of this study.  
 
Social quality and ethnicity 
 
Different ethnic groups appear to enjoy different levels of social 
quality. Positive attitudes vary by ethnicity and immigration status for 
all the social quality indicators which are measured at individual-
level. The effect of individual-level characteristics on individual 
opinions is not the focus of this study, which is concerned with area-
level effects, but the individual-level effects of ethnicity point to 
differences in the experience or perception of social quality which 
have implications, discussed later in this thesis, for how social quality 
outcome variables in studies like this are constructed or selected.  
 
In the social inclusion dimension, there was an increase on all three 
indicators from 2001 to 2011 for the three ethnic origin groups other 
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than the white UK-born group. For white UK-born people, trust in 
parliament decreased over the period and while trust in the police 
and local councils increased for this group, the increases were 
smaller than for all other groups. When considered by specific ethnic 
groups, the increase in trusting parliament was greatest for Asian 
people, moderate for black people and decreased for white people 
over the 2001 to 2011 period. Trust in the police and the local council 
increased for all ethnic groups with the greatest increase for black 
people. The higher social inclusion reported by ethnic minority 
groups is confirmed by data from other sources showing that migrant 
groups come with a very positive view of British democracy and tend 
to have higher-levels of trust in parliament and politicians than white 
British people (Heath and Khan, 2012). 
 
In the social cohesion dimension, white people tended to feel safer in 
their local areas than ethnic minority people, for both UK and non 
UK-born people. Within ethnic groups, Asian people were less likely 
than white and black people to feel safe in their local area. But the 
differences between ethnic groups and between UK-born and non 
UK-born groups on this indicator are small. Over the decade, the 
percentage of people feeling safe increased for all ethnic origin 
groups, with the greatest increase for ethnic minority people born 
outside the UK.  
 
In the empowerment dimension, ethnic minority and non UK-born 
groups had a slightly more positive view than white UK-born people 
about their ability to influence local decisions. By ethnic group, 
feeling able to influence was highest among black people and 
increased for both black and Asian people from 2001 to 2011. Again 
this finding confirms that ethnic minorities have greater faith in 
Britain’s democratic institutions (Heath and Khan, 2012).  
 
Feeling able to influence local decisions is one of only two social 
quality indicators where there was a decline between 2001 and 2011. 
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This decline was for all ethnic origin groups but greatest for the white 
UK-born group and smallest for the ethnic minority population born 
outside the UK. By specific ethnic group, the proportion of Asian and 
black people who feel able to influence decisions actually increased 
from 2001 to 2011. 
 
Finally, in the social capital dimension, civic participation was much 
lower for ethnic minority people born outside the UK than for other 
groups, but being non UK-born seems not to be the most important 
factor here as white people born outside the UK had civic 
participation rates which were about the same as UK-born ethnic 
minority people, both of which were slightly lower than for white UK-
born people. Local trust was higher for white UK-born people than for 
ethnic minority and non UK-born people. Local trust was lowest for 
black people, although increased most for this group between 2001 
and 2011. Between 2001 and 2011, local trust increased for all 
groups, other than white people born outside the UK. For white 
people born in the UK and for ethnic minority people, both UK and 
non UK-born, there were substantial increases in local trust. 
 
There are no clear patterns of variance in social quality outcomes by 
ethnic group; positive response rates are higher for ethnic minority 
and immigrant respondents than for white UK-born people on some 
indicators and lower on others. In general, the changes in positive 
responses to social quality questions were consistent for all ethnic 
origin groups; positive attitudes increased for all groups on most 
indicators and decreased for all groups on the civic participation and 
feeling able to influence local decisions indicators. The exceptions 
were trusting parliament, where positive attitudes decreased for the 
white UK-born population and increased for all other groups, and 
local trust where the positive response from white non UK-born 
people remained static.  
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Chart xi: Social quality positive responses by ethnic origin, 2011 (%)  
 
 
 
 
Chart xii: Social quality positive responses by ethnic group, 2011 (%)  
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Chart xiii: Change in positive responses by ethnic origin, 2001 to 2011 
(percentage point) 
 
 
 
Chart xiv: Change in positive responses by ethnic group, 2001 to 2011 
(percentage point) 
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Social quality and racial prejudice 
 
Visible ethnic minority people are less likely to trust people in their 
local area, less likely to feel safe walking alone after dark in their 
local area and less likely to trust the police than white people. This is 
the case regardless of whether people are born within or outside the 
UK. These indicators are linked to feelings of security and lower 
positive reporting by ethnic minority people suggests that they feel 
less safe than white people. A key factor which could explain this 
difference is racial prejudice.  
 
It is difficult to quantify racial prejudice and there are no measures 
which reliably track this over the 2001 to 2011 time period, which is 
why it is not included in this study as an indicator of social quality. 
However, in considering changes in social quality within the context 
of increased ethnic diversity and immigration, it is relevant to look at 
what may have happened to racial prejudice over this period, in as 
far as the available data enable this. 
 
In the 2011 Citizenship Survey, 11% of ethnic minority respondents 
said they had personally experienced racial harassment, compared 
with 2% of white respondents (this question was not asked in 2001). 
A much higher proportion of visible ethnic minority than white people 
reported that racial or religious harassment was a problem, even if 
they were not affected by it; 59% of ethnic minority people compared 
with 33% of white people. Ethnic minorities born outside the UK were 
more likely to experience racial harassment and to see it as a 
problem than UK-born ethnic minorities. These variables are 
associated with the local trust, feeling safe and trusting the police 
social quality indicators. People who reported that racial harassment 
was a problem were significantly more likely to report that they do not 
trust people in their local area, do not feel safe in their local area and 
do not trust the police. Ethnic minority respondents who reported that 
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racial harassment is a problem were even less likely to feel safe, 
trust the police or trust other people in their local area.  
 
It is difficult to gauge whether racial prejudice increased or decreased 
over the study period. Survey questions about being racially 
prejudiced are highly susceptible to social desirability bias (so much 
so that they are used in some research methods guides to illustrate 
social desirability bias, see Vogt, 1993, for example). The desire to 
produce socially acceptable responses may underestimate the real 
extent of racial prejudice. On measures of experiencing racial 
prejudice, there is a lack of consistency in survey questions and 
other forms of data collection which make it impossible to compare 
data over time.  
 
The British Social Attitudes survey has been asking the following 
question about self-reported racial prejudice for 30 years: “Would you 
describe yourself as very prejudiced/a little prejudiced against people 
of other races?” (NatCen Social Research, 2014).The level of racial 
prejudice was remarkably constant from 1983 to 2013. The 
percentage of those who describe themselves as racially prejudiced 
never rose above 38% and never fell below 25%. There is no clear 
upward or downward trend over the 30-year period compared with, 
for example, views on same-sex relationships, believing that sex 
before marriage is sometimes wrong, and belief that people who 
want children should get married, which all showed clear downward 
trends over the same time scale. 
 
In 2013, slightly more men (32%) than women (29%) described 
themselves as very or a little prejudiced and older people (aged 55+) 
were much more likely than younger people (aged 17 to 34) to 
describe themselves as racially prejudiced.  People with degree-level 
education were far less likely than all other levels of education to say 
they are racially prejudiced (19% of those with a degree compared 
with 38% of those with no qualifications). From 2001 to 2011 there 
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was an overall increase in self-reported racial prejudice, from 25% to 
38% of respondents, with a particularly sharp increase between 2010 
and 2011. But set against the longer term picture of relatively small 
fluctuations with no clear upward or downward trend from 1983 to 
2013, the 2001 to 2011 increase in racial prejudice does not stand 
out as remarkable. 
 
Chart xv: Population self-reporting racial prejudice, 1983 to 2013 (%) 
 
 
[Source: British Social Attitudes survey, NatCen Social Research, 2014] 
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whether people felt that different forms of prejudice had increased or 
decreased over the past 20 years. There were differences in 
responses by ethnicity. More than half of white respondents believed 
that racial prejudice had decreased in the past 20 years in various 
areas of life including in job applications, media coverage and 
political representation. Ethnic minority people were less inclined to 
see prejudice as decreasing; there were no areas of life where a 
majority of ethnic minority people felt that racial prejudice had 
decreased.  
 
Research commissioned by the Runnymede Trust and carried out in 
2013 found that many ethnic minority people but very few white 
people had experienced racism and discrimination. Experiences of 
discrimination were highest for Black Caribbean people; 44% had 
experienced discrimination at work, 37% by the police and 37% at 
school, college or university. Black African respondents had also 
experienced high levels of discrimination; 40% at work, 31% at 
school, college or university and 28% when looking for a job. Black 
Caribbean and Black African people reported more discrimination 
than other ethnic groups on every measure other than applying for 
social housing, where more discrimination was reported by eastern 
European respondents. Experiences of discrimination were lowest for 
white British people; 3% reported discrimination at work and 3% in 
looking for work (Runnymede Trust, 2013). 
 
Interestingly, the Runnymede Trust research found that black people 
experienced far more discrimination from their local council (25% of 
black Caribbean and 5% of black African respondents reported this) 
than other ethnic groups (8% of eastern Europeans, 1% of Pakistani 
and 1% of Indian respondents). And yet on the social quality indicator 
used in this study, black people were more inclined to trust the local 
council than white people, although less likely than Asian people; in 
2011 77% of Asian, 70% of black and 62% of white respondents said 
that they trusted the local council. 
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Clearly, much depends on what is asked, and probably on who is 
asking the questions. We cannot tell from the available data whether 
racial harassment (as measured in the Citizenship Survey), racial 
prejudice (as measured in the British Futures survey) and racial 
discrimination (as measured by Runnymede Trust’s survey) are 
perceived by those who experience them to have similar or different 
effects on their quality of life. So while common sense and other 
research (although there is surprisingly little on this subject) suggest 
that social quality for ethnic minority people is negatively affected by 
racial harassment, prejudice and discrimination, there is insufficient 
data to more firmly link these experiences to lower feelings of 
personal and neighbourhood security. 
 
6.7 Case study areas 
 
To explore what the changes from 2001 to 2011 in ethnic diversity, 
immigration and social quality look like within LADs, I have selected 
three case study areas; Allerdale, Newham and Eastleigh. These 
case study LADs represent very low, very high and average ethnic 
diversity respectively, as indicated by their ethnic diversity index 
scores for 2011. The case study LADs are not the highest, lowest 
and average LADs on all ethnic diversity and immigration indicators, 
but they are close to this on most. 
 
The summary data in Tables xxvi and xxvii shows how the case 
study LADs compare with the median and mean values for all the 
study variables, in 2001 and in 2011. In these tables, the values for 
the social quality outcome variables represent the proportion of 
respondents who responded positively to the survey questions; in the 
case study areas of Allerdale and Eastleigh these are based on fairly 
small samples.  
 
236 
 
The inclusion of these case studies serves several purposes.  Firstly, 
they illustrate the huge differences between LADs in their 
experiences of ethnic diversity and immigration over the study period; 
from the very low levels but high rates of increase in Allerdale, to the 
very high levels but low rates of increase in Newham. Secondly, the 
case studies are a useful way to compare changes in ethnic diversity 
and immigration alongside changes in social quality over the same 
period. In all three case study areas, the overall picture is of 
improving social quality over the 2001 to 2011 decade. With a few 
exceptions, these three LADs experienced the same increases on 
the social quality indicators that were seen nationally. Finally, these 
case study LADs will reappear in Chapters Seven and Eight where 
they are used to help illustrate the size of any statistically significant 
effects on social quality from average, very high and very low levels 
of ethnic diversity and immigration. It is hoped that their inclusion 
here as case studies will help to make these later illustrations more 
interesting.  
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Table xxvi: Summary statistics for all LADs and case study LADs 2001 
 
 ALL LADs Allerdale Newham Eastleigh 
VARIABLES Mean StdDev Median    
EXPLANATORY         
ED  13.43 15.54 6.35 1.81 79.92 6.32 
IMM 7.89 7.96 5.26 1.78 38.10 4.94 
Black IMM 4.34 5.59 2.37 0.64 34.24 2.27 
White IMM 3.57 3.20 2.60 1.01 6.90 2.48 
ED rate of inc 124.88 93.69 118.11 164.60 25.84 95.17 
IMM rate of inc 19.74 12.74 17.60 18.03 37.52 11.09 
OUTCOME    (n=23) (n=251) (n=54)* 
Social inclusion       
Trust parliament 35.34 14.04 35.94 19.05 49.14 28.85 
Trust local 
council 54.58 15.09 54.23 42.86 62.81 53.85 
Trust police 78.98 10.11 79.45 91.30 68.95 85.19 
Social cohesion       
Voter turnout 31.03 7.49 32.00 33.90 27.00 36.40 
Feel safe 69.71 14.09 70.37 78.26 59.60 81.48 
Reg charities n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Empowerment       
Influence 43.83 15.56 43.48 26.09 39.91 42.31 
New bus 4.80 2.20 4.53 3.49 3.29 5.23 
Social capital       
Local trust 73.04 16.85 75.25 78.26 53.98 85.42 
Civic 
participation 37.78 12.88 37.68 17.39 22.71 20.37 
Watch TV 44.68 12.10 45.81 68.18 51.46 48.15 
CONTROL       
Crime rate 100.12 44.18 89.31 82.61 163.71 67.70 
Deprivation 22.17 11.45 19.93 27.80 56.18 10.56 
Higher quals 19.51 7.29 17.96 15.94 21.31 18.59 
LLI 11.12 2.55 10.80 12.90 13.10 8.70 
Income 402.53 64.24 388.25 382.10 384.00 415.60 
Pop density 1517.59 2119.63 568.23 75.34 6885.20 1457.25 
*n=number of cases from Citizenship Survey in this case study LAD 
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Table xxvii: Summary statistics for all LADs and case study LADs 2011 
 
 ALL LADs Allerdale Newham Eastleigh 
VARIABLES Mean StdDev Median    
EXPLANATORY         
ED  19.55 18.83 11.41 2.66 84.99 11.5 
IMM 11.47 10.41 8.20 2.70 53.70 7.30 
Black IMM 5.90 6.57 3.40 0.90 39.60 3.70 
White IMM 5.01 3.96 3.93 1.58 12.73 3.32 
ED rate of inc 59.72 28.00 58.28 47.03 6.34 82.04 
IMM rate of inc 51.39 34.87 43.67 51.52 40.93 47.74 
OUTCOME    (n=38) (n=416) (n=32) 
Social inclusion       
Trust parliament 36.51 13.31 35.29 26.32 60.97 20.00 
Trust local 
council 64.91 12.59 66.67 64.86 77.04 63.33 
Trust police 83.73 7.94 84.40 81.58 77.91 87.50 
Social cohesion       
Voter turnout 41.75 4.52 41.60 41.20 52.30 42.00 
Feel safe 75.92 12.18 76.37 86.84 59.62 84.37 
Reg charities 3.06 1.53 2.67 4.15 2.16 3.38 
Empowerment       
Influence 39.06 12.17 38.98 24.32 56.52 32.26 
New bus 6.72 3.15 6.08 5.32 7.26 6.57 
Social capital       
Local trust 84.46 11.96 86.21 81.08 59.95 93.55 
Civic 
participation 33.95 12.59 33.33 26.32 23.32 31.25 
Watch TV n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
CONTROL       
Crime rate 67.83 26.49 62.71 53.56 143.16 57.69 
Deprivation 19.17 8.41 17.33 22.30 41.84 10.49 
Higher quals 27.12 7.63 25.90 22.80 30.10 27.90 
LLI 21.87 4.56 21.67 26.42 14.94 18.37 
Income 510.50 80.29 496.60 444.80 498.20 528.80 
Pop density 1609.73 2285.71 590.13 75.77 6628.82 1533.87 
*n=number of cases from Citizenship Survey in this case study LAD 
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ALLERDALE 
 
England’s least ethnically diverse area 
 
Allerdale is a district in the county of Cumbria, in 
the north west region of England, with a population 
of 96,422 in 2011. Population density in Allerdale 
is among the lowest in England, with only 75 
people per km2 in 2001 and 76 in 2011. The area 
belongs to the Rural-80 group in the DEFRA classifications, meaning 
that at least 80% of the population lives in rural settlements or market 
towns.  
 
Allerdale was home to the world’s first commercial nuclear power 
station, built in the 1950s and still operating today as Sellafield. With 
Allerdale’s traditional industrial base in decline since the 1970s, the 
nuclear industry has become the LAD’s most significant economic 
sector, and a growing proportion of Allerdale’s population is 
dependent on Sellafield for employment. Allerdale has a notably low 
rate of new business formation, although survival rates for new 
businesses are above the national average (Peck et al, 2010). As 
part of the Lake District National Park, tourism plays an important 
role in the local economy. However, the district is prone to flooding 
and many businesses have been disrupted by repeated flooding, 
which was particularly severe in 2009.  The Labour party lost overall 
control of Allerdale Borough Council in 2003 although has since 
remained the single biggest party on the Council. Candidates from 
the British National Party stood for election to Allerdale Council in 
2003, 2007 and 2011, without success, receiving less than 3% of 
votes each time. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been 
represented on the Council since 2013. 
 
On the 2011 ethnic diversity index, Allerdale ranked as the least 
ethnically diverse LAD in England. The 2011 ethnic diversity index 
240 
 
score of 2.66 was well below the LAD median of 11.41. The 2011 
census found that 97.6% of the population was white British, which 
was considerably above the average of 79.8% across England. 
Ethnic diversity was low in Allerdale on all measures, including the 
number of households where people live in mixed ethnic 
partnerships; just 1.8% of households in Allerdale compared with 
4.6% across England. 
 
Immigration was also very low in Allerdale. The 2011 census found 
that 2.7% of the population was born outside the UK, compared with 
the LAD median of 8.2%. Black immigrants made up less than 1% of 
the population in 2011 and white immigrants accounted for 1.6% of 
the population. 
 
Chart xvi: Allerdale population by ethnic group, 2011 
 
Although ethnic diversity and immigration levels remained low in 
Allerdale relative to the averages across England, the area 
experienced a rapid increase in ethnic diversity between 1991 and 
2001, when the ethnic diversity score more than doubled, although 
this rate of increase slowed to below the national average increase 
between 2001 and 2011. The rate of increase in immigration was 
similar in Allerdale to the average of all LADs. 
 
Chart xvii: Allerdale: Ethnic diversity and immigration variables 
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Allerdale was below average on the social inclusion indicators for 
both years, trust in parliament was particularly low. But the district 
was higher than average on social capital indicators; civic 
participation in Allerdale was low in 2001 but showed a substantial 
increase between 2001 and 2011, and local trust was higher than the 
national average. On the social cohesion indicators, the number of 
registered charities in Allerdale (4.2 per 1,000 population) was higher 
than the England average (3.5).  Allerdale scored very high on other 
social quality indicators, not included in this study. In the 2001 
Citizenship Survey, 96% of Allerdale respondents reported that they 
enjoyed living there. In 2011, 97% of respondents in Allerdale felt 
that people in the local area got on well together and 89% were 
satisfied with living there.  
 
On area-level measures, incomes in Allerdale were well below the 
average for England, as were the new business start-up rate and the 
number of people with degree or higher qualifications. The 2001 
responses indicate that 68% of Allerdale respondents watched a lot 
of TV. 
 
Chart xviii:  Changing social quality in Allerdale (individual-level variables) 
 
[Citizenship Survey 2001 n = 23; 2011 n = 38 
 
Chart ixx: Changing social quality in Allerdale (area-level variables) 
  
19
43
78 91
17 26
78
26
65
87 82
26 24
81
Trusting
parliament
Trusting local
council
Feeling safe Trusting the
police
Civic
participation
Influence Local trust
2001 2011
4
16
83
34
135 4
23
54
41
26
New business
formation
Registered
charities
Higher
qualifications
Crime rate Voter turnout LID
2001 2011
242 
 
NEWHAM 
 
England’s most ethnically diverse area 
 
Newham is a London borough in the east of the 
capital with a population of 307,984 in 2011. 
Like all major urban areas, population density 
in Newham is high, with 6,629 people per km2 
in 2011. 
 
Newham Borough Council has been led by Britain’s first directly 
elected mayor, Robin Wales, since 2002. The Council was Labour-
majority throughout the 2000s and Labour won all 60 Council seats in 
the 2010 election. UKIP fielded a candidate in Newham for the first 
time in the 2010 Council election but secured only 0.1% of the votes.  
 
Newham has long been one of the most deprived LADs in the UK. 
Throughout the decade, unemployment was higher than average and 
incomes were lower. The new business start-up rate was similar to 
the average for England but lower than other London boroughs. 
London’s selection as host for the 2012 Olympic games meant 
considerable infrastructure development in Newham, where the main 
stadium, athletes’ village and other key event venues were sited. The 
social and economic changes anticipated from the Olympic 
regeneration investment were not yet apparent in 2011, when 
Newham remained the third most deprived of the 326 LADs in 
England.  
 
Newham is the most ethnically diverse LAD in England. In the 2011 
census the single largest ethnic group was white British but this only 
accounted for 16.7% of Newham’s population. Newham’s ethnic 
diversity index score was 79.9 in 2001 rising to 85.0 in 2011. 
Conversely, the rate of increase in ethnic diversity in Newham 
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between 1991 and 2011 was the fourth lowest of all LADs in 
England. 
 
 
 
Chart xx: Newham population by ethnic group, 2011 
 
 
Newham has one of largest immigrant populations of any LAD. It had 
the fourth highest immigration level in 2001, the second highest in 
2011 and the highest black immigration level in 2011, with 40% of the 
LAD population born in African, Asian or Caribbean countries, 
compared with an average of around 3% for all LADs. 
 
Chart xxi: Newham: Ethnic diversity and immigration variables 
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London boroughs. The University of East London has its main 
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students, the university ranks very low in the league tables; ranking 
117th (out of 118) in The Guardian’s university league table for 2011 
(The Guardian, 2010).  
 
On the social quality indicators, trusting parliament and trusting the 
local council were higher than average but trusting the police and 
civic participation were lower. Local trust was lower than average but 
feeling able to influence local decisions showed a big rise from 2001 
to become higher than average in 2011. On other social quality 
indicators, 86% of respondents to the 2001 Citizenship Survey 
enjoyed living in the area. In 2011, 88% felt people in the local area 
got on well and 74% were satisfied with living there. Finally, just over 
half (51%) of the 2001 respondents watched a lot of TV. 
 
Chart xxii: Changing social quality in Newham (individual-level variables) 
 
[Citizenship Survey 2001 n = 251; 2011 n = 416] 
 
 
Chart xxiii: Changing social quality in Newham (areal level variables) 
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EASTLEIGH 
 
A place of average ethnic diversity 
 
Eastleigh is in the county of Hampshire in the 
south east of England. Eastleigh’s 2011 
population was 125,199 and population 
density was 1,534 people per km2. Eastleigh 
is a ‘significant rural’ district in the DEFRA 
categories meaning that more than 26% of the population lives in 
rural settlements and larger market towns. 
 
Eastleigh Borough Council has been led by the Liberal Democrat 
party for many years. In the 2011 Council elections, the Liberal 
Democrats won 38 of 44 seats, with four going to the Conservatives 
and two to independent candidates. Eastleigh’s economy is 
increasingly retail-based and its manufacturing and engineering 
sectors are in decline. Its location on the M3 motorway and good 
train links to London combine to give Eastleigh one of the largest out-
commuting populations in Hampshire (SQW, 2011).  
 
Eastleigh is more affluent than the national average, with higher 
incomes and lower deprivation, but is close to average on these 
measures for the south east region. Eastleigh routinely features in 
‘top 20’ lists of good quality places to live in the UK, although it 
seems never to appear in the top ten. 
 
Ethnic diversity in Eastleigh in 2011 was exactly at the median 
average for England LADs of 11.5. What this means in terms of 
ethnic groups is that 92% of Eastleigh’s population was white British 
and ‘other white’ people accounted for 2.3% of the population. The 
largest single ethnic minority group was Indian, accounting for 1.6% 
of the population.  
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Chart xxiv:  Eastleigh population by ethnic group, 2011 
 
 
The 2001 immigration level in Eastleigh was 4.9% rising to 7.3% in 
2011, slightly below the LAD averages of 5.3% in 2001 and 8.1% in 
2011.  
 
 
Chart xxv Eastleigh: Ethnic diversity and immigration variables 
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indicators. In the 2001 Citizenship Survey, 98% of Eastleigh 
respondents enjoyed living in the area. In 2011, 96% said that people 
in the local area got on well together and 88% were satisfied with 
living there. Finally, just 48% of the Eastleigh respondents in 2001 
watched a lot of TV. 
 
Chart xxvi Changing social quality in Eastleigh (individual-level variables) 
 
[Citizenship Survey 2001 n=54    2011 n = 32] 
 
 
Chart xxvii:  Changing social quality in Eastleigh (area-level variables) 
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6.8 Chapter summary 
 
There were major changes in ethnic diversity, immigration and social 
quality across England in the decade from 2001 to 2011. To 
summarise the key changes of relevance to this study: 
 
 Ethnic diversity and immigration increased considerably between 
2001 and 2011, as had also happened in the previous decade. 
 
 Ethnic diversity and immigration became more widespread 
between 2001 and 2011, with many more LADs experiencing 
higher levels of both. 
 
 The rates of increase in ethnic diversity were greatest in LADs 
where the levels of ethnic diversity were lowest. 
 
 On the majority of indicators, social quality increased between 
2001 and 2011. A majority of people reported feeling safe and 
happy living in their local areas and this increased over the 
decade.   
 
 It is important to remember that local trust, the indicator most 
commonly used in the Putnam studies, actually increased over 
the 2001 to 2011 period. 
 
 The increase in social quality from 2001 to 2011 is linked to 
growing numbers of people with higher-level qualifications, which 
in turn is linked to increased immigration. 
 
 Compared with people who are white UK-born, ethnic minority 
and non UK-born people have higher social quality in terms of 
social inclusion (trusting parliament and local councils) and 
empowerment (feeling able to influence decisions about their 
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local area) and lower social quality in terms of social cohesion 
(feeling safe in their local area) and social capital (local trust and 
civic participation). 
 
 The poorer social quality experienced by ethnic minority and 
immigrant populations on the social cohesion and social capital 
indicators may be linked to their experiences of racism and racial 
prejudice, but exploring this connection is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
Despite catastrophic economic decline and regular outbreaks of 
social unrest, the picture of social quality in England in the decade 
between 2001 and 2011 is far from gloomy. Social quality was high 
on most indicators and rose on many. Against a popular discourse of 
social decline which was strongly linked to increases in immigration, 
a large majority of people felt safe in their local areas, trusted people 
in those local areas and trusted institutions such as the police and 
the local council. On some indicators social quality was lower, 
trusting parliament, civic participation and feeling able to influence 
local decisions, and declined over the decade for the last two. But 
these declines do not counter the general conclusion that social 
quality in England was high in 2001 and had risen even higher by 
2011.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  STATISTICAL MODELLING RESULTS 
 
7.1 Explanatory variable effects on social quality outcomes  
 
This chapter presents findings from the statistical modelling. 
Summary model output is presented for the indicators within each of 
the four social quality dimensions; social inclusion, social cohesion, 
empowerment and social capital. The full model output tables are in 
Annexes One (multi-level models) and Two (single-level models).  
Discussion of what these findings mean follows in Chapter Eight. 
 
Summary output for each social quality indicator is shown in separate 
tables. The summary output tables from the eight social quality 
variables in multi-level models differ from the three tables showing 
output from the single-level models.  
 
In the multi-level model output tables, the coefficient of the 
explanatory variable (B) is for the reference year (2001) and is noted 
in the table as having a non-significant (ns), significant at 0.05 (*) or 
significant at 0.01(**) effect on the social quality outcome variable, as 
indicated by the Wald test-equivalent Z score. These tables also 
show the coefficient of the interaction of the explanatory 
variable*year, which indicates whether there is a significant additional 
effect from the explanatory variable on the social quality outcome 
variable over time. The intra-class correlation (ICC) for the model is 
shown in the final column. (See Chapter Five, section 5.4. page 169 
for explanation of the Wald test-equivalent Z score and the ICC). 
 
In the single-level model output tables, the final column explains the 
effects on the outcome for those explanatory variables which have a 
statistically significant effect in the model. These effects are shown in 
terms of the change in the outcome variable from a one standard 
deviation increase in the explanatory variable.  The standard 
deviation values for the explanatory variables are given in Table xxvi 
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(for 2001) and Table xxvii (for 2011) in Chapter Six (pages 237 and 
238).  
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7.2  Model output 
 
7.2.1 The social inclusion dimension 
 
Table xxviii: Trusting parliament: multi-level model summary output   
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL          
Cons -0.539 0.026 -20.518    
Level 2 0.134 0.019 7.011  0.039 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons -0.465 0.051 -9.115    
Level 2 0.031 0.008 4.060  0.009 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons -0.411 0.057 -7.199    
ETHNICDIVERSITY -0.165 0.151 -1.090 ns   
ETHNICDIVERSITY*2011 0.330 0.148 2.226 *   
Level 2 0.031 0.007 4.151  0.009 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.428 0.062 -6.942    
IMMIGRATION -0.002 0.003 -0.619 ns   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.007 0.003 2.853 **   
Level 2 0.030 0.007 4.085  0.009 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.423 0.055 -7.729    
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.003 0.003 -0.788 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.011 0.003 3.309 **   
Level 2 0.029 0.007 3.989  0.009 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.417 0.064 -6.533    
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.009 0.008 -1.069 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.018 0.007 2.531 *   
Level 2 0.030 0.007 4.156  0.009 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons -0.468 0.072 -6.515    
ED increase 0.000 0.001 0.106 ns   
ED increase*2011 -0.001 0.001 -0.976 ns   
Level 2 0.030 0.007 4.050  0.009 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.415 0.064 -6.518    
IMM increase -0.001 0.001 -1.788 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -1.452 ns   
Level 2 0.028 0.007 3.945  0.009 
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Table xxix:  Trusting the local council: multi-level model summary output 
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 0.427 0.023 18.553    
Level 2 0.091 0.015 6.061  0.027 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY          
Cons -0.024 0.049 -0.490    
Level 2 0.042 0.009 4.710  0.013 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons 0.130 0.065 2.020    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.583 0.173 -3.376 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.498 0.123 4.046 **   
Level 2 0.040 0.010 4.191  0.012 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.127 0.073 1.740    
IMMIGRATION -0.011 0.004 -2.595 **   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.010 0.003 3.871 **   
Level 2 0.041 0.009 4.377  0.012 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.100 0.063 1.586    
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.013 0.005 -2.523 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.013 0.003 3.949 **   
Level 2 0.041 0.009 4.332  0.012 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.158 0.079 2.016    
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.033 0.012 -2.797 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.030 0.009 3.388 **   
Level 2 0.039 0.009 4.313  0.012 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons -0.085 0.066 -1.278    
ED increase 0.001 0.001 1.445 ns   
ED increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -2.227 *   
Level 2 0.042 0.009 4.661  0.013 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.038 0.063 -0.604    
IMM increase 0.000 0.001 0.151 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -2.026 *   
Level 2 0.042 0.009 4.647  0.013 
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Table xxx: Trusting the police: multi-level model summary output 
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 1.483 0.025 59.084    
Level 2 0.090 0.014 6.384  0.026 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY          
Cons 1.499 0.048 31.511    
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.656  0.011 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons 1.554 0.062 25.146    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.178 0.150 -1.187 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.317 0.132 2.397 *   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.586  0.010 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.572 0.067 23.428    
IMMIGRATION -0.005 0.003 -1.443 ns   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.006 0.002 2.463 *   
Level 2 0.036 0.010 3.649  0.011 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.552 0.060 26.075    
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.005 0.004 -1.257 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.008 0.003 2.398 *   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.631  0.011 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.648 0.070 23.513    
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.027 0.009 -2.938 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.020 0.007 2.972 **   
Level 2 0.033 0.009 3.613  0.010 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE            
Cons 1.475 0.073 20.172    
ED increase 0.001 0.001 0.403 ns   
ED increase*2011 0.000 0.001 -0.025 ns   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.658  0.011 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 1.598 0.064 24.883    
IMM increase -0.002 0.001 -2.573 *   
IMM increase*2011 0.000 0.001 -0.257 ns   
Level 2 0.031 0.009 3.401  0.009 
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The model output for the three social inclusion indicators shows that 
area-level factors, as indicated by the ICC, have a small effect on 
social inclusion.  
 
Area-level factors have the largest effect on whether people trust 
parliament. The ICC for the trusting parliament model with no 
explanatory variables indicates that around 4% of the unexplained 
variance in the outcome is due to area-level factors. When area-level 
control variables are added most of the area-level variance is 
accounted for and now only 1% of the unexplained variance in the 
outcome variable is at area-level. Adding the explanatory variables to 
the model makes no difference to the ICC, so even when the 
explanatory variables are significant they contribute very little to 
explaining why trust in parliament varies between LADs.  
 
Area level factors have less effect on whether people trust the local 
council. The ICC for the trusting local council model with no 
explanatory variables indicates that less than 3% of the unexplained 
variance in the outcome is at area-level. When area-level variables 
are added to the model, around 1% of variance in the outcome 
remains unexplained at area-level. The addition of the explanatory 
variables does very little to explain the outcome variance. 
 
Area-level variables have similarly little effect on trusting the police. 
The ICC for the trusting the police model with no explanatory 
variables is 0.026. So less than 3% of the variance in the outcome is 
explained by area-level factors. When area-level variables are 
included in the model but without explanatory variables, the ICC is 
0.011. The explanatory variables make little difference to the ICC for 
each model. 
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have differing effects on the three 
indicators within the social inclusion dimension.  
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For trusting parliament, none of the explanatory variables has a 
statistically significant effect in 2001. There is a statistically 
significant, positive additional effect in 2011 on trusting parliament 
from ethnic diversity and immigration, including both black and white 
immigration. The rate of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration 
has no effect in either year. 
 
For trusting the local council, there is a statistically significant, 
negative effect from ethnic diversity and immigration in 2001, 
including from both black and white immigration. These explanatory 
variables remain statistically significant for the additional 2011 effect, 
but now have positive effects. However, the size of the positive 
additional 2011 effects are smaller than the negative 2001 effects, so 
the overall effects on trusting the council remain negative for 2011. 
The ethnic diversity rates of increase have no effect on trusting the 
local council in 2001 and a significant, negative effect in 2011. 
 
For trusting the police, there are no statistically significant effects 
from ethnic diversity, immigration or the ethnic diversity rate of 
increase in 2001. There is a negative effect from white immigration 
(but no significant effect from black immigration) in 2001 and a 
negative effect from the immigration rate of increase in 2001. The 
additional 2011 effects on trusting the police are significant and 
positive for four of the explanatory variables; ethnic diversity, 
immigration, black immigration and white immigration. For white 
immigration, the positive 2011 effect is smaller than the negative 
2001 effect, so the additional 2011 effect on trusting the police 
remains negative. There are no significant additional 2011 effects 
from the ethnic diversity or immigration rates of increase.  
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7.2.2 The social cohesion dimension 
 
Table xxxi: Voter turnout: single–level model summary output: 
 
  MODEL 
Explanatory 
variable 
Effect on 
outcome 
variable 
 AdjR
2 F  Sig B t Sig  
 2001        
Control variables 
only .405 12.201 **       
 
Ethnic Diversity .409 11.835 ** 0.063 1.778 ns no effect  
Immigration .403 11.553 ** 0.008 0.099 ns no effect  
Black immigration .404 11.625 ** 0.088 0.906 ns no effect  
White immigration .405 11.667 ** -0.184 -1.136 ns no effect  
ED rate of increase .403 11.552 ** 3.367 0.006 ns no effect  
IMM rate of increase .404 11.598 ** -0.015 -0.718 ns no effect  
 2011       
 
Control variables 
only .650 29.519 **       
 
Ethnic Diversity .653 28.360 ** 0.038 1.767 ns no effect  
Immigration .651 28.176 ** -0.072 -1.350 ns no effect  
Black immigration .650 28.046 ** 0.069 1.006 ns no effect  
White immigration .669 30.456 ** -0.415 -4.001 ** 
1SD increase 
in White Imm 
→ 1.64 
decrease in 
voter turnout 
(-0.415*3.96) 
ED rate of increase .662 29.567 ** -0.022 -3.237 ** 
1SD increase 
in EDinc →  
0.62 decrease 
in voter turnout  
(-0.022*28.00)  
IMM rate of increase .662 29.573 ** -0.018 -3.243 ** 
1SD increase 
in IMMinc → 
0.63 decrease 
in voter turnout  
(-0.018 *34.87)  
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Table xxxii: Feeling safe: multi-level model summary output 
 
  B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 1.028 0.029 35.014    
Level 2 0.173 0.017 10.472  0.050 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons 2.071 0.071 29.347    
Level 2 0.096 0.014 6.992  0.028 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons 1.199 0.169 7.082    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 1.098 0.208 5.274 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.278 0.192 1.447 ns   
Level 2 0.071 0.012 5.834  0.021 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.397 0.088 27.304    
IMMIGRATION -0.026 0.004 -5.910 **   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.000 0.003 0.069 ns   
Level 2 0.083 0.013 6.140  0.024 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.242 0.084 26.589    
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.025 0.005 -4.655 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.008 0.004 -1.845 ns   
Level 2 0.079 0.013 6.035  0.024 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.428 0.106 22.820    
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.064 0.015 -4.167 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.008 0.008 0.982 ns   
Level 2 0.094 0.014 6.721  0.028 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons 2.141 0.097 22.022    
ED increase -0.002 0.001 -1.371 ns   
ED increase*2011 0.003 0.001 2.088 *   
Level 2 0.096 0.014 7.014  0.028 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 2.124 0.086 24.784    
IMM increase -0.001 0.001 -1.255 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -1.683 ns   
Level 2 0.092 0.014 6.773  0.027 
 
 
  
260 
 
Table xxxiii: Registered charities: single-level model output  
 
  MODEL 
Explanatory 
variable 
Effect on 
outcome 
variable 
  AdjR2 F  Sig B t Sig 
 
2011         
Registered 
charity LAD 
mean = 3.06, 
SD = 1.53 
Control variables 
only .705 41.332 **     
Ethnic Diversity .705 39.430 ** -0.007 -1.280 ns No effect 
Immigration .702 38.849 ** -0.008 -0.632 ns No effect 
Black immigration .702 39.007 ** -0.017 -1.132 ns No effect 
White immigration .702 38.843 ** 0.015 0.605 ns No effect 
ED rate of increase .706 39.734 ** 0.005 2.314 * 
1SD increase 
in EDinc → 
0.14 per 1,000 
pop increase in 
Reg Charities 
(0.005*28.00) 
IMM rate of 
increase .701 38.787 ** 0.000 0.228 ns No effect 
 
 
The three social quality indicators within the social cohesion 
dimension include two with single level data (voter turnout and 
registered charities) and one with multi-level data (feeling safe). 
 
For voter turnout, the models for 2001 are a reasonable fit; R2 = .405 
for the model with no explanatory variables, indicating that around 
40% of the variability in the outcome is explained by the variables in 
this model. The explanatory variables barely increase the model fit 
and none are significant. The 2011 models for voter turnout are a 
better fit, R2 = .650 for the model with no explanatory variables, 
indicating that 65% of the variability in voter turnout is explained by 
the variables in the model. In 2011, white immigration levels and the 
ethnic diversity and immigration rates of increase all have a 
significant, negative effect on voter turnout. 
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The data for registered charities is only available for 2011. The model 
fit is good, R2   = .705, indicating that about 70% of the variance in the 
rate of registered charities by population within LADs is explained by 
the variables included in the model. The addition of the explanatory 
variables does not improve the model fit.  Aside from a statistically 
significant positive effect from the ethnic diversity rate of increase, 
none of the ethnic diversity and immigration explanatory variables 
has a significant effect on how many registered charities there are by 
population within local areas. 
 
The multi-level models for feeling safe show that area-level variables 
account for little of the variance between LADs in whether people feel 
safe walking on their own in their local area. Without explanatory or 
control variables the model ICC is 0.050, meaning that about 5% of 
the unexplained variation in the feeling safe outcome can be 
attributed to area-level factors. When area-level variables are 
included in the model, but with no explanatory variables, ICC is 
0.029, indicating that about 3% of the unexplained variability in the 
outcome is attributable to area-level factors that are not in the model. 
For the model with ethnic diversity, the ICC is 0.022, indicating that 
with the inclusion of ethnic diversity, approximately 2% of the 
unexplained variability in the outcome is attributable to area-level 
factors.  
 
The explanatory variable effects on feeling safe are inconsistent. In 
2001, there is significant positive effect from ethnic diversity but 
significant negative effects from immigration, including from both 
black and white immigration. The rate of increase explanatory 
variables are not significant in 2001. None of the explanatory 
variables has a significant additional effect in 2011 with the exception 
of the ethnic diversity rate of increase which has a positive effect.  
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7.2.3: The empowerment dimension  
 
Table xxxiv: Feeling able to influence decisions about the local area: multi-
level model summary output 
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.349 0.019 
-
18.172    
Level 2 0.048 0.008 5.931  0.014 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY          
Cons 0.156 0.045 3.447    
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.616  0.008 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons 0.145 0.057 2.531    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 0.056 0.174 0.324 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.068 0.170 0.402 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.598  0.008 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.128 0.061 2.086    
IMMIGRATION 0.002 0.003 0.671 ns   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.000 0.003 0.086 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.567  0.008 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.136 0.054 2.501    
BLACK IMMIGRATION 0.003 0.004 0.766 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.003 0.005 0.543 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.532  0.008 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.112 0.066 1.713    
WHITE IMMIGRATION 0.008 0.009 0.884 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.007 0.008 -0.941 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.651  0.008 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons 0.181 0.063 2.854    
ED increase 0.000 0.001 -0.529 ns   
ED increase*2011 -0.001 0.001 -0.449 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.567  0.008 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 0.227 0.051 4.463    
IMM increase -0.002 0.001 -1.815 ns   
IMM increase*2011 0.001 0.001 0.840 ns   
Level 2 0.025 0.007 3.526  0.008 
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Table xxxv: New business formation: single-level model summary output 
 
  MODEL 
Explanatory 
variable 
Effect on outcome 
variable 
  
AdjR
2 F  Sig B t Sig 
 
2001          
 
Control variables 
only .472 15.736 **    
 
Ethnic Diversity .471 14.942 ** 0.009 0.658 ns No effect 
Immigration .496 16.430 ** 0.119 3.998 ** 
1 SD increase in Imm 
→ 0.95 per 1000 pop 
increase in new 
business formation 
(0.119*7.96) 
Black immigration .477 15.300 ** 0.075 1.997 * 
1 SD increase in 
Black Imm → 0.42 per 
1,000 pop increase in 
new business 
formation (0.075*5.59) 
White immigration .488 15.941 ** 0.199 3.215 ** 
1SD increase in White 
Imm → 0.64 per 1,000 
pop increase in new 
business formation 
(0.199* 3.2) 
ED rate of 
increase .474 15.129 ** 0.004 1.514 ns No effect 
IMM rate of 
increase .474 15.114 ** 
-
0.012 
-
1.465 ns No effect 
2011         
Control variables 
only .558 22.356 **     
Ethnic Diversity .559 21.359 ** 0.018 1.263 ns No effect 
Immigration .565 21.921 ** 0.075 2.397 * 
1 SD increase in Imm 
→ 0.79 per 1,000 pop 
increase in new 
business formation 
(0.075 * 10.49) 
Black immigration .561 21.598 ** 0.065 1.749 ns No effect 
White immigration .560 21.532 ** 0.100 1.583 ns No effect 
ED rate of 
increase .559 21.389 ** 
-
0.006 
-
1.150 ns No effect 
IMM rate of 
increase .563 21.782 ** 
-
0.009 
-
2.143 * 
1SD increase in 
IMMinc → 0.31 per 
1,000 pop decrease in 
new business 
formation 
(-0.009*34.87) 
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There are two social quality indicators in the empowerment 
dimension: feeling able to influence decisions about the local area, 
which has a multi-level data structure, and the rate of new business 
formation in local areas, which has single level data. 
 
Area-level factors have a negligible effect on whether or not people 
feel they can influence decisions which are made about their local 
area. The ICC for the model with no explanatory variables is 0.014. 
That is, only about 1% of unexplained variation in the outcome 
variable is attributable to area-level factors. With area-level control 
variables but no ethnic diversity or immigration explanatory variables 
included the ICC is 0.008, indicating that only 0.8% of unexplained 
variance is due to area-level factors. The addition of the explanatory 
variables does not additionally explain variance in this outcome 
variable and none of the explanatory variables has a significant effect 
in the models. 
 
New business formation rates appear higher in 2011 than in 2001. 
The mean for LADs was 4.80 new businesses per 1,000 population 
in 2001 and 6.72 per 1,000 population in 2011. But the methodology 
for compiling these statistics changed between 2001 and 2011 so the 
data are not comparable between the two time points.  
 
The new business formation models have moderate R2  values. R2  is 
.472 in 2001 and .558 in 2011 for the models with control variables 
only, indicating that without explanatory variables the 2001 model 
accounts for about 47% and the 2011 model for about 56% of the 
variability in the outcome. The addition of explanatory variables does 
very little to improve the model fit.  
 
Ethnic diversity is not significant for new business formation in either 
2001 or 2011. Immigration is significant in both years. In 2001, as 
immigration increases by 1SD (7.96 percentage points) new 
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business registration increases by 0.95 new businesses per 1,000 
population.  
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7.2.4 The social capital dimension 
 
Table xxxvi: Local trust: multi-level model summary output: 
 
  B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 1.465 0.043 34.181    
Level 2 0.424 0.035 12.045  0.114 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY          
Cons 1.737 0.061 28.588    
Level 2 0.132 0.019 6.823  0.039 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons 1.853 0.092 20.078    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.763 0.234 -3.261 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 -0.667 0.214 -3.116 **   
Level 2 0.109 0.017 6.280  0.032 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.955 0.102 19.204    
IMMIGRATION -0.020 0.006 -3.579 **   
IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.009 0.004 -2.179 *   
Level 2 0.109 0.016 6.697  0.032 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.796 0.088 20.356    
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.016 0.006 -2.447 *   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.019 0.005 -3.984 **   
Level 2 0.114 0.017 6.641  0.034 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.045 0.111 18.374    
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.057 0.018 -3.143 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.016 0.013 -1.287 ns   
Level 2 0.112 0.017 6.704  0.033 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons 1.871 0.089 21.122    
ED increase -0.003 0.002 -2.207 *   
ED increase*2011 0.007 0.002 3.396 **   
Level 2 0.128 0.019 6.737  0.038 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 1.882 0.089 21.172    
IMM increase -0.003 0.002 -2.047 *   
IMM increase*2011 0.004 0.002 1.827 ns   
Level 2 0.128 0.019 6.851  0.037 
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Table xxxvii: Civic participation: multi-level model summary output 
 
  B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.638 0.023 -27.719    
Level 2 0.091 0.012 7.432  0.027 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY          
Cons 0.280 0.048 5.825    
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.476  0.012 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons 0.352 0.060 5.856    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.301 0.190 -1.579 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.096 0.150 0.642 ns   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.468  0.012 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.385 0.064 6.061    
IMMIGRATION -0.008 0.004 -2.096 *   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.002 0.003 0.722 ns   
Level 2 0.037 0.007 5.422  0.011 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.351 0.054 6.484    
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.009 0.005 -1.904 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.003 0.004 0.657 ns   
Level 2 0.037 0.007 5.409  0.011 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.350 0.069 5.101    
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.013 0.010 -1.257 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.000 0.008 -0.004 ns   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.469  0.012 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons 0.280 0.070 3.968    
ED increase 0.000 0.001 0.005 ns   
ED increase*2011 0.000 0.001 0.121 ns   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.476  0.012 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 0.276 0.061 4.555    
IMM increase 0.000 0.001 -0.158 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -2.214 *   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.384  0.012 
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Table xxxiii: Watching a lot of TV:  Multi-level model summary output 
 
  B SE Z SIG ICC 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.160 0.027 -5.995    
Level 2 0.080 0.014 5.867  0.024 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY          
Cons -0.702 0.061 -11.423    
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.068  0.011 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY          
Cons -0.699 0.072 -9.757    
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.016 0.194 -0.084 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.074  0.011 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.716 0.075 -9.513    
IMMIGRATION 0.001 0.004 0.268 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.039  0.011 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.706 0.068 -10.328    
BLACK IMMIGRATION 0.001 0.005 0.102 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.058  0.011 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.756 0.078 -9.633    
WHITE IMMIGRATION 0.011 0.010 1.088 ns   
Level 2 0.035 0.009 3.932  0.011 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF 
INCREASE           
Cons -0.667 0.082 -8.149    
ED increase 0.000 0.001 -0.625 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.025  0.011 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.690 0.073 -9.442    
IMM increase -0.001 0.002 -0.293 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.074  0.011 
 
 
There are three social quality indicators in the social capital dimension, all 
with multi-level data structures; local trust, civic participation and watching a 
lot of TV. 
 
Area-level factors have a substantial effect on local trust. Before 
control or explanatory variables are added to the model, the ICC is 
0.114 indicating that about 11% of the unexplained variation in the 
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outcome is due to area-level factors. When control variables are 
added to the model the ICC is 0.039, so more than half of the area-
level effect on local trust is explained by inclusion of the variables for 
crime rate, deprivation and higher-level qualifications. The addition of 
the explanatory variables has an effect on the ICC, particularly for 
ethnic diversity (ICC for this model is 0.032) and immigration (ICC for 
this model is 0.032) and so makes some contribution to explaining 
variation in the local trust outcome.  
 
Area-level factors make a greater contribution to explaining local 
variance in local trust than for the other indicators of social capital. 
They make little difference to variation in civic participation.  The ICC 
for the civic participation model with no control or explanatory 
variables is 0.027; that is, about 3% of the unexplained variance in 
the outcome is due to area-level factors. When area-level variables 
are included, but with no explanatory variables, ICC is 0.012, so the 
inclusion of the area-level variables has helped explain some of the 
variation in the outcome. But the addition of explanatory variables 
makes very little difference to the ICC, indicating that these variables 
are not doing much to explain area-level variance in civic 
participation. Similarly for TV watching. The  ICC for the TV watching 
model with no control or explanatory variables  is 0.024, reducing to 
0.011 when control variables are introduced to the model, but with no 
further reduction when the ethnic diversity and immigration variables 
are added. 
 
The explanatory variables have a significant and substantial effect on 
local trust but very little or no effects on the other indicators of social 
capital.  There are no statistically significant explanatory variable 
effects on civic participation other than a negative effect from 
immigration in 2001 and a negative effect from the immigration rate 
of increase in 2011. The 2001 negative effect from immigration is 
significant only at the 0.05 level of probability and neither black 
immigration nor white immigration alone has a statistically significant 
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effect. The data for TV viewing is only available for 2001. None of the 
explanatory variables has a significant effect on whether or not 
people report watching a lot of TV. 
 
Local trust is negatively affected by the area-levels of ethnic diversity 
and, to a smaller degree, immigration. These negative effects occur 
in both 2001 and 2011. The negative effect of immigration appears 
more strongly associated with black immigration, which has a 
statistically significant negative effect on local trust in 2001 and 2011, 
than white immigration, which has a negative effect in 2001 but no 
additional effect in 2011. The ethnic diversity rate of increase and 
immigration rate of increase both have a significant, negative effect 
on local trust in 2001. There is no significant additional 2011 effect 
from the immigration rate of increase but the 2011 additional effect 
from ethnic diversity rate of increase on local trust is a positive one. 
 
7.3 Summary of findings 
 
With each of the six explanatory variables modelled for each of the 
eleven social quality outcome variables, some in multi-level models 
combining data for both years and some in single-level models with 
separate data for 2001 and 2011, the final output gives 120 results, 
which are complex to keep track of. In the discussion of the findings 
from the statistical modelling, which follows in Chapter Eight, 
summary tables which distil and illustrate the findings are presented.  
 
In all of the summary tables, a statistically significant effect from the 
explanatory variable on the outcome variable is marked as ‘Pos’ or 
‘Neg’ depending on the direction of the effect. The “2001” column 
shows whether the explanatory variable has a statistically significant 
effect on the outcome variable. The “Additional effect 2011” column 
shows the change to the explanatory variable effect when the 
coefficient for the explanatory variable*year is added. It is worth 
remembering that in some cases the direction of the 2011 additional 
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effect is opposite to that of the 2001 effect, and that when these are 
summed the overall effect on the outcome may remain as for 2001; 
for example, this happens for the effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on trusting the local council, where the positive additional 
effects in 2011 are generally smaller than the negative effects in 
2001, so the overall effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on 
the local council in 2011 remain negative. 
 
A summary table in this format for all 120 results is shown on the 
following page, in Table xxxx.   
 
Table xxxix, below, provides a prompt for how the summary tables 
should be interpreted. 
 
Table xxxix: How to interpret the summary tables 
 
“2001” column “Additional effect 2011” column 
 (Add effect)  
Table 
shows 
Interpretation Table 
shows 
Interpretation 
Ns The explanatory variable has no 
effect on the outcome variable 
Ns Over time, there is no 
change to the 2001 effect 
Pos  The explanatory variable has a 
significant positive effect on the 
outcome variable 
Pos  Over time, there is a 
significant, positive 
change to the 2001 effect 
Neg   The explanatory variable has a 
significant negative effect on 
the outcome variable 
Neg  Over time, there is a 
significant, negative 
change to the 2001 effect 
* Effect is statistically significant at 0.05 level of probability 
** Effect is statistically significant at 0.01 level of probability 
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Table xxxx: Summary of all findings: effects of all explanatory variables on all social quality indicators  
 
 Ethnic diversity Immigration Black IMM White IMM ED rate of 
increase 
IMM rate of increase 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament ns Pos* ns Pos** ns Pos** ns Pos* ns ns ns ns 
Trusting council Neg** Pos** Neg** Pos** Neg** Pos**  Neg** Pos** ns Neg* ns Neg* 
Trusting the police ns Pos* ns Pos* ns Pos* Neg** Pos** ns ns Neg* ns 
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout ns ns ns ns ns ns ns Neg** ns Neg** ns Neg** 
Feeling safe Pos** ns Neg** ns Neg** ns Neg** ns ns Pos* ns ns 
Reg charities No data ns No data ns No data ns No data ns No data Pos* No data ns 
Empowerment  
Influencing ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
New businessa ns ns Pos** Pos* Pos* ns Pos** ns ns ns ns Neg* 
Social capital 
Local trust Neg** Neg** Neg** Neg* Neg* Neg** Neg** ns Neg* Pos** Neg* ns 
Civic participation ns ns Neg* ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns Neg* 
Watching a lot of 
TV 
ns No data ns No data ns No data ns No data ns No data ns No data 
a The new business variable is not comparable between the time points so caution is needed when considering the additional effects over 
time for this outcome. 
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
This chapter considers what the data modelling results can tell us 
about the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social quality. 
Firstly, this section discusses the findings in relation to the primary 
research questions: 
 
1. Do ethnic diversity and immigration have any effects on a range 
of indicators of social quality in local areas of England? 
 
2. Do any effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality change over time? 
 
The chapter then considers what the modelling results tell us in two 
areas which are not primary research questions, but where the 
research design and data have generated interesting findings: 
 
 Do levels of immigration by black and white ethnic groups have 
different effects on social quality? 
 
 Do ethnic diversity and immigration have differing effects on 
social quality measured at individual-level and area-level? 
 
The chapter moves on to consider what factors other than ethnic 
diversity and immigration might help to explain why social quality 
outcomes vary between local areas.  The chapter ends by exploring 
whether the modelling results make sense within the dimensions of 
the social quality framework, or if arranging the social quality 
indicators within other groups helps to better explain the pattern of 
results.  
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8.1 The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality 
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have an effect on some but not all of 
the selected indicators of social quality. These effects are mixed; 
ethnic diversity and immigration have a positive effect on some 
aspects of social quality and a negative effect on others. These 
effects are summarised in Table xxxxi. 
 
Table xxxxi:  Summary of findings: effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on social quality indicators 
 Ethnic diversity  Immigration 
2001 
Add 
effect 
2011  2001 
Add effect 
2011 
Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament ns Pos**  ns Pos** 
Trusting the local council Neg** Pos**  Neg** Pos** 
Trusting the police ns Pos*  ns Pos* 
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout ns ns  ns ns 
Feeling safe Pos** ns  Neg** ns 
Registered charities no data ns  no data ns 
Empowerment  
Influencing ns ns  ns ns 
New business formation ns ns  Pos** Pos* 
Social capital 
Local trust Neg** Neg**  Neg** Neg** 
Civic participation ns ns  Neg* ns 
Watching a lot of TV ns no data  ns no data 
 
 
There are more non-significant effects than significant effects from 
ethnic diversity, but the effects from immigration are as likely to be 
significant as non-significant.  For both ethnic diversity and 
immigration, the effects which are statistically significant are almost 
evenly divided between positive and negative. 
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There is no clear pattern of effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration across the four social quality dimensions. Within the 
social inclusion and social cohesion dimensions, ethnic diversity and 
immigration have all possible effects (positive, negative and none). 
Ethnic diversity has no effects in the empowerment dimension, while 
immigration has no effects and positive effects on the indicators in 
this dimension. In the social capital dimension, ethnic diversity and 
immigration have negative effects or no effects on the social quality 
indicators. 
 
The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration differ in frequency.  
More social quality outcomes have statistically significant effects from 
immigration than from ethnic diversity. As Table xxxxi illustrates, ten 
out of 20 results are statistically significant in the immigration models 
compared with seven out of 20 results for the ethnic diversity models.  
For two social quality indicators, ethnic diversity has no effect while 
immigration shows a significant effect; ethnic diversity has no effect 
on new business formation or civic participation in either year while 
immigration has a significant positive effect on new business 
formation in both years and a significant negative effect on civic 
participation in 2001. 
 
The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social quality are 
generally the same as each other. Neither have any effect on voter 
turnout, the number of registered charities, feeling able to influence 
local decisions, or watching a lot of TV. Both have negative effects 
on trusting the local council in 2001 and positive effects in 2011. Both 
have a positive effect on trusting parliament and trusting the police in 
2011, having no effect in 2001. Both have a negative effect on local 
trust in both 2001 and 2011. 
 
The one notable difference between the effects of ethnic diversity 
and immigration is the positive effect of ethnic diversity and the 
negative effect of immigration on feeling safe in 2001. This result is 
anomalous to the similar direction of any statistically significant 
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effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on all other social 
quality outcomes. The same direction of effects is consistent with the 
high positive correlation between the ethnic diversity and immigration 
explanatory variables (r=.911 in 2001). It is therefore difficult to 
explain why the significant effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration on feeling safe are in opposing directions. This indicator 
of social quality has not been used in previous studies in this field 
(see Table ii on page 99 for a list of the outcome variables used in 
the Putnam studies) so there is no empirical research which offers an 
explanation for this unexpected result. The 2011 effects for this 
outcome are consistent; neither ethnic diversity nor immigration has 
any significant additional effect on feeling safe. This means that the 
increases in ethnic diversity and immigration from 2001 to 2011 
make no difference to their effect on feeling safe, which remain 
positive for ethnic diversity and negative for immigration. 
 
Area-level effects on individual-level social outcome variables  
 
For the social quality outcomes which are measured at individual-
level, the area-level variables in the multi-level models explain very 
little of the variance in social quality outcomes, with the exception of 
the local trust indicator. 
 
Table xxxxii shows the ICC for the models with no predictor variables 
(in column a), with control variables only (column b) and with the 
ethnic diversity variable included (column c) (ICCs for the models 
with immigration variables are not included in this table as the values 
are identical or very close to those for the models with ethnic 
diversity). The ICC is expressed as a percentage which indicates 
approximately how much of the Level 2 variance between LADs is 
unexplained by the area-level variables included in the model. The 
ICC values in column a, where there are no area-level variables, 
indicates the proportion of all variability between LADs that is 
attributed to Level 2. Any reduction from column a to column b is a 
measure of how much Level 2 variance is accounted for by the 
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addition of the area-level control variables. A reduction from column 
b to column c indicates how much Level 2 variance is accounted for 
when the ethnic diversity explanatory variable is added to the model.  
 
The ICC values in column a show that area-level factors are least 
relevant for explaining the variability between LADs in feeling able to 
influence local decisions and have most relevance for local trust. 
Comparing the values in column c with those in column b shows that 
ethnic diversity goes some way to explaining outcome variance for 
feeling safe and local trust, but has no or negligible effects on the 
other indicators. The ICC for local trust remains high even when the 
control and ethnic diversity variables are included, indicating that 
there are other area-level factors, not included in this study, which 
help to explain the variance in local trust.  
 
Table xxxxii: Summary of intra class correlations for multi-level models 
 
Social quality outcome a 
No 
predictor 
variables 
b 
Control 
variables 
only 
c 
Ethnic 
diversity 
added 
Trusting parliament 3.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
Trusting the local council 2.7% 1.3% 1.2% 
Trusting the police 2.6% 1.1% 1.0% 
Feeling safe 5.0% 2.8% 2.1% 
Feeling able to influence local decisions 1.4% 0.8% 0.8% 
Local trust 11.4% 3.9% 3.2% 
Civic participation 2.7% 1.2% 1.2% 
Watching a lot of TV 2.4% 1.1% 1.1% 
 
Area-level effects on area-level social outcome variables  
 
For the social quality outcomes measured at area-level, the only 
significant effects are from immigration, which has a positive effect 
on new business formation in 2001 and a weaker but still positive 
effect in 2011. Ethnic diversity has no effect on the social quality 
outcomes measured at area-level. 
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Effect sizes 
 
To consider the relative sizes of the effects which ethnic diversity and 
immigration have on social quality, Table xxxxiii shows the effect 
sizes in a comparable format. These effect sizes are calculated by 
multiplying the coefficient by one standard deviation (SD) in the 
explanatory variable. For the multi-level modelled data, taking ethnic 
diversity as an example, the effect size of ethnic diversity (ED) is 
shown as: 
 
For 2001:   ED *1SDED     
For 2011:   (ED + ED*2011) *1SDED  
 
Only explanatory variables which have statistically significant effects 
on the social quality outcomes are included in Table xxxxiii. New 
business formation, while having statistically significant effects from 
immigration, is excluded from this table because the effect sizes are 
not comparable with those for the multi-level modelled outcomes.   
 
Table xxxxiii:  Effect sizes of ethnic diversity and immigration for 
explanatory variables with significant effects on outcome variables  
 
 
Ethnic diversity Immigration 
2001 2011 2001 2011 
Trusting parliament ns 3.107 ns 0.052 
Trusting local council -9.060 -1.601 -0.088 -0.010 
Trusting police ns 2.617 ns 0.010 
Feeling safe 17.063 nsc -0.207 nsc 
Local trust -11.857 -26.927 -0.159 -0.302 
Civic participation ns nsc ns -0.062 
ns = not statistically significant    nsc = no statistically significant change from 2001 
 
Table xxxxiii  shows that any significant effects from ethnic diversity 
and immigration on the social quality outcomes, whether positive or 
negative, are generally small. There are three exceptions to this, 
where effect sizes are much larger: the negative effect of ethnic 
diversity on local trust; the positive effect of ethnic diversity on feeling 
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safe, the negative effect of ethnic diversity on trusting the local 
council.  For the social quality outcomes where both have an effect, 
the effects of ethnic diversity are much larger than the effects of 
immigration.  
 
Another way to illustrate and compare the sizes of the ethnic diversity 
and immigration effects is to consider how they affect the predicted 
probabilities of the social quality outcomes occurring, using the 
method described in Chapter 5 (page 172).  Table xxxxiv shows 
predicted probabilities for the three social quality outcomes in multi-
level models where the explanatory variables have the greatest 
effect: trusting the council, feeling safe, local trust. The predicted 
probabilities are of the outcome occurring for the reference group 
(male, white, UK born, employed, with degree level qualification) 
when a local area takes the sample mean values for all variables in 
the model and the ethnic diversity and immigration values of the case 
study areas. The intention is to illustrate the size of the explanatory 
variable effects in a comparable way by holding all other values 
constant and varying only the value of the explanatory variables from 
very low (using the ethnic diversity and immigration values for 
Allerdale), median (using the values for Eastleigh), to very high 
(using the values for Newham). 
 
Table xxxxiv illustrates that the predicted probabilities for the 
reference group without adding the explanatory variable values (the 
zero rows) are markedly different for the three social quality 
outcomes. The reference group predicted probability of trusting the 
local council is only 39% in 2001; someone in the reference group is 
more likely to not trust the local council than to trust the local council. 
In contrast, the predicted probability of feeling safe in the zero 
explanatory variable value case is very high; someone in the 
reference group has a 91% probability of feeling safe in their local 
area in 2001, rising to 93% in 2011. 
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Table xxxxiv: Reference group predicted probabilities for selected 
outcomes   
 
Explanatory variable value ETHNIC DIVERSITY IMMIGRATION 
2001 2011 2001 2011 
Trusting the local council     
Zero 38.88 56.98 52.90 58.53 
Very low  (Allerdale) 28.41 53.49 52.69 58.51 
Average  (Eastleigh) 2.79 35.15 51.86 58.46 
Very high (Newham) 0.00 0.10 43.12 57.96 
Feeling safe     
Zero 90.86 92.78 91.46 92.57 
Very low  (Allerdale) 96.03 99.21 91.30 92.27 
Average  (Eastleigh) 99.97 100.00 90.63 91.39 
Very high (Newham) 100.00 100.00 80.48 76.45 
Local trust     
Zero 74.84 72.84 87.38 91.85 
Very low  (Allerdale) 61.58 19.98 87.21 91.48 
Average  (Eastleigh) 4.88 0.00 86.50 90.40 
Very high (Newham) 0.00 0.00 76.86 71.48 
 
The predicted probabilities change substantially when the values of 
ethnic diversity in the case study areas are added, and change to a 
much lesser degree with the values of immigration in the case study 
areas are added. For local trust, for example, the negative effect of 
ethnic diversity reduces the 2001 predicted probability from 75% 
when there is zero ethnic diversity, to 62% when the very low ethnic 
diversity area value from Allerdale is added, and to 5% when the 
median ethnic diversity area value  (as represented by Eastleigh) is 
added. When the very high ethnic diversity value of Newham is 
added, the predicted probability of local trust falls to zero. 
 
The large effect of ethnic diversity on local trust contrasts with the 
small effect size of immigration on local trust. Even when immigration 
takes the highest local area value (as for Newham), the predicted 
probability of local trust in 2001 falls only from 87% to 77% due to the 
effect of immigration. 
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For the social quality outcomes measured at area-level, only 
business formation is significantly affected by the explanatory 
variables. Table xxxv in Chapter Seven (page 263) showed that the 
2001 model predicts a 0.95 per 1,000 population increase in new 
business formation from each one standard deviation increase in 
immigration. The actual mean business formation rate for LADs in 
2001 is 4.80, so an increase of almost one new business per 1,000 
population can be considered a fairly large effect.    
 
The size of the immigration effect on new business formation can be 
illustrated in terms of the predicted number of new businesses in an 
LAD with average population and an immigration level equal to one 
standard deviation. The 2001 LAD average population is 150,733 
and the standard deviation for immigration is 7.96. The model 
predicts that in 2001 an LAD with average population size and an 
immigration level of 7.96 would have 143 new businesses more than 
if the immigration level was zero ((150,733*0.95)/1,000).  In 2011 the 
level of immigration still has a positive effect although the size of the 
effect is smaller (0.79 new businesses per 1,000 population, 
compared with 0.95 in 2001). To illustrate, despite the increase in the 
LAD mean population size from 150,733 in 2001 to 163,093 in 2011, 
the model predicts 129 additional new businesses in 2011 (as 
calculated by (163,093*0.79)/1,000).   
 
Summary of ethnic diversity and immigration effects on social quality 
 
To summarise the findings for the effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on the social quality indicators: 
 
 Ethnic diversity and immigration have an effect on some but not 
all of the social quality indicators. Where there is a statistically 
significant effect, the direction of the effect is varied; some social 
quality outcomes are positively affected by ethnic diversity and 
immigration while others are negatively affected.   
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 Significant effects from ethnic diversity and immigration are as 
likely to be positive as negative.   
 
 There are more significant effects from immigration than from 
ethnic diversity. 
 
 When both have a significant effect on the same outcome, the 
effects of ethnic diversity are substantially larger than those from 
immigration.   
 
 There is no clear pattern of effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration across the four dimensions of the social quality 
framework. The social inclusion and social cohesion dimensions 
include non-significant as well as significant positive and 
significant negative effects. The empowerment dimension 
includes non-significant and positive effects. The social capital 
dimension includes non-significant and negative effects.   
 
 For the social quality outcomes measured at individual-level, 
area-level factors are generally not of great importance in 
explaining variance between LADs. Area-level factors have the 
most relevance for explaining variations in local trust. The area-
level factors included in this study do not explain all of the 
variance in local trust. 
 
 For the social quality outcomes measured at area-level, 
immigration has a positive effect on new business formation. No 
other area-level indicators of social quality are affected by ethnic 
diversity or immigration. The effect of immigration on new 
business formation appears fairly large, but there are no other 
statistically significant effects with which to compare this.   
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8.2 The temporal effects of ethnic diversity and immigration 
on social quality 
 
In this study, the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality over time are measured in two ways; by comparing the effects 
of levels of ethnic diversity and immigration in 2001 with the effects of 
levels in 2011, and by looking at the effects of the rates of increase in 
ethnic diversity and immigration in the 10 years to 2001 and the 10 
years to 2011.  In the following discussion, levels of ethnic diversity 
and immigration are also sometimes referred to as ‘stocks’ and the 
rates of increase sometimes referred to as ‘flows’.  
 
Comparing effects of levels in 2001 and 2011 
 
When the effects of levels of ethnic diversity and immigration are 
compared for 2001 and 2011, the direction of change over the time 
period can be considered to be either positive or negative. Where a 
negative effect is greater in 2011 than in 2001, this can be 
considered a negative change over time. Conversely, a negative 
effect which is weaker in 2011 than in 2001 can be considered a 
positive change over time. Where there is no significant effect in 
2001 and a positive effect in 2011, this can be considered a positive 
change over time. The changes over time for effects from levels of 
ethnic diversity and immigration are summarised in Table xxxxv. 
Table xxxxv excludes the social quality outcomes which cannot be 
compared over time (registered charities, new business formation, 
watching a lot of TV). 
 
When considered in terms of direction of change over time, there is a 
clear pattern of effects across the four social quality dimensions and 
this pattern is the same for the effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration. The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
inclusion move in a positive direction over time. The effects of ethnic 
diversity and immigration on social capital move in a negative 
direction over time, although not entirely as their effects on the civic 
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participation indicator of social capital are unchanged over time. 
There is no change over time from the effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on indicators in the social cohesion and empowerment 
dimensions.  
 
Table xxxxv:  Summary of findings:  Direction of change over time 
 
 Ethnic diversity  Immigration  
Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament No effect becomes 
positive 
+ve  No effect becomes 
positive 
+ve  
Trusting local 
council 
Negative effect becomes 
less negative 
+ve  Negative effect less 
negative 
+ve  
Trusting the police No effect becomes 
positive 
+ve  No effect becomes 
positive 
+ve  
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout  No effect no change  No effect no change  
Feeling safe Positive effect no change  Negative effect no 
change 
 
Empowerment 
Influencing No effect no change  No effect no change  
Social capital 
Local trust Negative effect increases -ve Negative effect increases -ve 
Civic participation No effect no change  Negative effect no 
change 
 
 
Rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration 
 
A measure of change over time is included in the modelling in the 
form of the rate of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration within 
LADs. Table xxxxvi summarises the effects on social quality from the 
rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration in local areas in 
2001 and the additional effect for 2011.  
 
Table xxxxvi shows that where the ethnic diversity rate of increase 
has a significant effect on social quality outcomes, these effects are 
both positive and negative. In contrast, where the immigration rate of 
increase has a significant effect, the effect is always negative. 
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The effects of the rate of increase variables are generally consistent 
with the level of ethnic diversity and immigration variables in terms of 
whether or not they have any effect on the social quality outcomes. 
Like the levels of ethnic diversity and immigration, the rates of 
increase in ethnic diversity and immigration have no effect on TV 
watching or on whether people feel they can influence decisions 
about their local area.  
 
Table xxxxvi Summary findings: Effects of ethnic diversity and immigration 
rates of increase compared over time 
 
 Ethnic diversity  
rate of increase 
 Immigration 
 rate of increase 
2001 Add effect 
2011 
 2001 Add effect 
2011 
Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament ns ns  ns ns 
Trusting council ns Neg*  ns Neg* 
Trusting police ns* ns  Neg* ns 
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout ns Neg**  ns Neg** 
Feeling safe ns Pos*  ns ns 
Registered charities n/a Pos*  n/a ns 
Empowerment 
Influencing ns ns  ns ns 
New business formation ns ns  ns Neg* 
Social capital 
Local trust Neg* Pos**  Neg* ns 
Civic participation ns ns  ns Neg* 
Watching a lot of TV ns ns  ns n/a 
 
In a similar way to the levels of ethnic diversity and immigration, the 
effects of ethnic diversity and immigration rates of increase are 
almost but not entirely consistent with each other. Ethnic diversity 
and immigration rates of increase both have a significant negative 
effect in 2011 on trusting the local council and voter turnout, having 
shown no significant effect in 2001. Both have a negative effect on 
local trust in 2001, with no significant additional effect in 2011 on this 
outcome from immigration rate of increase, but a positive effect from 
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ethnic diversity rate of increase. The rate of change in ethnic diversity 
has a positive effect on feeling safe and registered charities in 2011 
only, while the immigration rate of increase has a negative effect on 
new business formation in 2011 only.  
 
The effects of the rate of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration 
are different from the effects from levels of ethnic diversity and 
immigration, but not in any clear or consistent ways, as illustrated in 
Table xxxxvii. 
 
Table xxxxvii Summary findings: Effects of ethnic diversity and ethnic 
diversity rates of increase 
 
 Ethnic 
diversity 
ED rate of 
increase 
 Immigration IMM rate of 
increase 
 2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
 2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
Social inclusion 
Trust parl  ns Pos* ns ns  ns Pos** ns ns 
Trust council Neg** Pos** ns Neg*  Neg** Pos** ns Neg* 
Trust police ns Pos* ns ns  ns Pos* Neg* ns 
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout ns ns ns Neg**  ns ns ns Neg* 
Feel safe Pos** ns ns Pos*  Neg** ns ns ns 
Reg chars no 
data 
ns no data Pos*  no 
data 
ns no 
data 
ns 
Empowerment 
Influence ns ns ns ns  ns ns ns ns 
New bus  ns ns ns ns  Pos*
* 
Pos* ns Neg* 
Social capital 
Local trust Neg** Neg** Neg* Pos**  Neg** Neg* Neg* ns 
Civic part ns ns ns ns  Neg* ns ns Neg* 
Watch TV ns no 
data 
ns no 
data 
 ns no 
data 
ns no 
data 
 
Neither rates of increase nor levels have any effects on the watching 
TV and influencing local decisions outcomes. For the social quality 
outcomes which are most frequently affected by the explanatory 
variables – local trust and trusting the local council – there are 
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consistent effects from ethnic diversity and immigration but 
differences in the effects from levels and rates of change.    
 
A comparison of the relative size of effects on social quality from 
levels and rates of change in ethnic diversity and immigration is 
shown in Table xxxxviii where the coefficients for explanatory 
variables which have a significant effect on the social quality 
outcomes are multiplied by one standard deviation in the explanatory 
variable. It is important to remember that the effect sizes on social 
quality indicators measured at area-level (voter turnout, registered 
charities and new business formation) are not comparable with those 
measured at individual-level. Only social quality outcomes for which 
the explanatory variables have significant effects are included Table 
xxxxviii. 
 
Table xxxxviii: Effect sizes for levels and rates of change in ethnic diversity 
and immigration  
 
Ethnic 
diversity level 
ED rate of 
increase 
 Immigration 
level 
IMM rate of 
increase 
 2001 
Add  
effect 
2011 2001 
Add  
effect 
2011 
 
2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 2001 
Add  
effect 
2011 
Social quality outcomes measured at individual-level 
Trust parl  ns 3.107 ns ns  ns 0.052 ns ns 
Trust 
council -9.060 1.601 ns -0.028  -0.088 0.010 ns -0.070 
Trust police ns 2.617 ns ns  ns 0.010 -0.025 ns 
Feel safe 17.063 ns ns 0.028  -0.207 ns ns ns 
Local trust 
-11.857 -26.927 
-
0.281 0.112  -0.159 -0.302 -0.038 ns 
Civic part ns ns ns ns  ns -0.062 ns -0.070 
Social quality outcomes measured at area-level 
Voting ns ns ns 0.000  ns ns ns -4.882 
Reg chars 
No 
data ns 
No 
data 2.352  No data ns No data ns 
New bus  ns ns ns ns  3.439 2.561 ns -3.348 
 
There are few cases where it is possible to compare effect sizes on 
outcomes from the rate of increase with the effects size from the 
level of ethnic diversity or immigration. Where this is possible for 
ethnic diversity effects, the levels of ethnic diversity have a far 
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greater effect than the rate of increase in ethnic diversity, as can be 
seen in Table xxxxviii in their effects on local trust.  Where 
comparisons for immigration are possible, for their effects on trusting 
the local council and civic participation in 2011 for example, the 
effects from level and rate of increase are similar in size to each 
other, and all are relatively small. Comparable effect sizes can also 
be seen for immigration on new business formation in 2011 where 
the size effect of the immigration level is similar to the size of the 
immigration rate of increase effect, although these are in opposite 
directions. 
 
The levels and the rates of increase have opposite effects on some 
variables in a small number of cases. There are 34 pairings of level 
and rate of increase which are directly comparable (17 each for 
ethnic diversity and immigration), of which four pairs show significant 
and opposite effects. These are:  
 
 Ethnic diversity on trusting the council in 2011 (positive for level 
and negative for rate of increase);  
 Immigration on trusting the council in 2011 (positive for level and 
negative for rate of increase); 
 Ethnic diversity on local trust in 2011 (negative for level and 
positive for rate of increase); 
 Immigration on new business formation in 2011 (positive for level 
and negative for rate of increase). 
 
Where ethnic diversity level and rate of increase have opposite 
effects on the same social quality outcomes, the size of the effect for 
the level is greater than the size of the effect for rate of increase. 
Where there are opposing effects from levels and rates of increase in 
immigration, the effect sizes are similarly very small on trusting the 
local council, and similarly reasonably large on new business 
formation. 
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To explore the opposite effects of stocks and flows in ethnic diversity 
and immigration, both explanatory variables were included in single 
models for those outcome variables where they showed opposite 
effects. Summary output from this modelling is shown in Table il.  
 
Table il: Level and rate of increase variables in the same model 
 
 B SE Z SIG 
Ethnic diversity and ED rate of increase on trusting the local council, 2011 
Cons -0.006 0.063 -0.102  
ED*2011 0.275 0.106 2.590 ** 
ED rate of increase 0.000 0.001 -0.059 ns 
Immigration and IMM rate of increase on trusting the local council, 2011 
Cons 0.016 0.058 0.270  
IMM*2011 0.006 0.002 3.115 ** 
IMM rate of increase -0.001 0.001 -0.937 ns 
Ethnic diversity and ED rate of increase on local trust, 2011 
Cons 1.718 0.082 21.000  
ED*2011 -0.903 0.176 -5.120 ** 
ED rate of increase -0.001 0.001 -0.836 ns 
Immigration and IMM rate of increase on new business formation, 2011 
Cons -8.006 2.602 -3.077  
IMM 2011 .074 .031 .017 * 
IMM rate of increase 2011 -0.009 .004 .033 * 
 
 
When modelled together with the level of ethnic diversity or 
immigration, the statistically significant effects from the rate of 
increase disappear for all but the new business formation outcome. 
This is consistent with the relative size of the effects (as shown in 
Table xxxxviii), which tend to be greater for levels than for rates of 
increase, but are similar in size of their effect on the new business 
formation outcome.   
 
Predicting future ethnic diversity and immigration effects 
 
Comparing the results of the statistical models for 2001 and 2011 
only tells us the direction of change in the relationship between the 
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explanatory and the outcome variable. It cannot tell us the path of 
travel in this relationship from the 2001 time point to the 2011 time 
point. Because we do not know the path of travel, we cannot know if 
the effects of ethnic diversity or immigration on the social quality 
outcomes will continue in the positive or negative direction shown in 
the change from 2001 to 2011.  
 
The limitations of the time series data available for this study mean 
that very little can be said about the longer term, future direction of 
the relationship between the explanatory and outcome variables. 
More data for the years in between 2001 and 2011 would give more 
clues as to how to plot the likely line of travel beyond 2011, as of 
course would data for the post-2011 years. In the absence of such 
additional data, the temporal analysis within this study is confined 
only to the change from 2001 to 2011 and cannot indicate the 
trajectory of that change or predict its future path. 
 
Summary of temporal effects 
 
To summarise the findings on the changing effects over time from 
ethnic diversity and immigration:  
 
 Comparing the effects from levels of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on social quality indicators in 2001 and 2011 shows a 
clear pattern of change over time across the four dimensions of 
the social quality framework. The effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration levels move in a positive direction for social inclusion, 
in a negative direction for social capital, with no change over time 
for social cohesion and empowerment. 
 
 The same social quality indicators which are affected by ethnic 
diversity and immigration stocks are also affected by ethnic 
diversity and immigration flows, with some exceptions. Some 
indicators of social quality are unaffected by either increasing 
stocks or flows. Feeling able to influence local decisions and TV 
 291 
 
watching are not affected at all, while trusting parliament, 
registered charities and civic participation are largely unaffected. 
 
 The rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration have 
significant effects on fewer indicators of social quality than the 
levels of ethnic diversity and immigration.  
 
  Where immigration rates of increase have a significant effect on 
social quality outcomes, these effects are always negative. 
Significant effects from ethnic diversity rates of increase are both 
negative and positive.  
 
 The levels of ethnic diversity and immigration and the rates of 
increase in ethnic diversity and immigration have opposite effects 
on some indicators of social quality; trusting the local council, 
local trust and new business formation.  
 
 Because the effects from levels are greater than the effects from 
rate of increase, when levels and rates of increase are modelled 
together, the level of ethnic diversity or immigration continues to 
have a statistically significant on trusting the local council and 
local trust, but the effect from the rate of increase disappears. The 
effect of immigration levels and rates on new business formation 
is an exception here. 
 
 The scope of temporal analysis is limited by the availability of 
comparable data at only two time points. It is not possible to 
derive longer term projections of the relationships between ethnic 
diversity or immigration and the social quality outcomes from the 
available data.   
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8.3 Additional findings of interest  
 
Do levels of immigration by black and white ethnic groups have 
different effects on social quality? 
 
The inclusion of explanatory variables which approximately indicate 
immigration by people from black and white ethnic groups enables 
some exploration of whether these have similar or different effects on 
social quality. Immigration has a significant effect on seven of the 
eleven social quality indicators; trusting parliament, trusting the local 
council, trusting the police, feeling safe, new business formation, 
local trust and civic participation. The summary effects of black and 
white immigration for these social quality indicators are shown in 
Table l. 
 
For almost all of the social quality indicators, black and white 
immigration have similar effects, or similarly have no effects. The 
exceptions are voter turnout, where black immigration has no effect 
and white immigration has a significant negative effect in 2011, and 
local trust, where black immigration has a significant negative effect 
and white immigration has no significant effect in 2011.   
 
A further exception is trusting the police, for which white immigration 
has a negative effect in 2001 and a positive additional effect in 2011, 
although the overall effect remains negative for 2011 as the size of 
the additional positive effect is smaller than the size of the 2001 
negative effect. Black immigration only has a positive effect, in 2011. 
The negative effect from white immigration is surprising; it would 
seem more likely that white immigration would have a positive effect, 
given that white non UK-born respondents are more likely to trust the 
police than any other group (as shown in Chart xi on page 229). 
Clearly, the attitudes towards the police of white or black immigrants 
are not in themselves causing the effect, which results from the area-
level presence of white and black immigrant populations. 
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Overall, the consistency between the effects of black and white 
immigration suggest that any significant effects on social quality from 
immigration are associated with immigration per se, and not with 
immigration from black ethnic groups, or other ethnic groups which 
are visibly different from the white ethnic majority.  
 
Table l: Summary of findings: Effects of black and white immigration 
compared 
 
 Immigration  Black 
immigration 
 White 
immigration 
2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
 2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
 2001 Add 
effect 
2011 
Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament ns Pos*
* 
 ns Pos**  ns Pos** 
Trusting the local 
council 
Neg** Pos*
* 
 Neg** Pos**  Neg** Pos** 
Trusting the police ns Pos*  ns Pos**  Neg** Pos** 
Social cohesion 
Voter turnout ns ns  ns ns  ns Neg** 
Feeling safe Neg** ns  Neg** ns  Neg** ns 
Reg charities No 
data 
ns  No 
data 
ns  No 
data 
ns 
Empowerment  
Influencing ns ns  ns ns  ns ns 
New bus  Pos** Pos*  Pos*  ns  Pos** ns 
Social capital 
Local trust Neg** Neg*  Neg* Neg**  Neg** ns 
Civic participation Neg* ns  ns ns  ns ns 
TV watching ns ns  ns No 
data 
 ns No 
data 
 
Do ethnic diversity and immigration have differing effects on social 
quality measured at individual and area-level? 
 
Three of the eleven social quality indicators used in this study are 
derived from data collected at area-level: voter turnout, registered 
charities and new business formation. The small number of area-
level social quality indicators limits the comparisons that can be 
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made between findings for these and the individual-level indicators. 
Only two of the social quality dimensions include both individual and 
area-level indicators; the social cohesion dimension, where voter 
turnout and registered charities are measured at area-level and 
feeling safe is measured at individual-level, and the empowerment 
dimension which includes the area-level variable new business 
formation alongside the individual-level variable for feeling able to 
influence decisions about the local area. Table li summarises the 
effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on the individual and area-
level indicators for social cohesion and empowerment. 
 
Within both the social cohesion and empowerment dimensions, the 
individual and the area-level indicators are showing different things. 
For social cohesion, the area-level indicators show that ethnic 
diversity and immigration have no effect while the individual-level 
indicator shows a positive effect from ethnic diversity in 2001, a 
negative effect from immigration in 2001, and no additional effects 
from either ethnic diversity or immigration in 2011. For 
empowerment, the individual-level indicator shows no effect from 
either ethnic diversity or immigration while the area-level indicator 
shows a positive effect from immigration in both years. 
 
Table li: Summary of explanatory variable effects: individual and area-level 
measures of social quality 
 Ethnic diversity  Immigration 
 Individual-
level 
Area-level  Individual-
level 
Area-level 
 
2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 2001 
Add 
effect 
2011  2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 
Social 
cohesion 
         
Voter turnout   ns ns   ns ns 
Feeling safe Pos** ns   Neg** ns   
Reg charities   n/a ns   n/a ns 
Empowerment         
Influencing ns ns   ns ns   
New bus   ns ns   Pos** Pos* 
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Summary of additional findings of interest 
 
 In the main, the effects of black immigration are the same as the 
effects of white immigration, suggesting that any effects from 
immigration on social quality, whether positive or negative, are 
associated with immigration itself rather than with characteristics 
associated with ethnic difference. 
 
 When social quality is measured at area-level, ethnic diversity has 
no effects and immigration has no effects or positive effects.  
 
 Within the dimensions where individual-level and area-level 
measures of social quality can be compared, there is no clear 
pattern of effects across the social quality framework dimensions. 
There are positive, negative and no significant effects in the social 
cohesion dimensions, and positive and no effects in the 
empowerment dimension.  
 
8.4 Other explanations for variance in social quality  
 
It should be stressed again that the focus of this study is on the 
effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social quality, and not 
on explaining why social quality outcomes differ between local areas. 
For this reason, the data analysis has not sought to find the best 
statistical explanation for variance in the social quality outcomes. In 
some cases, highlighted in the preceding discussions, the models 
are a poor fit for the data and are not useful for explaining the social 
quality outcomes. 
 
That said, it is still helpful for the discussion of ethnic diversity and 
immigration effects to look at whether factors other than ethnic 
diversity and immigration account for differences in social quality 
between LADs. To help explore this, Tables lii and liii show which of 
the area-level independent variables included in the models has the 
greatest effect on the social quality outcome variables.  
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Table lii shows which area-level independent variables have the 
largest effects in the multi-level models. The relative effect sizes are 
determined by the standardised coefficients of the independent 
variables. The coefficients are standardised by multiplying the 
unstandardized coefficient by one standard deviation in the 
independent variable. Although this only offers partial 
standardisation, as it takes no account of the variance in the 
dependent variable, this approach is recommended for comparing 
the order of magnitude of the influence of predictors on the 
dependent variable in logistic regression models (Menard, 2004). For 
each outcome variable in Table lii the output is for the random 
intercepts models with all level 1 and level 2 control variables and 
with either ethnic diversity or immigration as the explanatory variable.  
 
Table liii shows which independent variables have the greatest effect 
in the area-level models, based on the values of their standardised 
coefficients (the beta values, as given in SPSS output). As for the 
multi-level models, the area-level variable which has the greatest 
effect on each outcome variable is shown for both ethnic diversity 
and immigration as the explanatory variable. 
 
It should be remembered here that more area-level control variables 
were significant and therefore retained in the area-level models than 
in the multi-level models. The area-level control variables in the multi-
level models are deprivation, crime rate and higher qualifications. 
These variables are in all area-level models, along with limiting 
illness or disability, income, population density, region and area type.  
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Table lii: Independent variables with greatest effect on social quality: area 
level variables in multi-level models 
 
 MODELS WITH  
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
MODELS WITH  
IMMIGRATION 
 Area-level 
variable with 
greatest effect 
Std co-
efficient
(B*SD) 
Area-level 
variable with 
greatest 
effect 
Std co-
efficient 
(B*SD) 
SOCIAL INCLUSION     
Trusting parliament Ethnic 
diversity*2011 
3.107 Immigration*2
011 
0.052 
Trusting the council Ethnic diversity -9.060 Deprivation -0.141 
Trusting the police Ethnic diversity 2.617 Deprivation -0.132 
SOCIAL COHESION     
Feeling safe Ethnic diversity 17.063 Higher 
qualifications 
0.268 
EMPOWERMENT     
Feeling able to 
influence 
None significant  Deprivation -0.057 
SOCIAL CAPITAL     
Local trust Ethnic 
diversity*2011 
-26.927 Higher 
qualifications 
0.168 
Civic participation Higher 
qualifications 
0.191 Higher 
qualifications 
0.218 
Watching a lot of TV Deprivation 0.107 Deprivation 0.102 
 
Table liii: Independent variables with greatest effect on social quality: area-
level models 
 
 MODELS WITH  
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
MODELS WITH  
IMMIGRATION 
 Area-level 
variable with 
greatest effect 
Std co-
efficient   
(Beta) 
Area-level 
variable with 
greatest effect 
Std co-
efficient   
(Beta) 
SOCIAL COHESION     
Voter turnout 2001 Deprivation -0.461 South East 
region 
-0.466 
Voter turnout 2011 Higher 
qualifications 
0.686 Higher 
qualifications 
0.750 
Registered charities 
2011 
Higher 
qualifications 
0.604 Higher 
qualifications 
0.602 
EMPOWERMENT     
New business 2001 Deprivation -0.638 Deprivation -0.754 
New business 2011 Crime rate 0.569 Crime rate 0.524 
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We have already seen that for the social quality outcome indicators 
analysed in multi-level models, individual-level variables provide a far 
greater explanation of outcome variance than area-level factors. This 
is not unusual in multilevel modelling (Tarling, 2009). It helps to 
explain why fewer area-level control variables were significant in the 
multi-level models than in the single, area-level models. For most of 
the individual-level outcome indicators, the area-level contribution to 
explaining outcome variance, as indicated by the inter-class 
correlation, is 5% or less. Only for the local trust outcome variable do 
area-level variables provide a relatively high level of explanation, 
accounting for about 11% of the outcome variance. The focus of the 
following discussion is on which area-level variables play the greatest 
part in explaining social quality outcome variance, within the small 
portion which is explained at the area-level rather than by individual 
characteristics. 
 
Within the social inclusion dimension, ethnic diversity or immigration 
has a greater effect on trusting parliament than any other area-level 
variable. Ethnic diversity has the greatest effect on trusting the local 
council and trusting the police, but when immigration is the 
explanatory variable, deprivation has the greatest area-level effect on 
both these outcomes.   
 
Within the social cohesion dimension, ethnic diversity has the 
greatest effect on feeling safe, but when immigration is the 
explanatory variable, higher qualifications has the largest effect on 
feeling safe. For the social cohesion indicators measured at area 
level, higher qualifications have the greatest effect on the number of 
registered charities and voter turnout in 2011, with deprivation having 
the largest effect on voter turnout in 2001 when ethnic diversity is the 
explanatory variable, and the South East region having the largest 
effect when immigration is the explanatory variable. 
 
Within the empowerment dimension, no area-level variables have a 
statistically significant effect when ethnic diversity is the explanatory 
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variable, and deprivation has some effect when immigration is the 
explanatory variable. For the area-level social quality outcome in this 
dimension, deprivation has the greatest effect on new business 
formation in 2001, where the effect is negative, and crime rate has 
the greatest effect on new business formation in 2011, where the 
effect is positive. 
 
In the social capital dimension, ethnic diversity has the greatest effect 
on local trust when it is the explanatory variable. When immigration is 
the explanatory variable, higher qualifications have the largest effect 
on local trust. Higher qualifications have the greatest effect on civic 
participation, regardless of whether ethnic diversity or immigration is 
the explanatory variable. Deprivation is the only area-level variable 
which has a statistically significant effect on watching a lot of TV. 
 
Considered aside from the social quality dimensions, in terms of how 
many times each independent variable appears as that with the 
greatest effect on the social quality indicators, for the ethnic diversity 
models, ethnic diversity is the most frequent. For the eight social 
quality indicators with multi-level data, ethnic diversity has the largest 
effect of all area-level factors in five cases; trusting parliament, 
trusting the council, trusting the police, feeling safe and local trust. 
When immigration is the explanatory variable, deprivation has the 
largest area-level effect in four cases, and higher qualifications in 
three cases. 
 
For the three social quality indicators measured at area-level, ethnic 
diversity and immigration never have the largest effect. Higher 
qualifications and deprivation appear to have the greatest effects. 
The effects of the proportion of the population with higher 
qualifications are positive (on voter turnout and registered charities) 
while the effects of deprivation are negative (on voter turnout and 
new business formation). 
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When ethnic diversity is the explanatory variable and social quality 
outcomes are measured at individual level, ethnic diversity makes a 
larger contribution than other area-level factors to predicting variance 
of almost all social quality indicators. However, we know from 
comparing the ICC values (as shown in Table xxxxii, page 277) that 
adding ethnic diversity to the models does very little to explain 
variance between LADs in the social quality outcomes, with the 
exceptions of feeling safe and local trust. So the effects of ethnic 
diversity on other outcomes can only be considered large relative to 
the effects of other area-level variables included in the models, and 
all of these effects play only a very small part in explaining the 
variance of the social quality outcomes. 
 
When immigration is the explanatory variable, higher qualifications 
and deprivation have a greater effect on most of the social outcome 
indicators measured at individual-level. This underlines the finding 
that ethnic diversity has a greater effect than immigration on the 
social quality outcomes. 
 
It is interesting to find that higher qualifications appear so often as 
the strongest predicator of the social quality outcomes. Higher 
qualifications is a constituent part  of the deprivation variable, so its 
role as an important predictor of these social quality outcomes is 
additional to the part it is playing within the deprivation variable, a 
point which is discussed in more detail in Chapter Nine.  
 
The links between higher qualifications and higher positive 
responses on social quality indicators were highlighted in previous 
chapters, as were the positive correlations between higher 
qualifications and immigration (r = .690 in 2001 and .531 in 2011) 
and to a lesser extent between higher qualifications and ethnic 
diversity (r = .475 in 2001 and .369 in 2011). It may be that 
immigration and ethnic diversity contribute to the positive effects of 
higher qualifications on the social cohesion and social capital 
outcomes, as a bigger immigrant population and greater ethnic 
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diversity will contribute to a higher proportion of people with higher-
level qualifications.  Further modelling was carried out to explore 
whether higher qualifications offset the negative effects of 
immigration on feeling safe and local trust. The results of this were 
inconclusive and are not reported here. This remains an interesting 
area for future exploration. 
 
Summary of other explanations for social quality variance between 
local areas 
 
To summarise the findings for which control variables make the 
largest contribution to explaining variance in social quality: 
 
 The modelling approach adopted for this study has not tried to 
find the best explanation for social quality outcome variance, so 
findings concerning alternative or better explanations for social 
quality are very tentative. 
 
 For indicators of social quality which are measured at individual-
level, individual variables make a far greater contribution than 
area-level variables to explaining variance in social quality. 
 
 For five of the eleven outcome variables, when ethnic diversity is 
the explanatory variable, the level of ethnic diversity in the local 
area is the most important area-level variable for explaining why 
social quality varies between local areas. This is the case for all 
three indicators in the social inclusion dimension, and for some 
indicators of social cohesion and social capital. 
 
 When immigration is the explanatory variable, the level of 
immigration is only the most important area-level variable for 
explaining why trust in parliament varies between local areas. 
 
 Aside from ethnic diversity, the area-level variables which most 
frequently have the greatest effect on social quality are the level 
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of deprivation and the proportion of people with higher-level 
qualifications. 
 
 It is possible that the correlation between immigration and higher-
level qualifications influences variance in social cohesion and 
social capital, but exactly how this happens is not clear from the 
modelling approach employed. 
 
8.5 Alternative social quality frameworks considered 
 
Across the social quality framework developed for this study, there is 
no clear pattern of the effects from the ethnic diversity and 
immigration explanatory variables. All four dimensions of social 
quality show positive, negative and no significant effects (this is 
summarised in Table xxxx, page 272). It may be that this says more 
about the way the social quality framework is organised than it does 
about the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration. To consider this, 
we can look at a series of ‘what if’ scenarios which explore what the 
results might look like if a different approach to organising the social 
quality indicators had been adopted.  
 
What if the social quality indicators are grouped by the effects of 
ethnic diversity and immigration? 
 
What if the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration reveal a 
stronger association between the social quality indicators than their 
current organisation within the four social quality dimensions? It is 
possible that a more rational way to organise the social quality 
indicators is suggested by the effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on those indicators. By taking the modelling results 
themselves and working backwards from the findings, the social 
quality indicators can be grouped into positive, negative and no effect 
categories. This arrangement is loosely shown in Table liv (the two 
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indicators which show both negative and positive effects are placed 
in the negative group in this Table). 
 
We can then consider whether the social quality indicators within 
these groupings are more closely aligned with each other than they 
are within the social quality dimensions which have been used so far. 
One way of testing this is to examine the bivariate correlations for 
these groups, which are shown in Table lv.  
 
Table lv (and Tables lvi and lix which follow) show bivariate 
correlations for 2011 only. These are similar to the correlations for 
2001 and it is not necessary for this discussion to present tables for 
both years. Watching TV is excluded from these tables as there is no 
2011 data for this variable. The correlation values are marked ** 
when they are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) and * when they 
are significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
 
The correlations in Table lv do not provide a better rationale for the 
social quality outcome variables when they are grouped by the 
effects of ethnic diversity and immigration (as shown in Table liv) 
than the bivariate correlations for the variables when grouped within 
the four dimensions of the social quality framework (as shown in 
Table xiv and xv , page 184). In Table lv the strongest correlation is 
between registered charities and voter turnout (r = .679) both of 
which are in the ‘no effects’ group in this scenario, and which are 
also both in the social cohesion dimension. There is a moderately 
strong correlation (r = .503) between local trust and feeling safe, 
which are not in the same social quality dimension but which are 
grouped together in this scenario as both are negatively affected by 
immigration (although not by ethnic diversity). But other moderately 
strong correlations within the social quality dimensions, for example 
the correlation between trusting the local council and trusting 
parliament (r = .412) are less well reflected in the group by effects 
scenario, where one is in the negative effects group and the other in 
the positive effects group.  Overall, organising the outcome variables 
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by the nature of the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration does 
not produce a set of social quality groups which offers any clearer 
way of understanding social quality outcomes than the social quality 
framework which has been applied throughout this study. 
 
Table liv: Social quality indicators grouped by effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration 
 
 Ethnic diversity Immigration 
2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 
Negative effects 
Trusting the local council Neg  Pos Neg  Pos  
Feeling safe Pos None  Neg  None  
Local trust Neg  Neg  Neg  Neg  
Civic participation None  None  Neg  None 
Positive effects 
Trusting parliament None Pos  None Pos  
Trusting the police None  Pos None Pos  
New business formation None None Pos Pos  
No effects 
Influencing None  None  None  None  
Voter turnout None  None  None  None  
Registered charities n/a None n/a None 
Watching a lot of TV None n/a None n/a 
 
Table lv: Bivariate correlations 2011 outcome variables grouped by effects 
 
 Negative effects Positive effects No effects 
 Trust 
counc 
Feel  
safe 
Local 
trust 
Civic 
part 
Trust 
parl 
Trust 
police 
New 
bus 
Influ-
ence 
Vote Reg 
chars 
Trust counc 1 .211** -.023 -.004 .412** .331** .249** .215** .235** .143* 
Feel safe .211** 1 .503** .420** .038 .269** .122* .072 .401** .360** 
Local trust -.023 .503** 1 .406** -.200** .301** -.157** -.023 .414** .235** 
Civic part  -.004 .420** .406** 1 -.032 .217** .040 -.091 .373** .257** 
Trust parl .412** .038 -.200** -.032 1 .232** .316** .255** .110 .147* 
Trust police .331** .269** .301** .217** .232** 1 .089 .059 .289** .214** 
New bus   .249** .122* -.157** .040 .316** .089 1 .161** .332** .516** 
Influence .215** .072 -.023 -.091 .255** .059 .161** 1 .098 .116* 
Vote .235** .401** .414** .373** .110 .289** .332** .098 1 .679** 
Reg. chars .143* .360** .235** .257** .147* .214** .516** .116** .679** 1 
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What if the social quality indicators are grouped by the strength of 
their bivariate correlations? 
 
Another ‘what if’ scenario is to consider what the modelling findings 
might look like if the social quality indicators were grouped by the 
strength of their associations with each other, rather than within the 
social quality dimensions. How this would look in terms of bivariate 
correlations is shown in Table lvi. Considered like this, the social 
quality indicators could be organised into two groups. One with voter 
turnout, registered charities, local trust, feeling safe, new business 
formation and civic participation. And a second group with the three 
institutional trust indicators along with feeling able to influence. 
Leaving aside that some statistically significant correlations fall 
outside these groups (notably, the moderately strong correlation 
between trusting parliament and new business formation), we can 
then consider what the pattern of results from the data modelling 
might look like when organised within these groups of outcome 
variables. This is shown in Table lvii. 
 
Organised in this way, the effects of ethnic diversity and immigration 
on social quality appear no more coherent than when presented 
within the social quality framework. Both clusters include social 
quality indicators which are positively, negatively and not affected by 
ethnic diversity and immigration. It therefore appears that aspects of 
social quality that are more closely related to each other than to other 
aspects of social quality, as broadly indicated by their bivariate 
correlations, do not share the same relationship with area-levels of 
ethnic diversity and immigration. Whatever factors may link these 
social quality indicators together, it is not the way in which ethnic 
diversity and immigration affect them.  
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Table lvi: Bivariate correlations 2011 outcome variables grouped by 
associations 
 
 GROUP ONE GROUP TWO 
 Vote Reg 
chars 
Local 
trust 
Feel 
safe 
New 
bus 
Civic 
part 
Trust 
counc 
Trust 
parl 
Trust 
police 
Influ-
ence 
Vote 1 .679** .414** .401** .332** .373** .235** .110 .289** .098 
Reg. chars .679** 1 .235** .360** .516** .257** .143* .147* .214** .116** 
Local trust .414** .235** 1 .503** -.157** .406** -.023 -.200** .301** -.023 
Feel  safe .401** .360** .503** 1 .122* .420** .211** .038 .269** .072 
New bus   .332** .516** -.157** .122* 1 .040 .249** .316** .089 .161** 
Civic part  .373** .257** .406** .420** .040 1 -.004 -.032 .217** -.091 
Trust counc .235** .143* -.023 .211** .249** -.004 1 .412** .331** .215** 
Trust parl .110 .147* -.200** .038 .316** -.032 .412** 1 .232** .255** 
Trust police .289** .214** .301** .269** .089 .217** .331** .232** 1 .059 
Influence .098 .116* -.023 .072 .161** -.091 .215** .255** .059 1 
 
 
Table lvii:  Ethnic diversity and immigration effects on social quality 
indicators in correlated groups 
 Ethnic diversity Immigration 
 
2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 2001 
Add 
effect 
2011 
GROUP ONE  
Voter turnout None  None  None  None  
Registered charities n/a None n/a None 
Local trust Neg Neg Neg Neg 
Civic participation None  None  Neg None 
Feeling safe Pos None Neg None 
New business formation None None Pos  Pos  
GROUP TWO 
Trusting parliament None Pos  None Pos  
Trusting the police None Pos None Pos  
Trusting the local council Neg Pos Neg Pos 
Feeling able to influence None  None  None  None  
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What if the social quality indicators are grouped by ‘attitudes’ and 
‘behaviours’? 
 
Another scenario to consider is whether ethnic diversity and 
immigration produce different effects for social quality outcomes 
which indicate attitudes and those which reflect behaviours. Other 
studies in this field suggest that the effects on social quality of ethnic 
diversity and immigration may be differentiated in terms of what 
survey respondents say they think and what they report they do (for 
example, Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010). What people think about a 
range of social questions may be negatively influenced by media 
coverage of ethnic diversity and immigration, which is likely to affect 
how people behave (for example, Letki, 2008).   
 
To explore whether there is any clear pattern of effects from ethnic 
diversity and immigration in this ‘what if’ scenario, we can organise 
the social quality indicators into two groups. In the ‘attitudes’ group 
we can put the six indicators which are derived from survey 
responses to questions which ask for an opinion to be expressed. In 
the ‘behaviours’ group we can put the three area-level variables (new 
business formation, registered charities and voter turnout) along with 
the individual-level indicators which come from survey responses to 
questions which ask for a report of what people do (civic participation 
and watching TV). The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on 
the social quality indicator groupings organised in this way are shown 
in Table lviii. 
 
Table lviii shows that attitudes are more likely than behaviours to 
show an effect from ethnic diversity and immigration. There are some 
exceptions, notably the lack of any effect on feeling able to influence 
local decisions, which is included in the attitude group. In the main, 
there appears a reasonably clear pattern of no significant effects on 
behaviours and significant effects on attitudes. But this simple pattern 
is complicated by the direction of the significant effects, which are 
both positive and negative within each group.  When the associations 
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between the social quality indicators within each group are measured 
as bivariate correlations, as shown in Table lix, there is no clearer 
pattern than in the previous ‘what if’ scenarios. There are moderately 
strong correlations between some variables within the behaviour 
group, notably between voter turnout and registered charities, but 
this group also includes new business formation and civic 
participation, which are not correlated at all. Similarly, the attitudes 
group includes some variables with moderately strong correlations, 
feeling safe and local trust for example, but others with no 
correlation, feeling safe and trusting parliament for example. This 
arrangement also puts social quality variables which appear 
reasonably closely related into separate groups, such as the 
attitudinal variable for feeling safe and the behavioural variable for 
civic participation. 
 
Table lviii: Ethnic diversity and immigration effects on social quality 
indicators grouped by attitudes and behaviours 
 
 Ethnic diversity Immigration 
 
2001 
Add effect 
2011 2001 
Add effect 
2011 
Attitudes 
Trusting parliament None Pos None Pos 
Trusting the police None Pos None Pos 
Trusting the local council Neg Pos Neg Pos 
Feeling safe Pos None Neg None 
Local trust Neg Neg Neg Neg 
Influencing None  None  None  None  
Behaviours  
New business formation None None Pos Pos 
Civic participation None None Neg None 
Voter turnout None  None  None  None  
Registered charities n/a None n/a None 
Watching a lot of TV None n/a None n/a 
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Table lix: Bivariate correlations 2011 outcome variables grouped by 
attitude/behaviour 
 Attitudes Behaviours 
 Trust 
parl 
Trust 
police 
Trust 
counc 
Feel  
safe 
Local 
trust 
Influ-
ence 
New 
bus 
Civic 
part 
Vote Reg 
chars 
Trust parl 1 .232** .412** .038 -.200** .255** .316** -.032 .110 .147* 
Trust police .232** 1 .331** .269** .301** .059 .089 .217** .289** .214** 
Trust counc .412** .331** 1 .211** -.023 .215** .249** -.004 .235** .143* 
Feel safe .038 .269** .211** 1 .503** .072 .122* .420** .401** .360** 
Local trust -.200** .301** -.023 .503** 1 -.023 -.157** .406** .414** .235** 
Influence .255** .059 .215** .072 -.023 1 .161** -.091 .098 .116* 
New bus   .316** .089 .249** .122* -.157** .161** 1 .040 .332** .516** 
Civic part  -.032 .217** -.004 .420** .406** -.091 .040 1 .373** .257** 
Vote .110 .289** .235** .401** .414** .098 .332** .373** 1 .679** 
Reg. chars .147* .214** .143* .360** .235** .116** .516** .257** .679** 1 
 
What if the social quality indicators are grouped by their distance 
from day to day life? 
 
Chapter Three showed how debates about the social effects from 
ethnic diversity and immigration are strongly focused on local, 
neighbourhood levels, and how national and local-level impacts may 
differ. It may be that the differing effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration on the social quality indicators in this study would appear 
more coherent if the social quality indicators were organised by the 
level at which individuals are likely to perceive these social factors.   
 
Using common sense rather than any theoretical framework, this 
could mean organising the social quality indicators into three groups 
to represent national/regional level, local authority level and 
neighbourhood/household level effects. At the national or regional 
level we can put trust in parliament and trust in the police; both are 
national or regional institutions with which most people have little or 
no daily contact. Also at this level we can put new business formation 
and registered charities on the grounds that they are remote from 
daily life for most people, although this point is clearly arguable. At 
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the local-level we can put trusting the local council, voter turnout 
(which is a measure of turnout in local council elections) and feeling 
able to make decisions about the local area; these three indicators 
are all associated with what happens at the local-level, definitely at 
the local authority level for two of these and arguably for the feeling 
able to influence local decisions indicator. In a third group, we can 
put the indicators which represent how people feel within their 
immediate neighbourhoods and households; feeling safe, trusting 
others who live in the area, watching TV. Civic participation is 
excluded from this arrangement as this variable represents an 
aggregation of activities which have taken place at neighbourhood, 
local and national level.  
 
Table lx shows that when the social quality indicators are grouped by 
the likely perception of what level they operate at, there is a loose 
pattern of ethnic diversity and immigration effects across these 
groupings; mainly positive effects at the national or regional level, 
mainly negative effects at the neighbourhood level, and largely no 
effects in the intermediate, local authority level. This pattern is 
complicated by the significant effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration on the middle-level indicator of trusting the local council, 
and the positive effect from ethnic diversity on the near-level indicator 
of feeling safe.   
 
Tentatively, arranging the social quality indicators by proximity to 
daily life suggests that ethnic diversity and immigration effects tend to 
be negative for ‘close’ indicators of social quality, positive for ‘distant’ 
indicators, and have no effect on those in between. But the pattern of 
these effects is not clear cut and does not strongly support this line of 
argument. 
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Table lx: Ethnic diversity and immigration effects on social quality indicators 
grouped by level of perceived effects 
 
 Ethnic diversity Immigration 
 
2001 
Add effect 
2011 2001 
Add effect 
2011 
National or regional level 
Trusting parliament None Pos  None Pos  
Trusting the police None Pos None Pos  
New business formation None None Pos  Pos  
Registered charities n/a None n/a None 
Local authority level 
Influencing local 
decisions 
None  None  None  None  
Voter turnout None  None  None  None  
Trusting the local council Neg  Pos  Neg  Pos  
Neighbourhood or household level 
Feeling safe Pos None Neg  None 
Local trust Neg  Neg  Neg  Neg  
Watching a lot of TV None n/a None n/a 
 
 
Summary of social quality framework considerations 
 
To summarise key findings concerning the use of the social quality 
framework and possible alternative models: 
 
 This study uses a framework where four dimensions of social 
quality are measured by eleven indicators. Ethnic diversity and 
immigration do not have any clear pattern of effects on the social 
quality indicators when they are organised across these four 
social quality dimensions.  
 
 Attitudes are more likely than behaviours to be affected by the 
levels of ethnic diversity and immigration in local areas. Ethnic 
diversity has no effect on behaviours. 
 
 The proximity of the social quality indicators to daily life may be a 
factor in whether ethnic diversity and immigration have any effect. 
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The study findings suggest, but do not strongly support the idea 
that increased ethnic diversity and immigration have positive 
effects on aspects of social quality which are remote from daily 
life and negative effects on those aspects which are experienced 
at an immediate, day to day level.  
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS FROM THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
9.1 The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration on social 
quality indicators 
 
This study has found that ethnic diversity and immigration affect 
some but not all of the indicators of social quality which were 
investigated. Where there is a statistically significant effect the 
direction of that effect is varied; some social quality outcomes are 
positively affected by ethnic diversity and immigration while others 
are negatively affected.  
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have positive effects on: 
 Whether or not people trust parliament; 
 Whether or not people trust the police.  
Immigration (but not ethnic diversity) also has a positive effect on the 
rate of new business formation in local areas. 
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have negative effects on: 
 Whether or not people trust others who live in their local area. 
Immigration (but not ethnic diversity) also has a negative effect on 
civic participation. 
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have no effect at all on: 
 Whether or not people feel they can influence decisions which 
affect their local area; 
 Whether or not people vote in local elections; 
 Whether or not people watch a lot of TV. 
 
There are mixed effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on 
some social quality outcomes: 
 Ethnic diversity and immigration have negative effects on trusting 
the council in 2001 but positive effects in 2011; 
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 Ethnic diversity has a positive effect on feeling safe in 2001 but 
immigration has a negative effect on this. 
 
When all possible effects of the six explanatory variables on the 11 
social quality outcomes are considered, the most frequent 
occurrence is that the effect is not statistically significant.  This is 
shown in the summary table of all findings (Table xxxx, page 272). Of 
120 possible effects there are 20 positive, 26 negative and 74 non-
significant effects.  The prevalence of non-significant, or null effects, 
is in itself an important finding.  
 
Ethnic diversity and immigration have no effect at all on whether 
people feel they can influence decisions about their local area, nor on 
whether people spend a lot of time watching TV. They have very little 
effect on individual likelihood of civic participation or on voter turnout 
rates in local elections.  These findings differ from Putnam’s (2007) 
who identified negative effects from ethnic diversity on all these 
aspects of social quality (although Putnam’s voting measure is voter 
registration rather than voter turnout). This study also found barely 
any effects from ethnic diversity and immigration on the number of 
registered charities in a local area, an indicator used in only one 
other Putnam study; Coffe and Geys (2006) used a similar measure 
in their aggregate social capital outcome variable, for which they 
reported a negative effect from nationality diversity in Belgian 
municipalities. 
 
When the totality of the statistically significant effects of the six 
explanatory variables on the 11 social quality outcomes are 
considered, there are slightly more negative effects than positive 
effects.  This suggests that there may be greater tendency for ethnic 
diversity and immigration to negatively affect than to positively affect 
social quality, for the indicators of social quality included within this 
study.  
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This study has used a theoretically driven framework to identify the 
factors which make up the social quality of local areas. When these 
factors were operationalised into measurable variables upon which 
the effects of ethnic diversity/immigration in England could be tested, 
the resulting social quality framework located 11 social quality 
indicators across four social quality dimensions; social inclusion, 
social cohesion, empowerment and social capital (as shown in Table 
v, page 143).   
 
When all the effects of the ethnic diversity and immigration variables 
are considered across the four dimensions of the social quality 
framework, there is no discernible pattern relating negative or 
positive effects to different aspects of social quality; each of the 
social quality dimensions include positive, negative and null effects.  
 
If only the 2011 statistically significant effects of the ethnic diversity 
and immigration explanatory variables are considered (leaving aside 
black and white immigration, rate of increase, null effects and 2001 
effects), then a possible pattern across the social quality framework 
can be asserted. That is, ethnic diversity and immigration have only 
negative effects on social capital and only positive effects on 
empowerment and social inclusion. This possible pattern of ethnic 
diversity and immigration effects across the four dimensions of the 
social quality framework will now be considered in light of the 
tendency for other studies in this field to concentrate on just two of 
these dimensions; social cohesion and social capital (this tendency 
was discussed in Chapter Four, page 112).  
 
Table lxi shows the results from this study of significant positive and 
negative effects from ethnic diversity and immigration across the four 
social quality dimensions (the results are for 2011 only, to illustrate 
the possible pattern described above). Alongside the results from this 
study, the table shows which dimensions of social quality are the 
focus of the 30 Putnam studies which are referenced in this thesis 
(see Table ii, page 99 for the full list of these studies). As discussed 
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in Chapter Four (pages 112 to 114) social quality terminology is used 
fluidly across this field, so social capital, for example, is not always 
defined and measured in the same way. This makes it difficult to 
group studies together on the basis of their social quality focus and 
the groupings shown in Table lxi are tentative. 
 
Table lxi: Social quality outcomes used in this and the Putnam studies 
 
Measures of social 
quality in this study  
Findings of this 
study (2011) 
Putnam studies using 
similar outcome measures 
of social quality Ethnic 
diversity 
Imm 
 
Empowerment   Empowerment 
Influencing local 
decisions 
None  None  0 of 30 studies 
New business 
formation 
None Pos  
Social inclusion   Social inclusion 
Trusting parliament Pos  Pos  3 of 30 studies  
(Alesina & Ferrara, 2000; 
Pennant, 2005; Flore, 2005) 
Trusting local council Pos Pos 
Trusting the police Pos  Pos  
Social cohesion   Social cohesion 
Voter turnout None None 8 of 30 studies 
(Laurence & Heath, 2008; 
Andrews, 2009;  Twigg et al, 
2010; Wickes et al, 2011; 
Gijsberts et al 2011; Laurence, 
2011; Saggar et al, 2012; 
Sturgis et al, 2014) 
Feeling safe None None 
Registered charities None  None  
Social capital   Social capital 
Local trust Neg  Neg  19 of 30 studies 
(Duffy, 2004; Pennant, 2005; 
Flore, 2005; Leigh, 2006; 
Anderson & Paskeviciviute, 
2006; Coffe & Geys, 2006; 
Putnam, 2007; Gesthuizen et 
al, 2008; Letki, 2008; Stolle et 
al, 2008; Twigg et al, 2010;  
Fieldhouse & Cutts, 2010; 
Sturgis, 2010; Wickes et al, 
2011; Laurence, 2011; 
Gijsberts et al, 2012; Pendakur 
& Mata, 2012; Sturgis et al, 
2014; Schmid et al, 2014) 
Civic participation None  Neg 
Watching TV None  None 
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Table lxi shows that a majority of the Putnam studies use outcome 
measures which can be (cautiously) located in the social capital 
dimension of the social quality framework. All of these studies use 
measures of local, neighbourhood, or inter-personal trust as 
indicators of social capital (there is an exception to this; the Coffe 
and Geys (2006) study uses social capital as an outcome measure 
but does not include trust as a component of social capital). The 
finding from this study is that local trust is more strongly negatively 
affected by ethnic diversity than any other measure of social quality 
(see Table xxxxviii, page 287). Unsurprisingly, the negative effect 
from ethnic diversity on local trust is a key finding from Putnam 
studies, from both the US and the UK (including those by Putnam, 
2007; Letki, 2008; Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010; Twigg et al, 2010; 
Uslaner, 2011; Laurence, 2011).   
 
It is apparent, therefore, that the largest number of studies in this 
field use the outcome measure which is most likely to show negative 
effects from ethnic diversity. The implications for this field of enquiry 
from repeatedly investigating the aspect of social quality where 
ethnic diversity effects are known to be negative are further 
considered later in this chapter.  
 
Conversely, the two social quality dimensions used in this study 
where ethnic diversity and immigration have positive effects, 
empowerment and social inclusion, are very seldom included in the 
Putnam studies. None of the 30 Putnam studies referenced in this 
thesis measure empowerment as a social quality outcome, although 
Putnam’s study does include an indicator which is similar to the 
‘influencing local decisions’ measure of empowerment used in this 
study (he found that ethnic diversity has a negative effect on ‘how 
much impact people like you can have in making your community a 
better place to live’, 2007, p167, but uses this as an indicator of 
social capital rather than of empowerment). Only three studies (as 
shown in Table lxi) include the same or similar indicators of social 
inclusion as those used in this study.  
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This study found strong negative effects from ethnic diversity and 
immigration on social capital, and positive effects on empowerment 
and social inclusion. Moreover, this study found that the effects of 
ethnic diversity and immigration on social inclusion become 
increasingly positive over time, while their effects on social capital 
become increasingly negative. Yet, the majority of studies in this field 
measure the effects of ethnic diversity or immigration on social 
capital indicators, where they are likely to have a negative effect. 
Very few studies in this field have measured ethnic diversity and 
immigration effects on social inclusion or empowerment, where it is 
likely that they have a positive effect. 
 
A main conclusion from this study, therefore, is that across this field 
of enquiry it is usual to investigate aspects of social quality on which 
ethnic diversity and immigration have negative effects, and unusual 
to investigate aspects of social quality for which ethnic diversity and 
immigration have positive effects. 
 
The size of effects 
 
Where there are statistically significant effects from ethnic diversity 
and immigration on social quality, these vary greatly in size. The 
ethnic diversity and immigration variables constructed for this study 
are measured on different scales, but when the explanatory variable 
coefficients are shown in a comparable format (as in Table xxxxiii, 
page 278) it is apparent that ethnic diversity effects on social quality 
are considerably larger than those from immigration. 
 
Although immigration more often has a significant effect than ethnic 
diversity, the effects from immigration on the individual-level 
outcomes are relatively small. When the effects of immigration are 
considered in terms of the predicted probability of the social quality 
outcome occurring for the reference group, the size of the effect is 
too small to make any difference when the level of immigration is at 
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the median level for all LADs. For example, the negative effect of 
immigration on feeling safe in 2001 does not alter the 91% reference 
group predicted probability of feeling safe. It is only when the 
extremely high immigration value of Newham is applied that the 
negative effect from immigration produces a substantial change, 
reducing the predicted probability of feeling safe from 91% to 80% 
(these results are shown in Table xxxxiv, page 280). 
 
Although not directly comparable with results from the individual-level 
outcomes, there is a large positive effect from immigration on new 
business formation. When considered for an LAD with the average 
population size for 2001, the positive effect of immigration equal to 
one standard deviation in the immigration variable predicts 143 
additional new businesses than if there was zero immigration. To 
give this some context, the mean number of new business 
registrations across LADs in 2001 was 455. So the predicted effect 
from immigration is considerable. This finding indicates that the 
presence of immigration populations leads to new business 
formation, not that immigrants are themselves responsible for setting 
up more new businesses, although it is consistent with evidence that 
entrepreneurship rates are higher than average within immigrant 
populations (Ram and Jones, 2008). 
 
The effect sizes from ethnic diversity are larger than those from 
immigration and more complex, as these large effects have both 
positive and negative effects on different social quality indicators. 
Ethnic diversity effects are largest for feeling safe, where ethnic 
diversity has a positive effect, and local trust, where the effect is 
negative. When the median ethnic diversity value is applied to the 
predicted probability calculations, the size of the ethnic diversity 
effect increases the predicted probability of feeling safe in 2001 from 
91% to 100%, and reduces the predicted probability of local trust in 
2011 from 73% to 0%.     
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That the effects of ethnic diversity are larger than the effects of 
immigration may be due to the greater spread of ethnic diversity 
across more LADs over the study period. The charts in Chapter Six 
(Chart ii, page 200 and Chart vi, page 206) illustrate the increased 
ethnic diversity and immigration across LADs from 1991 to 2011. 
They show, for example, that while the number of LADs with a visible 
ethnic minority population of more than 5% increased from 78 to 166, 
an increase of 113%, the number of LADs with immigration of more 
than 5% increased by only 70%. We also saw in Chapter Six that 
ethnic diversity increased much more rapidly than immigration 
(compare Figure vi, page 212 with Figure viii, page 215). The more 
rapid increase and the wider spread of visible ethnic diversity mean 
that more people are likely to be aware of this than of the 
contemporaneous increase and spread in immigration, and this 
greater awareness may produce the larger effects found in this study.   
 
It is also possible that ethnic diversity has larger effects than 
immigration on some social quality indicators because there are 
closer associations with other factors that negatively affect social 
quality. There is some evidence to support this. Ethnic diversity is 
more highly correlated with deprivation (r = .365 in 2001) than 
immigration is with deprivation (r = .186 in 2001). It is possible that 
the presence of higher deprivation in areas with greater ethnic 
diversity contributes to the larger effect from ethnic diversity. 
Deprivation is controlled for in all the statistical models, so the ethnic 
diversity and immigration effects are independent of the effects from 
deprivation, but it would be useful to further explore the interactions 
between these variables in future studies. 
 
Chapter Eight flagged up the anomalous result of the positive effect 
of ethnic diversity and negative effect of immigration on feeling safe. 
Although this has little bearing on effect sizes (other than to note that 
the ethnic diversity effect is much larger than the immigration effect), 
this is a useful point to further consider why this anomaly occurred. 
While it appears inconsistent that more ethnic diversity makes people 
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feel safe in their local areas while more immigration makes people 
feel unsafe, it may be that people feel safest in the more densely 
populated, urban areas where ethnic diversity is highest. This idea is 
not supported by the data, however, as while ethnic diversity is very 
highly correlated with population density (r=.779 in 2001), so is 
immigration (r=.808 in 2001), and ethnic diversity and immigration 
are similarly concentrated in major urban areas, particularly in 
London (see Charts iii, iv, vii and viii, pages 201,206 and 207).  
There may also be a gender association here, as men are far more 
likely than women to report feeling safe in their local area. Perhaps 
men and women are differently influenced by the presence of ethnic 
diversity, so that the largely positive attitude of men towards feeling 
safe is enhanced by ethnic diversity. There is no available 
information about attitudes towards ethnic diversity, although we 
know from the British Social Attitudes Survey that men are slightly 
more likely than women to describe themselves as racially prejudiced 
(32% of men compared with 29% of women in 2013, NatCen Social 
Research, 2014), suggesting this line of speculation is unlikely to be 
substantiated.  The underlying cause of the opposing direction of the 
ethnic diversity and immigration effects remains unknown. 
 
In considering why effect sizes are much larger for ethnic diversity 
than for immigration, it is worth noting that in modelling which was 
carried out for this study without applying the individual weighting, 
ethnic diversity and immigration effects were of similar size. The 
weights in the Citizenship Survey enable the data to be adjusted to 
account for the over-representation of ethnic minority respondents. 
When modelled without applying the weights, the data gives too 
much weight to the responses of the over-sampled population. If the 
unweighted data analysis shows that any significant effects are very 
small and the correctly weighted data shows that these effects are 
much greater, then it appears that ethnic diversity has far smaller 
effects for the over-sampled, ethnic minority population than for the 
general population. This points to a central issue in the examination 
of ethnic diversity effects on social quality; that is, whose social 
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quality is being measured? Although this study elected not to 
examine how ethnic diversity affects social quality for different social 
groups, including different ethnic groups, this now looks like a 
compelling area for future investigation. 
 
This study’s investigation of effect sizes highlights the importance of 
considering the size as well as the statistical significance of 
modelling results. The American Statistical Association recently 
warned of the dangers of over-reliance on statistical significance 
alone to draw conclusions from quantitative data analysis 
(Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). Relying only on the binary of 
statistical significance may mean that too much importance is 
attached to ‘yes’ results. When conclusions are drawn only on the 
basis of statistically significant results, without any consideration of 
what those results mean in terms of size and impacts, it is possible 
that those conclusions may be over-inflated, or even misleading.  For 
this study, the critical finding from considering effect sizes is that 
ethnic diversity has a substantially larger effect than immigration, with 
the possible exception of the effect of immigration on new business 
formation for which effect sizes are not comparable with those for 
other social quality outcomes.  
 
Area-level and individual-level effects 
 
For indicators of social quality that are measured at individual-level, 
area-level factors are not of great importance in explaining variance 
in the social quality outcome between LADs. This was demonstrated 
by comparing the intra-class correlations before and after the 
explanatory variables were added to the models, as summarised in 
Table xxxxii (page 277). The exception is local trust, for which area-
level variables account for a substantial proportion of the variance. 
Area-level ethnic diversity and immigration both have a statistically 
significant, negative effect on local trust. When ethnic diversity is the 
explanatory variable of interest, it plays the greatest part of all the 
area-level predictor variables in explaining the area-level variance in 
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local trust. But when immigration is the explanatory variable of 
interest, the proportion of people with higher level qualifications does 
more to explain variance in local trust (see Table lii, page 297). 
However, neither ethnic diversity nor immigration together with the 
other area-level variables included in this study fully explain the 
variance in local trust. There must be other characteristics of local 
areas, not included in this study, which explain different levels of 
local trust. There are no clues from other Putnam studies as to what 
these missing characteristics might be. 
 
When considered within the two social quality dimensions where 
there are individual-level and area-level indicators, social cohesion 
and empowerment (illustrated in Table li, page 294) it is apparent 
that outcomes measured at individual-level show mixed effects from 
area-level ethnic diversity and immigration (negative, positive and no 
effects), while those measured at area-level show only positive or 
null-effects. This finding points to the importance of the level at which 
social quality is measured within studies seeking to identify causal 
explanations for social quality variance.  
 
The social quality framework 
 
This study identified indicators of social quality by working through 
the framework developed by Berman and Phillips to provide a 
comprehensive set of social quality dimensions and domains. The 
intention was to address the lack of any frame of reference within the 
Putnam studies for understanding the relative importance of 
individual social quality outcomes. 
 
The conclusion from this study is that there is no clear pattern of 
findings across the social quality framework. Tentatively, it can be 
suggested that ethnic diversity and immigration have positive effects 
on empowerment and social inclusion and negative effects on social 
capital (as illustrated in Table lxi, page 318). However, as some 
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results have been set aside to draw this pattern of effects, this 
suggestion cannot be offered as conclusive. 
 
The ‘what if’ scenarios in Chapter Eight considered a series of 
rearranged social quality frameworks. Of these, the framework which 
organises social quality in terms of ‘perceived distance of effects’ 
offers a neat way to explain how ethnic diversity and immigration 
affect social quality (in Table lx, page 311). Within this framework, 
ethnic diversity and immigration have a positive effect on aspects of 
social quality which are most distant from day to day life (like trusting 
parliament). They have no effect on aspects of social quality which 
are less remote but not immediately bound up with day to day life 
(like voting in local elections and feeling able to influence local 
decision making), and they have negative effects on the most 
immediate, day to day elements of social quality (like trusting people 
in the local area). This way of organising the social quality indicators, 
and the consequent results for positive, negative and null-effects of 
ethnic diversity and immigration, would support the argument that 
immigration brings positive benefits at national-level but negative 
effects at local-level (Keith, 2009).  
 
However, the social quality framework used in this study is flawed in 
many respects. Although the conjectured ‘perceived distance of 
effects’ conclusion provides interesting food for thought, it rests on a 
framework which is too shaky to firmly support this assertion. The 
shortcomings of the social quality framework, and ways in which it 
might be improved, are considered here.   
 
The first problem is that the Berman and Phillips social quality 
framework was only partially operationalised in this study. The 
selection of variables as indicators for each social quality dimension 
in the framework was constrained by my imposition of two 
fundamental criteria; that the variable should be measurable at LAD 
level and available in comparable form for 2001 and 2011. This 
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meant that the following domains from Berman and Phillips social 
quality framework were excluded from the study:  
 Social status inclusion; 
 Social status cohesion; 
 Social and cultural empowerment; 
 Political empowerment; 
 Social psychological empowerment. 
Therefore, the framework used in this study only represents some 
aspects of social quality. Moreover, there is a common theme in 
those elements of social quality excluded from the study, most of 
which were conceived by Berman and Philips to incorporate 
measures of discrimination. This is also the case for domains which 
were included, like inclusion in education system and services, but 
where the discrimination element stated by Berman and Philips was 
omitted from the operationalised outcome variables. The reason for 
these omissions was lack of available data. The consequences for 
this, and other Putnam studies, are significant. 
 
Excluding racial discrimination as a social quality outcome precludes 
important areas for investigation. We saw in Chapter Six that social 
quality varies between ethnic groups, and speculated that racial 
discrimination may play a role in this, particularly for social quality 
indicators which measure feelings of safeness and security. Including 
racial discrimination as a social quality outcome would contribute 
useful evidence here. On the one hand, we might find that there is a 
negative relationship between racial discrimination as an outcome 
variable and levels of ethnic diversity; a greater number of ethnic 
minority people in the population will mean that more people may 
potentially experience racial discrimination, so the incidence may be 
higher. On the other hand, racial discrimination may be lower in 
ethnically diverse areas; discriminatory behaviour may happen less 
often in areas where more people are comfortable with ethnic 
diversity. Either way, the absence of these dimensions from the 
adjusted social quality framework excluded an important sphere of 
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investigation about whose social quality is reflected in the indicators 
commonly used in the Putnam studies.    
 
A second issue with the social quality framework is that no social 
capital dimension was included in the original Berman and Phillips 
framework. I added this dimension for two reasons; to locate the 
most commonly used variable from the Putnam studies (local trust) 
somewhere in the framework, and to use civic engagement as an 
indicator of social capital, as it is in Putnam’s and other studies, 
rather than as an indicator of social cohesion, as it is in the Berman 
and Phillips framework.  Social capital is not featured by Berman and 
Phillips, either as a broad dimension or as a more specific domain. 
Nor is ‘local trust’ included anywhere in the Berman and Phillips 
framework. Arguably, local trust could belong within the ‘social 
psychological empowerment’ domain in the ‘empowerment’ 
dimension, but I think this would be stretching the intended meaning 
of this domain. The absence of local trust from the original social 
quality framework is important to remember when considering the 
importance which is attached to this indicator by the Putnam studies. 
This omission might be considered a shortcoming of the Berman and 
Phillips framework. Yet it also demonstrates that it is possible to 
conceive of a comprehensive, multi-dimensional scheme for social 
quality in which social capital and local trust have no part.  
 
Thirdly, and this point will be addressed in more detail later on, the 
socio-economic security dimension of Berman and Phillips 
framework was removed altogether. In common with other Putnam 
studies, I used the socio-economic indicators as control variables 
and, consequently, excluded these as outcome variables. Together 
with the addition of social capital measures and absence of various 
inclusion, cohesion and empowerment dimensions, the omission of 
socio-economic domains resulted in a social quality framework which 
was markedly different from Berman and Philips original construction. 
These important differences meant that the social quality framework 
used in this study only partially succeeded in enlarging the measures 
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of social quality beyond the narrow parameters of the Putnam 
studies. In particular, the framework used in this study failed to 
provide any consideration of social quality in terms of socio-economic 
security, social status or racial discrimination, and may have over-
emphasised the importance of local trust. 
 
Finally, I want to consider whether a social quality framework, in any 
configuration, provides a useful way of understanding the effects of 
ethnic diversity and immigration on social quality. The use of a social 
quality framework for this study was intended to enlarge the measure 
of social quality outcomes and to give these a frame of reference that 
would provide a means of understanding the relative importance of 
different aspects of social quality. This was to address the weight 
accorded to social capital by the Putnam studies which, in the 
absence of any wider frame of reference, imply that social capital 
represents the totality, or a great part of social quality.  
 
Despite its shortcomings, the social quality framework is a useful way 
to demonstrate that social quality operates across multiple 
dimensions.  The findings of positive, negative and no-effects from 
ethnic diversity and immigration across these dimensions underlines 
the complexity of social quality. Locating each social quality indicator 
within a wider framework highlights that there is no single, consistent 
effect from ethnic diversity and immigration. Looked at this way, there 
is no single story of ethnic diversity or immigration effects.  
 
However, while a social quality framework can help determine how 
many slices there are in the social quality cake, it cannot tell us the 
size of the cake, or how large each of the social quality slices should 
be. Although using a social quality framework enables social capital, 
as a measure of social quality, to be situated alongside other 
dimensions and not taken to mean all of social quality, we still have 
no way of assessing whether social capital is a small or large slice of 
the overall cake (although we know that Berman and Philips did not 
give social capital any slice at all). We don’t know if social quality can 
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even be finite, or whether this metaphorical cake is limitless and 
beyond any meaningful form of measurement.  
 
Some of these are things which should be investigated further, with 
the aim of building better models for measuring social quality. It is 
likely that social quality will look different for different social groups, 
including for ethnic groups, as we saw in Chapter Six. It is important 
that measures of social quality should reflect these different 
perceptions or experiences. In this light, the omission of any racial 
discrimination measure from the social quality framework is a serious 
shortcoming of this study. It also seems likely that perceptions of 
social quality will change over time, depending on age or life 
circumstances; that the weighting which a young, single adult will 
give to different social quality domains will change as they grow 
older, taking on financial responsibilities and dependents. A 
measurable social quality framework should, therefore, include a 
temporal dimension which factors in how the value of social quality 
changes over time.  
 
Further exploration of how social quality is defined and measured at 
individual-level and at area-level, and of the interplay between these 
levels of measurement and analysis, would also be useful. This study 
has demonstrated that area-level ethnic diversity and immigration do 
not have the same effects on area-level social quality measures as 
they do on individual-level social quality measures, an important 
finding when we recall that almost all Putnam studies use individual-
level social quality measures. How then, for the future, should social 
quality frameworks incorporate both subjective, individual and 
objective, collective experiences of social quality, an issue which 
others have considered (Deiner and Suh, 1997) and, for empirical 
research studies, how should the adoption of one type of social 
quality indicator as a dependent variable be acknowledged and 
weighted as just one of many indicators of social quality, not all of 
which will show the same effects from any independent variables, 
such as ethnic diversity?    
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9.2 The temporal effects of ethnic diversity and immigration 
on social quality 
 
Comparing the effects on social quality indicators from levels of 
ethnic diversity and immigration in 2001 and 2011 shows a clear 
pattern of change over time. Broadly, the effects from ethnic diversity 
and immigration levels move in a positive direction for indicators of 
social inclusion and a negative direction for indicators of social 
capital (illustrated in Table xxxxv, page 284).  
 
The rate of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration levels in 
LADs provides a measure of how neighbourhoods are changing. This 
is a central theme of immigration and ethnic diversity debates but an 
absent measure from all Putnam studies. This study demonstrates 
that rates of increase in ethnic diversity and immigration have an 
effect on some indicators of social quality. Where the rate of increase 
in immigration has a statistically significant effect, these effects are 
always negative. However, statistically significant effects from the 
ethnic diversity rate of increase are as likely to be positive as 
negative (see Table xxxxvi, page 285).  
 
The direction of statistically significant effects from levels and rates of 
increase are sometimes in opposite directions. Interestingly, this is 
the case for local trust, where the level of ethnic diversity has a large 
negative effect, but the rate of increase in ethnic diversity in 2011 has 
a statistically significant positive effect.  
 
The opposite effect on local trust from ethnic diversity level and rate 
of increase may be related to the negative correlation between these 
variables (as discussed in Chapter Six, pages 211 to 214). Rates of 
increase in ethnic diversity are highest in LADs where levels are 
lowest. This is the result of historic patterns of migrant settlement and 
consequent ethnic diversity, combined with the rapid increase in both 
between 1991 and 2011, so that LADs with limited histories of ethnic 
diversity prior to 1991 have seen far greater rates of growth, although 
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the traditional, urban locations for settlement have seen greater 
increases in actual numbers.   
 
While the negative effect on local trust from the level of ethnic 
diversity confirms the Putnam study findings, and is therefore simple 
to explain, the positive effect from ethnic diversity rates of increase 
requires more imaginative thinking to interpret, possibly along the 
lines that rapid increases in ethnic diversity are better absorbed 
within stable, high-trust populations. Because ethnic diversity rates of 
increase are highest in areas where ethnic diversity levels are lowest, 
it is possible that it is the absence of ethnic diversity rather than the 
presence of high ethnic diversity rate of increase which is causing the 
effect. This interpretation is supported by output from models which 
include both ethnic diversity level and rate of increase (see Table il, 
page 289), where the larger effects from the level of ethnic diversity 
cancel out the opposing effects from the rate of increase. 
 
The modelling carried out for this study offers no clear explanations 
for the sometimes opposite effects of levels and rates of increase of 
ethnic diversity and immigration on some indicators of social quality. 
It is possible that the positive effects of rates of increase on some 
social quality indicators are linked to other features of LADs which 
have no previous history of immigrant settlement or ethnic diversity 
but which are not fully accounted for by the control variables included 
in this study. The findings point to a greater complexity in the 
relationship between ethnic diversity or immigration and social quality 
than is identified when only the levels of these are measured in 
studies, or if only rates of increase were measured, suggesting that 
both should be included in future studies in this field. 
 
Immigration and ethnic diversity as sequential effects 
 
The inclusion of both immigration and ethnic diversity within this 
study was intended to enable examination of whether these effects 
differ and, if they do, what this may indicate about how social quality 
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changes as new immigrant populations become settled ethnic 
minority communities.  
 
The main finding from this study is that ethnic diversity and 
immigration have similarly positive, negative or no effects on much 
the same social quality indicators, but that any significant effects from 
ethnic diversity are substantially larger than the effects from 
immigration.  
 
This finding counters Putnam’s discovery that immigration has a 
greater negative effect than ethnic diversity (Putnam, 2007). 
Putnam’s finding allows for a scenario to be posited that the negative 
effects from immigration dissipate as migrants become absorbed 
within and help to create ethnically diverse populations. Interpreted in 
a similar way, the opposite finding would suggest that any negative 
effects from immigration worsen as immigrants settle and increase 
the ethnic diversity of local populations. Yet, it should also be 
recalled that this study found that the effects of ethnic diversity can 
be positive for social quality outcomes where the effects of 
immigration are negative (feeling safe in 2001, for example), and that 
both ethnic diversity and immigration effects are moving in a positive 
direction over time on some indicators (see Table xxxxv, page 284). 
This complicates any attempt to draw conclusions from the sequence 
of immigration and ethnic diversity effects. In this study, the small 
effects from immigration are usually matched by large effects from 
ethnic diversity, although not in any consistent direction. It appears 
possible from the study findings that immigration effects on social 
quality become magnified as immigrant populations create ethnic 
diversity, but this conjecture is not strongly supported. 
 
As a measure intended to distinguish between the sequential effects 
of immigration and ethnic diversity, the immigration variable 
constructed for this study was inadequate. The immigration measure 
simply counts the proportion of the LAD population born outside the 
UK. This measure fails to incorporate the main factor which is critical 
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to any conceptualisation of immigration as a measure of ‘newness’; 
the length of time someone has lived in the UK. The ‘born outside the 
UK’ measure also fails to reflect other possible indicators of 
‘newness’ such as English language proficiency or citizenship 
acquisition. Any future study seeking to investigate ethnic diversity 
and immigration effects in their temporal order (i.e. ethnic diversity as 
a consequence of immigration) should employ a measure of 
immigration which more accurately captures the features of 
immigration which are sequentially prior to the features of ethnic 
diversity. 
 
One useful finding from this study’s consideration of immigration and 
ethnic diversity is that there is no difference in the effects on social 
quality of immigration from visible (i.e. black) and invisible (i.e. white) 
ethnic groups. This suggests that it is immigration rather than ethnic 
difference that is responsible for any immigration effects. This finding 
underlines the importance of improving the measure of immigration 
to more accurately identify what it is about immigration that has an 
effect on social quality. 
 
The methodological challenges of measuring change over time 
 
There have been numerous methodological challenges in developing 
the temporal dimension of this study.  
 
First and foremost has been the lack of comparable data for the 
selected time points. Actually, the lack of comparable data defined 
the time points, as only one data source, the Citizenship Survey, 
provided data which met other criteria for the study, and this set the 
time points at 2001 and 2011, when the first and last Citizenship 
Surveys were conducted. It has been highly frustrating that even 
within the Citizenship Survey, a national survey designed expressly 
to track community cohesion, very few questions and response 
categories were consistently maintained, so not much data is 
comparable over time. As already discussed, the limited availability 
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of comparable data over the time period strongly influenced the 
selection of social quality outcome indicators included in this study. 
 
Secondly, in the absence of any suitable longitudinal survey data, 
this study has relied on comparing cross-sectional data at two time 
points. This analytical approach is arguably as strong as using 
longitudinal data (Martin, 2013), although some research points to 
inconsistent results when cross-sectional and longitudinal findings 
are compared (Hilton and Patrick, 1969). The chief difficulty of 
comparing cross-sectional data has been the challenges of applying 
the temporal variable to the interactions between the explanatory and 
the outcome variables, and interpreting the ensuing results. The 
complexity of interpreting the temporal findings influenced decisions 
to simplify other areas of the statistical modelling; specifically, the 
decision to use a single, fractionalisation measure for ethnic diversity, 
and to collapse the four category, ordinal responses on some 
outcome indicators into binary variables. So, the inclusion of the 
temporal dimension came at the expense of more detailed measures 
in other variables which may have led to more nuanced 
understandings of their effects. A longitudinal dataset would 
overcome some of these methodological challenges. The more 
recently available Understanding Society survey is longitudinal, 
includes ethnicity, immigration and social quality data, and may offer 
a useful future source of data for exploring these relationships 
temporally.  
 
9.3 Other explanations for variance in social quality 
 
This study did not seek to explain why social quality varies between 
local areas, only to identify if ethnic diversity and immigration play 
any part in this. The study was not designed to identify which 
variables best explain social quality variance, particularly in the 
statistical modelling approach where the same control variables were 
used in every case, resulting in poor fitting models for some outcome 
variables. Rather than conclusions, therefore, this section tentatively 
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raises some issues concerning better explanations for social quality 
which emerge from the study findings. 
 
Individual characteristics have a bigger effect than area-level 
characteristics on individual-level measures of social quality. The 
area-level part of the multi-level models accounts for between one 
per cent (for feeling able to influence local decisions) and eleven per 
cent (for local trust) of the variance in the social quality outcomes (as 
shown in Table xxxxii, page 277). This is not surprising; it is common 
in multi-level modelling to find that area-level variables have only a 
small part in explaining outcome variance (Tarling, 2009). Area-level 
variables play a substantial role for only one of the individual-level 
social quality outcome indicators, local trust, which we will examine 
more closely later in this chapter. The main point here is that 
variance in indicators of social quality which are derived from 
individual-level responses to surveys is largely determined by the 
personal characteristics of the survey respondents, and not by any 
characteristics of the areas in which those respondents live. The 
individual characteristics which most strongly explain variance in 
reported social quality are ethnic origin, gender and, above all, the 
level of educational qualifications attained. The most consistent 
finding across the social quality indicators is that people with degree 
or higher-level qualifications report higher levels of social quality. 
 
Within the area-level portion of the explanation for social quality 
variance, ethnic diversity is often the most important, while 
immigration is very seldom the most important variable. For models 
where immigration is the explanatory variable, higher qualifications 
and deprivation are more likely than immigration to affect the social 
quality of local areas.  
 
When social quality is measured at area-level, neither ethnic diversity 
nor immigration are the most important area-level predictors of 
variance in social quality. For these models, higher qualifications 
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appeared most frequently as the variable with the largest effect on 
social quality. 
 
The finding that higher-level qualifications is the strongest area-level 
explanatory variable for some outcomes (civic participation, voter 
turnout and registered charities) is interesting and merits further 
consideration. A common finding of the UK Putnam studies is that 
area-level deprivation accounts for variance in social quality, and that 
any effects from ethnic diversity are greatly reduced when 
deprivation is controlled for (Letki, 2008; Twigg et al, 2010). These 
studies employ the same deprivation variable used in this study and 
do not additionally include a variable for educational qualifications. 
My study finding that higher-level qualifications provides a stronger 
explanation for variance than deprivation on some outcomes 
suggests that it is the education element of the composite deprivation 
variable which is most important. This conjecture is supported by my 
study’s inclusion of income as a separate, area-level control variable, 
income being another of the seven domains which make up the 
deprivation measure. Area-level income was not a statistically 
significant explanatory variable for any of the social quality 
dependent variables and so was dropped from the final models. 
Future studies in this field might consider further unpacking the 
deprivation measure to isolate which different indicators within 
deprivation are having what effect on social quality measures. 
 
There are clear relationships between higher-level qualifications and 
immigrant populations, between higher-level qualifications and social 
quality outcomes, and between immigrant populations and social 
quality outcomes. It is less clear how these relationships interplay 
and beyond the scope of this study to explore this further. However, it 
is interesting to note the role of these factors in the current Brexit 
discussions. The post-referendum debate has included a strong 
narrative of ‘broken trust’; that the leave-vote reflects a loss of trust in 
the British government from large parts of the electorate. The leave 
campaign explicitly linked this broken trust to immigration, 
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highlighting the government’s failure to meet its own immigration 
reduction targets, and warning that promises to curb immigration 
could not be trusted. Because much of the leave-campaign centred 
on immigration, it is unsurprising that the leave-vote has been widely 
interpreted as a vote against immigration.  
 
Seeking to understand the links between the leave-vote and 
immigration, some analysts have shown that the leave-vote was 
highest in local area where immigration numbers are actually lowest 
(Travis, 2016). Others have found that the leave-vote was highest in 
areas where the rate of increase in immigration is highest (The 
Economist, 2016). Using the datasets constructed for this study, and 
the percentage of leave-voters in each LAD, my own analysis shows 
a reasonably strong correlation between voting to leave the EU and 
levels of immigration in 2011, r = .616. There is a much lower 
correlation between voting to leave and the immigration rate of 
change in 2011, r = .344. However, the strongest correlation by far is 
between voting to remain and levels of higher education in 2001, r = 
.901. The vote-remain map of England is almost identical to the 2001 
map of higher-level qualifications (shown in Figure ix, page 224); the 
higher the proportion of degree educated residents within a local 
authority area, the higher the vote to remain in the EU.  
 
Higher education, not immigration, is most closely associated with 
how people voted in the EU referendum. The immigration and Brexit 
theme will be examined further in my final chapter, where I return to 
the idea of ethnicity as ideological cover for other power struggles.   
 
9.4 Local trust 
 
This study has found that the largest effect on any social quality 
outcome is that from ethnic diversity on local trust, where the 
negative effect worsens over time. In 2001, people living in areas of 
higher ethnic diversity and immigration were less likely to trust others 
who lived in the local area, by 2011 they were even less likely to trust 
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others. Putnam studies using this indicator also find that ethnic 
diversity has a negative effect on local trust (including Pennant, 
2005; Flore, 2005; Anderson and Paskeviciute, 2006; Putnam, 2007; 
Stolle et al, 2008; Twigg et al, 2010; Sturgis et al, 2010; Laurence, 
2011; Pendakur and Mata, 2012; Schmid et al, 2014). The 
consistency of this finding merits further examination. 
 
The negative effect of ethnic diversity on local trust fits well with the 
dominant theoretical and narrative frameworks in this field. Trust is a 
core element of social capital; it is integral to Putnam’s definition of 
social capital as meaning ‘social networks and the associated norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness’ (2007, p137). Trust is considered 
essential for societies to succeed; higher-trust societies are more 
economically prosperous (Fukuyama, 1995) have less corruption and 
crime, are more supportive of equal rights and more likely to provide 
for the poor and vulnerable (Social Integration Commission, 2014b). 
Trust and social capital are believed to be in decline in Western 
societies (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 2000); increased immigration 
and ethnic diversity are partly responsible for this (Putnam, 2007). In 
summary, the literature and research show that local trust is a 
critically important attribute which is holding society together but 
threatened by the challenges of ethnic difference brought by 
immigration. 
 
Following the Putnam study convention, this study used local trust as 
an indicator of social capital. The other indicators used for social 
capital (civic participation and TV watching) had no relationship at all 
with ethnic diversity (there was a weak negative effect from 
immigration on civic participation in 2001 only). In this study, local 
trust is the indicator where area-level explanatory variables are most 
important and where ethnic diversity effects are strongest. There is 
clearly something about the behaviour or the measurement or the 
conceptualisation of local trust which sets this apart from alternative 
indicators of social capital used in this study. 
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What exactly is ‘local trust’? The local trust variable in this study, and 
in several UK Putnam studies (e.g. Pennant, 2005; Flore, 2005; 
Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010), is derived from a question in the 
Citizenship Survey which asks ‘Would you say that many/some/a 
few/none of the people in your neighbourhood can be trusted?’. This 
looks straightforward enough. The response is interpreted, in this and 
other studies, as indicating high or low levels of trust which, in turn, 
indicate high or low levels of social capital. However, the question 
assumes a common but unexplained understanding of its meaning. 
What does the question actually mean? Can people in your 
neighbourhood be trusted to do what? Brush their teeth? Drive your 
car? Ring the plumber? Report a crime? The more you consider the 
infinite list of things which you might trust someone else with, the less 
sense this question makes. Yet the question has a high response 
rate (100% in 2001, 96% in 2011) and must therefore be answerable 
on a common sense basis. Intrinsic to that common sense basis is a 
shared understanding of what the question and response options 
actually mean. The question itself requires a homogeneity in 
understanding and perception; it seems likely that people from 
diverse backgrounds will respond to this question in different ways.  
Perhaps this is why local trust as an indicator is so susceptible to 
effects from heterogeneity.  
 
This is the contention raised by Hero (2003); that social capital is a 
construct of homogeneity so will of course be negatively affected by 
heterogeneity. If local trust is operationalised into a variable which is 
constructed on a homogeneous basis, then this study and all the 
Putnam studies are asking the wrong question. The question should 
not be ‘Does difference affect local trust?’ but ‘Is local trust a 
construct of sameness? Asking the latter question would necessitate 
a closer examination of what we really mean by ‘local trust’, whether 
it means the same thing to everyone, and how to construct improved 
measures of local trust.     
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It was shown earlier that a great number of the Putnam studies 
include local trust as their main indicator of social quality (see Table 
ii,  page 99 for a list of the outcomes variables used in these studies 
and Table lxi, page 318 to see how the studies cluster in selecting 
local trust as their outcome measure). Repeatedly focusing on local 
trust as an indicator of social quality is producing a body of evidence 
which is skewed towards supporting a particular theoretical position; 
that local trust (an essential attribute for successful societies) is in 
decline, in part due to increasing social heterogeneity resulting from 
immigration and ethnic diversity. Putnam’s study supports this theory 
as do, albeit among other findings, a majority of the post-Putnam UK 
studies. However, the applicability of this theoretical perspective to 
the UK is questionable; we have already seen that local trust 
increased between 2001 and 2011, although repeated UK 
commissions and inquiries persist in framing local trust as in decline 
(Cantle, 2001; Social Integration Commission, 2014a and 2014b). 
Nevertheless, local trust continues to be used as an outcome 
indicator in studies of ethnic diversity effects on social quality, 
including in this study.  
 
9.5 How variable selection affects the findings 
 
Several findings from this study underline the importance of variable 
selection. They point to ways in which the selection process shapes 
the results and consequent conclusions from studies like this. Three 
findings from this study shed particular light on this: 
 
 Social quality indicators which reflect attitudes (e.g. local trust) 
are more likely to be affected by ethnic diversity and immigration 
than social quality indicators which reflect behaviours (e.g. 
watching TV); 
 
 Social quality indicators which are likely to be perceived as 
immediate to daily life (e.g. local trust) are negatively affected by 
ethnic diversity and immigration while social quality indicators 
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which are probably perceived as remote from daily life (e.g. 
trusting parliament) are positively affected by ethnic diversity and 
immigration; 
 
 Social quality indicators which are measured at individual-level 
(e.g. local trust) are more likely to be affected by ethnic diversity 
and immigration than social quality indicators which are measured 
at area-level (e.g. voter turnout). 
 
Together, these findings indicate that ethnic diversity and immigration 
will have far greater negative effects on some social quality 
outcomes than on others. If the selected dependent variable is 
measured at individual-level and measures an attitude about 
something which is perceived to be immediate or day to day, then it 
is far more likely that a negative effect from ethnic diversity and 
immigration will be found. This, though, is the common approach in 
this field. Only one of the Putnam studies (Coffe and Geys, 2006) 
uses area-level measures of social quality, some use attitude and 
behaviour measures (e.g. Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010), others use 
near and distant measures (e.g. Pennant, 2005). But the most 
commonly used social quality outcome indicators (local trust and, or 
as a part of, social capital) are measures which are individual-level, 
attitudinal and proximate.  
 
In the absence of any wider frame of reference for the selection of 
social quality outcome variables, such as the social quality 
framework used in this study, there is no clear, strong or consistent 
rationale for the selection of local trust and social capital as indicators 
of social quality. Yet, the repeated choice of these individual-level, 
attitudinal and proximate indicators is producing a mounting pile of 
evidence that ethnic diversity and immigration have damaging 
effects. If more studies selected area-level, behavioural indicators of 
social quality, like voter turnout, we would have more evidence that 
ethnic diversity and immigration have no effects on social quality. 
Similarly, more frequent selection of area-level indicators, like new 
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business formation, would evidence the positive benefits of 
immigration for social quality. 
 
The selection of indicators is constrained in large degree by the 
availability of data; a particular problem for this study due to the 
temporal dimension. Aside from the temporal challenge, it is 
impossible to find data which are comparable between LADs to 
indicate social quality on measures where ethnic diversity might be 
more likely to have positive effects. I would have liked to have 
included area-level, behavioural social quality outcome measures for 
the following: number of street parties, carnivals and fetes; number of 
people shopping in ethnic-minority owned shops or food outlets; 
participation in free arts or sports activities; taking active part in social 
movements for justice or equality. There are no data available for 
these.    
 
I have already explained how socio-economic indicators were not 
used as outcome variables in this study, in common with all Putnam 
studies. The absence of socio-economic social quality outcomes 
from the Putnam studies, mine included, influences the findings in 
this field in two, profound respects; it removes the possibility that the 
studies will find ethnic inequalities, and diverts the research focus 
away from components of social quality which are fundamental for all 
humans in favour of social quality indicators which suit a particular 
theoretical perspective on the decline of social capital in Western 
societies. 
 
The removal or absence of socio-economic variables effectively 
precludes a major line of enquiry within the Putnam studies. 
Focusing on any dimension of social quality other than the socio-
economic means that the studies are not looking at precisely where 
the relationships between ethnic diversity and social quality are 
known to be, so they by-pass the socio-economic inequalities 
experienced by ethnic minority populations. Several UK post-Putnam 
studies have tried to redress this with the inclusion of socio-economic 
 344 
 
control variables, finding that deprivation has stronger negative 
effects on social quality than ethnic diversity (Letki, 2008 and Saggar 
et al, 2012, for example). However, this approach still considers 
socio-economic indicators as part of the explanation, and as 
attendant to ethnic diversity, rather than part of the social quality 
outcome.  
 
Any attempt to build a comprehensive framework for social quality, 
like Berman and Philips’, will always include a socio-economic 
dimension. Socio-economic factors appear in the foundation layers of 
Maslow’s and other hierarchies of human needs, as they are 
unarguably more fundamental to social quality than social capital, 
social cohesion or any other social dimension. If we accept that 
attempts to measure what affects social quality outcomes (whether 
this is ethnic diversity, immigration or some other variable within local 
populations) should take place within some frame of reference, any 
framework of value must include socio-economic outcomes.  
 
9.6 Answering the research questions 
 
This study addressed two core research questions: 
1. Do ethnic diversity and immigration have any effects on a range 
of indicators of social quality in local areas of England? 
2. Do any effects from ethnic diversity and immigration change over 
time? 
 
The study findings do not offer simple answers to either question. 
They point to some conclusions but do not strongly confirm these. 
The study indicates that:  
 
 Ethnic diversity and immigration affect some, but not all, 
indicators of social quality, sometimes positively and sometimes 
negatively. It is not clear why some aspects of social quality are 
positively affected and some negatively, although the selection 
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and construction of the social quality variables may be the 
principle reason. 
 
 There is no clear pattern of ethnic diversity and immigration 
effects across the social quality framework. The findings point to 
ethnic diversity and immigration having positive effects on social 
inclusion and empowerment, no effects on social cohesion and 
negative effects on social capital, but there are exceptions in all 
dimensions. 
 
 Where both have statistically significant effects, the effects of 
ethnic diversity are substantially larger than the effects of 
immigration. Relatively large effects from ethnic diversity can be 
both positive and negative. 
 
 The effects of ethnic diversity and immigration change over time; 
broadly, becoming more positive for indicators of social cohesion 
and more negative for indicators of social capital. The trajectories 
of these changing relationships are not known, so they have no 
predictive value. 
 
It is frustrating not to produce more strongly conclusive answers to 
the research questions. It can also be worrying, as it may reflect a 
poor research design or some other failing on the part of the 
researcher. To pre-empt such a critique, I will explain why I think the 
research study provided limited answers to the research questions, 
despite being well designed. 
 
This study sought to address two core questions which, on the face 
of it, are complementary but when operationalised into measurable 
variables the data requirements for the two questions were not the 
same. This resulted in a dataset which could not address either 
question comprehensively nor answer them conclusively. Exploring 
both questions within a single study meant that neither could be 
addressed in sufficient depth to provide a clear answer. If the study 
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had only looked at the effect of ethnic diversity and immigration on 
social quality at one point in time, say 2011, then a far greater 
number of social quality indicators would have been available.  A 
study focused on 2011 could have selected at least one indicator for 
most of the Berman and Phillips social quality domains, and more 
than one indicator for some domains. This would have enabled a 
more thorough operationalisation of the social quality framework, 
providing more insight into the varying effects of ethnic diversity and 
immigration across the framework. We would have learned more 
about whether ethnic diversity and immigration positively or 
negatively affect different dimensions of social quality.  
 
Alternatively, if this study had looked only at the temporal dimension 
of ethnic diversity and immigration effects, if could have focused on 
one social quality indicator for which a greater number of time point 
measurements were available, local trust for example. Using 
response data on local trust from all the Citizenship Survey datasets 
from 2001 to 2011, and ethnic diversity measures based on ONS 
projections for the corresponding years, I could have created a 
dataset with a series of seven time points, rather than the two used in 
this study. Or, I could have used a social quality question from the 
British Social Attitudes survey, which has been running since 1983, 
to look at ethnic diversity and immigration effects on one social 
quality indicator from 1991 (the first year for which the ethnic diversity 
data is available) to the present time. A greater number of time points 
would have enabled more exploration of the trajectories of change in 
ethnic diversity and immigration effects, adding to the predictive 
value of the modelling approach. 
 
Where should this study have focused? On ethnic diversity and 
immigration effects within a comprehensive social quality framework 
at one point in time, or on ethnic diversity and immigration effects on 
one indicator of social quality over a series of time points? There was 
strong justification to combine both into a single study; both were 
major gaps in the Putnam studies. However, it is clear from this study 
 347 
 
that future research would benefit from tackling each of these 
questions separately, using the findings in one area to develop the 
methodology for the other.  
 
I suggest that the sequence for future research should be, firstly, to 
develop the social quality framework. Berman and Philips’s 
framework is a good starting point but further work is needed to 
operationalise this into measurable variables. Without the limitation of 
finding variables which are comparable over time, this process could 
be done more comprehensively and with greater respect for the 
intention of the Berman and Philips social quality dimensions.  The 
resulting set of social quality variables should be widely tested with 
varied communities to identify how they reflect different perceptions 
of social quality. This testing process would help to develop a 
weighting of social quality indicators within the overall framework, 
giving greater value to some measures depending on identified 
factors such as the age or gender of individuals, or their geographic 
locations. The aim would be to develop a robust framework for 
measuring social quality which recognises that this is constructed 
from multiple indices and may mean different things to different 
groups of people depending on their socio-economic position, life-
stage, or other factors. The resulting benefits would be multiple, 
including:  
 
 Moving towards a more consistent use of social quality indicators 
in quantitative studies, allowing for greater comparability of 
findings and for building up more robust conclusions through 
meta-analysis;  
 
 Moving away from the use of single, ‘free floating’ measures of 
social quality which have no wider frame of reference and which 
may therefore, whether by design or by implication, attribute 
greater importance to one aspect of social quality than is 
warranted; 
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 Ensuring that social quality indicators are relevant to all social 
groups, or weighted in some way that reflects their relative value 
to different social groups, thereby moving away from a 
conceptualisation of social quality as a social phenomenon which 
equally applies to all social groups in the same way at the same 
time.    
 
Any further exploration of how ethnic diversity and immigration affect 
social quality over time should come after a more robust social 
quality framework has been developed. Key elements to consider for 
an improved temporal methodology are the use of a longitudinal 
dataset and an improved immigration measure. The use of 
longitudinal data should allow for a more sophisticated analytical 
approach as fewer data ‘trade offs’ would have to be made to 
incorporate the temporal dimension. A better distinction between 
‘immigration’ as a measure of ‘newness’ and ‘ethnic diversity’ as a 
measure of population diversity should enable an improved analysis 
of any differing, sequential effects of these variables on social quality. 
 
Was Putnam right? 
 
Although not an explicit research question, this study was motivated 
by a consideration of whether Putnam’s 2007 finding was correct; 
does ethnic diversity negatively affect social capital?  There are 
several answers here. 
 
Firstly, it would be useful to see Putnam’s study re-run, using the 
same data but correcting the methodological errors highlighted by 
Dawkins (2008). Until this is done, Putnam’s findings cannot be 
considered correct with any high degree of confidence. 
 
Secondly, assuming that Putnam’s findings are correct, and for 
indicators which are comparable, my statistical findings differ from 
Putnam’s in some respects. My study found that ethnic diversity has 
no effects on civic participation nor on watching TV in contrast to 
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Putnam’s findings that ethnic diversity leads to more time spent 
watching TV and lower likelihoods of voluntary or community work. 
On other indicators, my findings concur with Putnam’s that ethnic 
diversity has some negative effects. In particular, and in common 
with Putnam, my study found that ethnic diversity has a significant, 
negative effect on local trust. However, my study has also 
demonstrated that decisions taken at each stage of the research 
process favour the likelihood of this finding. While this does not 
counter the validity of the finding, the limitations that this suggests for 
the wider relevance of this finding should be more clearly and more 
loudly expressed whenever Putnam is cited in evidence of ethnic 
diversity’s negative effects.  
 
The limitations of this key finding are further underlined in my 
research by contextualising local trust and other social capital 
measures within a wider framework of social quality. Locating local 
trust within a wider framework raises questions about its relative 
importance as a component of social quality in local areas, whilst 
highlighting the tendency across this research field to focus on this 
one element. This study confirms Putnam’s finding that ethnic 
diversity has a negative effect on local trust, but challenges the 
significance which Putnam attaches to this finding by asserting that 
within a broader conceptualisation of social quality, local trust may 
not play a particularly large part.             
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CHAPTER TEN: REFLECTIONS  
 
10.1 How racial considerations influenced this research 
process 
 
Part One of this thesis looked at the ‘idea of race’ and how this has 
been used and misused in the pursuit of social knowledge. There are 
powerful arguments for not using ‘race’ at all in social research, 
particularly as a causal explanation and especially in statistical 
analysis. In their arguments for a ‘de-racialisation’ of social research, 
Zuberi and Bonilla-Silva (2008) call on researchers to examine how 
racial considerations, from conceptualisation to analysis, influence 
the research process and findings. Knowles (2010) similarly urges 
that we should say how we are producing race, what part does each 
of us play in sustaining hierarchies of racialised difference?  This 
chapter considers how my own research study was ‘racialised’; that 
is, the process through which race or ethnicity were accorded a 
meaningful, leading role in explaining social quality. 
 
The starting point for this research was Robert Putnam’s finding that 
ethnic diversity has a negative effect on social capital. I wanted to 
disprove this. To do so, I adopted Putnam’s epistemological position; 
positivist, empiricist, deductive. From this standpoint, knowledge of 
the social world comes through empirical study which proves or 
disproves a theory about that world. By taking on this epistemology I 
committed my study to a viewpoint in which ‘social facts’ can be 
discovered through investigation. Specifically, that there is a ‘truth’ 
about the effects of ethnic diversity on social quality which can be 
‘proved’ with the right methodology and data. Already, at this 
conceptual stage, my study was committed to a philosophical 
positioning of ethnic diversity and social quality as discoverable 
social facts. 
 
The next conceptual step in my research was to accept that 
‘ethnicity’ is real. This is the critical point in the racialisation of this 
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research study. It makes no difference what ‘real’ means; whether 
ethnicity is biologically, culturally or socially constructed is irrelevant. 
I accepted that ethnic difference is conceptually real. From there, 
ethnic difference became a measurable entity which could be 
represented numerically. By using a measure of ethnic difference, my 
study confirmed the reality of that difference.  
 
Next, my research questions framed ethnic difference as causal. 
They positioned ethnic difference as potentially responsible for social 
quality. This framing had two primary racialising effects on this study. 
Firstly, it determined the logic sequence of any relationship between 
ethnic difference and social quality; ethnic difference may cause 
social quality, and not, social quality may cause ethnic difference. 
Secondly, it puts ethnic difference and only ethnic difference in the 
frame for explaining social quality; any other explanations are 
subordinate to ethnic difference. My research questions invested 
‘ethnicity’ with causal responsibility for social quality. This is ‘race as 
ideological cover’ in action, where focusing on the causality of 
ethnicity distracts attention from other causes of variance in social 
quality. 
 
Moving on, my study used statistical analysis of quantitative data. 
This compounded the racialised logic of treating ethnicity as real. In 
preparing the data for analysis, I transformed the ethnicity data from 
census categories into a single numerical observation for each local 
authority area. This process took ethnic difference, already 
demarcated into ten categories (for the 1991 census), and further 
reduced this to one number. Anything interesting or useful about 
specific ethnic groups in relation to social quality was lost in this 
process. The histories, experiences and cultures of diverse 
communities were reduced to a single figure. Most of the data 
analysis was carried out using logistic regression, in which the 
outcomes are binary; that is, the analysis generates only yes/no 
answers. This polarises the results, in my study into positive or 
negative effects, and gives no ‘in between’ answers. The statistical 
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analysis itself pushes findings into black and white, with no shades of 
grey. My study attempted to fill in some shading by looking at effect 
sizes. But I am not certain that this overcomes the effect of polarised 
positive and negative results, and the contribution of this to 
confirming the causality of ethnicity, even when the causal effect is 
very small. 
 
Another step to consider in the progress of my study is construction 
of the social quality framework. Two key aspects of this process 
contributed to the racialisation of the study; the exclusion of socio-
economic indicators of social quality, and the failure to operationalise 
any of the social quality indicators to incorporate measures of racism 
or discrimination. Using socio-economic indicators as control rather 
than outcome variables guided the study away from considering 
ethnic inequalities. The main reason for this was that the 
relationships between ethnicity and these socio-economic variables 
are already known. But when reflecting on the racialisation of the 
research process, this is probably a reason for retaining rather than 
removing socio-economic outcomes; ethnic inequalities should be 
central to any ethnicity research, not parked to one side. 
Furthermore, removing discrimination indicators from the Berman 
and Philips social quality framework (not by choice, it is fair to say, 
but through lack of available data) also guided my study away from 
examining social quality experiences which would reveal ethnic 
inequalities. 
 
Finally, my study assumed the validity of the selected social quality 
variables. This is a major issue which goes beyond the scope of the 
current consideration. What this means for the racialisation of my 
study is that the variables were accepted as reasonable, realistic 
measures of social quality, on which ethnic diversity might have an 
effect. But when I later unpacked one of these variables, local trust, I 
found that the variable itself was constructed from assumed, shared 
understandings of the meaning of ‘trust’. I conjectured that because 
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the ‘local trust’ variable is a construct of ‘sameness’ it is strongly 
influenced by measures of ‘difference’.   
 
10.2 The contribution of this research study 
 
It became clear to me part way through this research process that if 
you adopt the same epistemological and methodological approaches 
you will get much the same results. In this sense I consider that the 
ambition of my research study, to disprove Putnam’s finding that 
ethnic diversity has negative effects on social quality, has not been 
achieved. I now think this was an impossible task. Challenging 
Putnam’s findings from a different epistemological, theoretical or 
methodological position would not produce any real challenge but, 
rather, a different type of study. Challenging Putnam’s findings by 
using the same approach, I came to learn, is no real challenge either, 
because the logic of the approach will produce similar results. This is 
where other post-Putnam researchers have ended up, clearly 
reluctantly; with statistical findings that confirm Putnam’s, albeit 
alongside other findings of positive effects from ethnic diversity.  
 
On the positive side, I consider that my study makes the following 
useful contributions to social research:  
 
 By anchoring social quality measures within a theoretically-
grounded framework for social quality, this study recognises that 
social capital is only one small part of what we might consider to 
contribute to overall social quality. This study demonstrates that 
social capital is the dimension of social quality which shows the 
strongest negative effects from ethnic diversity. It is also the 
dimension where most of the empirical studies in this field are 
focused. 
 
 This study has confirmed the common finding that ethnic diversity 
has negative effects on social capital. But it has also found that 
ethnic diversity and immigration have positive effects on other 
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dimensions of social quality, particularly on empowerment and 
social inclusion.  
 
 The study has shown that the selection and construction of social 
quality outcome variables strongly influences the findings of their 
relationship with ethnic diversity and immigration. Social quality 
outcomes measured at area-level and measuring behaviours, are 
far less likely to show any significant relationship with ethnic 
diversity and immigration than social quality outcomes measured 
at individual-level and measuring attitudes. The tendency for 
studies in this field to select social quality outcome indicators 
which are individual-level, attitudinal and proximate, like local 
trust, is skewing the evidence towards finding negative effects 
from ethnic diversity. There is no agreed rationale for using these 
indicators more commonly than area-level, behavioural, distal 
measures which, if employed, would evidence no effects or 
positive effects from ethnic diversity. 
 
 The study has shown that immigration and ethnic diversity have 
broadly similar effects on the same aspects of social quality, but 
that the effects from ethnic diversity are much larger.  
 
 This study has identified that any positive or negative effects on 
social quality from immigration result from some aspect of 
immigration other than ethnic difference, as the effects of white 
immigration and black immigration are much the same as each 
other. 
 
 By introducing a temporal dimension, this study shows that any 
effects from ethnic diversity change over time. Broadly, between 
2001 and 2011, ethnic diversity and immigration have 
increasingly positive effects on social inclusion and increasingly 
negative effects on social capital.  
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 The study findings suggest that the percentage of local 
populations possessing higher-level qualifications is an important 
explanatory variable for difference in social quality outcomes. 
Higher-level qualifications have a positive effect on social quality 
and may well be the factor of greatest influence within composite 
measures of ‘deprivation’ which are commonly used as the only 
area-level control variable within studies of this type. 
 
On the negative side, this study is guilty of several charges from the 
anti- or beyond-race theorists: 
 
 By using ethnicity as an explanatory variable rather than ethnic 
inequality as an outcome variable, as Zuberi accuses, this study 
has perpetuated the notion that ethnic difference is a cause of 
social problems while failing to investigate the actual social 
problems resulting from the historical hierarchisation of racial 
difference.   
 
 By adopting Brubaker’s ‘groupist’ approach, this study has reified 
race into a real, measurable entity.  
 
 Using race to explain social difference has obscured other 
explanations of social quality. This, as Arendt, Miles and Malik 
would assert, is ethnicity as ‘ideological cover’ which not just 
overlooks but actively perpetuates relations of power and 
inequality. 
 
In the light of the recent EU referendum, this employment of ‘race as 
ideological cover’ is a timely accusation. My study focused on the 
pro-leave campaign’s defining issue, immigration, at the expense of 
investigating other factors which shape local-area social quality. The 
role of higher-level qualifications, for example, which appears to have 
played a far stronger part in the referendum vote than the levels of 
immigration in local areas. Within the complex relationships of age, 
housing and employment opportunities which influence where people 
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with higher-level qualifications live, it is likely that immigration is an 
important factor, but not the cause. It may also be that feeling 
comfortable with ethnic diversity is an outcome of higher-level 
education; again, ethnic diversity is not the cause.  
 
10.3 My dilemma resolved 
 
My final conclusion is that ethnic diversity should not be used as an 
explanatory variable in quantitative studies. This is the resolution of 
my philosophical dilemma. The process of carrying out this research 
has shown me that using ethnicity in this way legitimises a deeply 
engrained belief that ethnic difference is a meaningful form of 
categorisation, and perpetuates a long tradition of pinning the blame 
for social ills on this form of difference.  
 
If we no longer use ethnic diversity as an explanatory variable, how 
do we answer questions about its effects? Simply, we stop asking the 
questions. Any question which relies on a racialised quantification of 
human difference to provide an answer, is not one which is useful to 
ask.   
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ANNEX ONE: MODEL OUTPUT FOR MULTI-LEVEL MODELS  
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
SOCIAL INCLUSION: TRUSTING PARLIAMENT 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.539 0.026 -20.518 **   
Level 2 0.134 0.019 7.011 ** 0.039 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons -0.465 0.051 -9.115 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.190 0.029 -6.644 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.302 0.038 -7.974 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.304 0.060 -5.048 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.035 0.075 0.472 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.209 0.034 6.114 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.653 0.073 8.991 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.169 0.061 2.755 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.072 0.054 19.959 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.003 0.002 -1.364 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.001 0.001 0.943 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.005 0.003 1.781 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.046 0.053 -0.864 ns   
Level 2 0.031 0.008 4.060 ** 0.009 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons -0.411 0.057 -7.199 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.190 0.029 -6.628 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.300 0.038 -7.881 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.306 0.060 -5.083 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.039 0.075 0.517 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.206 0.034 6.108 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.657 0.072 9.068 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.158 0.065 2.424 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.065 0.059 17.947 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.002 0.002 -1.018 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.001 0.001 0.832 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.006 0.003 1.916 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.160 0.065 -2.448 *   
ETHNICDIVERSITY -0.165 0.151 -1.090 ns   
ETHNICDIVERSITY*2011 0.330 0.148 2.226 *   
Level 2 0.031 0.007 4.151 ** 0.009 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.428 0.062 -6.942 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.188 0.028 -6.617 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.300 0.038 -7.913 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.307 0.060 -5.115 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.039 0.075 0.527 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.205 0.034 6.092 **   
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White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.645 0.072 8.914 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.153 0.065 2.344 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.060 0.059 17.836 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.003 0.002 -1.232 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.608 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.004 0.003 1.192 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.182 0.063 -2.878 **   
IMMIGRATION -0.002 0.003 -0.619 ns   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.007 0.003 2.853 *   
Level 2 0.030 0.007 4.085 ** 0.009 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.423 0.055 -7.729 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.188 0.029 -6.608 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.300 0.038 -7.903 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.307 0.060 -5.115 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.038 0.075 0.515 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.205 0.034 6.086 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.646 0.073 8.891 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.149 0.065 2.307 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.057 0.059 17.961 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.002 0.002 -1.108 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.556 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.005 0.003 1.602 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.181 0.060 -3.026 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.003 0.003 -0.788 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.011 0.003 3.309 **   
Level 2 0.029 0.007 3.989 ** 0.009 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.417 0.064 -6.533 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.189 0.028 -6.627 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.301 0.038 -7.940 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.306 0.060 -5.091 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.039 0.075 0.526 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.207 0.034 6.105 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.648 0.072 9.002 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.165 0.063 2.614 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.070 0.056 19.200 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.003 0.002 -1.290 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.001 0.001 0.832 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.005 0.004 1.375 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.160 0.064 -2.480 *   
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.009 0.008 -1.069 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.018 0.007 2.531 *   
Level 2 0.030 0.007 4.156 ** 0.009 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
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Cons -0.468 0.072 -6.515 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.189 0.029 -6.614 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.302 0.038 -7.985 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.306 0.060 -5.092 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.037 0.075 0.489 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.207 0.034 6.101 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.653 0.073 8.995 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.163 0.061 2.661 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.069 0.055 19.611 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.003 0.002 -1.434 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.001 0.001 0.954 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.004 0.003 1.508 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.018 0.090 0.203 ns   
ED increase 0.000 0.001 0.106 ns   
ED increase*2011 -0.001 0.001 -0.976 ns   
Level 2 0.030 0.007 4.050 ** 0.009 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.415 0.064 -6.518 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.189 0.029 -6.606 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.303 0.038 -8.019 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.306 0.060 -5.087 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.037 0.075 0.495 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.207 0.034 6.077 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.655 0.073 9.003 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.165 0.061 2.718 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 1.072 0.054 20.026 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.003 0.002 -1.446 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.001 0.001 1.559 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.001 0.003 0.329 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.082 0.088 0.927 ns   
IMM increase -0.001 0.001 -1.788 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -1.452 ns   
Level 2 0.028 0.007 3.945 ** 0.009 
SOCIAL INCLUSION: TRUSTING THE LOCAL COUNCIL 
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 0.427 0.023 18.553 **   
Level 2 0.091 0.015 6.061 ** 0.027 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons -0.024 0.049 -0.490 ns   
Female (ref = male) -0.008 0.030 -0.284 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.161 0.034 -4.704 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.124 0.053 -2.344 *   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.074 0.065 1.132 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.233 0.035 6.668 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.476 0.089 5.374 **   
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BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.281 0.059 4.729 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.862 0.049 17.432 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.014 0.003 -5.300 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.613 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.002 0.003 0.711 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.384 0.051 7.548 **   
Level 2 0.042 0.009 4.710 ** 0.013 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons 0.130 0.065 2.020 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.009 0.030 -0.307 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.160 0.035 -4.623 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.127 0.053 -2.405 *   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.081 0.066 1.232 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.231 0.035 6.656 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.477 0.089 5.360 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.299 0.063 4.758 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.889 0.051 17.368 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.003 -3.713 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.543 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.007 0.003 2.209 *   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.236 0.061 3.862 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.583 0.173 -3.376 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.498 0.123 4.046 **   
Level 2 0.040 0.010 4.191 ** 0.012 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.127 0.073 1.740 ns   
Female (ref = male) -0.007 0.030 -0.222 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.159 0.034 -4.598 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.127 0.053 -2.400 *   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.079 0.066 1.200 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.229 0.035 6.612 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.476 0.088 5.380 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.289 0.061 4.714 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.880 0.050 17.652 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.012 0.003 -4.031 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.389 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.008 0.004 1.932 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.218 0.066 3.295 **   
IMMIGRATION -0.011 0.004 -2.595 **   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.010 0.003 3.871 **   
Level 2 0.041 0.009 4.377 ** 0.012 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.100 0.063 1.586 ns   
Female (ref = male) -0.007 0.030 -0.226 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.159 0.034 -4.608 **   
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No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.127 0.053 -2.397 *   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.078 0.066 1.186 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.228 0.035 6.594 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.476 0.089 5.375 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.292 0.062 4.729 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.884 0.050 17.578 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.003 -4.025 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.635 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.007 0.003 1.961 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.243 0.061 4.015 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.013 0.005 -2.523 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.013 0.003 3.949 **   
Level 2 0.041 0.009 4.332 ** 0.012 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.158 0.079 2.016 *   
Female (ref = male) -0.007 0.030 -0.232 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.158 0.035 -4.587 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.127 0.053 -2.413 *   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.080 0.066 1.213 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.231 0.035 6.658 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.475 0.088 5.373 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.284 0.060 4.735 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.871 0.049 17.742 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.013 0.003 -4.679 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.060 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.009 0.004 2.156 *   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.203 0.074 2.754 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.033 0.012 -2.797 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.030 0.009 3.388 **   
Level 2 0.039 0.009 4.313 ** 0.012 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.085 0.066 -1.278 ns   
Female (ref = male) -0.007 0.030 -0.233 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.161 0.034 -4.666 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.126 0.053 -2.384 *   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.076 0.065 1.164 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.231 0.035 6.625 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.475 0.088 5.367 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.278 0.060 4.633 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.865 0.050 17.433 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.014 0.003 -4.829 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.729 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.003 0.003 0.962 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.495 0.076 6.489 **   
ED increase 0.001 0.001 1.445 ns   
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ED increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -2.227 *   
Level 2 0.042 0.009 4.661 ** 0.013 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.038 0.063 -0.604 ns   
Female (ref = male) -0.008 0.030 -0.254 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.161 0.034 -4.686 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.125 0.053 -2.374 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.076 0.065 1.169 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.232 0.035 6.640 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.479 0.089 5.397 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.280 0.059 4.751 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.865 0.049 17.706 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.014 0.003 -5.241 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.493 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.000 0.003 0.136 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.517 0.080 6.466 **   
IMM increase 0.000 0.001 0.151 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -2.026 *   
Level 2 0.042 0.009 4.647 ** 0.013 
SOCIAL INCLUSION: TRUSTING THE 
POLICE           
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 1.483 0.025 59.084 **   
Level 2 0.090 0.014 6.384 ** 0.026 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons 1.499 0.048 31.511 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.214 0.035 6.070 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.269 0.039 -6.903 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.340 0.058 -5.897 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.319 0.069 -4.592 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.020 0.036 0.564 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.230 0.101 2.270 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.744 0.062 -12.069 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.074 0.051 -1.466 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.012 0.002 -5.764 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -0.989 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.002 0.003 0.707 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.245 0.054 4.550 **   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.656 ** 0.011 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons 1.554 0.062 25.146 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.216 0.036 6.088 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.266 0.039 -6.814 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.341 0.058 -5.930 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.318 0.070 -4.575 **   
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Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.019 0.036 0.519 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.242 0.103 2.359 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.749 0.064 -11.666 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.074 0.054 -1.365 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.002 -4.882 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.112 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.003 0.003 0.914 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.130 0.074 1.755 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.178 0.150 -1.187 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.317 0.132 2.397 *   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.586 ** 0.010 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.572 0.067 23.428 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.216 0.035 6.094 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.267 0.039 -6.851 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.341 0.057 -5.947 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.317 0.070 -4.554 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.018 0.036 0.487 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.231 0.102 2.276 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.740 0.065 -11.433 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.066 0.054 -1.221 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.002 -4.647 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -0.997 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.004 0.004 1.057 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.136 0.072 1.897 ns   
IMMIGRATION -0.005 0.003 -1.443 ns   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.006 0.002 2.463 *   
Level 2 0.036 0.010 3.649 ** 0.011 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.552 0.060 26.075 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.215 0.035 6.093 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.267 0.039 -6.860 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.341 0.057 -5.944 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.317 0.070 -4.562 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.018 0.036 0.484 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.230 0.101 2.266 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.744 0.064 -11.572 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.070 0.054 -1.309 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.002 -4.643 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.148 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.003 0.003 0.972 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.147 0.071 2.082 *   
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.005 0.004 -1.257 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.008 0.003 2.398 *   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.631 ** 0.011 
 388 
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.648 0.070 23.513 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.216 0.035 6.091 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.267 0.039 -6.840 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.342 0.057 -5.952 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.317 0.069 -4.561 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.019 0.036 0.514 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.237 0.102 2.333 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.734 0.063 -11.672 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.060 0.053 -1.143 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.002 -4.895 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 -0.514 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.009 0.004 2.005 *   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.118 0.069 1.700 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.027 0.009 -2.938 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.020 0.007 2.972 **   
Level 2 0.033 0.009 3.613 ** 0.010 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE            
Cons 1.475 0.073 20.172 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.214 0.035 6.078 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.269 0.039 -6.910 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.339 0.057 -5.922 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.319 0.069 -4.590 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.020 0.036 0.563 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.231 0.101 2.283 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.739 0.062 -11.872 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.070 0.052 -1.355 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.012 0.002 -5.062 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.045 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.003 0.003 0.888 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.241 0.074 3.239 **   
ED increase 0.001 0.001 0.403 ns   
ED increase*2011 0.000 0.001 -0.025 ns   
Level 2 0.035 0.010 3.658 ** 0.011 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 1.598 0.064 24.883 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.215 0.035 6.075 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.272 0.039 -6.976 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.341 0.057 -5.943 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.318 0.069 -4.599 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.020 0.036 0.539 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.229 0.101 2.271 *   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.751 0.061 -12.244 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.081 0.050 -1.608 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.013 0.002 -6.380 **   
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CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.031 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.003 0.003 -1.083 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.323 0.083 3.874 **   
IMM increase -0.002 0.001 -2.573 *   
IMM increase*2011 0.000 0.001 -0.257 ns   
Level 2 
 
 
0.031 0.009 3.401 ** 0.009 
SOCIAL COHESION: FEELING SAFE           
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 1.028 0.029 35.014 **   
Level 2 0.173 0.017 10.472 ** 0.050 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons 2.071 0.071 29.347 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.038 0.035 -29.922 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.201 0.048 -4.200 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.548 0.054 -10.061 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.370 0.069 -5.348 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.540 0.040 -13.567 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.009 0.087 0.102 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.004 0.052 0.080 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.048 0.053 0.913 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.016 0.003 -4.886 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -3.311 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.006 0.003 1.959 *   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.081 0.063 1.271 ns   
Level 2 0.096 0.014 6.992 ** 0.028 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons 1.199 0.169 7.082 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.039 0.035 -30.098 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.205 0.047 -4.349 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.546 0.054 -10.091 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.373 0.069 -5.381 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.539 0.040 -13.540 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.057 0.089 0.637 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.098 0.056 1.745 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.140 0.058 2.431 *   
DEPRIVATION -0.008 0.003 -2.316 *   
CRIME RATE -0.002 0.001 -2.819 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.021 0.003 6.005 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.022 0.153 -0.144 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 1.098 0.208 5.274 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.278 0.192 1.447 ns   
Level 2 0.071 0.012 5.834 ** 0.021 
IMMIGRATION           
 390 
 
 B SE Z SIG ICC 
Cons 2.397 0.088 27.304 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.040 0.034 -30.400 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.204 0.047 -4.300 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.546 0.054 -10.087 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.374 0.069 -5.399 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.539 0.040 -13.584 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.043 0.089 0.488 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.074 0.054 1.359 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.120 0.056 2.148 *   
DEPRIVATION -0.010 0.003 -2.982 **   
CRIME RATE -0.002 0.001 -2.299 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.029 0.004 6.521 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.151 0.068 2.238 *   
IMMIGRATION -0.026 0.004 -5.910 **   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.000 0.003 0.069 ns   
Level 2 0.083 0.013 6.140 ** 0.024 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.242 0.084 26.589 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.040 0.034 -30.365 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.205 0.047 -4.348 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.547 0.054 -10.117 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.373 0.069 -5.370 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.538 0.040 -13.569 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.035 0.088 0.397 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.076 0.055 1.371 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.120 0.057 2.097 *   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.003 -3.251 **   
CRIME RATE -0.002 0.001 -2.643 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.020 0.004 5.321 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.221 0.070 3.166 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.025 0.005 -4.655 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.008 0.004 -1.845 ns   
Level 2 0.079 0.013 6.035 ** 0.024 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.428 0.106 22.820 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.040 0.034 -30.294 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.201 0.048 -4.205 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.547 0.054 -10.116 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.373 0.069 -5.387 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.540 0.040 -13.627 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.036 0.088 0.407 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.034 0.052 0.646 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.079 0.052 1.529 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.012 0.003 -4.019 **   
CRIME RATE -0.002 0.001 -2.432 *   
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HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.028 0.006 4.737 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.047 0.073 0.641 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.064 0.015 -4.167 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.008 0.008 0.982 ns   
Level 2 0.094 0.014 6.721 ** 0.028 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 2.141 0.097 22.022 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.040 0.035 -30.119 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.202 0.048 -4.252 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.546 0.054 -10.028 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.372 0.069 -5.364 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.538 0.040 -13.496 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.010 0.088 0.110 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.004 0.052 0.077 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.044 0.053 0.830 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.017 0.003 -5.383 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -3.247 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.005 0.004 1.383 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.039 0.099 -0.390 ns   
ED increase -0.002 0.001 -1.371 ns   
ED increase*2011 0.003 0.001 2.088 *   
Level 2 0.096 0.014 7.014 ** 0.028 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 2.124 0.086 24.784 **   
Female (ref = male) -1.038 0.035 -29.948 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.201 0.048 -4.205 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.549 0.054 -10.110 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.369 0.069 -5.337 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.542 0.040 -13.646 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.011 0.087 0.121 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.001 0.052 0.019 ns   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.048 0.052 0.916 ns   
DEPRIVATION -0.016 0.003 -4.977 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.854 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.002 0.004 0.524 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.238 0.097 2.442 *   
IMM increase -0.001 0.001 -1.255 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -1.683 ns   
Level 2 0.092 0.014 6.773 ** 0.027 
EMPOWERMENT: FEELING ABLE TO INFLUENCE LOCAL DECISIONS       
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.349 0.019 -18.172 **   
Level 2 0.048 0.008 5.931 ** 0.014 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons 0.156 0.045 3.447 **   
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Female (ref = male) 0.035 0.026 1.322 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.391 0.033 -11.982 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.778 0.052 -15.014 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.066 0.059 1.110 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.119 0.031 -3.829 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.189 0.068 2.783 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.280 0.053 5.246 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.250 0.045 5.615 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.004 0.002 -1.863 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.437 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.006 0.003 2.166 *   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.272 0.055 -4.908 **   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.616 ** 0.008 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons 0.145 0.057 2.531 *   
Female (ref = male) 0.034 0.026 1.298 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.387 0.032 -11.934 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.779 0.052 -14.963 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.067 0.059 1.143 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.119 0.031 -3.846 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.185 0.069 2.694 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.267 0.059 4.525 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.238 0.049 4.821 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.005 0.002 -1.904 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.355 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.005 0.003 1.599 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.301 0.064 -4.687 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 0.056 0.174 0.324 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.068 0.170 0.402 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.598 ** 0.008 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.128 0.061 2.086 *   
Female (ref = male) 0.035 0.026 1.334 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.390 0.033 -11.983 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.779 0.052 -15.023 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.066 0.059 1.117 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.119 0.031 -3.832 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.184 0.069 2.688 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.269 0.057 4.715 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.238 0.047 5.031 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.005 0.002 -1.968 *   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.272 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.004 0.004 1.022 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.283 0.065 -4.317 **   
IMMIGRATION 0.002 0.003 0.671 ns   
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IMMIGRATION*2011 0.000 0.003 0.086 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.567 ** 0.008 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.136 0.054 2.501 *   
Female (ref = male) 0.035 0.026 1.343 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.390 0.033 -11.982 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.779 0.052 -15.021 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.066 0.059 1.120 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.119 0.031 -3.846 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.182 0.068 2.667 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.261 0.057 4.549 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.230 0.049 4.715 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.005 0.002 -2.046 *   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.235 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.004 0.003 1.257 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.306 0.064 -4.798 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION 0.003 0.004 0.766 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.003 0.005 0.543 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.532 ** 0.008 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.112 0.066 1.713 ns   
Female (ref = male) 0.035 0.026 1.311 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.391 0.033 -11.996 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.778 0.052 -15.050 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.064 0.059 1.092 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.118 0.031 -3.810 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.189 0.069 2.741 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.278 0.055 5.058 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.247 0.044 5.632 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.005 0.002 -1.941 ns   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.324 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.004 0.004 1.046 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.228 0.066 -3.461 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION 0.008 0.009 0.884 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.007 0.008 -0.941 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.651 ** 0.008 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 0.181 0.063 2.854 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.036 0.026 1.357 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.391 0.033 -11.996 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.780 0.052 -15.022 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.066 0.059 1.121 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.119 0.031 -3.854 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.188 0.068 2.768 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.273 0.054 5.048 **   
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BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.244 0.045 5.457 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.005 0.002 -2.040 *   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.508 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.005 0.003 1.605 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.239 0.087 -2.734 **   
ED increase 0.000 0.001 -0.529 ns   
ED increase*2011 -0.001 0.001 -0.449 ns   
Level 2 0.026 0.007 3.567 ** 0.008 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 0.227 0.051 4.463 **   
Female (ref = male) 0.035 0.026 1.326 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.392 0.033 -12.039 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.779 0.052 -15.051 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.065 0.059 1.097 ns   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.119 0.031 -3.835 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.188 0.068 2.767 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.276 0.053 5.172 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.245 0.045 5.477 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.004 0.002 -2.120 *   
CRIME RATE 0.001 0.001 0.905 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.003 0.003 1.127 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.288 0.086 -3.355 **   
IMM increase -0.002 0.001 -1.815 ns   
IMM increase*2011 0.001 0.001 0.840 ns   
Level 2 0.025 0.007 3.526 ** 0.008 
SOCIAL CAPITAL: LOCAL TRUST           
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons 1.465 0.043 34.181 **   
Level 2 0.424 0.035 12.045 ** 0.114 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons 1.737 0.061 28.588 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.156 0.027 -5.808 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.397 0.046 -8.676 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.587 0.056 -10.523 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.330 0.064 -5.191 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.029 0.036 0.796 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.051 0.083 -0.613 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.648 0.053 -12.183 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.563 0.060 -9.456 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.015 0.004 -3.493 **   
CRIME RATE -0.004 0.001 -2.722 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.001 0.004 -0.236 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.217 0.083 2.607 **   
Level 2 0.132 0.019 6.823 ** 0.039 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
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Cons 1.853 0.092 20.078 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.154 0.026 -5.907 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.405 0.046 -8.762 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.587 0.056 -10.535 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.327 0.063 -5.185 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.035 0.036 0.968 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.011 0.084 -0.136 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.574 0.054 -10.545 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.495 0.059 -8.352 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.009 0.004 -2.118 *   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.481 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.010 0.005 2.065 *   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.563 0.102 5.550 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.763 0.234 -3.261 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 -0.667 0.214 -3.116 **   
Level 2 0.109 0.017 6.280 ** 0.032 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.955 0.102 19.204 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.159 0.026 -6.029 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.404 0.046 -8.786 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.584 0.055 -10.523 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.336 0.063 -5.309 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.035 0.036 0.971 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.020 0.085 -0.242 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.590 0.054 -10.922 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.508 0.058 -8.707 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.010 0.004 -2.499 *   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.119 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.018 0.005 3.442 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.496 0.100 4.943 **   
IMMIGRATION -0.020 0.006 -3.579 **   
IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.009 0.004 -2.179 *   
Level 2 0.109 0.016 6.697 ** 0.032 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 1.796 0.088 20.356 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.159 0.026 -6.019 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.405 0.046 -8.732 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.585 0.056 -10.510 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.334 0.064 -5.247 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.036 0.036 1.008 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.030 0.085 -0.358 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.594 0.054 -11.006 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.515 0.059 -8.702 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.013 0.004 -2.993 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.268 *   
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HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.008 0.005 1.595 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.538 0.095 5.683 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.016 0.006 -2.447 *   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.019 0.005 -3.984 **   
Level 2 0.114 0.017 6.641 ** 0.034 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 2.045 0.111 18.374 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.158 0.027 -5.958 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.401 0.045 -8.820 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.585 0.055 -10.569 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.339 0.063 -5.363 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.033 0.036 0.915 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.022 0.084 -0.263 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.623 0.053 -11.791 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.538 0.059 -9.100 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.011 0.004 -2.797 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.185 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.022 0.006 3.850 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.366 0.102 3.609 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.057 0.018 -3.143 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 -0.016 0.013 -1.287 ns   
Level 2 0.112 0.017 6.704 ** 0.033 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 1.871 0.089 21.122 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.159 0.026 -6.012 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.401 0.046 -8.770 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.583 0.056 -10.479 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.336 0.063 -5.323 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.034 0.036 0.948 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.053 0.084 -0.630 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.652 0.053 -12.221 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.576 0.059 -9.686 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.018 0.004 -4.213 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.671 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.004 0.004 -0.897 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.035 0.114 -0.311 ns   
ED increase -0.003 0.002 -2.207 *   
ED increase*2011 0.007 0.002 3.396 **   
Level 2 0.128 0.019 6.737 ** 0.038 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 1.882 0.089 21.172 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.157 0.027 -5.870 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.399 0.046 -8.724 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.586 0.056 -10.498 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.334 0.063 -5.276 **   
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Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.029 0.036 0.813 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.056 0.083 -0.676 ns   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.656 0.053 -12.405 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.575 0.059 -9.688 **   
DEPRIVATION -0.016 0.004 -3.970 **   
CRIME RATE -0.003 0.001 -2.433 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.005 0.005 -1.044 ns   
2011 (ref = 2001) 0.090 0.134 0.671 ns   
IMM increase -0.003 0.002 -2.047 *   
IMM increase*2011 0.004 0.002 1.827 ns   
Level 2 0.128 0.019 6.851 ** 0.037 
SOCIAL CAPITAL: CIVIC PARTICIPATION           
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.638 0.023 -27.719 **   
Level 2 0.091 0.012 7.432 ** 0.027 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons 0.280 0.048 5.825 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.017 0.033 -0.517 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.463 0.036 -12.951 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.969 0.049 -19.967 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.130 0.062 -2.107 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.026 0.033 -0.780 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.383 0.080 -4.801 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.420 0.050 -8.402 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.668 0.044 -15.146 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.004 0.002 1.925 ns   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -2.518 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.017 0.002 7.162 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.397 0.049 -8.088 **   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.476 ** 0.012 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons 0.352 0.060 5.856 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.018 0.033 -0.526 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.462 0.036 -12.808 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.971 0.049 -19.953 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.129 0.062 -2.082 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.028 0.033 -0.836 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.376 0.080 -4.700 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.400 0.054 -7.431 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.644 0.046 -14.141 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.006 0.003 2.459 *   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -2.259 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.021 0.003 7.309 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.415 0.064 -6.524 **   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.301 0.190 -1.579 ns   
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ETHNIC DIVERSITY*2011 0.096 0.150 0.642 ns   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.468 ** 0.012 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.385 0.064 6.061 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.017 0.033 -0.511 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.463 0.036 -12.846 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.969 0.049 -19.957 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.130 0.062 -2.098 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.027 0.033 -0.802 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.372 0.079 -4.677 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.394 0.053 -7.459 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.639 0.045 -14.073 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.006 0.002 2.621 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.960 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.023 0.003 7.024 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.421 0.065 -6.482 **   
IMMIGRATION -0.008 0.004 -2.096 *   
IMMIGRATION*2011 0.002 0.003 0.722 ns   
Level 2 0.037 0.007 5.422 ** 0.011 
BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.351 0.054 6.484 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.017 0.033 -0.508 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.463 0.036 -12.839 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.970 0.049 -19.942 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.130 0.062 -2.091 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.027 0.033 -0.819 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.375 0.079 -4.721 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.396 0.054 -7.359 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.641 0.046 -14.051 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.006 0.002 2.610 **   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.000 -2.390 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.021 0.003 7.617 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.422 0.060 -6.979 **   
BLACK IMMIGRATION -0.009 0.005 -1.904 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION*2011 0.003 0.004 0.657 ns   
Level 2 0.037 0.007 5.409 ** 0.011 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons 0.350 0.069 5.101 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.017 0.033 -0.522 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.463 0.036 -12.904 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.969 0.048 -19.998 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.132 0.062 -2.119 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.026 0.033 -0.769 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.375 0.079 -4.747 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.411 0.051 -8.062 **   
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BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.658 0.044 -14.826 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.005 0.002 2.232 *   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -1.850 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.022 0.004 6.187 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.394 0.065 -6.050 **   
WHITE IMMIGRATION -0.013 0.010 -1.257 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION*2011 0.000 0.008 -0.004 ns   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.469 ** 0.012 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 0.280 0.070 3.968 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.017 0.033 -0.519 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.463 0.036 -12.916 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.969 0.049 -19.955 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.131 0.062 -2.108 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.026 0.033 -0.777 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.382 0.080 -4.802 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.419 0.050 -8.330 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.668 0.044 -15.120 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.004 0.002 1.872 ns   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -2.537 **   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.017 0.003 6.774 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.404 0.076 -5.299 **   
ED increase 0.000 0.001 0.005 ns   
ED increase*2011 0.000 0.001 0.121 ns   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.476 ** 0.012 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons 0.276 0.061 4.555 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.016 0.033 -0.490 ns   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) -0.464 0.036 -12.969 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) -0.971 0.049 -19.979 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) -0.128 0.062 -2.064 *   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) -0.027 0.033 -0.810 ns   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.381 0.080 -4.772 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.421 0.050 -8.387 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.665 0.044 -15.059 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.004 0.002 1.941 ns   
CRIME RATE -0.001 0.001 -2.254 *   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS 0.015 0.003 5.525 **   
2011 (ref = 2001) -0.259 0.076 -3.384 **   
IMM increase 0.000 0.001 -0.158 ns   
IMM increase*2011 -0.002 0.001 -2.214 *   
Level 2 0.039 0.007 5.384 ** 0.012 
SOCIAL CAPITAL: WATCHING TV           
VARIANCE COMPONENTS MODEL           
Cons -0.160 0.027 -5.995 **   
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Level 2 0.080 0.014 5.867 ** 0.024 
CONTROL VARIABLES ONLY           
Cons -0.702 0.061 -11.423 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.016 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.534 0.055 9.775 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.748 0.075 9.977 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.556 0.085 6.563 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.334 0.046 7.227 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.324 0.108 -2.997 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.179 0.076 2.366 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.209 0.065 -3.237 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.009 0.002 4.036 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.459 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.006 0.003 -1.881 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.068 ** 0.011 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY           
Cons -0.699 0.072 -9.757 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.019 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.534 0.055 9.775 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.748 0.075 9.977 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.556 0.085 6.557 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.334 0.046 7.191 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.323 0.108 -2.997 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.181 0.086 2.103 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.207 0.074 -2.810 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.009 0.002 3.892 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.464 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.006 0.004 -1.538 ns   
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -0.016 0.194 -0.084 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.074 ** 0.011 
IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.716 0.075 -9.513 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.017 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.534 0.055 9.777 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.748 0.075 9.981 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.556 0.085 6.561 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.334 0.047 7.190 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.325 0.108 -3.012 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.174 0.083 2.109 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.214 0.071 -3.034 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.009 0.002 3.772 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.426 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.007 0.005 -1.442 ns   
IMMIGRATION 0.001 0.004 0.268 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.039 ** 0.011 
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BLACK IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.706 0.068 -10.328 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.017 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.534 0.055 9.775 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.748 0.075 9.977 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.556 0.085 6.557 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.334 0.047 7.178 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.324 0.108 -3.004 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.177 0.085 2.093 **   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.212 0.072 -2.943 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.009 0.002 3.869 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.455 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.006 0.004 -1.575 ns   
BLACK IMMIGRATION 0.001 0.005 0.102 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.058 ** 0.011 
WHITE IMMIGRATION           
Cons -0.756 0.078 -9.633 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.014 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.534 0.055 9.782 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.748 0.075 10.003 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.557 0.085 6.575 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.334 0.046 7.221 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.329 0.108 -3.042 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.172 0.077 2.232 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.218 0.066 -3.300 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.008 0.002 3.693 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.264 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.010 0.005 -1.885 ns   
WHITE IMMIGRATION 0.011 0.010 1.088 ns   
Level 2 0.035 0.009 3.932 ** 0.011 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.667 0.082 -8.149 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.013 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.533 0.055 9.771 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.747 0.075 9.979 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.557 0.085 6.574 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.335 0.046 7.251 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.325 0.108 -3.016 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.170 0.078 2.169 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.218 0.067 -3.253 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.009 0.002 3.765 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.214 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.006 0.003 -1.998 *   
ED increase 0.000 0.001 -0.625 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.025 ** 0.011 
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IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE           
Cons -0.690 0.073 -9.442 **   
Female (ref = male) -0.115 0.038 -3.015 **   
A level or GCSE qualification (ref = degree) 0.533 0.055 9.762 **   
No qualifications (ref = degree) 0.747 0.075 9.979 **   
Unemployed (ref = employed) 0.556 0.085 6.560 **   
Economically inactive (ref = employed) 0.334 0.046 7.225 **   
White non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.324 0.108 -3.002 **   
BME UK born (ref = white UK born) 0.179 0.076 2.366 *   
BME non UK born (ref = white UK born) -0.210 0.065 -3.239 **   
DEPRIVATION 0.009 0.002 4.098 **   
CRIME RATE 0.000 0.001 0.449 ns   
HIGHER QUALIFICATIONS -0.006 0.003 -1.827 ns   
IMM increase -0.001 0.002 -0.293 ns   
Level 2 0.036 0.009 4.074 ** 0.011 
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ANNEX TWO: MODEL OUTPUT FOR SINGLE-LEVEL MODELS  
 
 
VOTER TURNOUT 2001 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
Model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .664a .441 .405 4.177 
2 .668b .447 .409 4.161  
 
Anova  Sum of 
squares 
df 
Mean 
square 
F Sig 
1 Regression 4043.965 19 212.840 12.201 .000b 
Residual 5128.471 294 17.444     
Total 9172.436 313       
2 Regression 4098.729 20 204.936 11.835 .000c 
Residual 5073.707 293 17.316     
Total 9172.436 313       
 
Model  Unstanda
ridised 
coefficien
ts 
B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffic
ients 
Beta 
t sig 
1 (Constant) 43.349 4.635   9.353 .000 
LLI  .081 .282 .038 .288 .774 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.162 .246 
Deprivation  -.142 .064 -.302 -2.209 .028 
Income  -.017 .007 -.196 -2.281 .023 
Degree qualifications .176 .064 .241 2.754 .006 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.385 .018 
Region ref = London      
South East region -6.177 1.435 -.471 -4.303 .000 
South West region -4.348 1.653 -.247 -2.630 .009 
North East region -3.634 2.018 -.118 -1.801 .073 
North West region -6.327 1.596 -.377 -3.965 .000 
West Midlands region -7.990 1.576 -.428 -5.071 .000 
East Midlands region -6.085 1.651 -.371 -3.686 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.949 1.786 -.321 -3.891 .000 
East region -6.554 1.520 -.425 -4.313 .000 
Area ref group = major 
urban 
     
Large urban area 1.354 1.020 .083 1.327 .185 
Other urban area .497 .942 .035 .527 .599 
Significant rural area 2.383 1.023 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 50 area 2.823 1.125 .178 2.509 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.105 1.128 .282 3.639 .000 
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Model  Unstanda
ridised 
coefficien
ts 
B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffic
ients 
Beta 
t sig 
2 (Constant) 38.424 5.385   7.136 .000 
LLI  .399 .333 .186 1.199 .232 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.090 -1.203 .230 
Deprivation  -.216 .076 -.461 -2.828 .005 
Income  -.013 .007 -.156 -1.762 .079 
Degree qualifications .147 .066 .201 2.232 .026 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.391 .017 
South East region -4.966 1.584 -.378 -3.135 .002 
South West region -2.923 1.832 -.166 -1.595 .112 
North East region -1.914 2.231 -.062 -.858 .392 
North West region -5.152 1.722 -.307 -2.992 .003 
West Midlands region -6.947 1.676 -.372 -4.144 .000 
East Midlands region -5.017 1.751 -.306 -2.865 .004 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-5.506 1.956 -.255 -2.816 .005 
East region -5.425 1.642 -.352 -3.305 .001 
Large urban area 1.609 1.026 .098 1.567 .118 
Other urban area .810 .955 .058 .848 .397 
Significant rural area 2.806 1.046 .196 2.682 .008 
Rural 50 area 3.349 1.159 .211 2.889 .004 
Rural 80 area 4.754 1.182 .327 4.023 .000 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY .063 .035 .182 1.778 .076 
 
 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .664a .441 .405 4.177 
2 .664b .441 .403 4.184 
 
Anova  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig 
1 Regression 4043.965 19 212.840 12.201 .000b 
Residual 5128.471 294 17.444     
Total 9172.436 313       
2 Regression 4044.137 20 202.207 11.553 .000c 
Residual 5128.299 293 17.503     
Total 9172.436 313       
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Model  Unstandari
dised 
coefficients 
B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffi
cients 
Beta 
t sig 
1 (Constant) 43.349 4.635   9.353 .000 
LLI  .081 .282 .038 .288 .774 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.162 .246 
Deprivation  -.142 .064 -.302 -2.209 .028 
Income  -.017 .007 -.196 -2.281 .023 
Degree qualifications .176 .064 .241 2.754 .006 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.385 .018 
Region ref = London      
South East region -6.177 1.435 -.471 -4.303 .000 
South West region -4.348 1.653 -.247 -2.630 .009 
North East region -3.634 2.018 -.118 -1.801 .073 
North West region -6.327 1.596 -.377 -3.965 .000 
West Midlands region -7.990 1.576 -.428 -5.071 .000 
East Midlands region -6.085 1.651 -.371 -3.686 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.949 1.786 -.321 -3.891 .000 
East region -6.554 1.520 -.425 -4.313 .000 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area 1.354 1.020 .083 1.327 .185 
Other urban area .497 .942 .035 .527 .599 
Significant rural area 2.383 1.023 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 50 area 2.823 1.125 .178 2.509 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.105 1.128 .282 3.639 .000 
2 (Constant) 43.152 5.050   8.546 .000 
LLI  .091 .300 .043 .304 .761 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.164 .245 
Deprivation  -.144 .068 -.307 -2.114 .035 
Income  -.016 .008 -.194 -2.170 .031 
Degree qualifications .173 .074 .236 2.347 .020 
Population density -.001 .000 -.276 -2.363 .019 
South East region -6.110 1.587 -.466 -3.850 .000 
South West region -4.261 1.874 -.242 -2.273 .024 
North East region -3.529 2.280 -.115 -1.548 .123 
North West region -6.240 1.824 -.372 -3.421 .001 
West Midlands region -7.908 1.786 -.424 -4.427 .000 
East Midlands region -6.008 1.830 -.367 -3.283 .001 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.855 2.026 -.317 -3.384 .001 
East region -6.488 1.659 -.421 -3.911 .000 
Large urban area 1.366 1.029 .083 1.328 .185 
Other urban area .505 .947 .036 .533 .594 
Significant rural area 2.393 1.029 .167 2.325 .021 
Rural 50 area 2.836 1.134 .179 2.500 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.119 1.138 .283 3.618 .000 
IMMIGRATION .008 .081 .012 .099 .921 
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BLACK IMMIGRATION 
 
Model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .664a .441 .405 4.177 
2 .665b .442 .404 4.178 
 
Anova  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig 
1 Regression 4043.965 19 212.840 12.201 .000b 
Residual 5128.471 294 17.444     
Total 9172.436 313       
2 Regression 4058.302 20 202.915 11.625 .000c 
Residual 5114.134 293 17.454     
Total 9172.436 313       
 
Model  Unstandard
ised 
coefficients 
B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffi
cients 
Beta 
t sig 
1 LLI  43.349 4.635   9.353 .000 
Crime rate  .081 .282 .038 .288 .774 
Deprivation  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.162 .246 
Income  -.142 .064 -.302 -2.209 .028 
Degree qualifications -.017 .007 -.196 -2.281 .023 
Population density .176 .064 .241 2.754 .006 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.001 .000 -.274 -2.385 .018 
South West region -6.177 1.435 -.471 -4.303 .000 
North East region -4.348 1.653 -.247 -2.630 .009 
North West region -3.634 2.018 -.118 -1.801 .073 
West Midlands region -6.327 1.596 -.377 -3.965 .000 
East Midlands region -7.990 1.576 -.428 -5.071 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.085 1.651 -.371 -3.686 .000 
East region -6.949 1.786 -.321 -3.891 .000 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -6.554 1.520 -.425 -4.313 .000 
Other urban area 1.354 1.020 .083 1.327 .185 
Significant rural area .497 .942 .035 .527 .599 
Rural 50 area 2.383 1.023 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 80 area 2.823 1.125 .178 2.509 .013 
LLI  4.105 1.128 .282 3.639 .000 
2 (Constant) 41.081 5.268   7.798 .000 
LLI  .214 .318 .100 .673 .501 
Crime rate  -.010 .009 -.086 -1.143 .254 
Deprivation  -.174 .073 -.371 -2.371 .018 
Income  -.015 .008 -.175 -1.968 .050 
Degree qualifications .158 .067 .215 2.338 .020 
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Population density -.001 .000 -.277 -2.409 .017 
South East region -5.474 1.632 -.417 -3.355 .001 
South West region -3.518 1.890 -.200 -1.861 .064 
North East region -2.673 2.280 -.087 -1.173 .242 
North West region -5.522 1.827 -.329 -3.023 .003 
West Midlands region -7.237 1.782 -.388 -4.060 .000 
East Midlands region -5.372 1.829 -.328 -2.936 .004 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.068 2.034 -.280 -2.984 .003 
East region -5.831 1.717 -.378 -3.397 .001 
Large urban area 1.416 1.023 .086 1.385 .167 
Other urban area .580 .947 .041 .612 .541 
Significant rural area 2.487 1.029 .174 2.416 .016 
Rural 50 area 2.962 1.136 .187 2.608 .010 
Rural 80 area 4.290 1.147 .295 3.741 .000 
BLACK 
IMMIGRATION 
.088 .097 .092 .906 .366 
 
 
WHITE IMMIGRATION 
 
Model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .664a .441 .405 4.177 
2 .666b .443 .405 4.175 
 
Anova  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig 
1 Regression 4043.965 19 212.840 12.201 .000b 
Residual 5128.471 294 17.444     
Total 9172.436 313       
2 Regression 4066.463 20 203.323 11.667 .000c 
Residual 5105.973 293 17.427     
Total 9172.436 313       
 
Model  Unstandard
ised 
coefficients 
B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffi
cients 
Beta 
t sig 
1 (Constant) 43.349 4.635   9.353 .000 
LLI  .081 .282 .038 .288 .774 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.162 .246 
Deprivation  -.142 .064 -.302 -2.209 .028 
Income  -.017 .007 -.196 -2.281 .023 
Degree qualifications .176 .064 .241 2.754 .006 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.385 .018 
Region ref = London      
South East region -6.177 1.435 -.471 -4.303 .000 
South West region -4.348 1.653 -.247 -2.630 .009 
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North East region -3.634 2.018 -.118 -1.801 .073 
North West region -6.327 1.596 -.377 -3.965 .000 
West Midlands region -7.990 1.576 -.428 -5.071 .000 
East Midlands region -6.085 1.651 -.371 -3.686 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.949 1.786 -.321 -3.891 .000 
East region -6.554 1.520 -.425 -4.313 .000 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area 1.354 1.020 .083 1.327 .185 
Other urban area .497 .942 .035 .527 .599 
Significant rural area 2.383 1.023 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 50 area 2.823 1.125 .178 2.509 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.105 1.128 .282 3.639 .000 
2 (Constant) 43.971 4.665   9.426 .000 
LLI  .070 .282 .033 .249 .804 
Crime rate  -.009 .009 -.071 -.919 .359 
Deprivation  -.144 .064 -.308 -2.250 .025 
Income  -.018 .007 -.214 -2.449 .015 
Degree qualifications .215 .072 .294 2.967 .003 
Population density -.001 .000 -.232 -1.917 .056 
South East region -6.366 1.444 -.485 -4.408 .000 
South West region -4.743 1.689 -.269 -2.809 .005 
North East region -4.182 2.074 -.136 -2.017 .045 
North West region -6.760 1.640 -.403 -4.123 .000 
West Midlands region -8.395 1.615 -.450 -5.199 .000 
East Midlands region -6.453 1.681 -.394 -3.838 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-7.397 1.828 -.342 -4.046 .000 
East region -6.657 1.522 -.432 -4.375 .000 
Large urban area 1.208 1.028 .074 1.175 .241 
Other urban area .458 .942 .033 .486 .628 
Significant rural area 2.382 1.022 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 50 area 2.811 1.124 .177 2.500 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.154 1.128 .286 3.681 .000 
WHITE IMMIGRATION -.184 .162 -.110 -1.136 .257 
 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R 
Square 
Std. Error 
of the 
Estimate 
1 .664a .441 .405 4.177 
2 .664b .441 .403 4.184 
 
Anova  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean square F Sig 
1 Regression 4043.965 19 212.840 12.201 .000b 
Residual 5128.471 294 17.444     
Total 9172.436 313       
2 Regression 4043.965 20 202.198 11.552 .000c 
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Residual 5128.471 293 17.503     
Total 9172.436 313       
 
Model  Unstand
ardised 
coefficie
nts 
B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffi
cients 
Beta 
t sig 
1 (Constant) 43.349 4.635   9.353 .000 
LLI  .081 .282 .038 .288 .774 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.162 .246 
Deprivation  -.142 .064 -.302 -2.209 .028 
Income  -.017 .007 -.196 -2.281 .023 
Degree qualifications .176 .064 .241 2.754 .006 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.385 .018 
Region ref = London      
South East region -6.177 1.435 -.471 -4.303 .000 
South West region -4.348 1.653 -.247 -2.630 .009 
North East region -3.634 2.018 -.118 -1.801 .073 
North West region -6.327 1.596 -.377 -3.965 .000 
West Midlands region -7.990 1.576 -.428 -5.071 .000 
East Midlands region -6.085 1.651 -.371 -3.686 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.949 1.786 -.321 -3.891 .000 
East region -6.554 1.520 -.425 -4.313 .000 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area 1.354 1.020 .083 1.327 .185 
Other urban area .497 .942 .035 .527 .599 
Significant rural area 2.383 1.023 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 50 area 2.823 1.125 .178 2.509 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.105 1.128 .282 3.639 .000 
2 (Constant) 43.351 4.664   9.296 .000 
LLI  .081 .304 .038 .265 .791 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.087 -1.145 .253 
Deprivation  -.141 .068 -.302 -2.093 .037 
Income  -.017 .007 -.196 -2.264 .024 
Degree qualifications .176 .064 .241 2.749 .006 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.379 .018 
South East region -6.177 1.441 -.471 -4.287 .000 
South West region -4.350 1.689 -.247 -2.576 .010 
North East region -3.634 2.021 -.118 -1.798 .073 
North West region -6.328 1.601 -.377 -3.952 .000 
West Midlands region -7.991 1.579 -.428 -5.061 .000 
East Midlands region -6.086 1.654 -.371 -3.679 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.950 1.794 -.321 -3.875 .000 
East region -6.554 1.523 -.425 -4.303 .000 
Large urban area 1.354 1.025 .083 1.321 .188 
Other urban area .496 .945 .035 .525 .600 
Significant rural area 2.383 1.029 .166 2.314 .021 
Rural 50 area 2.821 1.159 .178 2.434 .016 
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Rural 80 area 4.103 1.190 .282 3.449 .001 
ED RATE OF 
INCREASE 
3.367E-
05 
.006 .000 .006 .996 
 
 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .664a .441 .405 4.177 
2 .665b .442 .404 4.180  
 
Anova  Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig 
1 Regression 4043.965 19 212.840 12.201 .000b 
Residual 5128.471 294 17.444     
Total 9172.436 313       
2 Regression 4052.966 20 202.648 11.598 .000c 
Residual 5119.470 293 17.473     
Total 9172.436 313       
 
Model  Unstandar
dised 
coefficient
s B 
Std 
Error 
Stand
ardise
d 
coeffi
cients 
Beta 
t sig 
1 (Constant) 43.349 4.635   9.353 .000 
LLI  .081 .282 .038 .288 .774 
Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.088 -1.162 .246 
Deprivation  -.142 .064 -.302 -2.209 .028 
Income  -.017 .007 -.196 -2.281 .023 
Degree qualifications .176 .064 .241 2.754 .006 
Population density -.001 .000 -.274 -2.385 .018 
Region ref = London      
South East region -6.177 1.435 -.471 -4.303 .000 
South West region -4.348 1.653 -.247 -2.630 .009 
North East region -3.634 2.018 -.118 -1.801 .073 
North West region -6.327 1.596 -.377 -3.965 .000 
West Midlands region -7.990 1.576 -.428 -5.071 .000 
East Midlands region -6.085 1.651 -.371 -3.686 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-6.949 1.786 -.321 -3.891 .000 
East region -6.554 1.520 -.425 -4.313 .000 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area 1.354 1.020 .083 1.327 .185 
Other urban area .497 .942 .035 .527 .599 
Significant rural area 2.383 1.023 .166 2.330 .020 
Rural 50 area 2.823 1.125 .178 2.509 .013 
Rural 80 area 4.105 1.128 .282 3.639 .000 
2 (Constant) 43.817 4.684   9.354 .000 
LLI  .072 .283 .033 .254 .800 
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Crime rate  -.011 .009 -.090 -1.195 .233 
Deprivation  -.137 .064 -.293 -2.125 .034 
Income  -.017 .007 -.198 -2.301 .022 
Degree qualifications .183 .065 .250 2.824 .005 
Population density -.001 .000 -.285 -2.454 .015 
South East region -6.292 1.445 -.479 -4.353 .000 
South West region -4.433 1.659 -.252 -2.672 .008 
North East region -3.543 2.024 -.115 -1.751 .081 
North West region -6.491 1.613 -.387 -4.024 .000 
West Midlands region -8.155 1.594 -.437 -5.117 .000 
East Midlands region -6.201 1.660 -.378 -3.735 .000 
Yorks and Humber 
region 
-7.026 1.791 -.325 -3.924 .000 
East region -6.610 1.523 -.429 -4.340 .000 
Large urban area 1.374 1.021 .084 1.345 .180 
Other urban area .440 .946 .031 .465 .642 
Significant rural area 2.284 1.033 .159 2.212 .028 
Rural 50 area 2.709 1.137 .171 2.383 .018 
Rural 80 area 3.947 1.151 .271 3.430 .001 
IMM RATE OF 
INCREASE 
-.015 .021 -.035 -.718 .473 
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VOTER TURNOUT 2011 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
Model Summary 
Model R 
R 
Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .820a .673 .650 2.678 
2 .823b .677 .653 2.667 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3809.237 18 211.624 29.519 .000b 
Residual 1849.621 258 7.169   
Total 5658.858 276    
2 Regression 3831.445 19 201.655 28.360 .000c 
Residual 1827.413 257 7.111   
Total 5658.858 276    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed 
Coefficien
ts 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.173 3.472  8.402 .000 
LLI  .235 .066 .225 3.579 .000 
Crime rate  -.040 .016 -.187 -2.464 .014 
Deprivation  .031 .059 .056 .528 .598 
Income  -.004 .004 -.065 -.924 .356 
Degree qualifications .508 .046 .715 11.029 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.209 -3.048 .003 
Region ref = London      
South East region .412 .687 .030 .600 .549 
South West region -2.316 1.071 -.096 -2.163 .031 
North East region -3.503 .718 -.267 -4.877 .000 
North West region -1.693 .680 -.113 -2.490 .013 
West Midlands region -1.056 .620 -.081 -1.702 .090 
East Midlands region -2.594 .770 -.152 -3.367 .001 
Yorks and Humber 
region -.468 .558 -.039 -.839 .402 
East region .338 .676 .025 .500 .618 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area .659 .640 .057 1.030 .304 
Other urban area .295 .737 .026 .400 .689 
Significant rural area -.236 .804 -.019 -.294 .769 
Rural 50 area -.125 .820 -.011 -.153 .879 
2 (Constant) 27.790 3.545  7.839 .000 
LLI  .297 .074 .284 4.003 .000 
Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.189 -2.502 .013 
Deprivation  -.005 .062 -.010 -.089 .929 
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Income  -.003 .004 -.052 -.746 .456 
Degree qualifications .487 .047 .686 10.298 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.224 -3.260 .001 
South East region .526 .687 .038 .766 .444 
South West region -1.814 1.104 -.075 -1.644 .101 
North East region -3.279 .726 -.250 -4.514 .000 
North West region -1.714 .677 -.114 -2.530 .012 
West Midlands region -1.066 .618 -.082 -1.726 .086 
East Midlands region -2.434 .773 -.143 -3.150 .002 
Yorks and Humber 
region -.564 .558 -.046 -1.010 .314 
East region .576 .687 .043 .838 .403 
Large urban area .928 .656 .081 1.416 .158 
Other urban area .602 .754 .053 .799 .425 
Significant rural area .130 .828 .010 .157 .875 
Rural 50 area .262 .846 .023 .310 .757 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY .038 .021 .109 1.767 .078 
 
Excluded Variables 
Model Beta In t Sig. 
Partial 
Correlation 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Tolerance 
1 South East region .b . . . .000 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY .109b 1.767 .078 .110 .332 
2 South East region .c . . . .000 
 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .820a .672 .650 2.675 
2 .821b .675 .651 2.671 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3806.327 18 211.463 29.546 .000b 
Residual 1853.683 259 7.157   
Total 5660.010 277    
2 Regression 3819.336 19 201.018 28.176 .000c 
Residual 1840.674 258 7.134   
Total 5660.010 277    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed 
Coefficien
ts 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.119 3.468  8.395 .000 
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LLI  .236 .066 .225 3.584 .000 
Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.190 -2.499 .013 
Deprivation  .034 .058 .062 .591 .555 
Income  -.004 .004 -.062 -.895 .371 
Degree qualifications .508 .046 .716 11.034 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.211 -3.082 .002 
Region ref = London      
South West region .411 .686 .029 .599 .550 
North East region -2.370 1.068 -.098 -2.220 .027 
North West region -3.596 .707 -.277 -5.088 .000 
West Midlands region -1.708 .679 -.114 -2.515 .013 
East Midlands region -1.062 .620 -.082 -1.713 .088 
Yorks & Humber 
region -2.619 .769 -.153 -3.406 .001 
East region -.478 .557 -.039 -.857 .392 
Area ref = major 
urban      
Large urban area .326 .676 .024 .483 .630 
Other urban area .644 .639 .056 1.007 .315 
Significant rural area .278 .736 .025 .377 .706 
Rural 50 area -.310 .798 -.025 -.388 .698 
Rural 80 area -.145 .819 -.013 -.177 .860 
2 (Constant) 30.439 3.598  8.459 .000 
LLI  .195 .072 .187 2.703 .007 
Crime rate  -.036 .017 -.167 -2.144 .033 
Deprivation  .049 .059 .089 .831 .407 
Income  -.005 .005 -.086 -1.198 .232 
Degree qualifications .532 .049 .750 10.790 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.198 -2.867 .004 
South West region .207 .701 .015 .296 .768 
North East region -2.884 1.132 -.119 -2.548 .011 
North West region -3.989 .763 -.307 -5.226 .000 
West Midlands region -1.963 .704 -.131 -2.789 .006 
East Midlands region -1.223 .630 -.094 -1.940 .053 
Yorks & Humber 
region -2.942 .804 -.172 -3.658 .000 
East region -.446 .557 -.037 -.801 .424 
Large urban area .161 .686 .012 .235 .814 
Other urban area .513 .646 .045 .794 .428 
Significant rural area .117 .744 .010 .157 .875 
Rural 50 area -.498 .809 -.040 -.615 .539 
Rural 80 area -.288 .825 -.025 -.349 .727 
IMMIGRATION -.072 .053 -.088 -1.350 .178 
 
 
BLACK IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .820a .672 .650 2.675 
2 .821b .674 .650 2.675 
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ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3806.327 18 211.463 29.546 .000b 
Residual 1853.683 259 7.157   
Total 5660.010 277    
2 Regression 3813.572 19 200.714 28.046 .000c 
Residual 1846.437 258 7.157   
Total 5660.010 277    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.119 3.468  8.395 .000 
LLI  .236 .066 .225 3.584 .000 
Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.190 -2.499 .013 
Deprivation  .034 .058 .062 .591 .555 
Income  -.004 .004 -.062 -.895 .371 
Degree qualifications .508 .046 .716 11.034 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.211 -3.082 .002 
Region ref = London      
South West region .411 .686 .029 .599 .550 
North East region -2.370 1.068 -.098 -2.220 .027 
North West region -3.596 .707 -.277 -5.088 .000 
West Midlands region -1.708 .679 -.114 -2.515 .013 
East Midlands region -1.062 .620 -.082 -1.713 .088 
Yorks & Humber 
region -2.619 .769 -.153 -3.406 .001 
East region -.478 .557 -.039 -.857 .392 
Area ref = major 
urban      
Large urban area .326 .676 .024 .483 .630 
Other urban area .644 .639 .056 1.007 .315 
Significant rural area .278 .736 .025 .377 .706 
Rural 50 area -.310 .798 -.025 -.388 .698 
Rural 80 area -.145 .819 -.013 -.177 .860 
2 (Constant) 28.437 3.534  8.047 .000 
LLI  .265 .072 .254 3.680 .000 
Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.193 -2.538 .012 
Deprivation  .018 .060 .033 .303 .762 
Income  -.003 .004 -.054 -.765 .445 
Degree qualifications .495 .048 .698 10.354 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.225 -3.222 .001 
South West region .506 .692 .036 .731 .466 
North East region -2.097 1.102 -.087 -1.903 .058 
North West region -3.407 .731 -.262 -4.660 .000 
West Midlands region -1.612 .686 -.108 -2.351 .019 
East Midlands region -1.005 .622 -.077 -1.614 .108 
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Yorks & Humber 
region -2.478 .782 -.145 -3.170 .002 
East region -.465 .557 -.038 -.834 .405 
Large urban area .420 .682 .031 .615 .539 
Other urban area .736 .646 .064 1.139 .256 
Significant rural area .380 .743 .034 .512 .609 
Rural 50 area -.186 .807 -.015 -.231 .818 
Rural 80 area -.027 .827 -.002 -.033 .974 
BLACK 
IMMIGRATION  .069 .068 .059 1.006 .315 
 
 
WHITE IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .820a .672 .650 2.675 
2 .832b .692 .669 2.601 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3806.327 18 211.463 29.546 .000b 
Residual 1853.683 259 7.157   
Total 5660.010 277    
2 Regression 3914.634 19 206.033 30.456 .000c 
Residual 1745.376 258 6.765   
Total 5660.010 277    
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed 
Coefficien
ts 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.119 3.468  8.395 .000 
LLI .236 .066 .225 3.584 .000 
Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.190 -2.499 .013 
Deprivation  .034 .058 .062 .591 .555 
Income  -.004 .004 -.062 -.895 .371 
Degree qualifications .508 .046 .716 11.034 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.211 -3.082 .002 
Region ref = London      
South West region .411 .686 .029 .599 .550 
North East region -2.370 1.068 -.098 -2.220 .027 
North West region -3.596 .707 -.277 -5.088 .000 
West Midlands region -1.708 .679 -.114 -2.515 .013 
East Midlands region -1.062 .620 -.082 -1.713 .088 
Yorks & Humber region -2.619 .769 -.153 -3.406 .001 
East region -.478 .557 -.039 -.857 .392 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area .326 .676 .024 .483 .630 
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Other urban area .644 .639 .056 1.007 .315 
Significant rural area .278 .736 .025 .377 .706 
Rural 50 area -.310 .798 -.025 -.388 .698 
Rural 80 area -.145 .819 -.013 -.177 .860 
2 (Constant) 32.914 3.503  9.396 .000 
LLI .181 .065 .173 2.775 .006 
Crime rate  -.017 .017 -.080 -1.013 .312 
Deprivation  .021 .057 .038 .374 .708 
Income  -.009 .005 -.149 -2.092 .037 
Degree qualifications .557 .046 .786 12.006 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.221 -3.317 .001 
South West region -.153 .682 -.011 -.224 .823 
North East region -3.585 1.081 -.148 -3.315 .001 
North West region -4.628 .734 -.356 -6.306 .000 
West Midlands region -2.507 .690 -.167 -3.634 .000 
East Midlands region -1.575 .616 -.121 -2.556 .011 
Yorks & Humber region -3.548 .783 -.208 -4.532 .000 
East region -.209 .546 -.017 -.383 .702 
Large urban area -.051 .664 -.004 -.076 .939 
Other urban area .441 .624 .038 .707 .480 
Significant rural area -.003 .719 .000 -.004 .997 
Rural 50 area -.621 .780 -.050 -.797 .426 
Rural 80 area -.243 .797 -.021 -.305 .761 
WHITE IMMIGRATION -.415 .104 -.208 -4.001 .000 
 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .820a .672 .650 2.675 
2 .828b .685 .662 2.628 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3806.327 18 211.463 29.546 .000b 
Residual 1853.683 259 7.157   
Total 5660.010 277    
2 Regression 3878.681 19 204.141 29.567 .000c 
Residual 1781.329 258 6.904   
Total 5660.010 277    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed 
Coefficien
ts 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.119 3.468  8.395 .000 
LLI  .236 .066 .225 3.584 .000 
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Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.190 -2.499 .013 
Deprivation  .034 .058 .062 .591 .555 
Income  -.004 .004 -.062 -.895 .371 
Degree qualifications .508 .046 .716 11.034 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.211 -3.082 .002 
Region ref = London      
South West region .411 .686 .029 .599 .550 
North East region -2.370 1.068 -.098 -2.220 .027 
North West region -3.596 .707 -.277 -5.088 .000 
West Midlands region -1.708 .679 -.114 -2.515 .013 
East Midlands region -1.062 .620 -.082 -1.713 .088 
Yorks & Humber region -2.619 .769 -.153 -3.406 .001 
East region -.478 .557 -.039 -.857 .392 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area .326 .676 .024 .483 .630 
Other urban area .644 .639 .056 1.007 .315 
Significant rural area .278 .736 .025 .377 .706 
Rural 50 area -.310 .798 -.025 -.388 .698 
Rural 80 area -.145 .819 -.013 -.177 .860 
2 (Constant) 31.372 3.477  9.023 .000 
LLI  .235 .065 .225 3.643 .000 
Crime rate  -.040 .016 -.184 -2.470 .014 
Deprivation  .018 .057 .032 .311 .756 
Income  -.004 .004 -.065 -.955 .340 
Degree qualifications .493 .045 .695 10.852 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.199 -2.958 .003 
South West region .177 .678 .013 .261 .794 
North East region -2.324 1.049 -.096 -2.217 .028 
North West region -4.151 .715 -.319 -5.805 .000 
West Midlands region -2.156 .681 -.144 -3.165 .002 
East Midlands region -1.521 .625 -.117 -2.434 .016 
Yorks & Humber region -2.477 .757 -.145 -3.274 .001 
East region -.602 .549 -.050 -1.098 .273 
Large urban area .376 .664 .028 .566 .572 
Other urban area .720 .629 .063 1.146 .253 
Significant rural area .317 .723 .028 .438 .662 
Rural 50 area -.442 .785 -.036 -.563 .574 
Rural 80 area -.244 .805 -.021 -.303 .762 
ED RATE OF 
INCREASE   
-.022 .007 -.127 -3.237 .001 
 
 
 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .820a .672 .650 2.675 
2 .828b .685 .662 2.627 
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ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 3806.327 18 211.463 29.546 .000b 
Residual 1853.683 259 7.157   
Total 5660.010 277    
2 Regression 3878.919 19 204.154 29.573 .000c 
Residual 1781.091 258 6.903   
Total 5660.010 277    
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 29.119 3.468  8.395 .000 
LLI  .236 .066 .225 3.584 .000 
Crime rate  -.041 .016 -.190 -2.499 .013 
Deprivation  .034 .058 .062 .591 .555 
Income  -.004 .004 -.062 -.895 .371 
Degree qualifications .508 .046 .716 11.034 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.211 -3.082 .002 
Region ref = London      
South West region .411 .686 .029 .599 .550 
North East region -2.370 1.068 -.098 -2.220 .027 
North West region -3.596 .707 -.277 -5.088 .000 
West Midlands region -1.708 .679 -.114 -2.515 .013 
East Midlands region -1.062 .620 -.082 -1.713 .088 
Yorks & Humber region -2.619 .769 -.153 -3.406 .001 
East region -.478 .557 -.039 -.857 .392 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area .326 .676 .024 .483 .630 
Other urban area .644 .639 .056 1.007 .315 
Significant rural area .278 .736 .025 .377 .706 
Rural 50 area -.310 .798 -.025 -.388 .698 
Rural 80 area -.145 .819 -.013 -.177 .860 
2 (Constant) 31.574 3.490  9.048 .000 
LLI  .213 .065 .204 3.283 .001 
Crime rate  -.027 .017 -.124 -1.609 .109 
Deprivation  .026 .057 .046 .448 .655 
Income  -.006 .004 -.091 -1.315 .190 
Degree qualifications .479 .046 .675 10.391 .000 
Population density -.001 .000 -.224 -3.326 .001 
South West region .319 .674 .023 .473 .636 
North East region -2.365 1.048 -.098 -2.255 .025 
North West region -3.750 .696 -.289 -5.390 .000 
West Midlands region -1.846 .668 -.123 -2.761 .006 
East Midlands region -.982 .609 -.076 -1.613 .108 
Yorks & Humber region -2.463 .757 -.144 -3.254 .001 
East region -.419 .548 -.035 -.766 .444 
Large urban area .244 .664 .018 .367 .714 
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Other urban area .567 .628 .049 .903 .368 
Significant rural area .294 .722 .026 .407 .684 
Rural 50 area -.358 .784 -.029 -.457 .648 
Rural 80 area -.188 .805 -.016 -.234 .815 
IMM RATE OF 
INCREASE  
-.018 .005 -.140 -3.243 .001 
 
  
 421 
 
REGISTERED CHARITIES 2011 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .850a .722 .705 .824 
2 .851b .724 .705 .824 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 533.763 19 28.093 41.332 .000b 
Residual 205.267 302 .680   
Total 739.030 321    
2 Regression 534.874 20 26.744 39.430 .000c 
Residual 204.156 301 .678   
Total 739.030 321    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -2.998 .931  -3.221 .001 
LLI  .096 .017 .291 5.536 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .401 6.442 .000 
Deprivation  -.058 .014 -.321 -4.005 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.075 -1.182 .238 
Degree qualifications .117 .012 .588 9.400 .000 
Population density 5.880E-5 .000 .089 1.098 .273 
Region ref = London      
South East region .354 .279 .095 1.269 .205 
South West region .551 .319 .115 1.726 .085 
North East region .009 .363 .001 .024 .981 
North West region .168 .302 .036 .556 .578 
West Midlands region .175 .304 .034 .575 .566 
East Midlands region .134 .314 .029 .428 .669 
Yorks and Humber region .304 .334 .050 .908 .364 
East region .474 .294 .110 1.616 .107 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.288 .204 -.062 -1.410 .160 
Other urban area .032 .187 .008 .170 .865 
Significant rural area .722 .203 .179 3.565 .000 
Rural 50 area 1.246 .217 .290 5.732 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.362 .222 .583 10.619 .000 
2 (Constant) -2.464 1.019  -2.418 .016 
LLI  .083 .020 .251 4.121 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .408 6.541 .000 
Deprivation  -.051 .015 -.285 -3.363 .001 
Income  -.002 .001 -.091 -1.403 .161 
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Degree qualifications .120 .013 .604 9.472 .000 
Population density 5.374E-5 .000 .081 1.001 .317 
South East region .232 .294 .062 .788 .432 
South West region .401 .339 .083 1.180 .239 
North East region -.206 .399 -.026 -.516 .606 
North West region -.003 .330 -.001 -.008 .993 
West Midlands region .052 .319 .010 .164 .870 
East Midlands region .006 .330 .001 .017 .986 
Yorks and Humber region .137 .359 .022 .382 .703 
East region .372 .304 .086 1.222 .223 
Large urban area -.341 .208 -.073 -1.636 .103 
Other urban area -.038 .195 -.009 -.193 .847 
Significant rural area .638 .213 .158 2.999 .003 
Rural 50 area 1.152 .229 .268 5.025 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.262 .236 .558 9.598 .000 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY -.007 .006 -.091 -1.280 .202 
 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .848a .720 .702 .827 
2 .849b .720 .702 .828 
 
ANOVA 
Model Sum of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 532.057 19 28.003 40.954 .000b 
Residual 207.180 303 .684   
Total 739.237 322    
2 Regression 532.330 20 26.617 38.849 .000c 
Residual 206.907 302 .685   
Total 739.237 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3.076 .932  -3.299 .001 
LLI  .097 .017 .293 5.563 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .399 6.390 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.889 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.070 -1.094 .275 
Degree qualifications .116 .012 .587 9.360 .000 
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Population density 5.577E-5 .000 .084 1.039 .300 
Region ref = London      
South East region .368 .279 .099 1.316 .189 
South West region .566 .320 .118 1.771 .078 
North East region .003 .364 .000 .008 .994 
North West region .125 .302 .027 .415 .679 
West Midlands region .184 .305 .035 .601 .548 
East Midlands region .147 .315 .032 .467 .641 
Yorks and Humber region .307 .335 .050 .914 .361 
East region .484 .294 .112 1.645 .101 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.297 .205 -.064 -1.451 .148 
Other urban area .022 .188 .006 .117 .907 
Significant rural area .712 .203 .177 3.509 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.203 .216 .283 5.555 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.353 .223 .580 10.548 .000 
2 (Constant) -2.834 1.009  -2.810 .005 
LLI  .092 .019 .279 4.848 .000 
Crime rate  .024 .004 .411 6.296 .000 
Deprivation  -.054 .015 -.303 -3.715 .000 
Income  -.002 .001 -.080 -1.216 .225 
Degree qualifications .119 .013 .602 8.997 .000 
Population density 5.852E-5 .000 .088 1.085 .279 
South East region .282 .310 .076 .909 .364 
South West region .460 .362 .096 1.272 .204 
North East region -.134 .424 -.017 -.317 .752 
North West region -.001 .363 .000 -.004 .997 
West Midlands region .072 .353 .014 .205 .838 
East Midlands region .046 .354 .010 .130 .896 
Yorks and Humber region .186 .386 .030 .482 .630 
East region .405 .320 .094 1.268 .206 
Large urban area -.318 .208 -.068 -1.531 .127 
Other urban area .004 .190 .001 .022 .983 
Significant rural area .692 .206 .172 3.364 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.181 .219 .278 5.381 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.335 .225 .576 10.376 .000 
IMMIGRATION -.008 .012 -.054 -.632 .528 
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BLACK IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .848a .720 .702 .827 
2 .849b .721 .702 .827 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 532.057 19 28.003 40.954 .000b 
Residual 207.180 303 .684   
Total 739.237 322    
2 Regression 532.932 20 26.647 39.007 .000c 
Residual 206.305 302 .683   
Total 739.237 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3.076 .932  -3.299 .001 
LLI  .097 .017 .293 5.563 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .399 6.390 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.889 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.070 -1.094 .275 
Degree qualifications .116 .012 .587 9.360 .000 
Population density 5.577E-5 .000 .084 1.039 .300 
Region ref = London      
South East region .368 .279 .099 1.316 .189 
South West region .566 .320 .118 1.771 .078 
North East region .003 .364 .000 .008 .994 
North West region .125 .302 .027 .415 .679 
West Midlands region .184 .305 .035 .601 .548 
East Midlands region .147 .315 .032 .467 .641 
Yorks and Humber region .307 .335 .050 .914 .361 
East region .484 .294 .112 1.645 .101 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.297 .205 -.064 -1.451 .148 
Other urban area .022 .188 .006 .117 .907 
Significant rural area .712 .203 .177 3.509 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.203 .216 .283 5.555 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.353 .223 .580 10.548 .000 
2 (Constant) -2.630 1.012  -2.599 .010 
LLI  .088 .019 .266 4.611 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .409 6.488 .000 
Deprivation  -.053 .015 -.293 -3.571 .000 
Income  -.002 .001 -.086 -1.313 .190 
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Degree qualifications .119 .013 .601 9.406 .000 
Population density 5.180E-5 .000 .078 .963 .336 
South East region .237 .302 .064 .786 .433 
South West region .409 .349 .085 1.173 .242 
North East region -.194 .403 -.024 -.482 .630 
North West region -.057 .342 -.012 -.166 .868 
West Midlands region .026 .335 .005 .079 .937 
East Midlands region -.005 .343 -.001 -.015 .988 
Yorks and Humber region .128 .371 .021 .344 .731 
East region .352 .316 .081 1.114 .266 
Large urban area -.326 .206 -.070 -1.580 .115 
Other urban area -.018 .191 -.005 -.095 .924 
Significant rural area .663 .208 .165 3.193 .002 
Rural 50 area 1.150 .221 .270 5.193 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.299 .228 .567 10.085 .000 
BLACK IMMIGRATION -.017 .015 -.072 -1.132 .258 
 
 
WHITE IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .848a .720 .702 .827 
2 .849b .720 .702 .827 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 532.057 19 28.003 40.954 .000b 
Residual 207.180 303 .684   
Total 739.237 322    
2 Regression 532.308 20 26.615 38.843 .000c 
Residual 206.929 302 .685   
Total 739.237 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3.076 .932  -3.299 .001 
LLI  .097 .017 .293 5.563 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .399 6.390 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.889 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.070 -1.094 .275 
Degree qualifications .116 .012 .587 9.360 .000 
Population density 5.577E-5 .000 .084 1.039 .300 
Region ref = London      
South East region .368 .279 .099 1.316 .189 
South West region .566 .320 .118 1.771 .078 
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North East region .003 .364 .000 .008 .994 
North West region .125 .302 .027 .415 .679 
West Midlands region .184 .305 .035 .601 .548 
East Midlands region .147 .315 .032 .467 .641 
Yorks and Humber region .307 .335 .050 .914 .361 
East region .484 .294 .112 1.645 .101 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.297 .205 -.064 -1.451 .148 
Other urban area .022 .188 .006 .117 .907 
Significant rural area .712 .203 .177 3.509 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.203 .216 .283 5.555 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.353 .223 .580 10.548 .000 
2 (Constant) -3.166 .945  -3.349 .001 
LLI  .099 .018 .297 5.588 .000 
Crime rate  .022 .004 .386 5.847 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.885 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.064 -.983 .327 
Degree qualifications .114 .013 .575 8.741 .000 
Population density 4.971E-5 .000 .075 .909 .364 
South East region .410 .288 .110 1.422 .156 
South West region .624 .334 .130 1.868 .063 
North East region .083 .388 .010 .213 .831 
North West region .198 .325 .043 .609 .543 
West Midlands region .249 .324 .048 .768 .443 
East Midlands region .199 .327 .043 .609 .543 
Yorks and Humber region .372 .353 .061 1.055 .292 
East region .513 .298 .118 1.719 .087 
Large urban area -.284 .206 -.061 -1.378 .169 
Other urban area .022 .188 .005 .116 .908 
Significant rural area .710 .203 .176 3.492 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.200 .217 .282 5.537 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.342 .224 .578 10.460 .000 
WHITE IMMIGRATION .015 .025 .039 .605 .546 
 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .848a .720 .702 .827 
2 .851b .725 .706 .821  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 532.057 19 28.003 40.954 .000b 
Residual 207.180 303 .684   
Total 739.237 322    
2 Regression 535.667 20 26.783 39.734 .000c 
Residual 203.570 302 .674   
Total 739.237 322    
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Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3.076 .932  -3.299 .001 
LLI  .097 .017 .293 5.563 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .399 6.390 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.889 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.070 -1.094 .275 
Degree qualifications .116 .012 .587 9.360 .000 
Population density 5.577E-5 .000 .084 1.039 .300 
Region ref = London      
South East region .368 .279 .099 1.316 .189 
South West region .566 .320 .118 1.771 .078 
North East region .003 .364 .000 .008 .994 
North West region .125 .302 .027 .415 .679 
West Midlands region .184 .305 .035 .601 .548 
East Midlands region .147 .315 .032 .467 .641 
Yorks and Humber region .307 .335 .050 .914 .361 
East region .484 .294 .112 1.645 .101 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.297 .205 -.064 -1.451 .148 
Other urban area .022 .188 .006 .117 .907 
Significant rural area .712 .203 .177 3.509 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.203 .216 .283 5.555 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.353 .223 .580 10.548 .000 
2 (Constant) -3.486 .943  -3.698 .000 
LLI  .098 .017 .295 5.648 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .395 6.365 .000 
Deprivation  -.052 .014 -.291 -3.626 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.074 -1.166 .245 
Degree qualifications .122 .013 .616 9.698 .000 
Population density 5.726E-5 .000 .087 1.074 .284 
South East region .250 .282 .067 .886 .376 
South West region .485 .319 .101 1.519 .130 
North East region -.123 .365 -.015 -.336 .737 
North West region .119 .300 .026 .398 .691 
West Midlands region .155 .303 .030 .511 .610 
East Midlands region .127 .313 .027 .406 .685 
Yorks and Humber region .158 .339 .026 .467 .641 
East region .395 .295 .091 1.339 .182 
Large urban area -.305 .204 -.066 -1.500 .135 
Other urban area .014 .186 .004 .076 .940 
Significant rural area .721 .202 .179 3.574 .000 
Rural 50 area 1.246 .216 .293 5.776 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.391 .222 .590 10.766 .000 
ED RATE OF INCREASE .005 .002 .084 2.314 .021 
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IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .848a .720 .702 .827 
2 .848b .720 .701 .828  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 532.057 19 28.003 40.954 .000b 
Residual 207.180 303 .684   
Total 739.237 322    
2 Regression 532.093 20 26.605 38.787 .000c 
Residual 207.144 302 .686   
Total 739.237 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -3.076 .932  -3.299 .001 
LLI  .097 .017 .293 5.563 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .399 6.390 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.889 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.070 -1.094 .275 
Degree qualifications .116 .012 .587 9.360 .000 
Population density 5.577E-5 .000 .084 1.039 .300 
South East region .368 .279 .099 1.316 .189 
South West region .566 .320 .118 1.771 .078 
North East region .003 .364 .000 .008 .994 
North West region .125 .302 .027 .415 .679 
West Midlands region .184 .305 .035 .601 .548 
East Midlands region .147 .315 .032 .467 .641 
Yorks and Humber region .307 .335 .050 .914 .361 
East region .484 .294 .112 1.645 .101 
Large urban area -.297 .205 -.064 -1.451 .148 
Other urban area .022 .188 .006 .117 .907 
Significant rural area .712 .203 .177 3.509 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.203 .216 .283 5.555 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.353 .223 .580 10.548 .000 
2 (Constant) -3.133 .967  -3.241 .001 
LLI  .098 .018 .295 5.522 .000 
Crime rate  .023 .004 .396 6.179 .000 
Deprivation  -.056 .014 -.312 -3.881 .000 
Income  -.001 .001 -.069 -1.067 .287 
Degree qualifications .117 .013 .591 9.133 .000 
Population density 5.688E-5 .000 .086 1.053 .293 
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South East region .369 .280 .100 1.320 .188 
South West region .569 .321 .118 1.775 .077 
North East region .005 .365 .001 .013 .989 
North West region .130 .303 .028 .427 .669 
West Midlands region .187 .306 .036 .612 .541 
East Midlands region .146 .316 .031 .463 .644 
Yorks and Humber region .304 .336 .050 .904 .366 
East region .484 .295 .112 1.643 .101 
Large urban area -.296 .205 -.064 -1.440 .151 
Other urban area .023 .188 .006 .121 .904 
Significant rural area .712 .203 .177 3.503 .001 
Rural 50 area 1.205 .217 .283 5.551 .000 
Rural 80 area 2.355 .224 .581 10.530 .000 
IMM RATE OF INCREASE .000 .002 .008 .228 .820 
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NEW BUSINESS FORMATION 2001 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .710a .504 .472 1.620 
2 .711b .505 .471 1.621  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 784.198 19 41.274 15.736 .000b 
Residual 771.136 294 2.623   
Total 1555.333 313    
2 Regression 785.336 20 39.267 14.942 .000c 
Residual 769.998 293 2.628   
Total 1555.333 313    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -2.036 1.797  -1.133 .258 
LLI  .246 .109 .279 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .612 8.632 .000 
Deprivation  -.112 .025 -.582 -4.514 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .149 1.833 .068 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .257 3.112 .002 
Population density 1.183E-5 .000 .011 .105 .916 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.106 .557 -.020 -.190 .850 
South West region -.380 .641 -.052 -.592 .554 
North East region -1.516 .782 -.120 -1.937 .054 
North West region -.442 .619 -.064 -.714 .476 
West Midlands region -.540 .611 -.070 -.883 .378 
East Midlands region -1.204 .640 -.178 -1.880 .061 
Yorks and Humber region -1.282 .693 -.144 -1.851 .065 
East region -.382 .589 -.060 -.649 .517 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.209 .396 -.031 -.528 .598 
Other urban area -.436 .365 -.076 -1.195 .233 
Significant rural area .676 .397 .115 1.704 .089 
Rural 50 area .994 .436 .152 2.279 .023 
Rural 80 area 1.681 .437 .281 3.842 .000 
2 (constant) -2.746 2.098  -1.309 .192 
LLI  .292 .130 .331 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .611 8.608 .000 
Deprivation  -.123 .030 -.638 -4.136 .000 
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Income  .006 .003 .163 1.938 .054 
Degree qualifications .073 .026 .243 2.846 .005 
Population density 1.197E-5 .000 .012 .106 .915 
South East region .069 .617 .013 .112 .911 
South West region -.174 .714 -.024 -.244 .808 
North East region -1.268 .869 -.100 -1.459 .146 
North West region -.272 .671 -.039 -.406 .685 
West Midlands region -.389 .653 -.051 -.596 .552 
East Midlands region -1.050 .682 -.156 -1.538 .125 
Yorks and Humber region -1.074 .762 -.121 -1.410 .160 
East region -.220 .640 -.035 -.343 .732 
Large urban area -.172 .400 -.026 -.431 .667 
Other urban area -.391 .372 -.068 -1.052 .294 
Significant rural area .737 .408 .125 1.808 .072 
Rural 50 area 1.070 .452 .164 2.369 .018 
Rural 80 area 1.774 .460 .296 3.854 .000 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY .009 .014 .064 .658 .511 
 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .710a .504 .472 1.620 
2 .727b .529 .496 1.582 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 784.198 19 41.274 15.736 .000b 
Residual 771.136 294 2.623   
Total 1555.333 313    
2 Regression 822.212 20 41.111 16.430 .000c 
Residual 733.121 293 2.502   
Total 1555.333 313    
 
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -2.036 1.797  -1.133 .258 
LLI  .246 .109 .279 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .612 8.632 .000 
Deprivation  -.112 .025 -.582 -4.514 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .149 1.833 .068 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .257 3.112 .002 
Population density 1.183E-5 .000 .011 .105 .916 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.106 .557 -.020 -.190 .850 
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South West region -.380 .641 -.052 -.592 .554 
North East region -1.516 .782 -.120 -1.937 .054 
North West region -.442 .619 -.064 -.714 .476 
West Midlands region -.540 .611 -.070 -.883 .378 
East Midlands region -1.204 .640 -.178 -1.880 .061 
Yorks and Humber region -1.282 .693 -.144 -1.851 .065 
East region -.382 .589 -.060 -.649 .517 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.209 .396 -.031 -.528 .598 
Other urban area -.436 .365 -.076 -1.195 .233 
Significant rural area .676 .397 .115 1.704 .089 
Rural 50 area .994 .436 .152 2.279 .023 
Rural 80 area 1.681 .437 .281 3.842 .000 
2 (constant) -4.963 1.909  -2.599 .010 
LLI  .396 .114 .449 3.490 .001 
Crime rate  .029 .003 .580 8.313 .000 
Deprivation  -.145 .026 -.754 -5.651 .000 
Income  .008 .003 .233 2.840 .005 
Degree qualifications .024 .028 .080 .865 .388 
Population density -6.268E-5 .000 -.060 -.561 .575 
South East region .885 .600 .164 1.474 .141 
South West region .914 .709 .126 1.289 .198 
North East region .040 .862 .003 .047 .963 
North West region .855 .690 .124 1.239 .216 
West Midlands region .692 .675 .090 1.025 .306 
East Midlands region -.049 .692 -.007 -.071 .944 
Yorks and Humber region .119 .766 .013 .155 .877 
East region .589 .627 .093 .939 .348 
Large urban area -.032 .389 -.005 -.082 .935 
Other urban area -.310 .358 -.054 -.865 .388 
Significant rural area .824 .389 .140 2.118 .035 
Rural 50 area 1.188 .429 .182 2.770 .006 
Rural 80 area 1.882 .430 .314 4.373 .000 
IMMIGRATION .119 .031 .432 3.898 .000 
 
BLACK IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .710a .504 .472 1.620 
2 .715b .511 .477 1.611 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 784.198 19 41.274 15.736 .000b 
Residual 771.136 294 2.623   
Total 1555.333 313    
2 Regression 794.552 20 39.728 15.300 .000c 
Residual 760.781 293 2.597   
Total 1555.333 313    
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -2.036 1.797  -1.133 .258 
LLI  .246 .109 .279 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .612 8.632 .000 
Deprivation  -.112 .025 -.582 -4.514 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .149 1.833 .068 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .257 3.112 .002 
Population density 1.183E-5 .000 .011 .105 .916 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.106 .557 -.020 -.190 .850 
South West region -.380 .641 -.052 -.592 .554 
North East region -1.516 .782 -.120 -1.937 .054 
North West region -.442 .619 -.064 -.714 .476 
West Midlands region -.540 .611 -.070 -.883 .378 
East Midlands region -1.204 .640 -.178 -1.880 .061 
Yorks and Humber region -1.282 .693 -.144 -1.851 .065 
East region -.382 .589 -.060 -.649 .517 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.209 .396 -.031 -.528 .598 
Other urban area -.436 .365 -.076 -1.195 .233 
Significant rural area .676 .397 .115 1.704 .089 
Rural 50 area .994 .436 .152 2.279 .023 
Rural 80 area 1.681 .437 .281 3.842 .000 
2 (constant) -3.963 2.032  -1.950 .052 
LLI  .359 .123 .407 2.925 .004 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .615 8.716 .000 
Deprivation  -.139 .028 -.724 -4.937 .000 
Income  .007 .003 .192 2.296 .022 
Degree qualifications .061 .026 .203 2.358 .019 
Population density 5.529E-6 .000 .005 .049 .961 
South East region .491 .629 .091 .781 .436 
South West region .326 .729 .045 .447 .656 
North East region -.700 .879 -.055 -.796 .427 
North West region .243 .705 .035 .344 .731 
West Midlands region .101 .687 .013 .147 .883 
East Midlands region -.597 .706 -.089 -.846 .398 
Yorks and Humber region -.533 .784 -.060 -.680 .497 
East region .232 .662 .037 .350 .726 
Large urban area -.156 .394 -.023 -.396 .693 
Other urban area -.366 .365 -.063 -1.002 .317 
Significant rural area .765 .397 .130 1.926 .055 
Rural 50 area 1.113 .438 .170 2.540 .012 
Rural 80 area 1.838 .442 .307 4.155 .000 
BLACK IMMIGRATION .075 .037 .190 1.997 .047 
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WHITE IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .710a .504 .472 1.620 
2 .722b .521 .488 1.594 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 784.198 19 41.274 15.736 .000b 
Residual 771.136 294 2.623   
Total 1555.333 313    
2 Regression 810.478 20 40.524 15.941 .000c 
Residual 744.856 293 2.542   
Total 1555.333 313    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (constant) -2.036 1.797  -1.133 .258 
LLI  .246 .109 .279 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .612 8.632 .000 
Deprivation  -.112 .025 -.582 -4.514 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .149 1.833 .068 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .257 3.112 .002 
Population density 1.183E-5 .000 .011 .105 .916 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.106 .557 -.020 -.190 .850 
South West region -.380 .641 -.052 -.592 .554 
North East region -1.516 .782 -.120 -1.937 .054 
North West region -.442 .619 -.064 -.714 .476 
West Midlands region -.540 .611 -.070 -.883 .378 
East Midlands region -1.204 .640 -.178 -1.880 .061 
Yorks and Humber region -1.282 .693 -.144 -1.851 .065 
East region -.382 .589 -.060 -.649 .517 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.209 .396 -.031 -.528 .598 
Other urban area -.436 .365 -.076 -1.195 .233 
Significant rural area .676 .397 .115 1.704 .089 
Rural 50 area .994 .436 .152 2.279 .023 
Rural 80 area 1.681 .437 .281 3.842 .000 
2 (constant) -2.709 1.782  -1.520 .130 
LLI  .258 .108 .292 2.391 .017 
Crime rate  .028 .004 .568 7.973 .000 
Deprivation  -.109 .024 -.567 -4.464 .000 
Income  .007 .003 .195 2.410 .017 
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Degree qualifications .036 .028 .118 1.289 .198 
Population density .000 .000 -.100 -.895 .371 
South East region .099 .552 .018 .179 .858 
South West region .047 .645 .006 .073 .942 
North East region -.923 .792 -.073 -1.166 .245 
North West region .026 .626 .004 .042 .967 
West Midlands region -.102 .617 -.013 -.166 .869 
East Midlands region -.806 .642 -.119 -1.255 .210 
Yorks and Humber region -.799 .698 -.090 -1.144 .254 
East region -.270 .581 -.043 -.465 .642 
Large urban area -.051 .393 -.008 -.130 .897 
Other urban area -.394 .360 -.068 -1.096 .274 
Significant rural area .677 .390 .115 1.735 .084 
Rural 50 area 1.007 .429 .154 2.344 .020 
Rural 80 area 1.628 .431 .272 3.778 .000 
WHITE IMMIGRATION .199 .062 .289 3.215 .001 
 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .710a .504 .472 1.620 
2 .713b .508 .474 1.616  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 784.198 19 41.274 15.736 .000b 
Residual 771.136 294 2.623   
Total 1555.333 313    
2 Regression 790.184 20 39.509 15.129 .000c 
Residual 765.150 293 2.611   
Total 1555.333 313    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standar
dized 
Coeffici
ents 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -2.036 1.797  -1.133 .258 
LLI  .246 .109 .279 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .612 8.632 .000 
Deprivation  -.112 .025 -.582 -4.514 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .149 1.833 .068 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .257 3.112 .002 
Population density 1.183E-5 .000 .011 .105 .916 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.106 .557 -.020 -.190 .850 
South West region -.380 .641 -.052 -.592 .554 
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North East region -1.516 .782 -.120 -1.937 .054 
North West region -.442 .619 -.064 -.714 .476 
West Midlands region -.540 .611 -.070 -.883 .378 
East Midlands region -1.204 .640 -.178 -1.880 .061 
Yorks and Humber region -1.282 .693 -.144 -1.851 .065 
East region -.382 .589 -.060 -.649 .517 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.209 .396 -.031 -.528 .598 
Other urban area -.436 .365 -.076 -1.195 .233 
Significant rural area .676 .397 .115 1.704 .089 
Rural 50 area .994 .436 .152 2.279 .023 
Rural 80 area 1.681 .437 .281 3.842 .000 
2 (constant) -1.779 1.801  -.987 .324 
LLI  .181 .117 .205 1.541 .124 
Crime rate  .032 .004 .630 8.782 .000 
Deprivation  -.100 .026 -.518 -3.825 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .135 1.665 .097 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .256 3.115 .002 
Population density 4.666E-6 .000 .004 .041 .967 
South East region -.162 .557 -.030 -.290 .772 
South West region -.572 .652 -.079 -.877 .381 
North East region -1.519 .781 -.120 -1.946 .053 
North West region -.497 .618 -.072 -.804 .422 
West Midlands region -.554 .610 -.072 -.909 .364 
East Midlands region -1.220 .639 -.181 -1.910 .057 
Yorks and Humber region -1.358 .693 -.152 -1.959 .051 
East region -.413 .588 -.065 -.703 .483 
Large urban area -.254 .396 -.038 -.641 .522 
Other urban area -.466 .365 -.081 -1.278 .202 
Significant rural area .616 .398 .105 1.550 .122 
Rural 50 area .835 .448 .128 1.866 .063 
Rural 80 area 1.463 .460 .244 3.184 .002 
ED RATE OF INCREASE .004 .002 .093 1.514 .131 
 
 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .710a .504 .472 1.620 
2 .713b .508 .474 1.616 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 784.198 19 41.274 15.736 .000b 
Residual 771.136 294 2.623   
Total 1555.333 313    
2 Regression 789.803 20 39.490 15.114 .000c 
Residual 765.531 293 2.613   
Total 1555.333 313    
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Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardi
zed 
Coefficien
ts 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -2.036 1.797  -1.133 .258 
LLI  .246 .109 .279 2.247 .025 
Crime rate  .031 .004 .612 8.632 .000 
Deprivation  -.112 .025 -.582 -4.514 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .149 1.833 .068 
Degree qualifications .077 .025 .257 3.112 .002 
Population density 1.183E-5 .000 .011 .105 .916 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.106 .557 -.020 -.190 .850 
South West region -.380 .641 -.052 -.592 .554 
North East region -1.516 .782 -.120 -1.937 .054 
North West region -.442 .619 -.064 -.714 .476 
West Midlands region -.540 .611 -.070 -.883 .378 
East Midlands region -1.204 .640 -.178 -1.880 .061 
Yorks and Humber region -1.282 .693 -.144 -1.851 .065 
East region -.382 .589 -.060 -.649 .517 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.209 .396 -.031 -.528 .598 
Other urban area -.436 .365 -.076 -1.195 .233 
Significant rural area .676 .397 .115 1.704 .089 
Rural 50 area .994 .436 .152 2.279 .023 
Rural 80 area 1.681 .437 .281 3.842 .000 
2 (constant) -1.667 1.811  -.920 .358 
LLI  .238 .109 .270 2.180 .030 
Crime rate  .030 .004 .607 8.567 .000 
Deprivation  -.109 .025 -.563 -4.356 .000 
Income  .005 .003 .145 1.787 .075 
Degree qualifications .082 .025 .273 3.289 .001 
Population density -8.882E-6 .000 -.009 -.078 .938 
South East region -.196 .559 -.036 -.351 .726 
South West region -.446 .642 -.061 -.695 .487 
North East region -1.444 .782 -.114 -1.845 .066 
North West region -.570 .624 -.083 -.914 .361 
West Midlands region -.669 .616 -.087 -1.086 .278 
East Midlands region -1.294 .642 -.192 -2.017 .045 
Yorks and Humber region -1.343 .692 -.151 -1.939 .053 
East region -.427 .589 -.067 -.724 .469 
Large urban area -.193 .395 -.029 -.490 .625 
Other urban area -.481 .366 -.083 -1.314 .190 
Significant rural area .598 .399 .101 1.497 .135 
Rural 50 area .905 .440 .138 2.058 .040 
Rural 80 area 1.556 .445 .260 3.497 .001 
IMM RATE OF INCREASE  -.012 .008 -.066 -1.465 .144 
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NEW BUSINESS FORMATION 2011 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .558 2.103 
2 .766b .587 .559 2.101 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1879.179 19 98.904 22.356 .000b 
Residual 1336.091 302 4.424   
Total 3215.270 321    
2 Regression 1886.220 20 94.311 21.359 .000c 
Residual 1329.051 301 4.415   
Total 3215.270 321    
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
1 (constant) -7.102 2.375  -2.991 .003 
LLI  .146 .044 .211 3.277 .001 
Crime rate  .069 .009 .578 7.590 .000 
Deprivation  -.161 .037 -.430 -4.384 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .377 4.835 .000 
Degree qualifications .057 .032 .138 1.800 .073 
Population density .000 .000 .104 1.052 .293 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.277 .711 -.036 -.389 .698 
South West region -.638 .814 -.064 -.783 .434 
North East region -.680 .926 -.041 -.735 .463 
North West region -.196 .771 -.020 -.254 .800 
West Midlands region -.371 .777 -.034 -.478 .633 
East Midlands region -.621 .802 -.064 -.775 .439 
Yorks and Humber region -.308 .853 -.024 -.361 .718 
East region -.378 .749 -.042 -.505 .614 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.820 .522 -.085 -1.572 .117 
Other urban area -.855 .478 -.103 -1.789 .075 
Significant rural area .303 .517 .036 .586 .558 
Rural 50 area .274 .555 .031 .493 .622 
Rural 80 area 1.087 .568 .128 1.915 .056 
2 (constant) -8.445 2.600  -3.248 .001 
LLI  .179 .052 .258 3.466 .001 
Crime rate  .068 .009 .569 7.443 .000 
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Deprivation  -.177 .039 -.473 -4.559 .000 
Income  .016 .003 .396 4.991 .000 
Degree qualifications .049 .032 .117 1.503 .134 
Population density .000 .000 .113 1.144 .254 
South East region .031 .751 .004 .041 .968 
South West region -.261 .866 -.026 -.301 .764 
North East region -.140 1.019 -.008 -.137 .891 
North West region .234 .842 .024 .278 .781 
West Midlands region -.062 .814 -.006 -.076 .939 
East Midlands region -.297 .841 -.031 -.354 .724 
Yorks and Humber region .112 .915 .009 .122 .903 
East region -.119 .776 -.013 -.154 .878 
Large urban area -.688 .531 -.071 -1.295 .196 
Other urban area -.681 .497 -.082 -1.370 .172 
Significant rural area .514 .543 .061 .948 .344 
Rural 50 area .510 .585 .057 .872 .384 
Rural 80 area 1.339 .601 .158 2.227 .027 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY .018 .015 .110 1.263 .208 
 
 
IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .558 2.101 
2 .769b .592 .565 2.084  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1879.798 19 98.937 22.421 .000b 
Residual 1337.013 303 4.413   
Total 3216.811 322    
2 Regression 1904.756 20 95.238 21.921 .000c 
Residual 1312.056 302 4.345   
Total 3216.811 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -7.048 2.369  -2.976 .003 
LLI  .145 .044 .210 3.271 .001 
Crime rate  .069 .009 .579 7.610 .000 
Deprivation  -.162 .037 -.433 -4.431 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .375 4.824 .000 
Degree qualifications .057 .032 .138 1.806 .072 
Population density .000 .000 .106 1.070 .286 
Region ref = London      
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South East region -.286 .710 -.037 -.403 .687 
South West region -.649 .813 -.065 -.798 .425 
North East region -.676 .925 -.041 -.731 .465 
North West region -.166 .767 -.017 -.217 .829 
West Midlands region -.377 .776 -.035 -.486 .627 
East Midlands region -.630 .801 -.065 -.787 .432 
Yorks and Humber region -.310 .852 -.024 -.364 .716 
East region -.385 .748 -.043 -.515 .607 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.814 .521 -.084 -1.563 .119 
Other urban area -.848 .477 -.102 -1.778 .076 
Significant rural area .309 .516 .037 .600 .549 
Rural 50 area .304 .550 .034 .552 .581 
Rural 80 area 1.093 .567 .129 1.929 .055 
2 (constant) -9.356 2.540  -3.684 .000 
LLI  .191 .048 .276 3.978 .000 
Crime rate  .063 .009 .524 6.658 .000 
Deprivation  -.178 .037 -.474 -4.815 .000 
Income  .017 .003 .423 5.305 .000 
Degree qualifications .030 .033 .071 .885 .377 
Population density .000 .000 .087 .881 .379 
South East region .528 .782 .068 .676 .500 
South West region .368 .911 .037 .404 .687 
North East region .633 1.068 .038 .593 .554 
North West region 1.043 .913 .108 1.143 .254 
West Midlands region .686 .888 .063 .772 .441 
East Midlands region .336 .891 .035 .377 .707 
Yorks and Humber region .841 .972 .066 .865 .388 
East region .367 .805 .041 .455 .649 
Large urban area -.616 .523 -.064 -1.177 .240 
Other urban area -.678 .479 -.082 -1.416 .158 
Significant rural area .503 .518 .060 .971 .332 
Rural 50 area .512 .553 .058 .926 .355 
Rural 80 area 1.263 .567 .149 2.228 .027 
IMMIGRATION .075 .031 .246 2.397 .017 
 
BLACK IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .558 2.101 
2 .767b .589 .561 2.094 
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1879.798 19 98.937 22.421 .000b 
Residual 1337.013 303 4.413   
Total 3216.811 322    
2 Regression 1893.207 20 94.660 21.598 .000c 
Residual 1323.604 302 4.383   
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Total 3216.811 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -7.048 2.369  -2.976 .003 
LLI  .145 .044 .210 3.271 .001 
Crime rate  .069 .009 .579 7.610 .000 
Deprivation  -.162 .037 -.433 -4.431 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .375 4.824 .000 
Degree qualifications .057 .032 .138 1.806 .072 
Population density .000 .000 .106 1.070 .286 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.286 .710 -.037 -.403 .687 
South West region -.649 .813 -.065 -.798 .425 
North East region -.676 .925 -.041 -.731 .465 
North West region -.166 .767 -.017 -.217 .829 
West Midlands region -.377 .776 -.035 -.486 .627 
East Midlands region -.630 .801 -.065 -.787 .432 
Yorks and Humber region -.310 .852 -.024 -.364 .716 
East region -.385 .748 -.043 -.515 .607 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.814 .521 -.084 -1.563 .119 
Other urban area -.848 .477 -.102 -1.778 .076 
Significant rural area .309 .516 .037 .600 .549 
Rural 50 area .304 .550 .034 .552 .581 
Rural 80 area 1.093 .567 .129 1.929 .055 
2 (constant) -8.792 2.563  -3.431 .001 
LLI  .180 .048 .260 3.711 .000 
Crime rate  .067 .009 .560 7.318 .000 
Deprivation  -.176 .037 -.469 -4.712 .000 
Income  .016 .003 .405 5.103 .000 
Degree qualifications .046 .032 .112 1.439 .151 
Population density .000 .000 .117 1.185 .237 
South East region .224 .765 .029 .293 .770 
South West region -.032 .883 -.003 -.036 .971 
North East region .095 1.022 .006 .093 .926 
North West region .547 .866 .056 .631 .529 
West Midlands region .238 .849 .022 .280 .780 
East Midlands region -.034 .868 -.003 -.039 .969 
Yorks and Humber region .391 .939 .031 .416 .677 
East region .131 .801 .014 .163 .871 
Large urban area -.701 .523 -.072 -1.340 .181 
Other urban area -.691 .484 -.084 -1.429 .154 
Significant rural area .503 .526 .060 .957 .339 
Rural 50 area .511 .561 .058 .911 .363 
Rural 80 area 1.304 .577 .154 2.258 .025 
BLACK IMMIGRATION .065 .037 .135 1.749 .081 
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WHITE IMMIGRATION 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .558 2.101 
2 .767b .588 .560 2.095  
 
 
ANOVAa 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1879.798 19 98.937 22.421 .000b 
Residual 1337.013 303 4.413   
Total 3216.811 322    
2 Regression 1890.801 20 94.540 21.532 .000c 
Residual 1326.010 302 4.391   
Total 3216.811 322    
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -7.048 2.369  -2.976 .003 
LLI  .145 .044 .210 3.271 .001 
Crime rate  .069 .009 .579 7.610 .000 
Deprivation  -.162 .037 -.433 -4.431 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .375 4.824 .000 
Degree qualifications .057 .032 .138 1.806 .072 
Population density .000 .000 .106 1.070 .286 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.286 .710 -.037 -.403 .687 
South West region -.649 .813 -.065 -.798 .425 
North East region -.676 .925 -.041 -.731 .465 
North West region -.166 .767 -.017 -.217 .829 
West Midlands region -.377 .776 -.035 -.486 .627 
East Midlands region -.630 .801 -.065 -.787 .432 
Yorks and Humber region -.310 .852 -.024 -.364 .716 
East region -.385 .748 -.043 -.515 .607 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.814 .521 -.084 -1.563 .119 
Other urban area -.848 .477 -.102 -1.778 .076 
Significant rural area .309 .516 .037 .600 .549 
Rural 50 area .304 .550 .034 .552 .581 
Rural 80 area 1.093 .567 .129 1.929 .055 
2 (constant) -7.646 2.393  -3.196 .002 
LLI  .155 .045 .224 3.466 .001 
Crime rate  .064 .010 .538 6.711 .000 
Deprivation  -.162 .037 -.433 -4.442 .000 
Income  .016 .003 .395 5.026 .000 
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Degree qualifications .041 .033 .100 1.254 .211 
Population density .000 .000 .077 .764 .445 
South East region -.006 .730 -.001 -.008 .993 
South West region -.271 .845 -.027 -.320 .749 
North East region -.147 .981 -.009 -.149 .881 
North West region .317 .824 .033 .384 .701 
West Midlands region .056 .821 .005 .068 .946 
East Midlands region -.287 .827 -.030 -.347 .729 
Yorks and Humber region .123 .893 .010 .138 .891 
East region -.194 .755 -.022 -.257 .797 
Large urban area -.728 .522 -.075 -1.394 .164 
Other urban area -.849 .476 -.103 -1.785 .075 
Significant rural area .292 .515 .035 .567 .571 
Rural 50 area .288 .549 .032 .525 .600 
Rural 80 area 1.025 .567 .121 1.809 .072 
WHITE IMMIGRATION .100 .063 .125 1.583 .114 
 
 
ETHNIC DIVERSITY RATE OF INCREASE  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted 
R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .558 2.101 
2 .766b .586 .559 2.100  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1879.798 19 98.937 22.421 .000b 
Residual 1337.013 303 4.413   
Total 3216.811 322    
2 Regression 1885.632 20 94.282 21.389 .000c 
Residual 1331.179 302 4.408   
Total 3216.811 322    
 
Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -7.048 2.369  -2.976 .003 
LLI  .145 .044 .210 3.271 .001 
Crime rate  .069 .009 .579 7.610 .000 
Deprivation  -.162 .037 -.433 -4.431 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .375 4.824 .000 
Degree qualifications .057 .032 .138 1.806 .072 
Population density .000 .000 .106 1.070 .286 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.286 .710 -.037 -.403 .687 
South West region -.649 .813 -.065 -.798 .425 
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North East region -.676 .925 -.041 -.731 .465 
North West region -.166 .767 -.017 -.217 .829 
West Midlands region -.377 .776 -.035 -.486 .627 
East Midlands region -.630 .801 -.065 -.787 .432 
Yorks and Humber region -.310 .852 -.024 -.364 .716 
East region -.385 .748 -.043 -.515 .607 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.814 .521 -.084 -1.563 .119 
Other urban area -.848 .477 -.102 -1.778 .076 
Significant rural area .309 .516 .037 .600 .549 
Rural 50 area .304 .550 .034 .552 .581 
Rural 80 area 1.093 .567 .129 1.929 .055 
2 (constant) -6.527 2.410  -2.708 .007 
LLI  .144 .044 .208 3.249 .001 
Crime rate  .070 .009 .581 7.645 .000 
Deprivation  -.167 .037 -.446 -4.536 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .378 4.856 .000 
Degree qualifications .050 .032 .120 1.547 .123 
Population density .000 .000 .104 1.056 .292 
South East region -.136 .721 -.018 -.189 .850 
South West region -.546 .817 -.054 -.668 .505 
North East region -.517 .934 -.031 -.553 .581 
North West region -.159 .767 -.016 -.207 .836 
West Midlands region -.341 .776 -.031 -.440 .661 
East Midlands region -.605 .800 -.062 -.755 .451 
Yorks and Humber region -.121 .867 -.009 -.140 .889 
East region -.271 .754 -.030 -.360 .719 
Large urban area -.804 .520 -.083 -1.544 .124 
Other urban area -.838 .477 -.101 -1.758 .080 
Significant rural area .299 .516 .036 .580 .562 
Rural 50 area .248 .552 .028 .450 .653 
Rural 80 area 1.045 .568 .124 1.840 .067 
ED RATE OF INCREASE   -.006 .005 -.051 -1.150 .251 
 
 
IMMIGRATION RATE OF INCREASE 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 .764a .584 .558 2.101 
2 .768b .591 .563 2.088  
 
ANOVA 
Model 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1879.798 19 98.937 22.421 .000b 
Residual 1337.013 303 4.413   
Total 3216.811 322    
2 Regression 1899.820 20 94.991 21.782 .000c 
Residual 1316.992 302 4.361   
Total 3216.811 322    
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Coefficients 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standa
rdized 
Coeffic
ients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (constant) -7.048 2.369  -2.976 .003 
LLI  .145 .044 .210 3.271 .001 
Crime rate  .069 .009 .579 7.610 .000 
Deprivation  -.162 .037 -.433 -4.431 .000 
Income  .015 .003 .375 4.824 .000 
Degree qualifications .057 .032 .138 1.806 .072 
Population density .000 .000 .106 1.070 .286 
Region ref = London      
South East region -.286 .710 -.037 -.403 .687 
South West region -.649 .813 -.065 -.798 .425 
North East region -.676 .925 -.041 -.731 .465 
North West region -.166 .767 -.017 -.217 .829 
West Midlands region -.377 .776 -.035 -.486 .627 
East Midlands region -.630 .801 -.065 -.787 .432 
Yorks and Humber region -.310 .852 -.024 -.364 .716 
East region -.385 .748 -.043 -.515 .607 
Area ref = major urban      
Large urban area -.814 .521 -.084 -1.563 .119 
Other urban area -.848 .477 -.102 -1.778 .076 
Significant rural area .309 .516 .037 .600 .549 
Rural 50 area .304 .550 .034 .552 .581 
Rural 80 area 1.093 .567 .129 1.929 .055 
2 (constant) -5.700 2.437  -2.339 .020 
LLI  .130 .045 .188 2.913 .004 
Crime rate  .074 .009 .615 7.938 .000 
Deprivation  -.163 .036 -.434 -4.469 .000 
Income  .014 .003 .360 4.631 .000 
Degree qualifications .041 .032 .098 1.257 .210 
Population density .000 .000 .087 .879 .380 
South East region -.329 .706 -.042 -.466 .642 
South West region -.705 .808 -.070 -.873 .383 
North East region -.727 .919 -.044 -.790 .430 
North West region -.267 .764 -.028 -.350 .727 
West Midlands region -.467 .772 -.043 -.604 .546 
East Midlands region -.607 .796 -.063 -.762 .447 
Yorks and Humber region -.248 .847 -.019 -.293 .770 
East region -.392 .743 -.043 -.527 .599 
Large urban area -.849 .518 -.088 -1.639 .102 
Other urban area -.865 .474 -.104 -1.824 .069 
Significant rural area .313 .513 .037 .610 .543 
Rural 50 area .256 .547 .029 .469 .640 
Rural 80 area 1.034 .564 .122 1.833 .068 
IMM RATE OF INCREASE  -.009 .004 -.096 -2.143 .033 
 
